- Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Nucurrent, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 7, 2020 · IPR2019-00861 · APJ Wesley B Derrick · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Samsung’s rehearing request and instituted review on all challenged claims and all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“in an unusual place in time. As noted, the Petition was filed (March 22, 2019), and the Preliminary Response submitted (June 26, 2019), before promulgation of our 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update (July 16, 2019). At the time of filing, Petitioner could not have known of the guidance set forth in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update concerning multiple petitions. Although Petitioner “could, in theory, have filed a single petition including all of its grounds within the page limits,” Petitioner, acting on the guidance available to it at the time of filing, “determined that filing two separate IPR petitions allowed each asserted ground of unpatentability to be presented in a more clear and comprehensive manner.” Req. 4. Thereafter, the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update issued on the same day as our conference call to discuss the parties’ requests for additional briefing (July 16, 2019), and these concurrent events would not have allowed the parties time to review and apply the guidance in a manner that would have permitted them to tailor their requests for additional briefing or their filing strategy to accommodate the newly-issued guidance. In the subsequent briefing by both parties, the impact of the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, although discussed briefly, was not the primary focus. See generally Reply; Sur-Reply. This is understandable, given the breadth of the complex estoppel issues raised in this case as well as the contemporaneous issuance of the guidance in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update. Thus, on account of the timing of the Petition filed in this case relative to other events, and based on the reasoning presented by Petitioner in the Request, which we discuss in more detail below, we are persuaded that we should reconsider whether to allow institution of inter partes review based on the arguments presented in the Petition.” slip op. at 11
- Parallel petitionsInstitutedInstituted
“review, addresses Lee-based grounds rooted in anticipation (and obviousness over Lee and secondary references). IPR2019-00859, Paper 1. The petition in IPR2019-00861 addresses Partovi-based grounds rooted in obviousness. IPR2019-00861, Paper 1. In the Request, Petitioner argues that there is “almost no overlap” between the Partovi-based Petition in this case and Petitioner’s Lee-based petition in IPR2019-00859 (Req. 3), noting that “all grounds of the instant Petition rely on Partovi as the primary reference while the ’859 proceeding grounds rely on Lee as the primary reference” (id. at 2). In support, Petitioner provides a table depicting the various grounds presented in the two cases, and the differences between the two. Id. at 3. Petitioner also argues that “Partovi’s teachings are not redundant of Lee’s” because the references “disclose the claimed features of the ’046 patent in different ways.” Id. More particularly, Petitioner explains that “Lee is generally focused on an inductor structure” while “Partovi contains a more complete and clear disclosure of methods and circuitry for operating inductors,” which is important because the “dependent claims involve additional circuitry used in an inductor’s operation.” Id. at 4. Although Petitioner acknowledges that it “could, in theory, have filed a single petition including all of its grounds within the page limits,” Petitioner contends that “doing so would have resulted in a reduction in the thoroughness and completeness of the analysis presented due to the large number of challenged claims.” Id. Specifically, Petitioner argues that “NuCurrent chose to assert 98 claims from four patents against Samsung in a parallel district court litigation” and that Petitioner had to file two petitions in order to address “the sheer number of claims at issue.” Id. at 5. On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s arguments concerning the differences between the petitions, and Petitioner’s reasons for presenting its arguments in two petitions, as it did, merit reconsideration of our denial of institution. The differences between the petitions in this instance, as explained by Petitioner, support its position that there is a need for the Partovi reference to distinctly address certain limitations of the dependent claims. The number of claims asserted against Petitioner in corresponding litigation, as well, is a factor enumerated in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update as a circumstance in which more than one petition may be necessary. 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, 26 (“circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary” include “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation”). We note again that although Patent Owner was authorized to file a ten-page response to Petitioner’s Request (Dec. 5), in which it could have addressed, inter alia, Petitioner’s arguments about the differences between these Petitions or the number of claims at issue, Patent Owner did not file a response to the Request, leaving Petitioner’s contentions regarding rehearing undisputed on the present record.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)InstitutedInstituted
“Rehearing, on this record, we do not agree that proceeding to trial would be an inefficient use of Board resources. The number of Patent Owner’s patents that are being challenged is not a reason to deny institution. “[R]ecogniz[ing] the potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents,” the Board has enumerated factors that guide its discretion as to whether to deny institution under § 314(a), “especially as to ‘follow-on’ petitions challenging the same patent as challenged previously in an IPR . . . proceeding.” Trial Practice Guide Update 9 (August 2018) (quoting General Plastic, slip op. 16–17). Although a multiplicity of grounds relying on a number of principal references addressed in a number of separate petitions may raise concerns regarding fairness in some instances, we find no such concerns here, for largely the same reasons articulated above with respect to our disposition of the Request for Rehearing. In these circumstances, as discussed above, we are not persuaded that defending against both challenges is unfair, abusive, or unduly burdensome for Patent Owner. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Veveo, Inc., IPR2019-00237, Paper 15 at 14–15 (PTAB Jul. 5, 2019) (instituting inter partes review on two petitions addressing the same patent).” slip op. at 29
- BurdenInstitutedInstituted
“and 28, we discern no deficiency in Petitioner’s characterization of the cited references and the knowledge in the art, or in Petitioner’s assertions as to the reasonable inferences an ordinary artisan would have made from those references, to the extent the ground relies on AC current and voltage and the inherent characteristics of inductors for the limitation “wherein when an electrical current is propagated within at least the first conductor layer, a magnetic flux is generated within the inductor when a change occurs in at least one of a frequency, a magnitude, or a waveform shape of the propagated electrical current.” Because this showing is sufficient to demonstrate teaching of this claim element was in the prior art as alleged, we need not reach Petitioner’s alternative reasoning grounded on changes in the duty cycle as to frequency and waveform shape meeting this particular claim limitation. Thus, based on the information presented at this stage of the proceeding, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of independent claims 1 and 28 as obvious over Partovi in view of Chiang.” slip op. at 44
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,300,046 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Nucurrent, Inc.Rehearing grantedPTAB · Feb 7, 2020 · IPR2019-00860 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Rehearing
The Board granted Samsung’s rehearing request and instituted review of claims 1–8, 10, 12, 13, 15–22, and 24–30 on every asserted obviousness ground.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, grantedGranted
“On this record, we are persuaded that Petitioner’s arguments concerning the differences between the Petitions, and Petitioner’s reasons for presenting its arguments in two Petitions, as it did, merit reconsideration of our denial of institution. The differences between the Petitions in this instance, as explained by Petitioner, evince a need for the Partovi reference to distinctly address certain limitations of the dependent claims. The number of claims asserted against Petitioner in corresponding litigation, as well, is a factor enumerated in the 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update as a circumstance in which more than one petition may be necessary. 2019 Trial Practice Guide Update, 26 (“circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary” include “when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation”). We note again that although Patent Owner was authorized to file a ten-page response to Petitioner’s Request (Dec. 5), in which it could have addressed, inter alia, Petitioner’s arguments about the differences between these Petitions or the number of claims at issue, Patent Owner did not file a response to the Request, leaving Petitioner’s contentions regarding rehearing undisputed on the present record.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“Rehearing, on this record, we do not agree that proceeding to trial would be an inefficient use of Board resources. We also do not agree that the number of Patent Owner’s patents that are being challenged is a reason to deny institution. “[R]ecogniz[ing] the potential for abuse of the review process by repeated attacks on patents,” the Board has enumerated factors that guide its discretion as to whether to deny institution under § 314(a), “especially as to ‘follow-on’ petitions challenging the same patent as challenged previously in an IPR . . . proceeding.” Trial Practice Guide Update 9 (August 2018) (quoting General Plastic, slip op. 16–17). Although a multiplicity of grounds relying on a number of principal references addressed in a number of separate petitions may raise concerns regarding fairness in some instances, we find no such concerns here, for largely the same reasons articulated above with respect to our disposition of the Request for Rehearing. In these circumstances, as we have already discussed above, we are not persuaded that defending against both challenges is unfair, abusive, or unduly burdensome for Patent Owner. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). See Comcast Cable Communications, LLC v. Veveo, Inc., IPR2019-00237, Paper 15 at 14–15 (PTAB Jul. 5, 2019) (instituting inter partes review on two petitions addressing the same patent).” slip op. at 27
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) effective November 13, 2018) (now codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.100 (2019)). Under Phillips, claim terms are generally afforded “their ordinary and customary meaning,” read “in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13. “[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Id. at 1313. Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Petitioner does not propose a construction for any of the limitations of the claims. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 37). Patent Owner also declines to address the construction of the claims. See generally Prelim. Resp. We decline to construe any claim term of the ’960 patent because it is not necessary to do so in reaching our decision that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“For the reasons set forth above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’960 patent. Thus, we institute an inter partes review. IV. ORDER Accordingly, it is: ORDERED that Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing is granted; FURTHER ORDERED that an inter partes review is instituted on each of the grounds asserted in the Petition; and” slip op. at 49
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,680,960 - Autodesk, Inc. v. Uniloc USA, Inc. And Uniloc Luxembourg, S.A.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 11, 2017 · CBM2016-00043 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · CBM · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 12–19 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 3, 8–11, and 20 are subject to adverse judgment after disclaimer.
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“B. Statutory Disclaimer During the pendency of this proceeding, Patent Owner filed a disclaimer pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a). Ex. 2014. According to this disclaimer, Patent Owner disclaims claims 3, 8–11, and 20 of the ’820 patent. Id.; see also Resp. 1 (“Contemporaneously with the filing of this Response, Patent Owner is disclaiming claims 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 20 of the ’820 Patent.”). Our rules provide for entry of adverse judgment against a Patent Owner who disclaims “a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Although Patent Owner does not disclaim all the challenged claims, and although Patent Owner therefore has some claims remaining in this trial, we construe the disclaimer of claims 3, 8–11, and 20 as a request for the entry of adverse judgment solely with respect to those claims. We grant the request and enter adverse judgment with respect to claims 3, 8–11, and 20.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“1. Add-On Computer Software Code Both parties propose construing “add-on computer software code,” a term that appears in every challenged claim. Ex. 1001, 78:43–82:36. Petitioner argues that this term should be interpreted as a “set of computer code that cannot be run independently from a parent program.” Pet. 22. Patent Owner argues that the term should be interpreted as “set of computer code that is designed to run within a parent computer software application or code, particularly architectural CAD software (or another architectural, civil, industrial, or other software design tool), as an internal component.” Resp. 42–43. We agree with Patent Owner. Patent Owner’s construction is taken directly from the written description of the ’820 patent, which provides a reasonably clear, deliberate, and precise definition of the term. See Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480; Ex. 1001, 61:42–51 (“The plug-in (add-on) computer software code is . . . .”). To the extent that Petitioner’s proposed construction seeks to limit add-on software code further by requiring that the software code be incapable of running independently from a parent program, as opposed merely to being designed to run within the parent program as an internal component, this further limitation is inconsistent with the lexicography undertaken by the patentee of the ’820 patent. Accordingly, we construe “add-on computer software code” as a “set of computer code that is designed to run within a parent computer software application or code, particularly architectural CAD software (or another architectural, civil, industrial, or other software design tool), as an internal component.”” slip op. at 6
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable
“As discussed above, the ’820 patent describes solving problems with the generation of cost estimates of construction projects, including that the process takes significant time and effort, that the estimates produced are difficult to revise, and that the estimates can be inaccurate, leading to cost overruns and difficulties obtaining construction loans. Ex. 1001, 1:15–62. The claims recite a computer readable medium or system for automating the process of generating a price schedule, which is used to develop the overall project cost estimate. Id. at 78:43–82:36. In so doing, the claims do not recite any “specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities,” such as the “self-referential table for a computer database” in Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336. Instead, the claims of the ’820 patent “invoke[]” known aspects of computer technology, including “[a] non-transitory computer readable medium,” “a computer that includes a processor and a memory,” “an add-on computer software code,” “a software design tool,” and “a database,” “merely as a tool” for solving the problem of improving the known process of generating construction project cost estimates. Id.; Ex. 1001, 78:43–60. Accordingly, the claims of the ’820 patent are not like those considered in Enfish, where the claims were determined at the first step of the Alice framework not to be directed to abstract ideas because they were directed to “[a] specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities.” 822 F.3d at 1336. Instead, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims of the ’820 patent are focused “on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea.’” Id. The ’820 patent makes clear that the heart of the claimed subject matter is generating prices for construction projects, a process that can be accomplished without automation technology. Ex. 1001, 1:15–62. The claims themselves recite “[a] non-transitory computer readable medium [that] causes [a] computer to generate a price schedule” and “[a] system for creating a pricing schedule.” Id. at 78:43–51, 82:4. As discussed above, the computer technology recited in the claims is used merely as a tool to automate the process of determining the price of a construction project. Determining a price is an abstract idea. See Versata Dev. Grp., 793 F.3d at 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, on the current record, Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that the claims of the ’820 patent are directed to an abstract idea under the first step of the Alice analysis.” slip op. at 20
- Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable
“application of an abstract idea. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78. Petitioner argues that the challenged claims have no such elements, because “the challenged claims add nothing more than well-understood, routine, conventional activity to the abstract idea of calculating a price.” Pet. 32–48. Patent Owner argues that the presence of the add-on computer software code limitations in the challenged claims transforms those claims into patent-eligible applications. Resp. 49–50. We are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims of the ’820 patent do not add an inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 8,515,820 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibilitycites Alice · Mayo · EnfishPatents in suitUS 8,515,820 - Pungkuk Edm Wire Manufacturing Company v. Seong, Ki ChulNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 16, 2017 · IPR2016-00764 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
The Board entered adverse judgment against claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9; Petitioner did not prove claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 anticipated by Mukherjee because cracks were not shown to be necessarily …
RulingsFinal written decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“and instead only addresses the patentability of claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 of the ’036 patent over Mukherjee. See PO Resp. 2–3, 9–28. We asked Patent Owner during the hearing whether it was conceding the unpatentability of the claims that it did not address in the Patent Owner Response (i.e., claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9). Tr. 55:20–56:4 (“[W]e instituted on a number of grounds that you did not -- and on a number of claims that you did not address in your patent owner response. Are you conceding unpatentability of those claims on those grounds?”). Patent Owner’s counsel responded that Patent Owner was conceding the unpatentability of those claims. Id. at 55:20– 56:10 (“JUDGE KOKOSKI: You're conceding that they're [claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9] not patentable? MR. SUTTON: That they're not patentable, that's correct.”). The Board’s rules permit a party to “request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). The Board construes a party’s “[a]bandonment of the contest” as a request for adverse judgment. Id. § 42.73(b)(4). Accordingly, we construe Patent Owner’s concession that claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9 are unpatentable to be an “abandonment of the contest” and a request for adverse judgment as to those claims. Therefore, we enter adverse judgment against claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9 of the ’036 patent. C.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends that the term “cracks,” which, for purposes of the Decision on Institution, we determined did not require an explicit construction (Dec. on Inst. 11), should be construed to be mean “narrow breaks.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner did not address Patent Owner’s proposed construction in its Reply, but when asked during the hearing if it disagreed with it, Petitioner indicated that Patent Owner’s construction was “fine.” Tr. 18:3–21. Based on the record developed at trial, and in the absence of controversy about the construction of the term, we construe “cracks” to mean “narrow breaks.” B.” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureNot shown unpatentableInherency not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Inherency requires that the claim limitation in question is necessarily present in the reference. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”); see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (patent challenger must demonstrate “that ‘the disclosure [of the prior art] is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught [in the prior art] would result in’ the claimed product.”) (citations omitted). “Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.” Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Petitioner, therefore, must show that cracks in the alloy layer and the coating layer are necessarily present in Mukherjee.” slip op. at 10
- ExcludeOther
“III. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1014–1017, 1019, and 1020. Paper 59. We do not consider the merits of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude because, as explained above, even if the disputed evidence is considered, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 5, 7, 8, and 10 of the ’036 patent are unpatentable as anticipated by Mukherjee. Accordingly, we dismiss Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as moot.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 6,492,036 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipationPatents in suitUS 6,492,036 - Torrent Pharmaceuticals Limited / Apotex, Inc. et al. v. Novartis AG And Mitsubishi Pharma Corp.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 24, 2015 · IPR2014-00784 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–32 are unpatentable as obvious over Chiba and Aulton; the motion to amend with proposed claims 33–64 is denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“institute an inter partes review of claims 1–32 of U.S. Patent No. 8,324,283 B2 (“the ’283 patent,” Ex. 1001). Paper 2 (“Pet.”).1 On December 1, 2014, the Board instituted trial to review patentability of the challenged claims. Paper 11 (“Dec. on Inst.”). Apotex, Inc. and Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Apotex,” or, together with Torrent, “Petitioners”) filed a separate Petition also seeking to institute an inter partes review of claims 1–32 of the ’283 patent. IPR2015-00518, Paper 1 (“IPR-518 Pet.”). This second Petition was accompanied by a motion seeking joinder with the trial that had been instituted in IPR2014-00784. IPR2015-00518, Paper 2 (“IPR-518 Joinder Mot.”). On February 17, 2015, the Board instituted trial in IPR2015-00518 and joined the proceedings in IPR2014-00784 and IPR2015-00518. IPR2015-00518, Paper 8 (“IPR-518 Dec.”).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“unexpired patent according to its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1276–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under that standard, absent any special definitions, we assign claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, in the context of the entire patent disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Only terms which are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For this reason, we do not construe several terms for which constructions were proposed in the Petition but about which the parties do not disagree.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Where the prior art teaches the claimed invention, a claim is not rendered patentable by virtue of being motivated in the inventors’ minds by a newly-discovered advantage of the prior-art combination; allowing such a claim to stand “would remove from the public that which is in the public domain.” In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1022 (CCPA 1979); see also Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“One of ordinary skill in the art need not see the identical problem addressed in a prior art reference to be motivated to apply its teachings.”). Here, Patent Owners argue that the newly discovered low-dose instability of fingolimod when mixed with common excipients motivated the inventors’ choice of the allegedly less common mannitol as an excipient. PO Resp. 12–15 (citing Ex. 2043 ¶¶ 14–19, 22, 24–36). As explained above, though, it does not matter that the prior art failed to recognize this advantage of a fingolimod-mannitol combination. “[T]he motivation in the prior art to combine the references does not have to be identical to that of the [patentee] to establish obviousness.” In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1996).” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 8,324,283 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,324,283 - PTAB · Jul 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00517 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because neither petition showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 9, 10, 12, 30, 32, 42, or 45 were unpatentable over Kitamura or Mehrotra.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We review the Petitions under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Based on our review of the record, we conclude that neither Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in demonstrating that at least one of the challenged claims is not patentable, based on the Petitions filed. See 35 U.S.C. § 314. B.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Kitamura is largely silent as to the specific functioning of the D/A conversion circuit 10. Kitamura discloses that D/A conversion circuit 10 and A/D conversion circuit 13 “preferably share a voltage dividing element and a reference voltage supply (for the purpose of making their characteristics uniform),” and level differences to maximize the operating margin (Ex. 1010 ¶ 11), but does not disclose a “selection” between reference voltages or signals. Although Petitioners emphasize the obviousness of certain elements of the challenged claims (Pet. 25– 26), the obviousness of selecting a reference voltage versus outputting a voltage from a D/A conversion is not discussed. Indeed, Dr. Baker’s discussion is clear (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–79) as to how the output voltages could be set, but it remains unclear how Kitamura itself suggests the examples proffered. The normal function of a D/A converter is not to select between reference voltages, but to render the digital input into analog form. We are not persuaded that Kitamura teaches or suggests the selection of one of a plurality of reference voltages in accordance with the input information, per the challenged claims. In addition, the Petitions fail to provide any rationale for why Kitamura’s disclosure of D/A conversion renders the selection of a reference voltage or signal obvious. For these reasons, Patent Owner’s contentions that Kitamura does not teach or suggest “reference voltage selecting means,” or equivalent elements, or “reference voltages,” per the challenged claims, are persuasive. C.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed petitioner construction§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“Reference Voltage Selection Claim 1 recites “reference voltage selecting means for selecting one of a plurality of reference voltages,” with claims 9, 12, and 30 reciting “selecting device which selects one of a plurality of reference signals,” and claims 42 and 45 reciting “selecting one of a plurality of predetermined reference signals.” Petitioners acknowledge that the means-plus-function element in claim 1 is “governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6,” and that the construction of the claim term in claim 1 “is applicable to claim terms” recited in claims 9, 12, 30, 42, and 45, discussed above. Pet. 5, 8. Petitioners assert that “the verify reference voltage select circuit 222 selects and provides such a reference voltage to the comparator,” and is the corresponding structure described in the specification. Id. at 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4552). For purposes of this Decision, we construe the referenced claim terms according to that structure and apply the same to the analysis below. B.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Reference Voltages” “Reference Signals” All of the independent claims of the challenged claims recite either “reference signals” or “reference voltages.” Petitioners emphasize that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted these features to be broad enough to include and be met by either a digital reference voltage/ signal or an analog reference voltage/signal.” Id. at 10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 53–58). For purposes of this Decision, we construe the reference voltages and signals terms as being met by either digital or analog reference voltages/signals, and apply that construction to the analysis below. slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 5,764,571 - PTAB · Jul 20, 2015 · IPR2015-00504 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution in both proceedings because neither petition showed a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim obvious over Kitamura or Mehrotra.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We review the Petitions under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Based on our review of the record, we conclude that neither Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail in demonstrating that at least one of the challenged claims is not patentable, based on the Petitions filed. See 35 U.S.C. § 314. B.” slip op. at 3
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Kitamura is largely silent as to the specific functioning of the D/A conversion circuit 10. Kitamura discloses that D/A conversion circuit 10 and A/D conversion circuit 13 “preferably share a voltage dividing element and a reference voltage supply (for the purpose of making their characteristics uniform),” and level differences to maximize the operating margin (Ex. 1010 ¶ 11), but does not disclose a “selection” between reference voltages or signals. Although Petitioners emphasize the obviousness of certain elements of the challenged claims (Pet. 25– 26), the obviousness of selecting a reference voltage versus outputting a voltage from a D/A conversion is not discussed. Indeed, Dr. Baker’s discussion is clear (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 74–79) as to how the output voltages could be set, but it remains unclear how Kitamura itself suggests the examples proffered. The normal function of a D/A converter is not to select between reference voltages, but to render the digital input into analog form. We are not persuaded that Kitamura teaches or suggests the selection of one of a plurality of reference voltages in accordance with the input information, per the challenged claims. In addition, the Petitions fail to provide any rationale for why Kitamura’s disclosure of D/A conversion renders the selection of a reference voltage or signal obvious. For these reasons, Patent Owner’s contentions that Kitamura does not teach or suggest “reference voltage selecting means,” or equivalent elements, or “reference voltages,” per the challenged claims, are persuasive. C.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“The standard for granting a motion to seal is “good cause,” reflecting the strong public policy for making all information in inter partes review proceedings open to the public. 37 C.F.R. § 42.54. The moving party bears the burden of showing that the relief requested should be granted. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). This includes showing that the information is truly confidential, and that such confidentiality outweighs the strong public interest in having an open record. See Garmin Int’l v. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, Case IPR2012-00001, slip op. at 3 (PTAB Mar. 14, 2013) (Paper 36). Petitioner Micron has made a sufficient showing. Accordingly, the Motion to Seal Exhibit 1011 is granted.” slip op. at 15
§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 5,764,571 - Yamaha Corporation Of America v. Black Hills Media, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 18, 2015 · IPR2013-00597 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 2, 6, and 10–12 are unpatentable: Bi anticipates claims 2, 6, and 10–12; Gladwin anticipates claims 2, 6, 11, and 12; Berman renders claims 2, 6, 11, and 12 obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“[a] playlist is a list of a user’s favorite selections.” Ex. 1001, 1:33–34. Patent Owner quotes from the specification of the ’099 Patent: Playlists also facilitate the playing of a plurality of selections in a particular order. That is, the playlist may be compiled in an order in which the playing of selections therefrom is desired. The selections may then be automatically played sequentially from the playlist. Typically, selections may also be played randomly from a playlist. PO Resp. 10; Ex. 1001, 1:45–52 (emphasis added).2 As noted by Petitioner, this passage reflects that a playlist may have a particular order of selections (see Pet. Reply 6), but also expressly discloses that selections may be played randomly from a playlist. slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“wireless handheld remote control which is associated with and separate from the media player device,” arguing that the term requires “a handheld remote control that can operate as an independent device relative to the media player that it control.” PO Resp. 14–16 (emphasis and grammatical error in original); see also Tr. 70:1–14 (“independent and separate would be synonyms.”). Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is narrow and excludes “a standard remote control for a device,” Pet. Reply 8–9. We agree, as in addition to the Petitioner’s contentions, we note the terms “operate” and “independent” do not appear in the ’099 patent. 9 We decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction over the ordinary and customary meaning of the term.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelOther
“year of practical experience with networked multimedia.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 8. Patent Owner’s proposal is similar, requiring “a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science or electrical engineering and one year of practical experience with networked media.” PO Resp. 7. The parties dispute Petitioner’s use of the qualifying phrase “at least” in describing the level of education and work experience. While we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that “at least” is “improper because it is open-ended” (PO Resp. 7–8),3 we determine that an express definition of the level of ordinary skill is not required. The level of ordinary skill in the art can be reflected in the cited prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”) (internal quotations omitted); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Here, neither party has provided a sufficient explanation as to how their specific proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill (and in particular the importance of the inclusion or exclusion of “at least”) affects the analysis in this case. Therefore, we find the level of ordinary skill in the art to” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“B. Motion to Amend In its Motion to Amend, Patent Owner moves to cancel independent claim 1 and dependent claim 9. Paper 25. Petitioner’s Reply does not oppose the motion. Pet. Reply 1. We grant the motion to amend, and proceed to analyze the remaining five claims.” slip op. at 10
Patent outcomesUS 8,230,099 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 8,230,099 - Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC / Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. v. Velocity Patent LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 6, 2015 · IPR2014-01247 · APJ Peter P Chen · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request to cancel challenged claims 31 and 32 and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner before institution.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“of claims 31 and 32 (Paper 19). Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b), cancellation of all challenged claims leaving no remaining claims for trial is construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment. ORDER Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Patent Owner’s request to cancel claims 31 and 32 of U.S. Patent No. 5,954,781, is granted; and FURTHER ORDERED that adverse judgment is entered herein against Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 5,954,781 - PTAB · Sep 8, 2014 · IPR2014-00868 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Order
The Board granted the parties’ joint motion to terminate the proceeding and their request to keep the settlement agreement confidential.
RulingsOther- PTAB / AIA Trials › Other PTAB motions (exclude, strike, seal, additional discovery, rehearing)Granted
“On September 4, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate this proceeding. Paper 6 (“Joint Motion”). Accompanying that motion, the parties filed a settlement agreement resolving the dispute that is the subject of this proceeding. Ex. 1015 (“Settlement Agreement”). The parties request that the Settlement Agreement be treated “as business confidential information, which shall be kept separate from the file of the involved patent,” pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(c). Paper 8 (“Joint Request”). This proceeding is still in its preliminary stages. Other than the pending Joint Motion and Joint Request, no significant activity has occurred since the filing of the Petition on May 30, 2014. Paper 1. Trial has not been instituted, and a preliminary response to the Petition is not due until September 10, 2014. Based on the facts of this case, it is appropriate to terminate this proceeding without rendering a final written decision. 37 C.F.R. § 42.72. Therefore, the Joint Motion is granted.” slip op. at 2
None
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.