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  • PTAB · Jul 12, 2024 · IPR2024-00382 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on all three asserted obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Pet.”), to institute an inter partes review (“IPR”) of claims 1–22 (the “challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,665,685 B1 (“the ’685 patent”). 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2018). Vigilytics LLC (“Patent Owner”) did not file a Preliminary Response. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “VII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner identifies a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “ordinarily skilled artisan”) as having “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the field of computer science, focusing on data privacy, computer networking and/or data records management.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶¶ 20–25). Petitioner further states that “[s]uperior education could compensate for less work experience, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶¶ 20–25). The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. The ’685 patent issued from a continuation application filed on April 22, 2016 (Ex. 1001, code (22)) and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 to an application filed on June 30, 2010. Id. at code (63), 1:7–20. We apply the pre-AIA version of the statutory basis for unpatentability. 2 U.S. Pat. No. 7,823,207 (Ex. 1005) 3 U.S. Pat. Appl. Publ. No. US 2007/0294111 (Ex. 1006) 4 U.S. Pat. Appl. Publ. No. US2002/0111833 (Ex. 1007) 5 U.S. Pat. No. 7,519,591 (Ex. 1008) 6 Shawn N. Murphy & Henry C. Chueh, A Security Architecture for Query Tools Used to Access Large Biomedical Databases, 2002 AMIA Annual Symposium Proceedings, 552–56 (2002) (Ex. 1009). we apply Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art, because it appears commensurate with the subject matter of the ’685 patent and the references.” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “2. Petitioner’s Contentions Concerning Motivation to Combine the Teachings of Evenhaim and Settimi Petitioner notes that, where Evenhaim sends healthcare data queries to various healthcare organizations, Settimi consolidates the information from various providers in a central repository for queries. Pet. 39 (citing Ex. 1005, 15:15–24, 16:5–21, Fig. 4; Ex. 1006, Figs. 1–2, ¶ 27; Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶ 132). According to Petitioner, Settimi’s repository eliminates the need for conducting searches across different entities and uses a “common vocabulary” that make searching easier and more reliable. Id. (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 9, 60–62; Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶ 131). Petitioner further cites Settimi as disclosing generating encoded patient identifiers (EPIDs) for individuals, i.e., encrypted tokens, based, e.g., on a patient’s name or Social Security number, and querying the repository to obtain records without revealing the patient’s identity. Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 37–43; Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶¶ 51–52, 130–131). According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Evenhaim and Settimi to simplify search vocabulary, while still allowing for searches for specific patients. Id. at 39 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 9, 14, 17, 27, 39–40; Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶¶ 131–132). For purposes of this Decision, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to apply the teachings of Evenhaim to a central repository, as disclosed in Settimi.” slip op. at 24

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,665,685
  • PTAB · Jun 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00311 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–22 on all three asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on each challenge.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner identifies a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “ordinarily skilled artisan”) as having “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the field of computer science, focusing on data privacy, computer networking and/or data records management.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶ 22). Petitioner further states that “[s]uperior education could compensate for less work experience, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶ 22).” slip op. at 7

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “without waiving its right to pursue alternative constructions in any future litigation.” Pet. 8. We understand these constructions to be Petitioner’s identification of “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” under the Phillips standard applied by the district courts. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.104(b)(4). Without a Patent Owner Preliminary Response, we are not in a position to determine which constructions, if any, are necessary and disputed. Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803; Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, at this stage, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “identification of individuals in a search of a medical database using an algorithm that blocks queries returning information from fewer than three patients, thereby preventing disclosure of the patient’s identity. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1009, 552–53, 555; Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Evenhaim and Murphy because Murphy describes how to use query responses that maintain patient privacy (a stated goal of Evenhaim) using volume to mask patient identity in order to comply with the statistical de-identification provisions of HIPAA. Id. at 15 (citing Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶ 68; Ex. 1005, 14:7–13). On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Evenhaim and Murphy, at least because both are explicitly related to systems that provide medically relevant information in response to a query in compliance with HIPAA requirements concerning data privacy and de-identification of individual patient data.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,109,375
  • PTAB · Jun 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00307 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 because Datavant showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on each asserted obviousness ground.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review).” slip op. at 10

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner identifies a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA” or “ordinarily skilled artisan”) as having “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the field of computer science, focusing on data privacy, computer 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) included revisions to 35 U.S.C. § 103 that became effective on March 16, 2013. The ’651 patent issued from a continuation application filed on May 26, 2017 (Ex. 1001, code (22)), which is a continuation of applications filed on April 22, 2016 and November 18, 2013, and claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 120 as a continuation-in-part to an application filed on June 30, 2010. Id. at code (63), 1:7–21. Therefore, we apply the pre-AIA version of the statutory basis for unpatentability. 2 U.S. Pat. No. 7,823,207 (Ex. 1005) 3 Murphy and Church, “A Security Architecture for Query Tools Used to Access Large Biomedical Databases,” in Bio*medical Informatics: One Discipline, AMIA 2002 Symposium Proceedings 552–56 (Isaac S. Kohane, ed., 2002) (Ex. 1009) 4 U.S. Pat. Appl. Publ. No. US 2007/0294111 (Ex. 1006) 5 US. Pat. Appl. Publ. No. US 2002/0111833 (Ex. 1007) 6 U.S. Pat. No. 7,519,591 (Ex. 1008) networking and/or data records management.” Pet. 8. Petitioner further states that “[s]uperior education could compensate for less work experience, and vice-versa.” Id. at 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶¶ 22–25). The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). For purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art, because it appears commensurate with the subject matter of the ’651 patent and the references.” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

      “identification of individuals in a search of a medical database using an algorithm that blocks queries returning information from fewer than three patients, thereby preventing disclosure of the patient’s identity. Pet. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1009, 552–53, 555; Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶ 66). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Evenhaim and Murphy because Murphy describes how to use query responses that maintain patient privacy (a stated goal of Evenhaim) using volume to mask patient identity in order to comply with the statistical de-identification provisions of HIPAA. Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003, Clark Decl. ¶ 68; Ex. 1005, 14:7–13). On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a person of ordinary skill would have had reason to combine the teachings of Evenhaim and Murphy, at least because both are explicitly related to systems that provide medically relevant information in response to a query in compliance with HIPAA requirements concerning data privacy and de-identification of individual patient data.” slip op. at 16

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “l) Conclusion As To Representative Clam 7 In consideration of the above, we are persuaded for purposes of this Decision that Petitioner has cited sufficient evidence to demonstrate a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Evenhaim and Murphy and their combined teachings would have disclosed or suggested all the limitations of claim 7 to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Independent Claims 1 and 14 Independent claim 1 is drawn to a method and recites steps that correspond to the operations recited in claim 7. Independent claim 14 is drawn to a computer readable storage medium storing instructions executable by a processing device to perform operations that correspond to those in claim 7. For the same reasons as those addressed in our discussion of claim 7, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that Evenhaim and Murphy teach the limitations of independent claims 1 and 14.” slip op. at 23

    § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,965,651
  • PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00212 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3 and 5–14, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability on the Tajima–Foster and Foster–Hayhurst obviousness grounds.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “B. Claim Construction “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner

      “We note that the claims do not use the term “long-term” in referring to storage devices. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, . . . to define the scope of the patented invention.”). Nor do we see support in the ’116 specification for limiting the claims to “long-term storage,’ which, itself, would require further construction to determine what qualifies as “long-term.” We are, therefore, skeptical of Patent Owner’s proposed limitation of the term “storage device.” However, we need not resolve whether the claims require long-term storage at this stage because we disagree with Patent Owner that this feature distinguishes the systems resulting from combining Foster with Tajima or Hayhurst. See discussion in Sections II.C.2 and II.D, infra.” slip op. at 13

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “Petitioner provides a motivation to combine the teachings of Tajima and Foster with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 36–40. Petitioner contends that “[persons of ordinary skill] would have recognized that Tajima-Foster would have beneficially provided even further security . . . because encrypted data fragments/key pairs and the KEK needed to decrypt the keys are each stored on different databases under separate control of respective service sites.” Pet. 39. Furthermore, Dr. Bhattacharjee testifies that “to safely include encryption keys with encrypted data, Foster teaches encrypting the encryption keys.” Bhattacharjee Decl. ¶ 153.” slip op. at 17

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
    Patents in suitUS 11,178,116
  • PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00215 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–10 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 would be obvious over Foster and Hayhurst.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons discussed below, Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to all claims challenged in the Petition. Thus, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “The record at this stage sufficiently supports Petitioner’s argument that Foster’s receiver 430 stores content that it receives. Pet. 65 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 4, 8, Fig. 8). According to Dr. Rubin’s annotations, receiver 430 can be a personal computer (PC) or set-top box. Ex. 2003 ¶ 83 (labeling the receiver in Figure 16 as such). This is consistent with Foster. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 49, 51 (describing PC 18 and a set-top box). Foster describes how the receiver stores encrypted content. See id. ¶¶ 8, 79. For example, Foster explains, “Once received, recipient 430 can then synchronously store the encrypted content.” Id. ¶ 79, cited in Pet. 68–69. According to Foster, “The encrypted title key is then attached to the content packet and the header for synchronized transmission to, or storage by a receiver.” Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added), quoted in Pet. 65. For at least the reason that Foster teaches a PC or at this stage that Foster’s data set is “for storage.” See Pet. 65–66, 80–82. At this stage, we credit Dr. Bhattacharjee’s testimony (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 221–222) over Dr. Rubin’s (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 108–109) because it is better supported by the current record. In particular, we see no support for Dr. Rubin’s testimony that Foster’s receiver cannot provide long-term storage or is unlike the ’854 patent’s storage devices. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 108– 109. For instance, we see little difference between Foster’s PC 18 and the magnetic or optical disk, USB key drive, or other devices that Dr. Rubin claims are long-term storage devices. Ex. 1001, 67:16–19, cited in Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 108–109. PC 18 has “data storage.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 75. Foster explains “optical media” or “magnetic media” are types of data storage. Id. Foster also states that the receiver stores data. Id. ¶ 8. In view of these parts of Foster, we credit Dr. Bhattacharjee’s testimony that Foster’s receiver has data storage (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 221–222) over Dr. Rubin’s testimony that Foster’s devices are unlike those described in the ’854 patent (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 108–109), at this stage.” slip op. at 17

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related field, with three years of experience in the area of securing data from unauthorized access or use.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 10032 ¶¶ 37–38). Petitioner also asserts that a “higher level of education may substitute for less experience.” Id. Patent Owner does not respond to Petitioner’s assertions or argue for a definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. Here, we apply the skill level proposed by Petitioner. Pet. 6.” slip op. at 4

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “key (the encryption operation Petitioner contends would be reordered/repeated).” Id. at 16. Dr. Rubin explains why reordering the steps in the way that Petitioner proposes would have been pointless: Indeed, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would recognize that encryption with the alleged external key would not be an appropriate step to repeat or reorder because it is parsed along with the data set into portions and those portions are then encrypted. Consequently, encrypting the shares with the alleged external key (i.e., the session master key) would render the splitting and encryption of the alleged external key pointless. Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 52–53. Dr. Bhattacharjee does not fully explain why the key that is parsed and encrypted is then used to further secure the data. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110–111. Thus, we credit Dr. Rubin’s testimony (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 52–53) over Dr. Bhattacharjee’s (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 110–111) on this issue. For this additional reason, Petitioner has not shown that Orsini discloses the Different-Order Version. See Pet. 33–35.” slip op. at 29

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,452,854
  • PTAB · May 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00214 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on Foster grounds for claims 1–3, 7, and 8 and claims 4–6, 9, and 10.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2023). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Applying those standards, and upon consideration of the information presented in the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’609 patent is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all Challenged Claims of the ’609 patent on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The level of ordinary skill in the art also may be reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Neither party argues, at least at this stage of the proceeding, that the outcome of this case would differ based on our adoption of any particular definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Considering the subject matter of the ’609 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan, we apply the level of skill set forth above, which is consistent with the testimony of Dr. Bhattacharjee (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–38).” slip op. at 9

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

      “repeated, would not necessarily indicate that the chunks, each encrypted with a separate share key, would be again encrypted using the session master key (the cryptographic operation Petitioner contends would be reordered/repeated).” Prelim. Resp. 16. Dr. Rubin explains why reordering the steps in the way that Petitioner proposes would have been “pointless:” Indeed, [the skilled artisan] would recognize that encryption with the alleged first key would not be an appropriate step to repeat or reorder because it is parsed along with the data set into portions and those portions are then encrypted. Consequently, encrypting the shares with the alleged first key (i.e., the session master key) would render the splitting and encryption of the alleged first key pointless. Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 52–53. Dr. Bhattacharjee does not fully explain why the key that is parsed and encrypted is then used to further secure the data. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–105. Thus, we find Dr. Rubin’s testimony (Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 52–53) more persuasive than Dr. Bhattacharjee’s (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 101–105) on this issue. For this additional reason, Petitioner has not shown that Orsini discloses the Different-Order Versions.” slip op. at 39

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Decided for petitioner

      “Here, however, Petitioner does not insist any construction is incorrect. Rather, Petitioner presents alternative rationales for why the claims are unpatentable, stating that the Petition demonstrates “unpatentability regardless of which proposed construction is correct.” Pet. 9. Even though some stated rationales are based on Patent Owner’s constructions in the District Court Case, the Petition complies with the rule because it explains how the Challenged Claims are to be construed under the alternative challenges. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). The rule “does not require Petitioner to express its subjective agreement regarding correctness of its proffered claim constructions or to take ownership of those constructions.” Western Digital Corp. v. SPEX Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00084, Paper 14 at 11 (PTAB Apr. 25, 2018).” slip op. at 12

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,068,609
  • PTAB · May 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00226 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–19 on all asserted obviousness grounds based on Evenhaim; Evenhaim with Settimi; Dick with Landi; and Dick, Landi, with Murphy.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition”). We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’641 patent and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. See SAS Inst. Inc. v Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “patent would have possessed “a Bachelor of Science degree in computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience in the field of computer science, focusing on data privacy, computer networking and/or data records management.” Pet. 9 (citing Clark Decl. ¶ 22). Petitioner adds that “[s]uperior education could compensate for less work experience, and vice-versa.” Id. We regard Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 15

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “from Patent Owner’s claim-construction brief in the related district court litigation and “adopts these constructions for this proceeding.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1010, 9–20). Patent Owner’s brief identifies these as “disputed claim terms.” Ex. 1010, i (Table of Contents). The brief indicates that Petitioner disputes Patent Owner’s construction for each of the terms. Id. at 1 (referring to the parties’ Joint Claim Construction Statement). As Petitioner expressly “adopts these constructions for this proceeding” (Pet. 8), we understand these constructions to be Petitioner’s identification of “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed” under 37 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(3) (2023). Without a Patent Owner Preliminary Response, we are not in a position to determine which constructions, if any, are necessary and disputed. Vivid Techs., Inc., 200 F.3d at 803; Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. Nevertheless, at this stage, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial.” slip op. at 16

    Claim constructioncites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 9,118,641
  • PTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01373 · APJ Carl W Whitehead Jr · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–8 and 13–22 on the asserted § 103 ground over Bigbee and Nguyen after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claim 19.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of prior work experience with computer architecture design, including fault tolerant computer architecture design.” Pet. 1 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Petitioner further asserts that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction Petitioner contends that the terms ‘“detection of loss of lockstep’ and ‘detecting loss of lockstep’ should be construed to include both mismatch errors and errors that may eventually result in mismatch errors.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:56–67). In other words, Petitioner contends the terms include “a ‘precursor to lockstep mismatch,’” i.e., “detecting an error that may eventually cause a lockstep mismatch error.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 4:56–67). Petitioner contends the “specification provides detecting these two types of errors as examples of detection of LOL.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:26–59, 4:37–67). Petitioner contends the specification states that “[l]ockstep mismatch is one way of detecting an LOL [between the master processor 12A and slave processor 12B].” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 4:56–57). Petitioner contends the specification “is consistent with the dependent claims, which expressly define detecting loss of lockstep as either of the two options.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1001, 15:7–19, 30–49 (claims 1, 4–8)). Petitioner contends that the terms ‘“lockstep is recoverable’ and ‘loss of lockstep is recoverable’ should be construed as ‘lockstep is recoverable from the detected loss of lockstep’ because the specification only describes lockstep recovery from the detected LOL—‘whether the detected LOL is a recoverable LOL.”’ Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:56–6:1). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s position on these terms. See Prelim. Resp. 13. At this stage of the proceeding, only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F. 3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). After reviewing the parties’ evidence and contentions, we do not observe a dispute over the meaning of these terms that is necessary to resolve at this stage. Accordingly, we determine that we do not need to expressly construe any term for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Furthermore, on February 10, 2024, the Eastern District of Texas granted Foras Technologies Ltd., Kia Corp., and Kia America Inc.’s Joint Motion to Stay in that case. Ex. 1035, 1–2; Ex. 1036; see Reply 1–2. Therefore, because the trial in the district court litigation has been stayed, this factor weighs heavily against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 13

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3)); see also Intelligent Biosystems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). At this preliminary stage, we determine whether the information presented in the Petition shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing that at least one of the challenged claims would have been obvious. slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,502,958
  • PTAB · Feb 13, 2024 · IPR2023-01343 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–7, 13–15, 17, and 18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”) We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’494 patent and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. See SAS Inst. Inc. v Iancu, 138 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’494 patent would have possessed “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of professional experience working with the research, design and/or development of semiconductors, processors, power consumption and thermal power management, and related firmware and software or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience.” Pet. 12–13 (citing Wyatt Decl. ¶ 21). Petitioner adds, “[t]he more education one has, the less experience needed to attain an ordinary level of skill. Similarly, more experience in the field may serve as a substitute for formal education.” Id. at 13 (citations omitted) At this stage, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art or provide its own description. We regard Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “B. Claim Construction We construe claim terms only as relevant to the parties’ contentions and only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Neither party proposes claim constructions for our consideration. Petitioner states, “[u]nless indicated otherwise, all claim terms herein are given [their] ordinary and customary meaning.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s position or discuss claim construction. Therefore, we determine there are no claim terms that need to be construed at this stage.” slip op. at 13

    Claim constructioncites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 8,898,494
  • PTAB · Feb 13, 2024 · IPR2023-01333 · APJ Thomas L Giannetti · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 on all asserted obviousness grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Mercedes-Benz would prevail on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “response. Paper 9. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”) We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’080 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability. See SAS Inst. Inc. v Iancu, 138 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached

      “In this proceeding, Patent Owner has not requested that we exercise our discretion to deny institution under either § 314(a) or § 325(d). Therefore, we do not reach those issues here. In the ’567 IPR, Patent Owner argued that the petition there should be denied under § 325(d). ’567 IPR, Paper 12 at 10–22. In our Institution Decision in the ’567 IPR, we addressed that issue and, after analyzing Patent Owner’s arguments, we were not persuaded to exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d). Id., Paper 13 at 13–19.” slip op. at 14

    • Other 314aNot reached

      “In this proceeding, Patent Owner has not requested that we exercise our discretion to deny institution under either § 314(a) or § 325(d). Therefore, we do not reach those issues here. In the ’567 IPR, Patent Owner argued that the petition there should be denied under § 325(d). ’567 IPR, Paper 12 at 10–22. In our Institution Decision in the ’567 IPR, we addressed that issue and, after analyzing Patent Owner’s arguments, we were not persuaded to exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d). Id., Paper 13 at 13–19.” slip op. at 14

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “As noted, Patent Owner has expressly waived filing a preliminary response. Paper 9. At this stage, therefore, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art or provide its own description. We regard Petitioner’s description as consistent with the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). Thus, for the purpose of our decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,049,080

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.