• Illumina Inc. v. Molecular Loop Innovations LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 16, 2026 · IPR2024-00965 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable: Gloor anticipates them, Parameswaran and Gloor render them obvious, and Parameswaran, Binladen, and Bentley render claim 6 obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner asserts that a person of skill in the art (“POSA”) “would have had (i) a Ph.D. in molecular biology, genetics, bioinformatics, or a related field and at least two years of experience in high-throughput sequencing technologies or (ii) a Master’s degree in one of the same fields with at least four years of experience in high-throughput sequencing technologies.” Pet. 18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–20). Patent Owner states that it adopts Petitioner’s proposal for a POSA for purposes of this proceeding. PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 20–23). After reviewing the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the skill level as it is consistent with the prior art’s demonstration of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. We find both Dr. Spellman and Dr. Adalsteinsson are qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSA, because each has at least ordinary skill in the art. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4–15; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 4–9.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We acknowledge the ambiguous nature of the disputed claim language. On its face, it could require two or more identifier sequences together be uniquely associated with the nucleic acid of interest, as Petitioner argues; or it could require two or more identifier sequences, each individual identifier sequence must be uniquely associated with the nucleic acid of interest, as Patent Owner asserts. See Reply 2–3; Sur-reply 1–6. We, therefore, must examine the words of the claim and the specification to ascertain the scope of this limitation. The specification states that “[w]hile the pair of barcodes associated with any given template is unique, individual barcode sequences can be used with multiple templates as long as no pair is used across two different samples.” Ex. 1001, 2:50–53 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, it states that [t]he first and second identifiers are designed such that each set of identifiers is correlated to a particular sample (e.g., material obtained from a particular patient or group of patients), allowing samples to be distinguished and/or validated. The first and second identifiers may be the same or different, so long as the combination is unique with respect to the sample or sub-sample that one seeks to distinguish and/or validate. Id. at 3:15–22 (emphases added). We agree with Petitioner that the specification supports its proposed construction. See Reply 2.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Claim 5 recites “homopolymer region.” The ’200 patent specification provides an express definition for the term, stating that “the barcode sequences can be designed to have minimal or no homopolymer regions, i.e., 2 or more of the same base in a row such as AA or CCC, within the barcode sequence.” Ex. 1001, 9:6–10. Thus, we agree with Patent Owner that the term “homopolymer region” should be construed as “two or more of the same base in a row.” See PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶ 24). Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to expressly construe any other claim term.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “A reference is considered publicly accessible if it is “made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Jazz Pharms., Inc. v. Amneal Pharms., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2018). To “determine whether an interested researcher would have been sufficiently capable of finding the reference and examining its contents,” we “must consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the disclosure.” In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that a determination of whether a reference qualifies as a printed publication “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public”).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,768,200 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,768,200
• Salvacion USA, Inc. v. Trutek CorpAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2024-00711 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3 and 8 are unpatentable as anticipated by Chen, Baker, Wahi ’005, and, for claims 1, 2, and 8, Rolf; the Board also finds them obvious over the asserted grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) as it was undisputed at the time and consistent with the evidence of record. Inst. Dec. 7–8. Based on our consideration of the full record, we maintain our determination that a POSITA at the time the application for the ’802 patent was filed “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in pharmacy, chemistry, biochemistry, biomedical engineering or a closely related field, such that the POSITA generally understand[s] pharmaceutical formulation.” Pet. 12. Additionally, we agree with Petitioner that “[a] POSITA would be familiar with the chemical ingredients in the [’802] Patent, biocidic agents, and cationic agents, have knowledge of airborne particles including viruses and bacteria, and understand electrostatic fields, electrostatic attraction and repulsion, adhesion and cohesion.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 38–39).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner

    “of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. Inst. Dec. 7–8. The parties do not dispute our construction of the preambles of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting. See generally PO Resp.; Pet. Reply 2–4. After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction of the preamble of claims 1, 2, and 8 as limiting for the reasons set forth in our Institution Decision. Id. Briefly, the preamble of independent claims 1, 2, and 8 limits the challenged claims as both the preamble and the body are used to define the subject matter claimed. See Allen Engineering Corp., v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, the preamble is “necessary to give life, meaning and vitality” to the claim, see id., because it provides the only description in the claim for the application site of the formulation, i.e., “to skin or tissue of nasal passages,” and how the formulation is applied, i.e., “in a thin film.”” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “After consideration of the full trial record, we maintain our construction. From our perspective, the claims themselves support this construction as the claims expand upon the term “electrostatically inhibiting” with specific means for achieving such inhibition. Specifically, claims 1 and 2 recite electrostatically attracting the particulate matter, holding the matter in place, and inactivating the matter. Additionally, the Specification supports our construction as it describes the use of “an electrostatic field such that oppositely charged airborne particulates (including microorganisms) in the vicinity of the surface are electrostatically trapped, held thereto and one or more of the microorganisms so captured is neutralized, killed, inactivated, and rendered harmless.” Ex. 1001, 3:36–40; PO Resp. 10 n.6.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt the parties’ construction of “adequate impermeability” that has been accepted in the related district court litigation: “Adequate impermeability” refers to the “thin film holding harmful particles in place and inhibiting them from penetrating the thin film and contacting the skin or tissue of an individual’s nasal passages. This is done by varying the concentration of ingredients . . .[,] thereby adjusting the adhesion and cohesion of the thin film.” Pet. Reply 3 (quoting Ex. 1010, 17). Furthermore, as stated in our Institution Decision, along with that term, the claim language explains that the thin film is meant to stick to the skin or tissue and to hold the particulate matter in place. Inst. Dec. 9–10. The claim language also explains that the cohesion of the formulation is adjusted to provide adequate impermeability to the thin film. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the recited impermeability is a function of the cohesive properties of the thin film, and that such impermeability refers to a property of the thin film, i.e., inhibiting the penetration or passage of matter through it onto the skin or tissue at the application site.” slip op. at 10

  Patent outcomesUS 8,163,802 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,163,802
• Texas Instruments Incorprated v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00934 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over DeMaw and, separately, over Macnally.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 7,496,342 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,496,342
• Exotec Product France SAS / Exotec North America Inc. et al. v. Opex CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00850 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–12, 14, and 23–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Raizer and Hangzhou.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes an express construction” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In this case, we must determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Hangzhou’s disclosure of driving its auto-guided trolleys 200 under shelves 100 would improve the operation of Raizer’s system in the same way. For us to resolve this question in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). However, bodily incorporation, i.e., “an actual physical substitution of” Hangzhou’s auto-guided trolleys or operating software into Raizer’s system, is not required. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 11,472,632 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,472,632
• Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. The Johns Hopkins UniversityAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 18, 2025 · IPR2024-00625 · APJ Deborah Katz · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 6–8 are anticipated by MSR, and claim 5 is obvious over MSR with the additional marker-testing teachings of Chapelle.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “In an anticipation analysis, the dispositive question is whether a skilled artisan would ‘reasonably understand or infer’ from a prior art reference that every claim limitation is disclosed in that single reference.” Acoustic Tech., Inc. v. Itron Networked Sols., Inc., 949 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Extrinsic evidence, such as declarations and depositions may be considered when it is used to explain, but not expand, the meaning of a reference. See In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that the depositions and declarations of skilled workers were properly used to show what those skilled in the art would have known about the prior art). Although Patent Owner argues that a missing element cannot be filled by what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have envisioned, Petitioner’s argument is based on what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from what the MSR expressly teaches. (See Pet. 20 (“Indeed, prior art concerning the MSI-H Study indicates that the physicians understood postings on clinicaltrials.gov indicated that patients had ‘metastatic tumors.’ (EX1049, 444; see also EX1050, S4; EX1003, ¶62.)”).) Unlike the facts of Nidec, where a missing signal could have been envisioned but was not present, we are persuaded by the evidence Petitioner presents that those of ordinary skill in the art understood the MSR express disclosure to include patients with unresectable or metastatic tumors because references referring to the study underlying the MSR discuss the inclusion of patients with metastatic tumors in the study. Even if Dr. Neugut’s reasoning that the reference to “measurable” disease in the MSR would have indicated patients having metastatic cancer is flawed, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence of publications referring to the MSR as a study of metastatic colorectal cancer, and we are further persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the MSR to disclose treating patients having metastatic colorectal cancer with pembrolizumab. (See Ex. 1049, 444, Ex. 1050, S4.) Patent Owner does not address this evidence. Instead, Patent Owner acknowledges that “the MSR discloses treating cancer patients that could be within the claimed subset,” but argues that the MSR does not inherently anticipate results later obtained by treating only patients within the claimed subset. (See Pet. Sur- Reply 5–6.) We are persuaded, though, that Petitioner’s challenge is based on what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from the MSR (that patients who had an unresectable or metastatic tumor were selected), not on what is inherent to the disclosure of the MSR. We are persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time would have understood the MSR to teach selecting a patient “who has an unresectable or metastatic,” as required in claim 1. c) Element 1.2: “microsatellite instability-high (MSI-H) or mismatch slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues further that the MSR discloses an experimental use that does not qualify as prior art. (See PO Resp. 16–23.) Patent Owner argues that an inventor can be granted latitude to experiment in the public eye until her invention is ready for patenting. (See id. at 16 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998).) According to Patent Owner, the experimental use negation applies to the MSR under a 13-factor analysis provided in Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002). (See PO Resp. 17–23.) For example, Patent Owner argues that to establish that treatment of MSI-H cancers was effective, the inventors had to test treatment in humans, there being no animal models, and had to publish the MSR on the government website under federal law. (See PO Resp. 18–20.) Patent Owner argues further that the inventors had control over the MSI-H clinical study and that the field of cancer treatment was highly unpredictable, among other facts. (See id. at 19–20.) Patent Owner argues that “[a]t the time of the MSR’s posting, the claimed invention was not, nor could it have been, ready for patenting. The clinical study that ultimately collected the data reported in the patent specification and supporting the patent claims had not and could not have commenced before the MSR was posted.” (Id. at 21.) In City of Elizabeth, the Supreme Court was concerned that “[i]t is sometimes said that an inventor acquires an undue advantage over the public by delaying to take out a patent, inasmuch as he thereby preserves the monopoly to himself for a longer period than is allowed by the policy of the law,” but held that “when the delay is occasioned by a bona fide effort to bring his invention to perfection, or to ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended,” the experiment use exception can preserve the inventor’s rights. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877). Because we are not persuaded that Patent Owner could not have filed an earlier application, we are not persuaded that the experimental use doctrine is properly applied in this case. Given that clinical trial protocols published on the ClinicalTrials.gov website have been successfully asserted as prior art in other cases, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the MSR is not available as prior art against the challenged claims. See, e.g., Salix Pharms., Ltd. v. Norwich Pharms. Inc., 98 F.4th 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 567 (2024), and cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 983 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we are” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “In order to show that objective evidence renders the method of claim 5 non-obvious, Patent Owner must show a nexus between the subject matter recited in claim 5 and the evidence of non-obviousness. See Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“to be accorded substantial weight in the obviousness analysis, the evidence of secondary considerations must have a ‘nexus’ to the claims, i.e., there must be ‘a legally and factually sufficient connection’ between the evidence and the patented invention. . . . Ultimately, ‘[t]he patentee bears the burden of showing that a nexus exists.’” (quoting Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988), WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner argues that there is a nexus between the development and commercialization of pembrolizumab and the patented method of treatment recited in the challenged claims, citing, inter alia, the package insert for Keytruda® (pembrolizumab), but Patent Owner does not direct us to evidence of a nexus to MSI-H or MMR deficient tumors that exhibit instability in the microsatellite markers recited in claim 5 and the unexpected results, commercial success, or other objective measures of non-obviousness flowing from these additional limitations. (See PO Resp. 50–63 (citing Ex. 2129, Ex. 2072 ¶ 190, Ex. 2090 ¶¶ 82–92).) Patent Owner directs us only to evidence regarding determining MSI-H status and then using Keytruda® to treat MSI-H cancer patients, which we determine to be anticipated by the MSR. (See PO Resp. 60.) When evidence of a “secondary consideration [] is exclusively related” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “(Ex. 1001, 26:19–28.) In Grounds 3 and 5, Petitioner argues, relying on Dr. Neugut’s testimony, that Chapelle teaches standard methods of testing whether a tumor is MSI-H, including determining whether the patient’s tumor exhibits instability in a microsatellite marker, such as BAT-25 or BAT-26. (See Pet. 42 (citing Ex. 1007, 3380, 3383; Ex. 1003 ¶ 107).) For example, Chapelle states that “‘a standard test’ using a ‘[p]anel consisting of … BAT26, BAT25’ has ‘stood the test of time.’” (Ex. 1007 at 3382.) Dr. Neugut testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to treat a patient with an unresectable or metastatic MSI-H dMMR tumor, wherein the tumor exhibits instability in the BAT-25 and BAT-26 microsatellite marker, and would have expected success in doing so, in light of the teachings of Chapelle. (See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 105–108.) We find that the record as recounted above supports Petitioner’s challenges of claim 5 in Grounds 3 and 5.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,339,219 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,339,219
• Neurent Medical Inc. / Neurent Medical Ltd. v. The Foundry, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00669 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 and 11 are unpatentable as obvious over Makower, Fang, and Edwards, with claim 4 also obvious over those references and Stern; the Board did not reach Grounds 1–4.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Based on the record before us, including the types of problems and solutions described in the ’077 patent and the cited prior art, we find a POSA would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of science degree in biomedical engineering or a related discipline, (2) at least three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices that deliver energy to tissue, and 3) knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa. 11 Patent Owner suggests a POSA’s ability to “learn about” the nasal anatomy invokes the wrong standard because a POSA “must have the necessary background at the time of the invention.” PO Sur-reply 27. We agree in part with Patent Owner; the hypothetical POSA is presumed to possess the requisite skill at the time of the invention. Nevertheless, as it concerns an engineer with extensive experience designing and developing RF ablation devices (like Dr. Martin), we see no basis to conclude that such person may not become familiar with the features of the nose through review of the literature and/or consultation with clinicians. Ex. 1098 ¶ 44 (testifying a person with device design experience could learn about the relevant nasal anatomy and apply their skill to problems or solutions for that area by reviewing the relevant literature). Moreover, that Dr. Martin may not have had personal experience designing devices for the nose prior to 2006 does not mean that he cannot testify from a POSA’s perspective. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA, Inc., 116 F.4th 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“An expert need not have acquired the skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art” because “an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a [POSA] knew at the time of the invention”) (emphasis omitted). Petitioner that the ’077 patent discloses delivering neurotoxins to any target, and not just the nose, the claims of the ’077 patent are directed to methods of treating a nasal condition by delivering energy to the nasal cavity. Pet. Reply 32. Thus, to fill a gap between Petitioner’s POSA definition and the scope of the challenged claims, we add to Petitioner’s definition the requirement for knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. We additionally add that a POSA’s educational background may include a bachelor of science degree in biomedical engineering or related discipline to reflect the nature of the field of invention. Nonetheless, we also note that our analysis and conclusions herein would not change even under Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a POSA. We do not agree with Patent Owner that prior experience designing or developing nasal medical devices is required for a POSA. PO Resp. 19–20. A definition inclusive of the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of nasal medical devices that deliver energy to tissue is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’077 patent and prior art. Consequently, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Bu-Saba fails to qualify as a POSA because he lacks experience specific to designing medical devices. PO Resp. 19 n.4. We also disagree that Dr. Martin’s testimony should be discounted for a lack of first-hand experience designing RF ablation devices specific for the nose (which experience Patent Owner’s engineer expert also lacks). Id. As Dr. Martin’s testimony concerns certain issues in dispute (i.e., use of bipolar electrodes), we find Dr. Martin is qualified and his testimony helpful in resolving those disputes. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining And, even if there may be gaps in Dr. Martin’s experience or knowledge about the nasal anatomy, such gaps are filled by Dr. Bu-Saba’s extensive clinical expertise and testimony of record. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that we should discount the testimony of Dr. Bu-Saba or Dr. Martin; we give their testimony appropriate weight in reaching our conclusions here.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner that prior experience designing or developing nasal medical devices is required for a POSA. PO Resp. 19–20. A definition inclusive of the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of nasal medical devices that deliver energy to tissue is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’077 patent and prior art. Consequently, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Bu-Saba fails to qualify as a POSA because he lacks experience specific to designing medical devices. PO Resp. 19 n.4. We also disagree that Dr. Martin’s testimony should be discounted for a lack of first-hand experience designing RF ablation devices specific for the nose (which experience Patent Owner’s engineer expert also lacks). Id. As Dr. Martin’s testimony concerns certain issues in dispute (i.e., use of bipolar electrodes), we find Dr. Martin is qualified and his testimony helpful in resolving those disputes. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining And, even if there may be gaps in Dr. Martin’s experience or knowledge about the nasal anatomy, such gaps are filled by Dr. Bu-Saba’s extensive clinical expertise and testimony of record. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that we should discount the testimony of Dr. Bu-Saba or Dr. Martin; we give their testimony appropriate weight in reaching our conclusions here.” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “construction standard used to construe claims in a civil action before the courts under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), including construing claims’ language in accordance with its ordinary and customary meaning as understood by the POSA, in view of the patent’s specification and considering the patent’s prosecution history. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). We need only construe terms that are in controversy and only to the extent needed to resolve the dispute. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding claim construction is for “resolution of disputed meanings”). Petitioner contends that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR, the Board need not construe any terms.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner responds that “the Board need not construe any terms to determine Petitioners have failed to carry their burden in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 20. On the record before us, we conclude that the claims need not be expressly construed to resolve the dispute before us. Insofar as the parties dispute the mapping of the prior art to dependent claims 4 and 7, we address that dispute below including, to the extent necessary, any implicit disagreement about the subject matter encompassed by those claims.” slip op. at 17

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “For all the reasons above, we determine that the evidence supports Petitioner’s contention that a POSA would have reasonably expected success in combining the prior art to arrive at the subject matter of claim 1.” slip op. at 44

  Patent outcomesUS 11,679,077 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,679,077
• Neurent Medical Inc. / Neurent Medical Ltd. v. The Foundry, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00280 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 5, 8–10, 12, and 14 are unpatentable as obvious over Makower, Fang, and Edwards; the Board did not reach Grounds 1–3.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Based on the record before us, including the types of problems and solutions described in the ’011 patent and the cited prior art, we find a POSA would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of science degree in biomedical engineering or a related discipline, (2) at least three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices that deliver energy to tissue, and 3) knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We do not agree with Patent Owner that prior experience designing or developing nasal medical devices is required for a POSA. PO Resp. 19–20. A definition inclusive of the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of nasal medical devices that deliver energy to tissue is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’011 patent and prior art. Consequently, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Bu-Saba fails to qualify as a POSA because he lacks experience specific to designing medical devices. PO Resp. 19 n.4. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that we should discount the testimony of Dr. Bu-Saba and we give Dr. Bu-Saba’s testimony appropriate weight in reaching our conclusions here.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “On the record before us, we conclude that the claims need not be expressly construed to resolve the dispute before us. Insofar as the parties dispute the mapping of the prior art to dependent claim 9, we address that dispute below including, to the extent necessary, any implicit disagreement about the subject matter encompassed by claim 9.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that Makower and Fang7 are analogous art to the challenged claims. Pet. 77 (arguing Makower and Fang “are in the same field” and are “reasonably pertinent” to solving problems addressed by the claimed invention); Ex. 1002 ¶ 178. According to Petitioner, Makower and 7 Petitioner argues a POSA had reasons for combining Edwards with Makower and Fang with a reasonable expectation of success (see, e.g., Pet. 74–76, 81–85). We find persuasive Petitioner’s reasoning and evidence on the addition of Edwards, and Patent Owner provides no rebuttal about Edwards. energy to tissue and “each uses RF energy to treat tissue.” Pet. 77 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 1, 43, 132, 164, 187; Ex. 1006, 876–877).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,894,011 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,894,011
• Neurent Medical Inc. / Neurent Medical Ltd. v. The Foundry, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00279 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 7, 9, 10, and 17–25 are unpatentable as obvious over Makower and Fang; the Board did not reach the other grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, including the types of problems and solutions described in the ’675 patent and the cited prior art, we find a POSA would have had (1) a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or at least a bachelor of three years of experience in the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of medical devices that deliver energy to tissue, and 3) knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. Less work experience may be compensated by a higher level of education, and vice versa. In reaching our finding, we note that, although we agree with Petitioner that the ’675 patent discloses delivering neurotoxins to any target, and not just the nose, the claims of the ’675 patent are directed to methods of treating a nasal condition by delivering energy to the nasal cavity. Pet. Reply 30. Thus, to fill a gap between Petitioner’s POSA definition and the scope of the challenged claims, we add to Petitioner’s definition the requirement for knowledge and experience in treating nasal conditions, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. We additionally add that a POSA’s educational background may include a bachelor of science degree in biomedical engineering or related discipline to reflect the nature of the field of invention. Nonetheless, we also note that our analysis and conclusions herein would not change even under Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a POSA. We do not agree with Patent Owner that prior experience designing or developing nasal medical devices is required for a POSA. PO Resp. 19. A definition inclusive of the clinical use, design, development, and/or testing of nasal medical devices that deliver energy to tissue is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’675 patent and prior art. Consequently, we disagree with Patent Owner that Dr. Bu-Saba fails to qualify as a POSA because he lacks experience specific to designing medical devices. PO Resp. 19 n.4. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Second, we credit the testimony of the experts that, on balance, further confirms that skilled clinicians knew how to manage and remove fluids to the extent necessary. Dr. Bu-Saba testifies that typical steps for RF ablation procedures (even before 2006) included positioning the patient in a seated or slightly reclined position to facilitate the flow of any mucus or fluids away from the nasal cavity, application of topical decongestants, and “[i]n some circumstances,” if mucus or blood was still in the treatment area, “a 11 Nor does Patent Owner identify any disclosure in any other technical literature (either before or after 2006) expressing concerns that electrolytic fluids at the operative site could not be managed and/or would prevent targeted application of RF ablation energy to tissues at that site. See, e.g., Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 91–97 (testifying about the hypothetical “fluid” problem, but identifying no independent recognition of such a problem in any corroborating reference); Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 66–76 (same). visualization of the surgical site.” Ex. 1098 ¶¶ 81–89; Pet. Reply 14–15. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Levine, concurs that skilled clinicians knew how to remove mucus and other fluids, testifying that “[i]f [mucus] was obstructing my view” and “[i]f it was this thick . . . I might have to mechanically remove it with forceps, I might have to suction it, I might have to irrigate the nose with a saline solution to wash out the nose.” Ex. 1089 (Levine Tr.), 83:3–84:6 (admitting residual saline could either be swallowed or suctioned out); see also id. at 86:1–16 (testifying a patient may be positioned such that by “[v]irtue of gravity . . . fluid would fall to the bottom”).” slip op. at 33

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner contends that, “[f]or purposes of this IPR, the Board need not construe any terms.” Pet. 18. Patent Owner responds that “the Board need not construe any terms to determine Petitioners have failed to carry their burden in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 20. On the record before us, we conclude that the claims need not be expressly construed to resolve the dispute before us. Insofar as the parties dispute the mapping of the prior art to dependent claim 22, we address that dispute below including, to the extent necessary, any implicit disagreement about the subject matter encompassed by claim 22.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

  Patent outcomesUS 10,610,675 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,610,675
• Abbott Laboratories / Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Altivera LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 15, 2025 · IPR2024-00425 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5, 9, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Beck, Heller, and Lovejoy; the Board did not reach the alternative Bandy grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not dispute this assessment. See generally PO Resp. Having considered the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’307 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “both the unique sensor ID as well as the associated unique wireless device ID is contradicted, or at least unsupported, by the claim language and the Specification. We determine that this limitation does not require authentication of both the unique sensor ID and the unique wireless device ID, or otherwise require authentication using the unique wireless ID. Rather, the limitation only requires authentication of the unique sensor ID. The language and structure of the claim itself, “the remote server authenticates said unique sensor ID associated with said unique wireless device ID,” requires authentication of the unique sensor ID but not the unique wireless device ID. See Ex. 1001, 19:51–52 (emphasis added). The portion of the limitation reciting “associated with said unique wireless device ID” is linguistically an appositive modifying the “unique sensor ID.” Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges the “plain meaning of the claim term is that the remote server authenticates the unique sensor ID and that such unique sensor ID is associated with a unique wireless device ID.” PO Resp. 18.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed constructions of any of these other claim terms or phrases. PO Resp. 24. We agree with the parties that the identified limitations—which each recite a “means” or “means for” performing a particular function—are means-plus-function limitations that should be interpreted under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). And we agree with Petitioner’s uncontested identification of the recited functions and corresponding structure for these limitations for the reasons explained by Petitioner. See Pet. 11–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:20–21, 2:24–28, 3:33–36, 17:18–30); id. at 13–15 (citing Ex. 1009, 9:4–6, 9:19–20, 9:57–65, 10:10– 11) (explaining that Lovejoy is incorporated by reference into the ’307 Patent). We adopt the uncontested constructions identified by Petitioner, as” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the improvements offered by the incorporation of Heller’s teachings would have motivated one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller in the manner proposed by Petitioner. Confirming Petitioner’s assertion that the combination yields improvements, Heller states that it improves the type of glucose monitor used in one of Beck’s embodiments. Beck states that its “medical device 130 includes a glucose meter” which “measure[s] blood glucose levels of blood applied to test strips.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 34. Specifically addressing such “conventional” test strip glucose monitoring, Heller states that its in vivo glucose sensor system addresses a need for continuous or automatic monitoring in a small, comfortable device. Ex. 1016, 2:1–7, 2:15–58, 3:19–25. As such, we agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Beck and Heller to improve Beck’s medical device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401. We further agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate sensor implementation details described in Heller, e.g., an A/D converter and patient attachment systems, with Beck’s medical device. Pet. 44–45, 53, 55; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 228, 234, 236–238, 259, 267, 278, which do no more than yield predictable results, e.g., converting signals or attaching a sensor to a patient. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[A] combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 7,969,307 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,969,307
• Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00465 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1–10 and 12–24 as obvious over Szrek and Llach, and claim 11 as obvious over Szrek, Llach, and Gilmore.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that the level of ordinary skill in the art is an artisan with a working knowledge of POS activation systems and lottery systems that was gained through a mixture of training and work experience in the relevant field such as (i) having a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer communications, electrical engineering, or equivalent degree, coupled with at least three years of work experience; (ii) having a Master’s degree in computer science, computer communications, or electrical engineering, but having less work experience; or (iii) having no formal degree, but having experience in the relevant field of at least six years of work experience. Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–14).9 Patent Owner states that, “[f]or the purpose of this proceeding, Patent Owner adopts the Petition’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 19 (citing Pet. 2–3). We find that the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the ’451 patent and the prior art of record. See Inst. Dec. 14; see Okajima v. 9 Petitioner proposes the same level of ordinary skill in the art that the Board adopted in PGR2020-00084 (Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1008, 11)), and IPR2023- 01235 (see IPR2023-01235, Paper 34 at 12–13). Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Therefore, we adopt the parties’ agreed-upon level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, in our consideration of the issues presently before us.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We need not construe “transaction processor” expressly because its meaning is not in dispute and its construction is not necessary to resolve the controversy before us.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “On balance, we find that even with the alleged disadvantages identified by Patent Owner, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Szrek with Llach’s third-party transaction processor because the advantage of having a “centralized intermediary” allows Szrek’s system to support different game providers, such as different lottery companies, which would reduce some implementation costs and allow the system to be more easily and cheaply extended. Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181); see Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine”) (citing Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (stating the same). We acknowledge that the combination comes with some disadvantages, including “add[ed] delay, reduce[d] efficiency, and . . . implementation complexities by converting a simple, direct communication exchange into an exchange that traverses multiple systems.” PO Resp. 52 (citing Ex. 2052 ¶ 163). But, “[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.” Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 n.8. Here, Szrek expressly teaches indirect communication as a possible implementation of its system and Petitioner’s combination—employing Llach’s third-party transaction processor as part of the indirect communication channel—offers the attractive benefit of allowing Szrek’s system to support different game providers, which would reduce some implementation costs even if it might increase other costs, e.g., by having to program certain components (e.g., the cash registers) differently. Specifically, we find that the ability to expand Szrek’s system to support different game providers provides advantages that outweigh the disadvantages discussed above in the circumstance where one desires a more robust and comprehensive system. See Pet. Reply 23 (noting three advantages of the combination— (1) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to use ‘a centralized system for activating lottery tickets from different retailers and different locations,’” (2) “allow[ing] support for different game providers, such as different lottery companies,” “reduc[ing] implementation costs,” and (3) “allow[ing] Szrek’s system to ‘communicate with individual card” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 11,488,451 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,488,451

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.