• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 15, 2023 · IPR2021-01346 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 3–16 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over the seven combinations of prior art listed in the decision.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “These definitions are very similar, but we are persuaded that Patent Owner’s proposal is more consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’466 patent and prior art of record. Petitioner’s use of the term “and/or” is problematic because it makes experience with LED devices optional. In contrast, Patent Owner’s definition requires two or more years of experience with LED devices and related LED circuit design. We therefore adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill. Had we adopted Petitioner’s level of skill, however, the outcome here would not have changed.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes any claim constructions. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 8–9; Reply 1. We determine that no terms require construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner indeed relies on an improper bodily incorporation argument. Petitioner does not propose bodily incorporating Siwinski and Srivastava together, but rather taking certain teachings from these references and applying them to Hack. Reply 11, 14. For example, Petitioner argues that a POSITA would have relied on Siwinski’s teachings “to configure Hack’s device to implement a circuit configured to detect touch via capacitive sensing.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 124). And Petitioner relies on Srivastava for the teaching that a POSITA would have configured Hack’s device with a lens doped with particles configured to receive and transmit light from a plurality of LEDs. Id. at 29– 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 126–32). Patent Owner’s argument that Srivastava’s shell is not combinable with Siwinski’s touch screen misdirects our attention to a combination that Petitioner did not propose, and is a bodily incorporation that fundamentally misapplies the law of obviousness. “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). Regardless, Petitioner’s arguments are not conclusory. The Reply persuasively argues that “Srivastava’s express applicability to OLEDs and display backlights is consistent with Hack’s OLED backlight features.” Reply 11 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1052, 1:10–12, 5:29–38). We are further persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence supporting that “the use of a lens with LED backlight configurations was known,” which undercuts Mr. Credelle’s testimony that Srivastava’s lens would be incompatible with a touch screen backlight. Id. (citing, e.g., Ex. 1090 (depicting a lens over multiple OLED color elements), Fig. 13; Ex. 1098, code (57) (“display back lighting system” with an “entrance lens” and a “reflecting lens”); Ex. 1099, code (57) (“backlight assembly” with “a closely packed array of hemispherical or spherical lenses”)); see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 96–97. And contrary to Mr. Credelle’s testimony that “[i]t would be illogical to form Srivastava’s shell over Siwinski’s touch screen because the shell would prevent touching the touch screen, which is the function of the touch screen,” Petitioner persuasively argues that “Srivastava explains that it was known that LEDs are used as a backlight in liquid crystal displays.” Reply 11. In other words, Petitioner’s reliance on Srivastava’s backlight teachings would not prevent a user from touching a screen (in front of the backlight) in the modified device. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Hack, Siwinski, and Srivastava to achieve this limitation.” slip op. at 16

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner

    “We start our analysis with the Sur-reply because it exposes several weaknesses in Patent Owner’s arguments. First, contrary to what the Sur-reply contends, the Patent Owner response did not argue that “Srivastava’s LED shell is incompatible with Hack’s touch screen because the hard shell would interfere with the functionality of the touchscreen.” Id. This is a new argument first made in the Sur-reply, and we do not consider it. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). What Patent Owner actually argued in its Response was that “[a] POSITA would not combine Srivastava’s LED shell for a single LED with Hack’s flexible display.” PO Resp. 24. There is no mention of a “hard shell” interfering with the functionality of the touch screen in the Patent Owner Response. See id. At most, Patent Owner contends that the shell would “prevent touching the screen,” and that the “curvature of the shell” would be incompatible, not that any hardness of the shell would present a problem. Id. at 25–26 (quoting Ex. 2001 ¶ 97). Regardless, even if we consider this argument, it is inapposite because as the Reply correctly notes, “Srivastava explains that it was known that LEDs are used as a backlight in liquid crystal displays,” and we accordingly find that a backlight with a hard shell would not interfere with a user touching a display. See Reply 11 (citing Pet. 30–33; Ex. 1052, 1:10–12).” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 10,499,466 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,499,466
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 15, 2023 · IPR2021-01345 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 4, 9–11, 13, 17, 18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Hack and Garcia, Hack, Garcia, and Cordelli, or Hack and Porter.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would mean someone who, at the time of the invention in February 2004, had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or the equivalent, and two or more years of experience with LED devices and related LED circuit design. PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 41–48). Petitioner contends that there is little difference between these definitions and that Patent Owner does not tie any of its arguments to the minor differences. Reply 1–2. We agree. However, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill because we are persuaded that it is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’252 patent and prior art of record, except that we delete the phrase “or more” to avoid including ambiguity in the definition of the level of skill. The outcome of this decision would not have changed had we adopted Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Because the intrinsic record7 does not assist us with interpreting the term “folded,” we turn to the extrinsic evidence, including Patent Owner’s proffered dictionary definitions and expert testimony. As mentioned above, Patent Owner supplied two dictionary definitions for “fold.” See Exs. 2006, 2007. But these definitions are from non-technical sources and are non-contemporaneous with the ’252 patent’s priority date, and are thus of limited relevance to our analysis. Reply 14 n.7. As for expert testimony, Patent Owner’s expert submits that “[a] POSITA would understand that folding a substrate requires bending the substrate so that one part of the substrate is in full contact with another part of the substrate.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 81. However, Patent Owner’s expert provides no evidence or explanation for this conclusory assertion, so we give it little weight. See id.; PO Resp. 18–19; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Further, as we will discuss in detail below, the prior art upon which 7 The parties do not address the prosecution history. Petitioner relies explicitly discloses a substrate that is flexible enough to be folded. See, e.g., Pet. 40; Ex. 1005 ¶ 76 (“[T]he display 106 could be thin and flexible enough to . . . fold into a housing 102[.]”). Thus, apart from explaining the errors in Patent Owner’s proposed construction, we determine that it is unnecessary for us to further analyze the proper scope of this term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Because the intrinsic record7 does not assist us with interpreting the term “folded,” we turn to the extrinsic evidence, including Patent Owner’s proffered dictionary definitions and expert testimony. As mentioned above, Patent Owner supplied two dictionary definitions for “fold.” See Exs. 2006, 2007. But these definitions are from non-technical sources and are non-contemporaneous with the ’252 patent’s priority date, and are thus of limited relevance to our analysis. Reply 14 n.7. As for expert testimony, Patent Owner’s expert submits that “[a] POSITA would understand that folding a substrate requires bending the substrate so that one part of the substrate is in full contact with another part of the substrate.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 81. However, Patent Owner’s expert provides no evidence or explanation for this conclusory assertion, so we give it little weight. See id.; PO Resp. 18–19; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that Garbuzov discloses stacked LEDs, with a coating on one of those LEDs, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, which we discuss in detail below. To briefly summarize, first, we agree with Petitioner (and Patent Owner does not dispute) that Figure 39 (above) of the ’252 patent depicts an OLED. Second, we agree that each of the sets of layers Petitioner identifies in Garbuzov as an OLED has a similar structure as the OLED in Figure 39 of the ’252 patent, and is therefore an OLED. See, e.g., Ex. 1089, 48:3–6. Third, we agree with Petitioner that the phosphor layer 114 is applied to one of Garbuzov’s OLEDs within the stacked set of OLEDs, as shown in Garbuzov Figure 2, and therefore, that Garbuzov discloses coating an LED with a phosphor. Finally, we agree with Petitioner that phosphor layer 114 produces a change in color because Garbuzov describes phosphor layer 114 as “red downconversion phosphor layer 114.” See Ex. 1016, 3:32–33.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,492,252 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,492,252
• Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2023 · IPR2021-01347 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 and 21–25 are unpatentable: claims 6 and 24 are anticipated by Birrell; the remaining challenged claims are obvious over the stated combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner contends there are “several problems” with Petitioner’s proposed definition. PO Resp. 11. In particular, Patent Owner contends the “and/or” qualifier and addition of “or a related field” could be read to allow an individual with no experience with LED devices to be a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. Upon review of the parties’ arguments, the prior art of record, and the ’298 patent, we agree with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had experience working with LEDs and/or LED circuit design. Thus, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of one of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that neither party asserts that the outcome of this case rests on resolving the small differences between the parties’ definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “C. Claim Construction In this proceeding, the claims of the ’298 patent are construed “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have had to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention in the context of the 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party contends any terms of the ’298 patent require construction. Pet. 5–6; PO Resp. 12. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we agree that no terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “By its express language, the claim term “wirelessly” is best understood as “without the use of a wire.” We are directed to no disclosure in the written description or prosecution history that would contradict this conclusion or otherwise shed light on the meaning of this claim term. There is no dispute that capacitive coupling does not use a wire or any other form of direct contact to transmit power. Thus, the plain meaning of “wirelessly” encompasses capacitive coupling. This conclusion is supported 6,336,031 states that “[c]onnectionless (i.e., wireless) transmission of analog and digital signals has previously been accomplished using . . . [c]apacitive coupling.” Ex. 1131, 1:10–18. Likewise, U.S. Patent No. 6,988,026 describes a “power receiving system which receive[s] power wirelessly (inductively, through radio frequency energy transfer and/or capacitively).” Ex. 1133, 113:64–114:2. Mr. Credelle’s counter-testimony is not persuasive because he does not explain in any detail why one of ordinary skill in the art would not understand a capacitive coupling that transfers power to be a wireless system. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 80.” slip op. at 50

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “KSR instructs that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Here, Petitioner proposes to substitute one known method of transmitting power for another (an inductor in place of two capacitors), according to known methods (Logan), and Patent Owner does not dispute that the combination would yield a predictable result of wirelessly providing power from one device to another. This suggests that the proposed combination would have been obvious. Id. point to a specific problem discussed in Birrell for which Logan’s method of using inductive coupling would be a solution. See In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The use of patents as references is not limited to what the patentees describe as their own inventions or to the problems with which they are concerned. They are part of the literature of the art, relevant for all they contain.”) (internal quotations omitted). What the Petition must demonstrate is that there was some reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to combine the elements in the manner proposed. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. The Petition provides multiple, persuasive reasons (discussed above) as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to use inductors, as disclosed in Logan, to wirelessly transmit power to a lighting device, such as that disclosed in Birrell.13 (d) Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we find that Petitioner presents multiple, persuasive reasons as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to implement the wireless power transmission system of Logan in the lighting device of Birrell.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 10,966,298 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,966,298
• Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2023 · IPR2021-01300 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over the asserted combinations of Oba and the additional references listed for each ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner provides a very similar definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, but removes the “and/or” qualifier for experience with LED devices, as well as the allowance for individuals to have experience in an unspecified “related field.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner contends these modifications are appropriate because Petitioner’s proposed definition would allow an individual with no experience with LEDs to be a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. art of record, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan as it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’697 patent and with the prior art of record. We note, however, that neither party asserts that any arguments in this proceeding rise or fall based on the definition that is adopted.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Neither party contends any terms of the ’697 patent require construction. And, upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we determine that no terms require construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Petitioner provides uncontroverted testimony from Dr. Baker, which we credit, that: (1) Oba’s laptop computer necessarily has a battery ground (Ex. 1002 ¶ 102); (2) it was known in the art, for example as disclosed in Hara, that a capacitor could be coupled between a battery ground and the circuit elements powered by the device in order to serve as a filter for noise (id. ¶¶ 103, 108; Ex. 1090 ¶ 3 (asserting that AC power is a known source of noise)); and (3) capacitively coupling Oba’s battery ground to the conductor connecting the battery poles and the circuit components of the laptop computer would “smooth delivered power,” thereby “facilitating a steady supply of power” (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 104–106). As argued by Patent Owner, Hara uses a capacitive coupling to battery ground in order to mitigate standing waves caused by the extended length of the conductors connecting the laptop battery to circuit components. PO Resp. 15. The capacitive-coupling to battery ground, however, need not be used in Oba to solve the same problem identified in Hara, and Dr. Baker persuasively explains why the system of Oba would benefit from a ¶¶ 103–104; Ex. 1090 ¶ 3–10 (asserting that AC power is a known source of noise). As such, Petitioner persuasively explains why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to combine Oba and Hara to arrive at a battery ground that is capacitively coupled to the circuit components of the laptop computer. c)” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 11,019,697 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,019,697
• Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 14, 2023 · IPR2021-01369 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 11, and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over the respective combinations of Deese, Kuo, and Obeck; Deese and Kuo; and Okuno and Teshima.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “C. Claim Construction In this proceeding, the claims of the ’251 patent are construed “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2001). Under that standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have had to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “a) Analogous Art To resolve whether art is analogous we must determine “(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “c) Reason to Combine As noted above, Petitioner contends one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to add data signal preemption capabilities in Deese and Kuo because (1) Deese, Kuo, and Obeck are analogous art to the ’251 patent (i.e., are all in the field of lighting systems), (2) “[t]he need for signal preemption was well-known in the art,” and (3) Obeck expressly teaches that its use of a data receiver solves the need for signal preemption in traffic lights. Pet. 15–16. Petitioner contends one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in implementing Obeck’s data receiver and signal preemption method in Deese because Deese’s signal controller 70 is a “conventional” controller for selectively energizing the red, yellow, and green traffic lights and this is “precisely the same type of ‘regular signal control 71’ that Obeck teaches should be supplemented with 5:45–63; 1006, 6:36–48; Ex. 1002 ¶ 51).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 10,492,251 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,492,251
• Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 14, 2023 · IPR2021-01367 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are unpatentable as obvious over the Deese-based grounds; the Board did not reach the Lys- and Worley-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “February 25, 2004, would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with two years of relevant experience in the field of design and/or development of light-emitting diodes (LEDs) and circuits in the context of lighting control systems.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 24). For purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 11. Upon review of the prior art of record and Petitioner’s arguments, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Final Written Decision, as it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’551 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “In the Institution Decision, we construed “driver” to mean “a program, circuitry, or device used to power other programs, circuits, or devices.” Inst. Dec. 14. We also asked the parties to address whether the term “mounted,” as used in independent claims 1 and 5, permits indirect contact between the various components and the reflective substrate. Id. at 32 n.11. Patent Owner contends the Board’s adopted construction of “driver” is too broad, but because the arguments presented in Patent Owner’s Response to do not turn on a narrower construction of “driver,” it does not propose an alternate construction of the claim term. PO Resp. 12–13. Patent Owner does not address the scope of the term “mounted” in its Response or ask that any other claim terms be expressly construed. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we adopt our previous construction of “driver” and determine that we need not construe any additional claim terms for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We note, however, that we do provide” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Kuo discloses a “high efficiency light” that uses LEDs to emit light, as well as different lenses to amplify the intensity of the light emitted from the LEDs. See Ex. 1013, 1:6–9. Although Kuo focuses primarily on using its light as a traffic signal, Kuo is not limited to this embodiment and broadly claims “[a] high efficiency light.” Id. at 3:14–4:23 (Compare claim 1 directed to “[a] high efficiency light,” with claim 2 directed to use of the light of claim 1 “as a signal light”). Thus, we find that Kuo is in the same field of endeavor as the ’551 patent, i.e., LED lighting systems. that Kuo meets the “reasonably pertinent” prong of the analogous art test. KSR instructs that “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill in the art often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR, 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007). Given this instruction, the Federal Circuit has explained that when considering whether prior art is reasonably pertinent we must look beyond the primary problem the inventor was seeking to solve. See Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that in analyzing whether the prior art is reasonably pertinent we must construe the scope of analogous art “broadly”); see also Donner Tech., LLC. V. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that the “reasonably pertinent” analysis must look to all of the problems to which the claimed invention relates, and must not be analyzed so narrowly as to effectively collapse the “field-of-endeavor and reasonablepertinence inquiries”). Here, although the ’551 patent is primarily focused on ways to efficiently drive LEDs using AC power, the ’551 patent is also concerned with methods of assembling an LED lighting system, including the use of: an insulating substrate, a heat sink, a reflective material on which to mount the LEDs, a lens for directing light, and a light changing or enhancing substance(s). Ex. 1001, 5:6–31, code (54) (noting that the ’551 patent is directed to both AC LED drive methods and an apparatus). Kuo expressly discloses the design of a housing that uses a lens and a light reflecting surface to maximize the light obtained from LEDs. These disclosures are reasonably pertinent to at least one problem the ’551 patent was intended to solve, e.g., what techniques and materials should be used to construct an analogous art to the ’551 patent under both prongs of the analogous art test.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “5. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, and upon review of the record as a whole, we determine that Petitioner persuasively identifies where Deese and Kuo teach or suggest every limitation of independent claims 1 and 5 of the ’551 patent. Petitioner also provides a reasoned explanation as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Deese and Kuo to arrive at the subject matter of claims 1 and 5 with a reasonable expectation of success. Accordingly, Petitioner demonstrates by a” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 10,154,551 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,154,551
• Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 27, 2023 · IPR2021-01368 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 8, 11, and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over Grajcar and Walter; the Board did not reach the remaining grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with two years of relevant experience in the field of design and/or development of LEDs and circuits in the context of lighting control systems. An increase in experience could compensate for less education. Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 35). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of skill in the art. See PO Resp. 32 (referring to, but not disputing, Petitioner’s proposed level of skill). We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’783 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “1. “connection lead” Petitioner proposes only one construction, for the term “connection lead” in claim 17. Pet. 13–14. As Patent Owner disclaimed claim 17 and this term does not appear in the remaining challenged claims, we do not need to construe it. Ex. 2003.” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “2. “a switch configured to enable user selection” Prior to Institution, Patent Owner asserted that Petitioner applied an incomplete claim construction of the phrase “a switch configured to enable user selection.” Prelim. Resp. 19–22. Patent Owner contended that the switch must be “physical” and that a user must “be able to directly select an outcome.” Id. at 19. Our Institution Decision preliminarily construed “a switch configured to enable user selection of the different color temperatures of light” to permit a user to select the color temperature through direct or indirect use of the switch. Dec. 21. Patent Owner no longer disputes the construction of this term and applies our preliminary construction in its Response. PO Resp. 6. Having reviewed the complete record developed during trial, we determine that the record supports maintaining our preliminary construction of this term for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision.” slip op. at 6

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We view Petitioner’s combination to be sufficiently clear, setting forth sufficiently “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Petitioner explains that “Grajcar discloses a switch (switch 2115) configured to enable user selection” and that “[t]o the extent [Patent Owner] argues that switch 2115 does not explicitly show ‘a switch configured to enable user selection,’ it would have been obvious to modify Grajcar by adding a switch that allows user input, as taught by Walter.” Pet. 26–27 (citing Ex. 1004, ¶¶ 107, 102–112, 192–195, Fig. 21; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 72–73). This combination would have involved “integrat[ing] the LED circuits and switch of [Grajcar] Figure 21 with the LED bulb disclosed in Walter.” Id. at 21 (emphasis added). That is, the proposed combination simply aims to use Grajcar’s LED circuit in Walter’s bulb, so that Walter’s switch may actuate Grajcar’s LED circuit. See id. at 21–23, 27. Petitioner confirmed this position at the oral hearing, explaining, “so the proposed combination, looking again at Slide 13, it’s taking all of the circuits in [Grajcar] Figure 21 and putting them into the bulb of [Walter] Figure 2 where any user selection of color temperature is done using [Walter’s] Switch 170.” Tr. 11:20–23. Not only is Petitioner’s proposed combination sufficiently clear, but by arguing that Petitioner provides no “explanation of how the resulting combination would operate” or “what specific elements of Walter would be incorporated into Grajcar,” Patent Owner essentially attacks the Petition for not explaining how to bodily incorporate Grajcar into Walter. But “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). Patent Owner’s bodily incorporation argument fails to undermine Petitioner’s persuasive showing. In any event, Petitioner contends, and Patent Owner does not dispute, that “[i]t would have been well within the skill of a POSITA to implement Grajcar’s LED light with the user interface of Walter,” as “[t]he circuits described in Grajcar and claimed in claim 1 are extremely basic.” Pet. 23; see also Ex. 1002 ¶ 66 (Dr. Lebby testifying the same).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,757,783 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,757,783
• Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 18, 2023 · IPR2021-01370 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9–17 are unpatentable: claims 9–11, 13, 15, and 17 are anticipated by Dowling; claims 9–15 and 17 are obvious over Dowling, Mueller, and Okuno; claims 9–11, 15, and 16 are anticipated by Ter Weeme.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Given the breadth of the claims and specification, as well as Patent Owner’s implicit prosecution acknowledgement, we find the intrinsic evidence dispositive in this case of the meaning of “disconnected” as encompassing an electrical disconnection sufficient to turn the LED circuit off, including an electronic switch like a transistor to perform the electrical disconnection.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “Turning to our analysis, we start by addressing the interpretation of claim 9’s preamble, “[a]n LED lighting system.” Both parties brief the meaning of this preamble, but neither party addresses the threshold issue of whether the preamble is limiting. We note that “[g]enerally, a preamble is not limiting.” Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015). However, among other exceptions to this general rule, our reviewing court has “repeatedly held a preamble limiting when it serves as antecedent basis for a term appearing in the body of a claim.” In re Fought, 941 F.3d 1175, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). The body of claim 9 refers back to the preamble by reciting, “wherein the LED lighting system is driven with the AC voltage source.” Ex. 1001, 20:25–26. As such, the body of the claim relies on the preamble for antecedent basis support, and we determine that the preamble of claim 9 is limiting.” slip op. at 47

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Petitioner’s arguments are more persuasive. Dowling discloses mode switch 190, which, among other modes, can “strobe, that is, flash on and off,” LEDs in different colors. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47, 62. Dr. Neikirk testifies that this strobing action connects a red LED circuit to the AC voltage source, then disconnects it from the AC voltage source and connects a blue LED circuit to the AC voltage source. Ex. 1002 ¶ 39. Dr. Neikirk further testifies that Dowling discloses connecting and disconnecting the LED circuits to the AC voltage source via a controller that utilizes PWM to turn those circuits on and off. Ex. 1026 ¶ 27 (citing Ex. 1004, Figs. 1, 8, ¶¶ 38–43, 63). He further states, “[a]s I confirmed at my deposition, when a PWM transistor is off, it is off.” Id. (citing Ex. 2006, 33:17–25). Under the correct construction of “disconnected” set forth above, we find this evidence persuasive to show that Dowling discloses this limitation. Significantly, Dowling discloses, and Patent Owner does not dispute,8 that LEDs of 8 For the first time in the hearing, Patent Owner raised a new argument that “Petitioner [does not] point to any disclosure in Dowling that actually says that a mode turns an LED on and turns another LED circuit off.” E.g., Tr. 79:3–9. Relatedly, Patent Owner argues that Dowling’s “strobe mode” does not “cause[] some LED circuits to be connected and other LED circuits to be disconnected.” Id. at 80:21–81:2; see also id. at 81:3–83:12 (colloquy with counsel regarding the absence of a “strobe mode” discussion in the PO Response). These arguments came too late, and we do not consider them. See Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, 884 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Unless it different colors “flash on and off” in response to user selection of the mode switch, thereby teaching the claimed “second switch that allows the first LED circuit to be disconnected from the AC voltage source and a second LED circuit to be connected to an AC voltage source.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 47, 62.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “We agree with Petitioner that the combination of Dowling, Mueller, and Okuno would have rendered claim 14 obvious. We find persuasive Petitioner’s contention that it would have been obvious to implement the power conversion circuitry disclosed by Dowling for light bulb 180 using at least one transformer as taught by Mueller and Okuno. Pet. 34–35 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 85). We agree that Dowling already discloses power conversion circuitry for a light bulb, which converts a 120 volts AC input to a DC voltage of 5 or 12 volts. Id. at 29–30 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 58; Ex. 1002 ¶ 62). Specifically, Dowling describes a connection 70 for its light bulb that “may include a converter to convert received power to power that is useful,” for example, “an AC to DC converter to convert one-hundred twenty Volts at sixty Hertz into a direct current at a voltage of, for example, five Volts or twelve Volts.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 58; see also id. ¶ 63 (“A power converter can be used within the light bulb 180 to convert the received power . . . in the form of a variable amplitude AC signal . . . to the requisite power for the control circuitry and the LEDs . . . .”). We also credit Dr. Neikirk’s testimony that “a POSITA would have been motivated to investigate the known implementation details in the art regarding how to convert the AC power from a much higher voltage down to an appropriate direct current at a much lower voltage for driving LEDs, and been led to the teachings of Mueller and Okuno.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 62, quoted in Pet. 30. We further credit Dr. Neikirk’s testimony that “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to use a transformer and bridge rectifier as taught by Mueller and Okuno, and recognized the suitability of those components, for Dowling’s power conversion circuity in an Edison-mount lightbulb.” Id. ¶ 64 (citing Ex. 1004, Fig. 8, ¶¶ 62–63), quoted in Pet. 30. In other words, based on Dowling’s teachings of using power conversion circuitry in its light bulb, one of ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Okuno and recognized the suitability of a transformer for use as Dowling’s power conversion circuitry. See id. ¶¶ 62–64.” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 10,349,479 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,349,479
• Alcon Inc. / Alcon Vision, LLC et al. v. Amo Development, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 4, 2022 · IPR2021-00843 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable under §103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Both parties present compelling evidence that those of skill in the art would include individuals with experience in ophthalmology, as well as in the research, manufacture, and design of medical optics or medical lasers. Pet. 28; PO Resp. 8. The evidence of record also demonstrates that few individuals actually had such experience. Rather, teams of individuals with different expertise and various academic degrees would work together to design laser surgery systems intended to make incisions in the lens of the eye. Accordingly, we find that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been an ophthalmic surgeon or someone with a Ph.D., M.S., or B.S. degree in physics, biomedical engineering, or a related science such as optical engineering, with experience in researching, manufacturing, or designing medical optics or medical lasers (e.g., Ph.D. or five or more years to compensate for lesser degrees). These individuals would have worked in collaboration with one another to fill any necessary gaps in knowledge (e.g., the engineer would consult the medical doctor on clinical issues or” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “[C]lear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.” Catalina Mkt’g Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808–09 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, and as discussed in further detail below, the Examiner expressly allowed the claims, in part, due to an Examiner’s Amendment changing “scanning system” to “cataract surgery scanning system.” Ex. 1006, 13, 15, 18. This reliance on the preamble to help define the claimed invention transforms this portion of the preamble into a limitation. See Catalina Mkt’g, 289 F.3d. at 808. slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “(4) Analysis As discussed above, the intrinsic record of the ’023 patent, that is, the claims, written description, and prosecution history, suggests that a “cataract surgery scanning system” is one that is capable of performing at least one incision related to cataract surgery. This may include cataract and relaxation incisions in the cornea, limbus, or sclera, or incisions in the lens or lens capsule. Accordingly, we construe the claim term “cataract surgery scanning system” to require that the system be designed to, or capable of, performing at least one step of cataract surgery, such as creating an incision in the cornea or other exterior tissues to allow access for surgical instruments, correcting for astigmatism, creating an opening in the anterior lens capsule, or fragmenting the lens. See Pet. 20 (Petitioner describing the steps of a “typical cataract surgery”).” slip op. at 20

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In the Institution Decision, after reviewing the claims, written description, and prosecution history, we construed the claim phrase “cataract incision therein that provides access to an eye chamber of the patient’s eye, the incision . . . only partially extending through the target tissue” to require “a partially penetrating cataract incision that, when completed by the surgeon or another individual, allows access for lens removal instrumentation.” Dec. 13–14. Patent Owner agrees with this construction (PO Resp. 13) and Petitioner does not expressly dispute the construction in its Reply. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the Institution Decision, we adopt this construction for purposes of this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 9,233,023 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,233,023
• TCT Mobile (US), Inc. / TCT Mobile (US) Holdings, Inc. et al. v. Fundamental Innovation Systems International LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 23, 2022 · IPR2021-00599 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 8, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious over Morita and the knowledge of a skilled artisan.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Baker testifies that “[b]ecause the SE1 signal differentiates between PS/2 and USB interfaces, the SE1 signal in Casebolt . . . identifies a power source type.” Ex. 1026 ¶ 16. Dr. Baker relies on the undisputed facts that “the PS/2 interface provides a maximum current of 275 mA” and “according to the USB specification, a high-power function can draw up to 500 mA, while a low-power function may draw only up to 100mA.” Id. As discussed above, although Dr. Fernald testifies that Casebolt uses SE1 to distinguish between PS/2 and USB and that PS/2 and USB have different current limits, he offers no explanation for his conclusion that Casebolt does not suggest use of SE1 to identify a power source type. See Ex. 2023 ¶ 67. We credit Dr. Baker’s testimony over that of Dr. Fernald on this point because it is consistent with the evidence that USB and PS/2 have different current limits. Consequently, we find that Casebolt shows using an SE1 signal to identify a power source type was known to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 35

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 10

  • ExcludeOther

    “III. PETITIONER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Petitioner moves to exclude Exhibit 2030. Paper 28, 1. Petitioner contends Patent Owner filed Exhibit 2030 with its Sur-reply in violation of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), which prohibits the filing of new evidence other than deposition transcripts with the Sur-reply. Id. at 1–2. We do not rely on Exhibit 2030 in this Decision. Consequently, we dismiss Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 43

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “Patent Owner also submits “the preambles for claims 1 and 8 are limiting because they provide antecedent basis to ‘the mobile device’ in the rest of the claims and further limit the claimed ‘mobile device’ to one ‘configurable for use in a wireless telecommunications network.’” 7 Dr. Baker applies this construction in his Reply Declaration. See, e.g., Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 11–12. PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:49–50, 12:30–32). We need not reach the question of whether the preamble is limiting because, as explained below in our analysis of claim 1, there is no dispute that Morita discloses the subject matter of the preambles of claims 1 and 8. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Alleged Obviousness of Claims 1, 2, 8, and 9 over Morita and/or the” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 7,834,586 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,834,586

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.