- K-40 Electronics, LLC v. Escort, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Sep 29, 2014 · IPR2013-00240 · APJ Trenton A Ward · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 11–12, 15–18, 22–33, 41–72, and 74–85 are unpatentable; claims 36–38 were not shown unpatentable, because the prior art did not establish their continuous-signal location tracking limitation.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenDecided for petitioner
“In order to establish an actual reduction to practice, [a party] must establish three things: ‘(1) construct[ion of] an embodiment or perform[ance of] a process that met all the [claim] limitations [ ]; [ ](2) . . . determin[ation] that the invention would work for its intended purpose,’” and “(3) the existence of sufficient evidence to corroborate inventor testimony regarding these events.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). “A ‘rule of reason’ analysis is applied to determine whether the inventor’s prior conception testimony has been corroborated.” Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1993). slip op. at 11
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“Here, the only evidence of the successful reduction to practice of the claimed invention for its intended purpose prior to January 27, 1998 is the testimony of the inventor, Mr. Orr. “It has long been the case that an inventor’s allegations of earlier invention alone are insufficient—an alleged date of invention must be corroborated.” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d at 1291 (citing Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1170; Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). We conclude that the record is lacking sufficient evidence corroborating Mr. Orr’s testimony, which alone is insufficient. In view of the foregoing, we determine that Patent Owner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence its claim of reduction to practice of the claims 1–6, 15–16, 22–29, 33, 41–52, 54–66, 68–72, 75, 77–83, and 85 of the ’905 patent prior to January 27, 1998. Therefore, Hoffberg and Fleming, III are prior art to the ’905 patent.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“forth in the challenged claims of related U.S. Patent No. 7,999,721 at issue in IPR2013–00203. For the same reasons set forth in the ’203 Decision at pages 6–8, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that “correlates to a police signal” should be construed to mean an undefined determination made by comparing a received signal to the attributes of actual police signals. Accordingly, we construe “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to a police signal” as “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to one or more characteristics of a police signal.” 2. “position determining circuit” Claim 1 recites “a position determining circuit generating a location signal.” Ex. 1001, col. 25, l. 50 (emphasis added). Independent claims 43 and 68 provide similar recitations regarding a “position determining circuit.” Patent Owner proposes that “position determining circuit” should be construed to mean “a device for receiving information related to geographic locations.” PO Resp. 22. Patent Owner made similar arguments with respect to the “position determining circuit” set forth in the challenged claims of related U.S. Patent No. 7,999,721 at issue in IPR2013–00203. For the same reasons set forth in the ’203 Decision at pages 6–8, we determine that the “position determining circuit” must be involved in determining the position of the device, rather than merely receiving information related to geographic locations of the device, as proposed by Patent Owner. Accordingly, we construe “position determining circuit” as “a circuit for determining a position of a device.”” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments because they are not commensurate with the scope of the claims. As discussed above, we construe the phrase “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to a police signal” as “provide an alert if a received electromagnetic signal correlates to one or more characteristics of a police signal.” The ’905 patent Specification describes that this correlation may be implemented based on “any of the techniques” described in the many patents incorporated by reference in the Specification. Ex. 1001, col. 8, ll. 50–56. Therefore, the correlate limitation recited in the independent claims can involve many prior art techniques, such as those disclosed in Hoffberg. For example, Petitioner argues that Hoffberg discloses the use of a “commercially available radar detector.” Pet. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 33, ll. 9–15). More particularly, Hoffberg discloses “an event sensor is provided, such as a police radar and laser speed detection system (e.g., “radar detector”)” to detect signals and determine whether they correlate to a law enforcement signal. Ex. 1002, col. 33, ll. 9–15. We determine, therefore, that Hoffberg discloses the claimed correlating limitation. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of evidence that Hoffberg discloses all limitations of independent claims 1, 43, 54, 68, and 81. Patent Owner does not address dependent claims 2–4, 15, 17–18, 22–24, 28–29, 31–33, 41–42, 44–48, 53, 55–57, 59–60, 64–65, 67, 69–72, 76–80, and 82–84 with separate, specific arguments against the anticipation challenge based on Hoffberg. See PO Resp. 28–38. As to dependent claims 2–4, 15, 17–18, 22–24, 28–29, 31–33, 41–42, 44–48, 53, 55–57, 59–60, 64–65, 67, 69–72, 76–80, and 82–84, Petitioner provides sufficient evidence to show that Hoffberg discloses the additional recited limitations in those claims. Pet. 20–26, 28–32, 34–48. For example, Petitioner argues that the claim 15 limitation that the information associated with geographic locations includes information identifying rejectable signals at a geographic location is met by Hoffberg’s disclosure that “further information is also stored, such as a time of the event, its character or nature, and other quantitative or qualitative aspects.” Pet. 21 (quoting Ex. 1002, col. 18, l. 64–col. 19, l. 4 (emphasis omitted)). In a further example, Petitioner argues that the claim 28 requirement that the police warning receiver include “storage for vehicle history information identifying vehicle activities including geographic locations” is met by Hoffberg’s disclosure that the “memory stores information describing the event as well as the location of the event.” Pet. 29 (quoting Ex. 1002, col. 22, ll. 18–29 (emphasis omitted)).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 6,670,905 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 6,670,905 - Microsoft Corporation v. Proxyconn, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 19, 2014 · IPR2013-00109 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, 9–12, 14, 22, and 23 were canceled as anticipated; claim 24 was not shown unpatentable, and the motion to amend was denied.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenOther
“petitioner must establish facts supporting its challenges by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). 1. Anticipation The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit summarized the analytical framework for determining whether prior art anticipates a claim as follows: If the claimed invention was “described in a printed publication” either before the date of invention, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), or more than one year before the U.S. patent application was filed, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), then that prior art anticipates the patent. Although § 102 refers to “the invention” generally, the anticipation inquiry proceeds on a claim-by-claim basis. See Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC, 479 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007). To anticipate a claim, a single prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose each claim limitation. Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998). But disclosure of each element is not quite enough—this court has long held that “[a]nticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 175 Ct.Cl. 644, 360 F.2d 954, 960 (1966) (emphasis added)). Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We must analyze prior art references as a skilled artisan would. See Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (to anticipate, “[t]here must be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention”).” slip op. at 32
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“Both parties’ interpretations of “data access” are too narrow. Neither the challenged claims nor the Specification expressly limits “data access” to require a “request from the client” as proposed by Proxyconn. The claims merely recite “data access.” Even though the Specification describes examples in which the client requests data from a server, the Specification does not require that the client request data in all described embodiments of the claimed systems and methods. For example, the Specification expressly describes an embodiment in which “a sender/computer required to send data to a receiver/computer . . . initially sends a digital digest of the data.” Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 26–28. “[L]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321(Fed. Cir. 1989)). We decline to do so here. Microsoft’s position is similarly unsupported by the claims themselves or the Specification. None of the challenged independent claims affirmatively recites that the receiver/computer acquires data from the sender/computer. Microsoft cites no portion of the Specification, and we find no support for the proposition that the Specification equates “data access” with “data acquisition.” We determine that the plain meaning of “data access” is clear. Independent challenged claims 1, 6, 10, 11, and 22 recite “access” as a noun modified by “data.” Ex. 1002, col. 10, l. 31 (claims 1, 3), col. 10, l. 64 (claims 6, 7, and 9), col. 11, l. 20 (claim 10), col. 11, l. 35 (claims 11, 12, and 14), col. 12, l. 30 (claims 22–24). “Access” plainly means the “freedom or ability to obtain or make use of.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1999). We conclude, therefore, that the claimed systems and methods recite “data access” to refer to the freedom or ability to obtain or use data. Although obtaining or acquiring data requires access to that data, access to the data need not involve acquisition of that data.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Resolution of the parties’ arguments relating to whether Yohe anticipates claims 1, 3, and 10 requires that we interpret “digital digests” as recited in the comparison means. We interpret “digital digests” by reading claim 1 in its entirety. Claim 1 recites that both the sender and receiver include “means for creating digital digests on data.” We conclude that the “digital digests” recited in the means for comparison refers to the “digital digests on data” that are recited earlier in claim 1 in the “means for creating.” b. Claim 10 Claim 10, like claim 1, recites that the receiver includes “means for comparison between digital digests.” Also like claim 1, claim 10 recites that the sender includes a “means for creating digital digests on data.” By contrast to claim 1, claim 10 does not recite a “means for creating” in the receiver. Ex. 1002, col. 11, ll. 20–33. Instead, the receiver includes a “means for storing a digital digest received from said network.” Id. at col. 11, ll. 31–32 (emphasis added). The reference to “a digital digest” rather than “the digital digest on data” in the storing means implies that the receiver can store any type of digital digest received from the network. Therefore, the “digests” that are compared in the “means for comparison” recited in claim 10 need not be the two digests on data created by the sender and receiver. Instead, the “means for comparison between digital digests” recited in claim 10 refers to structure that can compare any digital digest received from the network with any other digital digest.” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“A finding of anticipation by inherency requires more than probabilities or possibilities. Motorola Mobility LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Based on the evidence discussed above, it is possible to infer that Perlman describes such permanent storage memory. However, Microsoft has not presented evidence that the computers or routers described by Perlman necessarily use permanent storage memory as recited in claims 1 and 3. Therefore, Microsoft has failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence that Perlman describes a receiver/computer or sender/computer necessarily having “permanent storage memory.” Without such evidence, we cannot conclude that Perlman anticipates claims 1 and 3.” slip op. at 34
Patent outcomesUS 6,757,717 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 6,757,717
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.