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  • PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00973 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that BOE would prevail on claim 4 over Reiner.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “We secondly conclude Petitioner’s stipulation is commensurate in scope with a Sotera stipulation. See Sotera, Paper 12, at 13–14, 18–19; Guidance Memo, at 3. The Guidance Memo states: Consistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB. Guidance Memo, 3, 7–8. Thus, applying that guidance here, we do not deny institution in view of the Co-Pending Litigation.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We conclude the preliminary record supports, sufficiently to justify institution, Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to configure Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 to include the ESD protection network structure illustrated in Figure 5. First, we agree with Petitioner’s position that Reiner discloses both of its display drivers 61 and 63 would benefit from ESD protection. That is, Reiner describes display drivers 61 and 63 as “typical example[s]” of integrated circuit devices that can benefit from utilizing Reiner’s bump bridge technology for providing ESD protection, due to the large number of parallel output lines that must cross power supply lines. See Ex. 1005, 4:15–16, 9:11–20 (describing Fig. 4), 12:4–5. Thus, based on this preliminary record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s position that Petitioner mischaracterizes Reiner’s teachings in this regard. Second, based on the preliminary record, Dr. Murphy’s testimony that the ESD protection network structure of Reiner’s Figure 5 would be suitable for implementing in Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 due to similarities between the two drivers is supported by the evidence sufficiently to justify institution. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105, 111–120. A first similarity is Reiner’s indication that both display drivers 61 and 63 “have areas where the output or input metal lines have to cross power supply lines” Vdd and Vss. Ex. 1005, 9:11–20, 12:4–5, Fig. 3 (illustrating exemplary integrated circuit device 30 powered by supply voltages Vdd and Vss). A second similarity is Dr. Murphy’s testimony that, at least in some embodiments of Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63, “each of the [scan] lines being driven will have its own semiconductor units . . . [that] drive that particular line,” akin to the individual output devices 70 and source lines 67 of Figure 5. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113, 117; see also Prelim. Resp. 21–22 (arguing “Reiner [discloses] that the gate driver integrated circuit comprises individual gate drivers” and “a POSITA would understand that individual gate/scan line drivers are coupled to one another”). These similarities between Reiner’s display drivers 61 and 63 support Dr. Murphy’s conclusion that Reiner’s bump bridge technology for providing ESD protection could and would have been implemented in Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 in the same fashion as illustrated in Figure 5 for Reiner’s source/data driver module 61. We appreciate, as Dr. Schubert testifies, that the individual circuits in gate/scanning driver 63 will drive their respective gate/scan lines 68 in different ways than the individual output devices 70 in source/data driver module 61 will drive their respective source/data lines 67. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 55–59. Nonetheless, based on the present record, we conclude such differences in the signal outputs of Reiner’s display drivers 61 and 63 have little to do with the benefits of configuring the power inputs of the display drivers to protect the individual circuits from electrostatic discharge events, or how to do so.” slip op. at 35

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “We conclude the preliminary record supports, sufficiently to justify institution, Petitioner’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to configure Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 to include the ESD protection network structure illustrated in Figure 5. First, we agree with Petitioner’s position that Reiner discloses both of its display drivers 61 and 63 would benefit from ESD protection. That is, Reiner describes display drivers 61 and 63 as “typical example[s]” of integrated circuit devices that can benefit from utilizing Reiner’s bump bridge technology for providing ESD protection, due to the large number of parallel output lines that must cross power supply lines. See Ex. 1005, 4:15–16, 9:11–20 (describing Fig. 4), 12:4–5. Thus, based on this preliminary record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s position that Petitioner mischaracterizes Reiner’s teachings in this regard. Second, based on the preliminary record, Dr. Murphy’s testimony that the ESD protection network structure of Reiner’s Figure 5 would be suitable for implementing in Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 due to similarities between the two drivers is supported by the evidence sufficiently to justify institution. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105, 111–120. A first similarity is Reiner’s indication that both display drivers 61 and 63 “have areas where the output or input metal lines have to cross power supply lines” Vdd and Vss. Ex. 1005, 9:11–20, 12:4–5, Fig. 3 (illustrating exemplary integrated circuit device 30 powered by supply voltages Vdd and Vss). A second similarity is Dr. Murphy’s testimony that, at least in some embodiments of Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63, “each of the [scan] lines being driven will have its own semiconductor units . . . [that] drive that particular line,” akin to the individual output devices 70 and source lines 67 of Figure 5. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 113, 117; see also Prelim. Resp. 21–22 (arguing “Reiner [discloses] that the gate driver integrated circuit comprises individual gate drivers” and “a POSITA would understand that individual gate/scan line drivers are coupled to one another”). These similarities between Reiner’s display drivers 61 and 63 support Dr. Murphy’s conclusion that Reiner’s bump bridge technology for providing ESD protection could and would have been implemented in Reiner’s gate/scanning driver 63 in the same fashion as illustrated in Figure 5 for Reiner’s source/data driver module 61. We appreciate, as Dr. Schubert testifies, that the individual circuits in gate/scanning driver 63 will drive their respective gate/scan lines 68 in different ways than the individual output devices 70 in source/data driver module 61 will drive their respective source/data lines 67. See Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 55–59. Nonetheless, based on the present record, we conclude such differences in the signal outputs of Reiner’s display drivers 61 and 63 have little to do with the benefits of configuring the power inputs of the display drivers to protect the individual circuits from electrostatic discharge events, or how to do so.” slip op. at 35

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “to the ’157 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, physics, or a similar field and at least two years of experience designing semiconductor display devices, including LCD displays,” and “[a]dditional relevant work experience can compensate for less education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 75–76. “Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill for a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . set forth in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 14; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 19–20. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears to be consistent with the ’157 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,184,157
  • PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00772 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and petition grounds, found the merits threshold met, and granted Texas Instruments’ motion to join IPR2024-00001.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “3. Analysis At this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Patent Owner’s statements made during prosecution of the ’195 patent appear to contradict its arguments in the present proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the present record, Patent Owner’s statements during prosecution support Petitioner’s argument tthat a graded dopant concentration is enough to teach aiding carrier movement in a particular direction. Patent Owner does not dispute that Kawagoe has a graded dopant concentration in the active region at this stage of the proceeding. Id. Patent Owner also does not dispute that Kawagoe’s transistor has carriers in the active region or that the graded dopant concentration of Kawagoe is lowered from the surface to the bottom substrate (Ex. 1007, Fig. 17). Id. At this stage of the proceeding, the evidence of record supports Petitioner’s position sufficiently to meet the reasonable likelihood threshold for institution. We decline to make further determinations, on this preliminary record, regarding the dispute surrounding this limitation, because the trial in the 00001IPR is the better proceeding in which to do so. Specifically, as compared to the preliminary phase of this case, the instituted trial in the 10 The examined claims of the ’195 patent generally recited “a unidirectional drift field drawing all minority carriers from said surface layer to said substrate.” Ex. 1016, 286. Patent Owner amended the claims of the ’195 patent to recite “maintain[ing] a single static unidirectional electric drift field to aid the movement of minority carriers from said surface layer to said substrate.” Id. 00001IPR affords the parties a better opportunity to fully and fairly brief, argue, and develop evidence in support of their positions. We observe, on this record, the dispute is inadequate to undermine the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence to support institution of review.” slip op. at 14

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

      “instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because applications from which the ’481 patent claims priority were filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 U.S. Patent No. 6,043,114, issued Mar. 28, 2000 (Ex. 1007, “Kawagoe”). 3 U.S. Patent No. 6,163,877, issued Dec. 19, 2000 (Ex. 1014, “Gupta”). 4 U.S. Patent Publication No. 2003/0183856 A1, published Oct. 2, 2003 (Ex. 1006, “Wieczorek”). 5 Petitioner cites four volumes for Wolf: Stanley Wolf & Richard Tauber, Silicon Processing For The VLSI Era, Volume 1 – Process Technology, 2nd ed., (Lattice Press 2000) (Ex. 1008A); Stanley Wolf & Richard Tauber, Silicon Processing For The VLSI Era, Volume 2 – Process Integration, (Lattice Press 2000) (Ex. 1008B); Stanley Wolf & Richard Tauber, Silicon Processing For The VLSI Era, Volume 3 – The Submicron MOSFET, (Lattice Press 2000) (Ex. 1008C); and Stanley Wolf & Richard Tauber, Silicon Processing For The VLSI Era, Volume 4 – Deep-Submicron Process Technology, (Lattice Press 2000) (Ex. 1008D). petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” Patent Owner argues that the Petition is untimely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities. Prelim. Resp. 14– 35. However, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) also provides that the one-year time bar “shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Because the Petition is accompanied by a timely request for joinder (Paper 2) to the instituted 00001IPR proceeding, which we grant as further discussed below, Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition is timebarred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) is moot, irrespective of whether Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities.” slip op. at 4

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, having reviewed the briefings of both parties, we determine Petitioner has established good cause for joining the 00001IPR. Specifically, we find that joining Petitioner to the 00001IPR is unlikely to require any delay or modification to the scheduling order already in place for the 00001IPR. We also determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder of this proceeding. Thus, we determine that granting the Motion for Joinder under these circumstances would help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of these proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). For the above reasons, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the 00001IPR.” slip op. at 19

    None
    Patents in suitUS 10,734,481
  • PTAB · Oct 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00771 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6 of the ’195 patent on all asserted grounds and granted Texas Instruments’ motion to join the Cirrus IPR.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Because the Preliminary Response in the instant case includes arguments pertaining to the sufficiency of the asserted prior art references, which were not raised in the preliminary response in the Cirrus IPR, we briefly address below the patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 6

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner

      “II. TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 315(B) Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” Patent Owner argues that the Petition is untimely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities. Prelim. Resp. 10– 30. However, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) also provides that the one-year time bar “shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).” See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Because the Petition is accompanied by a timely request for joinder (Paper 2) to the instituted proceeding (IPR2024-00017), which we grant as further discussed below, Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) is moot, irrespective of whether Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities.” slip op. at 5

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted

      “B. Whether to Join Petitioner as a Party to the Cirrus IPR Joinder may be authorized when warranted, but the decision to grant joinder is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122. A motion for joinder should (1) set forth reasons why joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013- 00004, Paper 15 (PTAB April 24, 2013). As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). As an initial matter, we find the Motion for Joinder meets the timing requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b) because Petitioner filed it on April 4, 2024, no later than one month after the Cirrus IPR was instituted on May 1, 2024.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “5. “Aid the Movement of Minority Carriers” Patent Owner argues that the Petition fails to show that the applied prior art references disclose the claim limitations “requiring ‘aid the movement of minority carriers,’” as twice recited in claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 8. Patent Owner summarizes this dispute as follows: The challenged patent discloses and claims a semiconductor device with (among other things) a “drift layer having a graded concentration of dopants . . . [and] further having a first static unidirectional electric drift field to aid the movement of minority carriers.”[] The Petition should not be instituted, because (among other deficiencies) it fails to show that the prior art discloses the “aid the movement of minority carriers” claim limitation. Rather than pointing to anything in the prior art that would teach this claim limitation, the Petition assumes that any “graded concentration of dopants” would necessarily “aid the movement of minority carriers.” The Petition contains no analysis explaining why the “graded concentration of dopants” in the prior art meet the “aid the movement of minority carriers” limitation, apart from the fact that they are “graded concentration of dopants.” In other words, Petitioner reads the “aid the movement of minority carriers” limitation out of the claims completely. Id. at 1–2. Patent Owner includes additional details in support of its view that the asserted prior art fails to establish obviousness of the “aid carrier movement” limitations of claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 1–10.” slip op. at 8

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 8,421,195
  • PTAB · Oct 4, 2024 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kohler would prevail on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Petitioner provides sufficient information for purposes of institution to show that Tseng discloses or would have suggested a translucent light pipe defining a closed loop to diffuse light from light emitters outwardly away from a housing. Tseng’s Figures 30 and 37 show that rib 371 and protrusion 383 of translucent light conductors 37, 38 (light pipes), respectively, are both shaped as unbroken circles. Ex. 1004, Figs. 37, 38; see also id. ¶ 24 (describing “circular” rib), ¶ 26 (indicating that the “light conductor is formed in a sleeve shape”). Tseng discloses that light from LED elements 40 enters input face 311 of Tseng’s light conductors 37, 38, travels through transmission portion 312, and is emitted through downward facing output face 313. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 91, 94, 97, 98, Figs. 30, 31, 35, 36, 37. Light is also emitted from outwardly extending annular rib 371 and protrusion 383 of light conductors 37, 38, respectively, which “enhance[s] light transmission.” Id. Petitioner, therefore, provides sufficient information to show that Tseng’s translucent light conductors 37, 38 (light pipes) define a closed loop to diffuse light from LED elements 40 (light emitters) outwardly away from external sleeve 34 (housing).” slip op. at 18

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had a degree in industrial design or an equivalent field, and two years of professional experience working with kitchen, bath, or other plumbing fixtures (or similar products), or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience. Pet. 14. Petitioner asserts that a POSITA also would have been aware of, and generally knowledgeable about, the standard features and functionality of kitchen, bath, or other plumbing fixtures (or similar products). Id. Patent Owner neither adopts nor disputes Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 10. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA, which is undisputed on this record, and is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Interpretation We interpret claims “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claims in a civil action held under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner asserts that the claim terms do not require construction and should be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that it “has applied the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms.” Prelim. Resp. 10. Taking into consideration the information presented, we determine that none of the claim terms requires express construction for purposes of deciding whether to institute review.7” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached

      “its sprayhead by routing an electric wire connected to an external power supply through the shower head. Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 68, Figs. 1–5). Petitioner asserts that because Tseng’s shower head is designed to be pulled out, the wire is subject to stress and strain, which could lead to failure over time. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 251–253). According to Petitioner, incorporating Mizuno’s hydroelectric generator into Tseng’s shower head would obviate the need for an external power supply or battery, which would reduce installation and operation costs, prevent a potential wiring failure, and eliminate periodic battery replacement. Id. at 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 257–260). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art, therefore, would have been motivated to incorporate Mizuno’s hydroelectric generator into Tseng’s shower head, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so because Mizuno’s hydroelectric generator is designed and intended to be integrated into a faucet’s shower head to reliably power LEDs. Id. at 45–46 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 1, 2). Patent Owner counters that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had any reason to modify Tseng in view of Mizuno. Prelim. Resp. 32. Patent Owner contends that Tseng expressly set out to develop a design that includes electrical wiring, and did so successfully by improving the integration of electrical wiring into its shower head design. Id. at 33–34 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 9, 102–110). Patent Owner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to completely redesign Tseng’s shower head to change the power source entirely to eliminate wiring. Id. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art also would not have had a reasonable expectation of success in incorporating Mizuno’s hydroelectric generator into Tseng’s shower head because Tseng explicitly discloses that the space in its shower head is narrow. Id. at 36 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 7, 108). According to Patent Owner, Mizuno’s hydroelectric generator requires room for additional components beyond the hydrogenator, including a voltage stabilizer, cooling components, and a relief valve, which Patent Owner contends would have discouraged the ordinarily skilled artisan from a major redesign of Tseng’s faucet necessary to incorporate these elements. Id. at 37. We have considered Petitioner and Patent Owner’s assertions for ground 2. Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to the patentability of claim 1 for ground 1, resolution of the disputed factual issues raised by Petitioner and Patent Owner in ground 2 is best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 22

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,393,363
  • PTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00304 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–12 based on a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Yoakim, Jarisch, and Rossi.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “have had “a bachelor’s degree in engineering plus five years of experience in design of mechanical beverage systems, or similar products, and experience with sensors for recognizing an identifier.” Pet. 16–17 (referencing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40; IPR2022-01574, Paper 12, 15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of the ’830 patent. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the technology at issue, and Mr. Jobin’s Declaration testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. The ’830 patent, as well as the prior art of record, includes systems that use identifiers on a capsule to control the operation of a beverage machine. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:28–34 (“[T]he present invention . . . has an identifier, which allows to individualize the respective portion capsule.”); Ex. 1004 ¶ 25 (discussing the system’s “identification means”); Ex. 1005 ¶ 1 (“The invention relates to the preparation of a beverage by use of a capsule containing beverage ingredient in a beverage production device. The present invention in particular focuses on the detection of the capsule.”); Ex. 1041, code (57) (“The process for controlling the operation of an edibleproduct making machine [includes] . . . recogni[zing] an identifying element . . . .”). Cf. Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee Sys. GmbH, IPR2022- 01574, Paper 29, 19–20 (PTAB April 10, 2024) (finding, for a related patent claiming similar subject matter, that the level of ordinary skill in the art is “is a bachelor’s degree in engineering plus five years of experience in design of mechanical beverage systems, or similar products, as well as experience with sensors for recognizing an identifier”).” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther

      “apparent interpretations that [Patent Owner] offered in its infringement contentions.” Pet. 17 (referencing Ex. 1049). Petitioner then provides certain examples. Id. at 17–23. Petitioner concludes “that for this proceeding, no claim terms require formal construction.” Id. at 23 (referencing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 150–153). Patent Owner does not address claim construction. We agree with Petitioner that, for the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We apply the plain and ordinary meaning in this Decision. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges.” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “In any event, Patent Owner’s reasonable expectation of success focuses on the wrong inquiry. “The reasonable expectation of success requirement refers to the likelihood of success in combining references to meet the limitations of the claimed invention.” Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claimed invention is not directed to reading the code. Instead, the claim is directed to a portion capsule with an individualized identifier on the bottom of the capsule’s flange, with the identifier having certain qualities. Petitioner sufficiently demonstrates, on the current record, that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in including an identifier on the bottom of the flange of a portion capsule as taught by Jarisch. See Pet. 42 (“Jarisch explicitly teaches positioning an optical code ‘on the bottom of the rim of the capsule which is opposed to the lid of the capsule.’” (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 22)). iii. Combining Yoakim and Jarisch with Rossi Next, Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s reasons for combining Rossi’s teaching of a capsule identification system is deficient because Yoakim already achieves a safety function by using a capsule and capsule holder with complementary shapes. Prelim. Resp. 39 (referencing Ex. 1004 ¶ 205); see also Ex. 1004 ¶ 205 (describing gripping structure 840 on the bottom of an exemplary capsule that serves as a “lock” into which a “key” structure in the capsule holder fits). We have considered Patent Owner’s argument and determine, on the current record, that it does not demonstrate a deficiency in Petitioner’s position for purposes of instituting trial. This argument is directed to a single embodiment with gripping structure 840, a feature not relied upon in the Petition for satisfying any claim limitations. Even if Yoakim discloses one way to ensure compatible capsules are used, such a disclosure does not mean that a person having ordinary skill in the art would not have found it obvious to use a different method known in the art that could be employed with predictable results for capsules that do not employ a gripping structure. Cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). Also, Petitioner’s rationale for employing Rossi’s teachings is broader than safety considerations. The Petition identifies “greater specificity and accuracy of brewing conditions” as well as increased safety. See Pet. 44.” slip op. at 28

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,465,830
  • PTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00299 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–8 based on a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Yoakim, Jarisch ’929, Rossi, and Rapparini.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in engineering plus five years of experience in design of mechanical beverage systems, or similar products, and experience with sensors for recognizing an identifier.” Pet. 16 (referencing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40; IPR2022-01574, Paper 12, 15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of the ’910 patent. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the technology at issue, and Mr. Jobin’s Declaration testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. The ’901 patent, as well as the prior art of record, includes systems that use identifiers on a capsule to control the operation of a beverage machine. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:28–34 (“[T]he present invention . . . has an identifier, which allows to individualize the respective portion capsule.”); Ex. 1004 ¶ 25 (discussing the system’s “identification means”); Ex. 1006 ¶ 1 (“The present invention relates in particular to coding supports adapted to store information related to a capsule, capsules associated with/for embedding coding supports, reading and processing arrangements for reading and using such information for preparing a beverage.”); Ex. 1041, code (57) (“The process for controlling the operation of an edible-product making machine [includes] . . . recogni[zing] an” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“We have frequently stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

      “a) Petitioner’s contentions Petitioner contends that Yoakim, Jarisch ’929, Rossi, and Rapparini are “analogous art in the field of portion capsule beverage extraction, each disclosing an invention that may be applied in automatic coffee/expresso machines.” Pet. 37 (referencing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2, 3; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1, 2; Ex. 1008 ¶ 1; Ex. 1041, 3; Ex. 1003 ¶ 220); cf. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“References within the statutory terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102 qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination only when analogous to the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner does not dispute this contention at this stage of the proceeding.” slip op. at 20

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,554,910
  • PTAB · Jun 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00257 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–24, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would have been obvious over Yoakim, Jarisch ’929, Rossi, and Rapparini.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the technology at issue, and Mr. Jobin’s Declaration testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. The ’722 patent, as well as the prior art of record, includes systems that use identifiers on a capsule to control the operation of a beverage machine. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:38–44 (“[T]he present invention . . . has an identifier, which allows to individualize the respective portion capsule.”); Ex. 1004 ¶ 25 (discussing the system’s “identification means”); Ex. 1006 ¶ 1 (“The present invention relates in particular to coding supports adapted to store information related to a capsule, capsules associated with/for embedding coding supports, reading and processing arrangements for reading and using such information for preparing a beverage.”); Ex. 1041, code (57) (“The process for controlling the operation of an edibleproduct making machine [includes] . . . recogni[zing] an identifying element . . . .”). Cf. Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee Sys. GmbH, IPR2022-01574, Paper 29, 19–20 (PTAB April 10, 2024) (finding, for a related patent claiming similar subject matter, that the level of ordinary skill in the art is “is a bachelor’s degree in engineering plus five years of experience in design of mechanical beverage systems, or similar products, as well as experience with sensors for recognizing an identifier”).” slip op. at 17

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther

      “Patent Owner does not address claim construction. We agree with Petitioner that, for the purposes of this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We apply the plain and ordinary meaning in this Decision. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, however, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges.” slip op. at 18

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “current record, that they do not demonstrate a deficiency in Petitioner’s position for purposes of instituting trial. Petitioner provides a reason to position a code on the bottom side of the rim of a capsule, taken directly from Jarisch ’929. See Pet. 37 (referencing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 17, 63); see also Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 17 (“These locations are particularly advantageous since they . . . [are] less prone to damages caused by the processing module and in particular by the pyramidal plate, and to ingredients projections. As a consequence, the amount of coded information and the reliability of the readings are both improved.”), 63 (same); cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (stating that, to facilitate the analysis of an obviousness position, the proponent should provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). On the current record, Patent Owner’s attorney argument does not identify sufficiently a deficiency in Petitioner’s reasoning.” slip op. at 27

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,548,722
  • PTAB · Jun 24, 2024 · IPR2024-00380 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5, 7, and 9–14 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner

      “because they are premised on a misapplication of our precedent. Providing a document to the Office in an Information Disclosure Statement is sufficient to satisfy AB prong one as long as that “previously presented” art is “the same or substantially the same” as that presented in the Petition. See Advanced Bionics, 7–8 (holding that “[p]reviously presented art includes . . . art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent”). As we have already found, there are no material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination under BD factor (a). Petitioner provides no authority that requires us to interpret “involved during examination” under BD factor (a) as “used in a rejection” or “mentioned by the examiner” (Pet. 60), and we are aware of none. Patent Owner’s position, in that regard, appears to conflate the first AB prong (whether the art previously was presented to the Office) with an aspect of the second AB prong (the extent to which the Examiner considered that art).” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The findings and conclusions set forth in this Decision are provided for the exclusive purpose of explaining our determination that Petitioner has met that standard on this record. slip op. at 6

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in a field such as chemistry, physics, or chemical engineering, as well as at least two years of experience with plasma-polymerization techniques.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 22–29). Patent Owner does not propose a different level of skill in the art at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp., generally. On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). A more specific definition is not necessary for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. To the extent a more specific definition is required, however, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed unchallenged definition because, on this record, it is consistent with the disclosures of the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts that the claimed term “aryl” should be construed to mean “an aromatic ring system.” See Pet. 20–23. Patent Owner does not propose a different claim construction at this stage of the proceeding. See Prelim. Resp., generally. After review of the preliminary record, we determine that no claim terms need to be construed for purposes of institution. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,041,087
  • PTAB · Jun 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00254 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Yoakim, Jarisch, and Rossi.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314 to determine whether to institute review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023) (permitting the Board to institute trial on behalf of the Director). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in engineering plus five years of experience in design of mechanical beverage systems, or similar products and experience with sensors for recognizing an identifier.” Pet. 17 (referencing Ex. 1003 ¶ 40; IPR2022-01574, Paper 12, 15). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of the ’829 patent. For purposes of this Decision, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the technology at issue, and Mr. Jobin’s Declaration testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. The ’829 patent, as well as the prior art of record, includes systems that use identifiers on a capsule to control the operation of a beverage machine. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:29–35 (“[T]he present invention . . . has an identifier, which allows to individualize the respective portion capsule.”); Ex. 1004 ¶ 25 (discussing the system’s “identification means”); Ex. 1005 ¶ 1 (“The invention relates to the preparation of a beverage by use of a capsule containing beverage ingredient in a beverage production device. The present invention in particular focuses on the detection of the capsule.” (emphasis added)); Ex. 1041, code (57) (“The process for controlling the operation of an edible-product making machine [includes] . . . “recogni[zing] an identifying element . . . .”). Cf. Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee Sys.” slip op. at 16

    • BurdenInstituted

      “c) Conclusion – Motivation to combine To summarize, we determine, on the current record, that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason to combine the teachings of Yoakim, Jarisch, and Rossi as Petitioner proposes, with a reasonable expectation of success in arriving at the claimed invention. We determine, on the current record, that Petitioner sufficiently provides rational underpinnings for its reasoning. Cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (stating that, to facilitate the analysis of an obviousness position, the proponent should provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 29

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “position a code on the bottom said of the rim of a capsule, taken directly from Jarisch. See Pet. 38 (referencing Ex. 1005 ¶ 22); see also Ex. 1005 ¶ 22 (“The bottom of the rim is sufficiently away from the liquid injection and beverage delivery areas so that there is a lower risk for the code to become unreadable . . . by beverage residues or otherwise (e.g., coffee particles). As a result, the reading is made more reliable.”); cf. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 418 (stating that, to facilitate the analysis of an obviousness position, the proponent should provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). On the current record, Patent Owner’s attorney argument does not identify sufficiently a deficiency in Petitioner’s reasoning. We also do not agree, on the current record, that Petitioner’s position is deficient for not accounting for Jarisch reading its code as the capsule spins or that Yoakim’s rim is not sufficiently sized for Jarisch’s code. These arguments are based on bodily incorporating features from Jarisch, rather than considering how a person having ordinary skill in the art would understand the teachings. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“[The] test for obviousness,” however, “is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”).” slip op. at 26

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,465,829
  • PTAB · May 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00093 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–9 and all asserted grounds, finding compelling evidence that Hirler anticipates claim 1.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). We may institute review, however, only upon a determination that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Applying that standard, for reasons set forth below, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “Id. at 5–6. In evaluating these factors, we take “a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We also apply additional guidance issued by the Director on the application of the Fintiv factors. See Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022).12 The Fintiv Memo states that “to benefit the patent system and the public good, the PTAB will not rely on the Fintiv factors to discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petition presents compelling evidence of unpatentability.” Id. at 2.” slip op. at 19

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

      “1. “the sidewalls of said trenches in said base layer” Petitioner requests an express construction of a single claim term, namely, the term in claim 1 that specifies “the sidewalls of said trenches in said base layer.” Pet. 17. We agree with Patent Owner that no express construction of that term is necessary to resolve whether to institute review. See Prelim. Resp. 4 (arguing that this term “has no apparent relevance to any of the asserted prior art grounds”). We thus decline to expressly construe the term at this stage of the proceeding. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claim terms are construed only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

      “Accordingly, on this record, we preliminarily determine that the phrase “lateral contact layer” does not require “a dopant concentration between P and P+ (P* doping) for an N-channel MOSFET or between N and N+ (N* doping) in a P-channel MOSFET.” Prelim. Resp. 8. b. Dopant Implantation We next consider Patent Owner’s view that “the lateral contact layer” of claim 1 requires “a region of dopant which is implanted into sidewalls of the source contact trenches.” Prelim. Resp. 8. We discern no words in claim 1, and the parties identify none, that even remotely touch upon a requirement related to dopant implantation. See id. at 7–8; Ex. 1001, 5:37– 6:17 (claim 1). Patent Owner argues that the written description “makes clear that the lateral contact layer is implanted into the sidewall of the source contact trenches.” Prelim. Resp. 7. However, by way of support, Patent Owner again merely directs the Board to written descriptions of embodiments of the invention. See id. at 7–8 (highlighting portions of the specification that describe embodiments of the invention). Patent Owner does not argue that the phrase “lateral contact layer” is” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,629,634

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.