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  • PTAB · Apr 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01576 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is unpatentable over Petruzzelli.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim of the ’985 patent is unpatentable, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims based on all grounds raised in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.08(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have a degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related discipline, along with relevant experience (at least 1– 2 years for a Ph.D., 2–3 years for a Master’s, and 3+ years for a Bachelor’s) researching or developing graphical user interfaces (GUIs) for ultrasound systems or other medical imaging devices. EX1007, ¶¶14–19. The person would have general knowledge of GUIs for ultrasound systems or other medical imaging devices as of April 18, 2014. Id.” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction Petitioner asserts that no claim terms require construction at this stage. Pet. 15. Patent Owner does not offer any claim constructions, but does challenge Petitioner’s choice not to offer any claim constructions, and suggests that we should deny the Petition on that basis. Prelim. Resp. 75– 77. We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. First, we note that the parties have not offered competing claim constructions, such that there is no specific claim construction issue between the parties at this time. Second, we note that we consider Petitioner’s interpretation of the claims sufficiently clear based on their application of the claims on the art. Thus, we are able to proceed without explicitly construing any claim terms, and we are not persuaded to deny on that basis. In view of the above, we do not construe any claim terms. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “To establish anticipation, every element and limitation of the claimed invention must be found in a single prior art reference, arranged as in the claim. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 6

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,538,985
  • PTAB · Apr 13, 2023 · IPR2022-01575 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 12, 13, and 15 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated and/or obvious over Halmann.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Considering the arguments presented in the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least 1 of the claims 1–6, 12, 13, and 15 of the ’168 patent as unpatentable under the grounds presented in the Petition. Pursuant to § 314, we hereby institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner “does not believe any terms require construction at this stage.” Pet. 10. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not yet filed a response. For purposes of this decision, we do not expressly construe any terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1695 (April 30, 2018) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “We have reviewed Petitioner’s evidence and argument, and find that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Halmann discloses this limitation of claim 1 for the purposes of institution.” slip op. at 19

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,867,168
  • PTAB · Mar 9, 2023 · IPR2022-01419 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–19 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. As discussed below, we have considered our whether to exercise our discretion to deny pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and determined not to exercise this discretion. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “other information defining or describing the way data is being transmitted by a wireless access point because Petitioner only maps “radio resources” to analog downlink RF carriers. Pet. 37–40. Thus, whether “radio resources” encompass other information defining or describing the way data is being transmitted by a wireless access point is not at issue here. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 11

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “2. Analysis Petitioner argues that Sabat-552 teaches a baseband unit communicatively coupled to another baseband unit, or receiving radio resources from another baseband unit, as claimed in claims 6, 12, and 17, or the indirect connection to yet another baseband unit, as claimed in claim 7. Pet. 52–56 (citing Ex. 1008, 6:55–61, Fig. 1; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 107, 109, 110, 113). Petitioner argues that the combination would be motivated by Sabat- 552’s teaching of easily sharing the system among service providers to reduce costs, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have expected success. Id. at 54–55 (citing Ex. 1008, 2:48–58, 3:65–4:5; Ex. 1012 ¶ 110).” slip op. at 25

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached

      “Patent Owner responds that “it is well settled law . . . that 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3) does not apply to a patent owner defending the validity of issued claims in IPR proceedings because the patent owner is not ‘obtaining’ a patent in this post-issuance proceeding as required by the language of § 42.73(d)(3).” Prelim. Resp. 2–3. Patent Owner also asserts that “the claims of the ’499 patent are also materially different from the claims of the ’178 patent such that Patent Owner is not taking any positions inconsistent with the prior IPR proceeding.” Id. at 3, 17–20. of institution as discussed above, we do not reach alleged estoppel under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).” slip op. at 26

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,334,499
  • PTAB · Mar 9, 2023 · IPR2022-01293 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability based on Wu grounds and compelling merits despite Fintiv factors favoring denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “f) Conclusion – Initial Fintiv Analysis We have considered the circumstances and facts before us in view of the first five Fintiv factors. Because our analysis is fact driven, no single factor is determinative of our conclusion. Considering these five Fintiv factors, we determine that they favor a discretionary denial. 2. Assessment of the Compelling Merits As we have found that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial, we proceed to assess whether the record shows that Petitioner has presented a compelling unpatentability challenge.” slip op. at 16

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons below, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. As discussed below, we have considered our whether to exercise our discretion to deny pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) and determined not to exercise this discretion. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner’s definition appears generally consistent with Petitioner’s definition, with the exception of requiring 3 years or more (as systems. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s provided definition for the level of skill of a person of ordinary skill in the art as reasonable and consistent with the prior art, which does not encompass an open-ended (“at least 3 years”) amount of experience, and which is supported by the testimony of Dr. Acampora. We would reach the same conclusions if we were to remove the open-ended terminology from Patent Owner’s definition and adopt that.” slip op. at 20

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

      “Thus, the record does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “radio resources,” that requires the RF carriers, CDMA codes, TDMA time slots or other information defining and describing the way data is being transmitted cannot include the user payload data that is transmitted. 4. Our Partial Construction For our present purposes, we do not need to completely construe the term “radio resources.” Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. However, a partial construction is required, and for the reasons discussed above, for this Decision, we construe “radio resources” to encompass RF carriers, CDMA codes, and TDMA time slots, including those in which underlying data is transmitted.” slip op. at 26

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,334,499
  • PTAB · Feb 1, 2023 · IPR2022-01212 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution

    Instituted IPR on claims 1–12 because Ericsson showed a reasonable likelihood that claims would be unpatentable under the asserted § 103 grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review is under 35 U.S.C. § 314. See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2020). To institute an inter partes review, the information presented in the Petition must show “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–12 of the ’338 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Postgrant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites /default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_di strict_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf (the “Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure explains that “[c]onsistent with Sotera Wireless, Inc., the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure 3 (internal footnote omitted) (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A). The Interim Procedure explains that such a Sotera stipulation “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB . . . . [and] allows the PTAB to review grounds that the parallel district court litigation will not resolve.” Id. at 7–8. Petitioner “adopts the identical stipulation from Sotera, namely, that if the IPR is instituted, . . . Petitioner will not pursue in the District Court Litigation any ground raised or that could have been reasonably raised in an IPR for the challenged patent.” Pet. 81.” slip op. at 55

    • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

      “Determining the level of ordinary skill in the art involves various factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The prior art of record also reflects the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Institution Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Patent Owner as it is consistent with the ’338 patent and the asserted prior art. Even if we were to adopt Petitioner’s similar assessment, it would not alter our decision to institute.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “Turning to the claim language, limitation vii recites “reconfiguring each remote radio unit by: determining a load percentage for each remote radio unit.” Claim 1 simply does not specify how to determine the load percentage for each remote radio unit and “load percentage” is a broad term. Stated differently, claim 1 does not specify the numerator or denominator to be used in determining the load percentage, but the parties agree that the numerator is the amount of load used in an RRU, as indicated above. On this preliminary record, Petitioner’s interpretation of “available capacity” as including “a single radio, a group of radios or the entire DAS system, [able to] be determined using throughput, number of connections, number of users, number of carriers, or power,” is sufficient for purposes of institution. See Pet. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1005, 4:24–27; 5:13–15; 6:1–4; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–06). On this preliminary record, as Petitioner argues (Pet. Reply 2) and contrary to Patent Owner’s construction, the claim language and the specification do not support limiting available capacity to a single RRU, or similarly, limiting the scope of “load percentage” to a load consumed by a remote radio unit divided by the assigned available capacity for that remote radio unit.6” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 8,682,338
  • PTAB · May 5, 2022 · IPR2022-00063 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–34 and all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prevail on obviousness over Ellsberry and Jeddeloh.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “another patent asserted in the Related Case was filed within a week of the Preliminary Response. Id. We decline to attempt to predict how the District Court would proceed should a stay be requested by either of the parties. Accordingly, we find that this factor neither favors nor weighs against discretionary denial of inter partes review. C. Factor 2 — Proximity of Court’s Trial Date Patent Owner admits that “[t]he district of Delaware has not yet set a trial date.” Id. Accordingly, this factor weighs against exercising our discretion to deny inter partes review.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “Given the facts above, because Averbuj was not presented in combination with the other references asserted here and is only used in two of the four grounds, the combination of references asserted in the Petition do not qualify as art that was “previously presented” to the Office. Thus, we find that the combination of references asserted in the Petition, were not previously presented to the Office. Additionally, Patent Owner does not assert or explain sufficiently that Ellsberry, Jeddeloh, and/or Lee are cumulative of any reference cited during prosecution of the ’523 patent. Prelim. Resp. 41–43. On this record, we are not persuaded that Ellsberry, Jeddeloh, and Lee are cumulative of any reference cited during prosecution of the ’523 patent. Accordingly, the first condition of the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied, and we need not consider whether Petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Conclusion After evaluating the Becton, Dickinson factors within the Advanced” slip op. at 13

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or in a related field and at least one year of work experience relating to memory systems, and would be familiar with the design of memory devices, memory modules, and BIST.” Pet. 6. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization or offer its own. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill, which we determine is consistent with the ’523 patent written description and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 14

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner offers constructions of several terms which are not disputed by Patent Owner. Pet. 13–15. Nevertheless, we determine that it is not necessary to provide an express interpretation of any of the terms of the claims at this juncture. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,217,523
  • PTAB · Mar 24, 2022 · PGR2021-00112 · APJ Bryan F Moore · PGR · Institution

    Instituted PGR on claims 1–20 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 lacks written description support; all petition grounds were included.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “content for output.” Id. at 89. We determine, however, that Petitioner’s argument under Step 2A Prong One that claim 1 is directed to the “obtaining content for output” is not substantially different from the Examiner’s determination that claims 1‒20 recite “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.” Compare Pet. 37–88 (citing e.g. Electric Power), with Ex. 2001, 193–194 (also citing Electric Power). In both cases, the argument is the same or substantially the same, i.e., that similarly identified subject matter of the claim is obtaining (collecting) data and displaying (outputting) it. Nevertheless, as to Step 2A Prong Two, we determine that the claims at issue in the ’096 prosecution differ in material ways from the ’903 patent claims at issue in this PGR. Specifically, the ’096 patent claims recite a touchscreen interface not recited in the ’903 patent claims. Additionally, the ’903 claims focus on the “output device” as performing the patented steps but in the ’096 prosecution history the “‘information apparatus performs the patented steps and “is integral to the claims” (as the Applicant argued). See Ex. 2008 [comparison of ’096 prosecution claims and ’903 claims]; Ex. 2001, 150; see also Pet. 89 (“the claims at issue in the ’067 application were different than the claims of the ’903 patent addressed here.”). rejection and arguments in the ’096 prosecution history turns on whether the claims in this PGR recite different elements that must be determined to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (i.e., Prong Two of Step 2A). Petitioner argues that an essential element different than the ’096 claims, i.e. the output device, does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because the claims do not amount to an improvement to computer functionality. Pet. 37–72. We find this a close case. Nevertheless, due to the differences in the claims, we determine that the Examiner’s withdrawal of the § 101 rejection in light of the applicant’s arguments regarding the claim being directed to a specific technical solution is not substantially the same argument that Petitioner’s presents in the Petition as to Prong Two of Step 2A.” slip op. at 22

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “C. Lack of Written Description Support Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable for lack of written description for the same reasons it contends the ’903 patent is PGR eligible. Pet. 13–36. The Specification of the ’903 patent has substantially the same disclosures as the Specification of the ’413 application relied on by Patent Owner (see Prelim. Resp. 20) to which the ’903 patent claims priority. Having determined that the disclosures in the ’903 patent Specification and the ’413 application is insufficient to provide written description support for the at least claim 1, we also determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is unpatentable for the same reasons. Thus, we exercise our discretion and institute post grant review of claims 1–20 challenged under this ground. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1369–60 (2018).” slip op. at 33

    • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateInstituted

      “in the art at the time of the invention] would have understood that an output system/device could be (or include) an information apparatus. Prelim. Resp. 24. We determine that Patent Owner’s argument has a logical flaw––i.e., the fact that a particular device could be used alternately as an information apparatus or an output device does not necessarily mean that it was known by one of ordinary skill in the art to use a combined information apparatus/output device and have the new combined device perform all the additional functions required by the claims. “The knowledge of ordinary artisans may be used to inform what is actually in the specification, but not to teach limitations that are not in the specification, even if those limitations would be rendered obvious by the disclosure in the specification.” Rivera v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 857 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Rivera”). “The question is not whether a claimed invention is an obvious variant of that which is disclosed in the specification . . . . It extends only to that which is 1997). Patent Owner has not pointed to any disclosure in the ’413 application teaching that an “output device” can perform the functions of the “information apparatus” including its interactions with the “output device.” For example, claim 1 recites “wirelessly receiving, by the output system . . . output data from at least one server of the one or more servers over the Internet.” Ex. 1001, 37:28–32. At this stage, we find sufficiently persuasive Petitioner’s argument, which we discuss above, that the only written description support for an “output device” that performs the claimed functions by accessing the Internet provided by Patent Owner is not an “output device” but an “information apparatus.” Prelim. Resp. at 27–29.” slip op. at 29

    § 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Mayo · Bilski · Electric Power
    Patents in suitUS 11,029,903
  • PTAB · Mar 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01158 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Palo Alto Networks would prevail in showing at least one challenged claim unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We consider each of these factors below.” slip op. at 8

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because every ground asserted in the Petition is based on the same or substantially similar art and arguments already considered during prosecution of the ’899 patent. Prelim. Resp. 13–26. Section 325(d) states, in relevant part, “[in] determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses the following two-part framework in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying the two-part framework, we consider the following non-exclusive factors: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph). Factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id.” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’899 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’899 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately two years of professional experience or equivalent study in network security and the use of machine-learning algorithms.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 30). Petitioner further asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 30). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the information presented in the Petition and Dr. Lee’s testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,503,899
  • PTAB · Mar 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01157 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are obvious over four combinations of Jungck, Shah, Ke, and Sarathy.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We consider each of these factors below.” slip op. at 11

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

      “35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 19–35. Pursuant to § 325(d), the Director may elect not to institute a proceeding if the challenge to the patent is based on matters previously presented to the Office. Section 325(d) states, in relevant part, “[in] determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses the following two-part framework in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (footnote omitted).” slip op. at 16

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “VII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and four years of professional experience” and that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1004, Decl. of Dr. Vijay Madisetti (“Madisetti Decl.”) ¶¶ 34–36). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill is commensurate with the subject matter of the ’906 patent and we apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,749,906
  • PTAB · Feb 16, 2022 · IPR2021-01150 · APJ Bryan F Moore · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 under § 103 over Paxton, Sutton, and Ivershen, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on at least claim 1.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “We concur with Petitioner’s assertions regarding the status of the underlying, related litigation. With respect to Fintiv factor (1), we determine this factor to be neutral. Although the parties stipulated to a trial date, the district court has yet to enter that schedule or hold a scheduling conference. The district court has continued the scheduling conference until after it decides the pending motion to stay. See Ex. 1031, Ex. 1032, 4:11–22. On this record, we are not persuaded that the district court will adhere to the previously agreed upon August 2022 trial date. Even with the arguments and evidence presented, we determine it to be speculative as to whether a stay may be granted if a proceeding is instituted. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Fintiv factor (2), given the speculative nature of the “trial date.” With respect to Fintiv factor (3), we determine that this weighs against discretionary denial; although some discovery has occurred, the parties have not invested significant resources in the district court proceeding.” slip op. at 12

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “Given the facts above, because Ivershen was submitted and discussed during the prosecution of the ’903 patent and in IPR2018-01654 and IPR2018-01655, Ivershen qualifies as art that was “previously presented” to the Office. Thus, we find that Ivershen, the same prior art asserted in the Petition, previously was presented to the Office. Nevertheless, Petitioner asserts that the other prior art references in” slip op. at 19

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Noting that relevant experience and education can substitute for each other, Petitioner states that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art, at the time the ’903 patent was filed, had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2–3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent. Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1003 [Declaration of Dr. Robert Akl] ¶¶ 18–20). Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill, which Patent Owner does not dispute at this stage, appears appropriate for the technology addressed by this proceeding.” slip op. at 21

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner asserts “no terms require construction.” Pet. 13. Patent Owner asserts “no express construction of any term is required to resolve any controversy in this proceeding.” Prelim. Resp. 12. After review of the current record, we conclude that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether to institute review of the challenged claims. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”).” slip op. at 22

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,530,903

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.