- Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01462 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Solus’s rehearing request, leaving institution denied for claims 1–8 because the petition did not adequately show motivation to combine Hanafusa and Dobashi.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined “if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“In particular, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz adequately explain why a POSITA looking for ways to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile would look to methods to achieve Dobashi’s RSm values. Dobashi teaches that because RSm “can be adopted as the period of waviness, RSm can also be used as an indicator for judgment of the surface.” Ex. 1005, 2:66–3:1, 6:23–26. Dobashi explains that waviness is “an indicator for determining whether the fine pattern forming performance is good or bad,” and “[t]he surface has small waviness and is smooth when RSm is large, and the surface has large waviness Dobashi also teaches that surface roughness Rzjis is used as a low-profile indicator. Ex. 1005, 2:66–3:1. Dobashi, therefore, teaches that RSm is an indicator of surface waviness, which Dobashi explains is different than surface roughness. Id. at 2:66– 3:3, 6:23–29. Given these teachings in Dobashi, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Josefowicz sufficiently explains how or why a POSITA would have been motivated to implement Dobashi’s RSm values to make Hanafusa’s surface roughness low-profile. See Pet. 10–12; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46–52.” slip op. at 4
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 11,346,014 - Solus Advanced Materials Co., Ltd. v. SK Nexilis Co., Ltd.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 7, 2025 · IPR2024-01461 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left in place its denial of institution because Petitioner did not show that claims 1–10 were likely obvious over the asserted combinations.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW When rehearing a decision on institution, we do not review the merits of the decision de novo, but instead review the decision for an abuse of discretion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c). An abuse of discretion may be determined “if a decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of law, if a factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or if the decision represents an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Arnold Partnership v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re 1 US 2013/0108922 A1, published May 2, 2013 (Ex. 1004, “Shinozaki”). 2 G. Khatibi, Temperature Dependent Elastic and Thermal Properties of Thin Copper Foils, Copper; Proceedings of the International Conference Copper ’06 (2006) (Ex. 1006, “Khatibi”). 3 Korean Patent Pub. No. 10-2012-0003485, published Jan. 10, 2012 (Ex. 1013; Ex. 1014 (English translation), “Toshio”). 4 US 2013/0108887 A1, published May 2, 2013 (Ex. 1012, “Kim”). 5 Griesi, M.B., Characterization of Electrodeposited Copper Foil Surface Roughness for Accurate Conductor Power Loss Modeling (2014) (Master’s Thesis, University of South Carolina) (Ex. 1015, “Griesi”). rehearing has the burden to show that the decision should be modified. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). Additionally, the request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” Id.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Not shown unpatentable
“For example, Dr. Randall does not provide adequate explanation or objective evidence to support his opinion that Khatibi’s use of a laser speckle based dilatometer instead of the claimed thermomechanical analyzer “is unlikely to significantly impact the CTE[6] value” because “variations in equipment and a heating speed of 5° C/min would not significantly alter the results.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 58. In particular, Dr. Randall neither explains what constitutes a “significant” impact on CTE, nor provides objective evidence to support his contention that equipment variations and heating differences would not “significantly alter” the resulting measurements. And although Dr. Randall opines that “the heating rate (5°C per minute) is typical for certain devices” such as a thermomechanical analyzer or dilatometer, and “[t]ypically, these devices use temperature ramp rates between 2°C and 20°C per minutes, so the ‘5° C./min’ recited in [1d] is common and should not drastically affect the measurement results,” Dr. Randall fails to point us to any evidence showing that these temperatures are “typical” or that the claimed heating rate is “common.” Id. ¶ 59 (emphases added).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner, however, does not adequately explain why a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s copper foil surface to have a Pc value of 19.2 as reported in Griesi. In particular, neither Petitioner nor Dr. Randall points us to, nor do we discern, any teaching in Griesi that a peak count of 19.2 provides any particular benefits or properties that would have lead a POSITA to modify Kim’s copper foil surface as Petitioner proposes. Instead, Petitioner’s arguments that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Kim’s copper foil surface with Griesi’s peak count patent itself. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (stating that the fact finder must be aware “of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning”). It was Petitioner’s burden to establish that the combined teachings Kim and Griesi disclose limitation [1g] as proposed. We are not persuaded that we misapprehended Petitioner’s argument when we determined that Petitioner did not meet that burden.” slip op. at 8
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“It was Petitioner’s burden to establish the Khatibi, alone or in combination with Shinozaki, Toshio, and Kim, discloses limitation [1d]. We concluded that Petitioner failed to meet that burden for the reasons explained in our Decision. We are not persuaded that we overlooked or misapprehended Khatibi’s disclosures, or Petitioner’s evidence and explanation thereof, in doing so.7” slip op. at 5
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,811,689 - PTAB · Sep 19, 2025 · PGR2025-00025 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–19 and all asserted grounds, finding it more likely than not that claim 1 is anticipated by the Gatorade Label.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Post-grant review is available for patents that issue from applications that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). After considering the briefing and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has shown that the ’422 Patent is eligible for post-grant review and has shown it is more likely than not that at least one challenged claim of the ’422 Patent is unpatentable under § 324(a). Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims of the ’422 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would possess at least (1) a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a related field, with (2) five years of experience in material identification and characterization using multiple analytical methods and field sampling, or equivalent research or professional experience.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 24). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition for one of ordinary skill in the art nor provide a proposed definition of its own. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed proposal regarding the level of one of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“336. The applicant explained that not all combinations of shrink films and light blocking materials are recyclable. Id. at 335. The applicant explained that films can be compatible with PET recycling in two ways, (1) the film can float in water and be separated from PET that sinks in water or (2) the PET films crystallize and “can be recovered with the PET stream.” Id. at 336 (citing “A Resource Document by the Association of Plastic Recyclers (APR)”) (found at Ex. 1002, 323–332) (emphasis omitted). The applicant explained that “removing the label before or during the recycling process is not evidence of the recyclability of the label” and that “[r]emoving the label during the recycling process is not equivalent to actually recycling the label.” Id. at 335. As such, a POSITA reading the prosecution history would understand that a label is not recyclable with a PET container, as recited by the independent claims, by removing the label from the PET recycle stream before or during the recycling process.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“To determine how a person skill in the art would determine if a shrink label is “recyclable” as recited in the independent claims, we look to how the Specification of the ’422 Patent describes or defines recyclable shrink labels. For example, the ’422 Patent states that PET shrink films are generally considered recyclable if no inks are retained on the film after a caustic wash cycle typically used in PET reclaiming processes. Ex. 1001, 6:61–65. The ’422 Patent further states that labels are fully recyclable if the polymers used are clear, preferably clear PET, and the labels include inks that can be washed off in a “typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash).” Id. at 11:44– 49; see also id. at 11:49–54 (describing embodiments in which the labels are free or substantially free of inks that cannot be washed off in a caustic wash or where the labels are free or substantially free of color plastics that cannot be recycled). The ’422 Patent further discusses “industry standards” for determining whether various embodiments of shrink labels are recyclable. See, e.g., id. at 11:29–53. For example, the Specification states that the “Association for Plastic Recyclers (APR) Critical Guidance Protocol for Clear PET Articles with Labels and Closures (PET-CG-02)” (Ex. 1005) can certify that a film is fully recyclable with a container or bottle. Id. at 11:34– 38. Additionally, the Specification states that labels “are recyclable according to the Evaluation of the Near Infrared (NIR) Sorting Potential of a Whole Plastic Article (SORT-B-01)” (Ex. 1010) and/or the “Evaluation of Sorting Potential for Plastic Articles Utilizing Metal, Metalized, or Metallic Printed Components (SORT-B-03)” (Ex. 1011). Ex. 1001, 11:39–44. The ’422 Patent further states that embodiments of the labels “are fully recyclable. For example, the labels may include inks that can be washed off in a typical PET recycling wash (caustic wash) and the polymers” are preferably clear PET. Id. at 11:44–48. The ’422 Patent thus provides various descriptions or standards to determine the recyclability of shrink labels. For the purposes of addressing the anticipation and obviousness grounds, we determine that any of these standards can be used to determine if a shrink label is “recyclable.” We note that our construction is preliminary and is based on the present record. We invite the parties to further the address the construction of “wherein the recyclable shrink label is recyclable with a PET container” during trial.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,961,422 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01382 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment against all challenged claims after their statutory disclaimer, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,740,423 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01228 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment on the disclaimed challenged claims, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,656,422 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01227 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment after it disclaimed challenged claims 1–5 and 8–13, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,435,542 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01218 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after it disclaimed challenged claims 1–5 and 8–13, terminating the inter partes review.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 10,795,107 - Champion Laboratories, Inc. / First Brands Group, LLC v. Hengst SENo claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-00603 · APJ Sheldon M Mcgee · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 5, 8–11, 15–17, 19, 23–25, and 28–30 were not shown unpatentable over Yokoyama, Yokoyama and Cline, or Honermann and Cline.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“On this record, we determine that the level of ordinary skill is reflected in the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (specific findings on the ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163–64 (Fed. Cir. 1985))). Because the level of ordinary skill in the art is not in dispute, and because the parties’ definition is consistent with the disclosures in the ʼ203 patent, the prior art, and the declaration testimony of Mr. Nranian and Dr. Basirat, we view the prior art and arguments through this lens when determining whether the claims are unpatentable as obvious over the prior art.5 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17 (identifying “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art” as an underlying factual inquiry to be resolved in deciding obviousness, which is a question of law).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Although the parties spend significant portions of their briefing discussing the term “eccentric” and how it applies to certain figures from the ʼ203 patent and the relied-upon prior art, we determine that it is not necessary to expressly construe the term “eccentric” beyond the parties’ agreed-upon definition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Ltd., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Rather, we adopt Patent Owner’s proffered definition because it is consistent with the intrinsic record and because it is not in dispute. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that the plain meaning of the term “eccentric” is defined as “located elsewhere than at the geometric center; also: having the axis or support so located.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing the Merriam-Webster online dictionary definition of the term “eccentric” for support). Petitioner agrees with this definition. Pet. 35 (asserting that certain prior art elements are eccentric “because they are not located at the center of the filter insert or housing”); Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”); see also Ex. 2017 ¶ 33 (Dr. Basirat testifying that “[a] POSITA would understand that ‘eccentric’ in the context of [the] ʼ203 patent, means that central axis is located elsewhere than at the geometric center [and] not placed centrally or not having its axis or other part placed centrally”). The parties’ definition of “eccentric” is also consistent with the usage of the term in the ʼ203 patent. Ex. 1001, 10:23–31; Fig. 17.” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“(opining that “Patent Owner’s construction of ‘having an axis no located in a geometric center’ is too narrow”). Mr. Nranian’s Declaration testimony in this respect is not persuasive for several reasons. First, it is internally inconsistent. Compare Ex. 1016 ¶ 3 (criticizing the “axis” language in Patent Owner’s definition), with id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (relying on that very language to support an argument). Also, Mr. Nranian’s proposed definition of “eccentric” to merely mean “not located at the center” begs the question of what, precisely, is “the center”? Mr. Nranian does not persuasively explain how far a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand she could travel from the exact center point of an object and still be in “the center” of that object. See Tr. 10:13–19 (Judge McGee asking whether the center is “a miniscule point in the middle of [the] disc”); see also id. at 10:25–12:26 (Judge Weatherly highlighting the significant ambiguity in referring to something as in “the center”). Also, Mr. Nranian’s opinion is inconsistent with how the ʼ203 patent compares something that is “central,” i.e., “at the center,” and something that is “eccentrically” located. Ex. 1001, 7:13–14 (describing pipe nozzle 15 as “central”); id. at 8:53–56 (describing a “through hole” as “located in the center of the front panel 22” depicted in Figures 7 and 8); id. at 10:23–31 (describing return 12 as “in the center” and outlet 13 as “eccentrically thereto” in Figure 17). Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated Figure 7 is reproduced below: Patent Owner’s colorized and annotated version of Figure 7 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates “central pipe nozzle 15” in yellow passing through the “through hole” located in “the center” of front panel 22. PO Resp. 20. Significantly, pipe nozzle 15 and the through hole in panel 22 are both described as “central” and in “the center” but must have different diameters; otherwise, “central pipe nozzle 15” would not be capable of traveling through “through hole 22.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 7. Thus, the ʼ203 patent intrinsically bases whether an element is “central” or “in the center” on whether its axis is located at the geometric center. This is also illustrated in Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent, reproduced below: Figure 17 of the ʼ203 patent illustrates filter housing 10 with return 12 “in the center . . . and, eccentrically thereto, the outlet 13 with the seat 14 for the blocking element 24.” Ex. 1001, 10:23–30. Finally, Mr. Nranian’s narrow interpretation of “eccentric”––which excludes the “having the axis or support so located” in the geometric center language––is at odds with the arguments it was proffered to support. Cf. Pet. Reply 9 (arguing that certain elements are eccentric because they “do not have an axis located at the geometric center”); id. at 10 (arguing the eccentricity of an element that does “not have an axis in the center” which has “an off-center axis”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 9,023,203 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,023,203 - Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01469 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not determined unpatentable under the asserted prior-art grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we disagree with Patent Owner that Menard is a “real party in interest” under § 315(b). See Resp. 77–82; Sur-reply 27–28. First, the circumstances here differ materially from the circumstances in Ventex. There, two agreements defined the relationship between Ventex (the petitioner and manufacturer of Heatwave fabric) and Seirus (the alleged real party in interest and purchaser of Heatwave fabric). Ventex, IPR2017- 00651, Paper 152 at 7 & n.8. First, a 2013 Supplier Agreement “prevented Ventex from selling to Seirus competitors” and included an indemnity provision requiring Ventex to indemnify Seirus for losses arising from Ventex’s failure to perform certain obligations. Id. at 7, 14. Second, a 2016 Exclusive Manufacturing Agreement provided that Ventex would manufacture the Heatwave fabric only for Seirus in exchange for Seirus’s payment of an exclusivity fee. Id. at 7. Columbia (the patent owner) accused Seirus products incorporating the Heatwave fabric of infringing the patent at issue, and Columbia served Seirus with a complaint alleging patent infringement in 2014 more than two years before Ventex filed a petition in 2017. Id. at 5, 7. When determining that Seirus was a “real party in interest” under § 315(b), the Board reasoned that “Ventex and Seirus had a specially structured, preexisting, and well established business relationship with one another, including indemnification and exclusivity arrangements.” Ventex, IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 10; see id. at 12. Additionally, the Board noted that certain evidence “suggest[ed] that” slip op. at 32
- Skill levelOther
“C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include (1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior-art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and (6) the educational level of workers active in the field. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Not all factors may exist in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. These factors are not exhaustive, but merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the ’336 patent’s effective filing date would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, optics, or physics with at least three years of experience working in the design of LED lights or lighting fixtures; a master’s degree in one of the above disciplines with at least two years of experience; or equivalent experience.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26–29). Dr. Eden’s testimony supports Petitioner’s assertion. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 27–28. Patent Owner “adopts for purposes of this proceeding only” Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan. Resp. 10 (citing Pet. 14). We adopt Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’336 patent as” slip op. at 40
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Alleged Objective Indicia of Nonobviousness (i) General Principles Before reaching a conclusion about obviousness, we consider evidence concerning objective indicia of nonobviousness. See Apple, 839 F.3d at 1048. For such evidence to have substantial weight, “its proponent must establish a nexus between the evidence and the merits of the claimed invention.” ClassCo, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 838 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Ancora Techs., Inc. v. Roku, Inc., 140 F.4th 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (noting that the Board did not err by requiring “a nexus to the challenged claims as opposed to the patent as a whole”). “[T]here is no nexus unless the evidence presented is ‘reasonably commensurate with the scope of the claims.’” ClassCo, 838 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). The patentee “bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “when the patentee shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied to a specific product and that product ‘embodies the claimed features, and is coextensive with them.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 882 F.3d 1056, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). Whether a rebuttable presumption of nexus arises “turns on the nature of the claims and the specific facts.” Teva Pharms. Int’l GmbH v. Eli Lilly & Co., 8 F.4th 1349, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The presumption analysis should consider the unclaimed features in the product tied to the objective evidence to assess their significance and impact on the correspondence between the patented invention and the product. Quanergy Sys., Inc. v. Velodyne Lidar USA, Inc., 24 F.4th 1406, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 2022). When, “for example, the patented invention is only a small component of the product tied to the objective evidence, there is no presumption of nexus.” Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Absent a presumption of nexus, the patentee may prove nexus by” slip op. at 76
Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,336 - Luminex International Co., Ltd. / Menard, Inc. v. Signify Holdings B.V.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00101 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable; claims 8, 16, and 17 are not shown unpatentable under the asserted grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner
“G. Analysis 1. REAL PARTY IN INTEREST Based on the record before us and for the reasons explained below, we” slip op. at 32
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner
“III. WHETHER THE PETITION IS TIME BARRED The parties dispute whether the Petition is time barred based on a” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“vacated the panel’s decision denying institution. Paper 12, 6. Among other things, the Director determined based on a “review of the current record” that (1) Menard is not a real party in interest in this proceeding and (2) Menard is not a privy of Petitioner. Id. at 5. Further, the Director remanded the case to the panel and instructed the panel “to determine whether the Petition presents a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), and to determine whether to institute inter partes review accordingly.” Id. at 5–6.” slip op. at 3
- BurdenMixed
“U.S. Patent No. 10,299,336 B2 (“the ’336 patent”) (Exhibit 1001). For the reasons explained below, a preponderance of the evidence shows that claims 1–7, 9–15, and 18–20 in the ’336 patent are unpatentable and does not show that claims 8, 16, and 17 are unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2024).” slip op. at 2
Patent outcomesUS 10,299,336 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,299,336
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.