- Apple Inc. v. Varia Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01363 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–32 are unpatentable under § 103 over Willgert and Mooney, or Willgert, Mooney, Holloway, and Pitroda, as applicable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner “disputes the narrow range of educational experiences in the Petition’s POSITA definition, but does not otherwise dispute the remaining portion of the definition.” PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art: [W]ould have been someone “with at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, with a background in radio frequency communications and software development, as well as approximately two years of experience working with or researching radio frequency communication systems. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 34).7 Based on a review of the record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with its inclusion of a Computer Science background, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’947 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, our Decision would not be altered if Petitioner’s definition applied.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached
“d) Analysis Re Construing “Voice Call Signals” We conclude that it is unnecessary to define “voice call signal.” Patent Owner’s construction would read into the term additional limitations that are for the most part already set forth in the claims: “the voice call signal is output over a wireless network” (claims 1 ); “outputting the voice call signal over a wireless network” (claim 9); “output a voice call signal for transmission over a wireless network” (claim 16); transmit voice call signals . . . over a wireless network” (claim 26); “wherein the mobile communication device is one of a wireless mobile phone and a personal digital assistant equipped with communication capability” (claims 8, 15, 25, 32). Thus the claims require the voice call signal to be transmitted over a wireless network, but do not restrict transmission to only a wireless network, and do not restrict the wireless network to “a network of a wireless network service provider,” as Patent Owner would require. We also agree that there is nothing in the ’984 prosecution history that supports Patent Owner’s assertion that the Examiner found that the Bluetooth signal of Cooper was not a voice call signal. Cooper was distinguished because: The term “transceiver,” however, is well understood by those of ordinary skill in the art. One of ordinary skill in the art would not reasonably interpret a “transceiver” so broadly as to incorporate an entire mobile device’s circuitry, and in particular to be read on by two separate transmitters, as Cooper teaches. Ex. 1008, 40. On the other hand, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“This functional emulation solution is served regardless of how the specific RFID transceiver is implemented — the ’947 specification specifically provides for both software and hardware implementations. Id. at 2:24–28 (“Embodiments of the present invention includes . . . certain hardware and/or software embodied therein for the practice of the emulated RFID method”), 3:35–36 (“mobile communication device 102 is equipped with hardware and/or software elements”), 3:52–54 (“substantial portions of the hardware and/or software elements employed to provide a RFID”), 5:16 (“A Hardware/Software Implementation”). There is no reason why one version of the hardware used to emulate the RFID function could not be RFID transponder circuitry. The issue is not whether an RFID transponder can emulate itself, but rather whether RFID transponder circuitry incorporated into a mobile communications device can be used to allow the mobile communications device to emulate a separate RFID transponder. For example, rather than requiring the person described in the Background of the ’947 patent to carry both a mobile phone and a “key with remote control for gaining access to his/her vehicle,” they need only carry the mobile communications device of the claims. The statement in the ’947 patent that “the present invention is related to an emulated radio frequency data input method” (Ex. 1001, 1:22–24), and the other references to emulation, are consistent with a conclusion that the claims encompass the “functional emulation” option as described above. However, there is no basis for adding the negative limitation proposed by Patent Owner (“without the use of a physical RFID transponder”). Omega Engineering, 334 F.3d at 1333 (rejecting a construction because “neither the plain text of the claims, the specification, nor the file wrapper justifies the imposition of this negative limitation”). See also BillJCo, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2023-2189, 2023-2190, 2025 WL 1417957, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2025): Our court has “identified claim constructions that exclude a particular element as including a ‘negative limitation’ and held that such exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 F. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Moreover, the prosecution history of the ’984 grandfather patent is not” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the fact that Willgert teaches that integrating its communications unit into a mobile telephone designed for Bluetooth communication was a “highly user- friendly application,” and that it was well known practice to use a Bluetooth headset wirelessly communicating with the phone to enable hands-free phone calls, as specifically taught by Mooney. Pet. 16–18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 30, 32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 7, 39, 48; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–65). Petitioner further argues that Bluetooth headsets were a well-known concept and widely available, that incorporating the headset involved known methods yielding predictable results, and that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably expected to succeed in combining the teachings of Willgert and Mooney. Id. at 19–21 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 10, 30; Ex. 1005, ¶ 8; Ex. 1016; Ex. 1017, 1, 3; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–68). Patent Owner does not specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Willgert and Mooney. See generally PO Resp. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Willgert and Mooney as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 9,405,947 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,405,947 - Apple Inc. v. Varia Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01362 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable under § 103 over Willgert and Mooney, or over Willgert, Mooney, Holloway, and Pitroda for claims 3–6, 10, 11, and 13–17.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner “disputes the narrow range of educational experiences in the Petition’s POSITA definition, but does not otherwise dispute the remaining portion of the definition.” PO Resp. 12. Patent Owner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art: [W]ould have been someone “with at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, with a background in radio frequency communications and software development, as well as approximately two years of experience working with or researching radio frequency communication systems. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 34).7 Based on a review of the record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with its inclusion of a Computer Science background, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’974 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, our Decision would not be altered if Petitioner’s definition applied.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner’s description of the characteristics and operation of a wireless mobile phone, which are not in dispute. Also, the Specification’s description of wireless mobile phones is relied on by Patent Owner in its arguments regarding the construction of “voice call signal,” as discussed below. Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that it is unnecessary to construe the term, “wireless mobile phone.” Reply 4. We agree. The term “wireless mobile phone” is only used in dependent claim 19 (not in independent claim 12, as Patent Owner alleges), and the principal reference relied on by Petitioner (Willgert) explicitly discloses the use of a mobile telephone. Ex. 1001, 12:2; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 30–32. For these reasons, and because our analysis of the issues set forth below is not dependent on Patent Owner’s proposed construction, it is unnecessary to adopt Patent Owner’s construction or otherwise construe the term “wireless mobile phone.”” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“to an emulated radio frequency data input method” (Ex. 1001, 1:20–21), and the other references to emulation, are consistent with a conclusion that the claims encompass the “functional emulation” option as described above. However, there is no basis for adding the negative limitation proposed by Patent Owner (“without the use of a physical RFID transponder”). Omega Engineering, 334 F.3d at 1333 (rejecting a construction because “neither the plain text of the claims, the specification, nor the file wrapper justifies the imposition of this negative limitation”). See also BillJCo, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2023-2189, 2023-2190, 2025 WL 1417957, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2025): Our court has “identified claim constructions that exclude a particular element as including a ‘negative limitation’ and held that such exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 F. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Patent Owner’s argument that the claim language, “[a] transceiver . . . configured to output . . . RFID transponder [signals or data],” only makes sense “if the transceiver is not itself an RFID transponder” (Sur-Reply 10) is not persuasive. Examination of the complete version of the passage that Patent Owner only paraphrases — “[a] transceiver configured to output voice call signals in the first state and to output RFID transponder signals in the second state” — shows that the transceiver is capable of both voice call and RFID functions, and thus there is no inconsistency in allowing the RFID function to be performed by RFID transponder circuitry incorporated into the transceiver.” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the fact that Willgert teaches that integrating its communications unit into a mobile telephone designed for Bluetooth communication was a “highly user-friendly application,” and that it was well known practice to use a Bluetooth headset wirelessly communicating with the phone to enable hands-free phone calls, as specifically taught by Mooney. Pet. 14–17 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 7, 39, 46–48; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner further argues that Bluetooth headsets were widely available, that incorporating the headset involved known methods yielding predictable results, and that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably expected to succeed in combining the teachings of Willgert and Mooney. Id. at 17–19 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 10; Ex. 1005, ¶ 8; Ex. 1017, 1, 3; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77–79). Patent Owner does not specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Willgert and Mooney. See generally PO Resp. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Willgert and Mooney as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 8,381,974 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,381,974 - Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01192 · APJ Michael J Strauss · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–10 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of the Lorex Manual or Lorex Video with the identified references.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute any of Petitioner’s contentions as to the effective filing date, stating in agreement with Petitioner’s asserted Effective Filing Date of the Challenged Claims that “[t]he ’916 Patent claims a priority of a provisional application 61/924,240 filed on January 7, 2014.” PO Resp. 8. Given that the parties are in agreement on the January 7, 2014, effective filing date, we similarly use January 7, 2014, as the effective filing date of the challenged claims for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 4
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Vlad Kardashov, Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’916 patent “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two 7 US 2012/0198040 A1, published August 2, 2012 (Ex. 1011, “Kuo”). 8 The subject ’916 patent claims priority to Kuo as a continuation-in-part of that earlier filed application. Ex. 1001, code (63). 9 Lorex Technology Inc., “How to set up remote access for DVR using - Lorex Stratus Connectivity” (June 18, 2013), available at https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=fMPRi9WFuTM (Ex. 1012, the “Lorex Video”). 10 US 2012/0113265 A1, published May 10, 2012 (Ex. 1013, “Galvin”). years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 12–14). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’916 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “no claim elements need a formal construction for purposes of resolving controversies in this proceeding.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 43–44; Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011), Google Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, 701 Fed. Appx. 946, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Petitioner states “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard.” Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303; 37 C.F.R. § 42.100). Patent Owner presents no proposed claim constructions. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes on the current record. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner
“that Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that the Lorex Manual was based on a disclosure made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. The Lorex Manual is relied on under Ground 1A, exclusively or in the alternative to or in combination with Kim, for all claim elements. Pet. 9– 31. Patent Owner fails to demonstrate that this subject matter was disclosed to Lorex by ThroughTek, much less by one of the inventors of the ’916 Patent.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 9,774,916 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,774,916 - PTAB · Jan 15, 2026 · IPR2025-01231 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“petition identifies all real parties in interest. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). Whether an unnamed party is a real party in interest “is a highly fact-dependent question.” See Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. RPX Corp., 897 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“AIT”); Ventex Co., Ltd. v. Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc., IPR2017-00651, Paper 152 at 4–5 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (precedential) (citing Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 13 (2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (CTPG). “A common consideration is whether the non-party exercised or could have exercised control over a party’s participation in a proceeding.” CTPG at 16. Other considerations include whether the non-party is funding or directing the proceeding; the non-party’s relationship with the petitioner; the non-party’s relationship to the petition itself, including the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing; and the nature of the entity filing the petition. Id. at 17–18.” slip op. at 8
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related field and at least two years of experience with lighting technology.” Pet. 2 (citing Ex. 1017 ¶ 35). Petitioner makes additional contentions about what a POSITA would have understood. Id. (“A POSITA would understand that all types of cameras (e.g., analog and digital, photo and video) generally involve the same lighting considerations . . . . [and] that it is important to provide light that evenly illuminates the target subject or object to minimize reflected glare and shadows.”). Patent Owner contends that a POSITA would have at least: (a) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, optical engineering, or a related field; (b) two years of practical experience in designing and developing lighting systems, particularly those integrated with electronic devices such as webcams or computer monitors; and (c) knowledge of user-interface considerations for consumer electronics . . . . Additional experience can substitute for education and vice versa. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 48). Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s contentions regarding what a POSITA would have understood. Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that analog and digital cameras have different operating principles and lighting requirements [and] Petitioner’s lack of appreciation for the suitability and unsuitability of different lights for different applications infects and dooms its invalidity analysis.” (citing Ex. 2036 ¶¶ 36–47)). and years of experience required for a POSITA. Pet. 2; Prelim. Resp. 12. For purposes of this Decision, we consider a person of ordinary skill in the art to have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or related field and two years of practical experience in lighting technology, and that additional experience may substitute for education and vice versa, which is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’729 patent and prior art of record. See Exs. 1001, 1005–1010, 1012–1015; see also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Patent Owner agrees that the Board need not formally construe any claim terms in order to adjudicate the merits of the Petition and argues Petitioner fails to show unpatentability of any claim under any reasonable construction of the claims. Prelim. Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2036 ¶ 51). We determine that no express claim construction is necessary to determine whether institution is warranted in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only terms in controversy must be construed “and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). When a ground in a petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). We base our obviousness inquiry on factual considerations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness that may be in evidence.14 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.” slip op. at 24
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,841,729 - Reolink Innovation Inc. / Shenzhen Reolink Technology Co., Ltd. v. Throughtek Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. And Throughtek Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 15, 2025 · IPR2024-01193 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 5, 7–13, 15–19, and 23–25 are unpatentable: claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 as anticipated by Zhang; all challenged claims also as obvious over at least one …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two years of work experience with network and communication technologies.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–15). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposal or provide a proposal of its own. On the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it is consistent with the technology described in the ’448 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededTerm construed board ownMixed
“construction of “feature flag” is inconsistent with the language of claim 8, which states that “the feature flag indicates that the running state of the second apparatus is the sleep state.” Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposal is not supported by claim 24, which depends from claim 23 and states that “the feature flag is located at a header of the sleep login packet.” Id. at 3. We agree with Petitioner. The plain language of claim 8 states what a feature flag indicates. Claim 24 recites where the feature flag is located. Neither claim suggests any of Patent Owner’s additional limitations.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“[A] prior art reference will anticipate if it ‘disclose[s] each and every element of the claimed invention . . . arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim.’” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration by Federal Circuit)). “However, a reference can anticipate a claim even if it ‘d[oes] not expressly spell out’ all the limitations arranged or combined as in the claim, if a person of skill in the art, reading the reference, would ‘at once envisage’ the claimed arrangement or combination.” Id. (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (alteration by Federal Circuit); In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676, 681 (CCPA 1962)). For the reasons explained below, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 23–25 are anticipated by Zhang. slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 10,602,448 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,602,448 - PTAB · Dec 12, 2025 · IPR2025-01327 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Schwan-Lee and Schwan-Lee-Strickland obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’655 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“III. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent, and two years of work experience with network devices and communication technologies. EX1003, ¶¶17–19. Additional education might compensate for less experience, and vice versa. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 17–19).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“The ’655 patent Specification states that: The topology data table 21 of the online server 20 is mainly recorded with a link data 49 between each of the P2P devices 41– 46 within the P2P device community. The link data 49 refers to the connection relationship between the P2P devices 41–46, which includes, but is not limited to, the connection structure, connection data and/or locations of connection. Ex. 1001, 4:51–57. On this preliminary record, we agree with Petitioner that the term “link data” is a “connection relationship between the P2P devices.” This meaning is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term within the context of the claim, that is, “link data” means data on the links (connections) between each of the P2P devices, where the Specification provides a more fulsome meaning that the term includes, at least, “the connection structure, connection data and/or locations of connection.” See id. at 4:55–57. We invite the parties to provide additional briefing on the construction of this term during trial.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Lee discloses that the P2P overlay is generated with the overlay generation unit 220 that generates the P2P overlay by analyzing information regarding “the corresponding application service, the peer, and the network,” where the network information “may include a network topology, a maximum bandwidth, a current network usage, [and] a transmission delay time, and the like.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 54. We determine that this disclosure provides support for Mr. Lett’s testimony that “Lee describes techniques for changing an overlay in response to changing network characteristics,” which could be beneficial. Ex. 1003 ¶ 48. Accordingly, on this preliminary record, we find this evidence is sufficient to support a rationale to combine Schwan and Lee. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious.”).” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,727,655 - Ericsson Inc. / Nokia Of America Corporation v. XR Communications LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00868 · APJ Kara L Szpondowski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 9–11, 13–15, and 18–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Trigui; claims 4–6, 13–15, and 18 are also unpatentable over Trigui and Rudrapatna.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art, or provide an alternative level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 9. In the Institution Decision, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which was also undisputed by Patent Owner at that stage of the proceeding. Inst. Dec. 11–12. Because nothing in the record establishes that our preliminary finding in the Institution Decision was incorrect, and because there is no dispute, we maintain our adoption of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Petitioner contends “[n]o specific construction of any term is required,” and Petitioner has applied the “ordinary and customary meaning” of the claim terms. Pet. 13–14. Patent Owner states that, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner agrees that no formal claim construction is necessary.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner provides the Board with the district court’s constructions in the related litigation. Id. (citing 2007, 39).4 4 The Petition in this case was filed on May 8, 2024. In the related litigation, Patent Owner’s opening brief on claim construction was filed on July 15, 2024, defendants’ responsive brief on claim construction was filed on this Decision, we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, to the extent necessary, we apply the district court’s constructions and the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. To the extent that the scope of any particular claim term requires discussion, we provide it in our assessment of the challenges.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Figures 6 and 10 show multiples of the system of Figure 2A. Id.; see also id. ¶ 81 (describing Figure 6) ¶ 85 (describing Figure 10). We find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments that Trigui’s arrays may consist of “subarrays.” See Pet. 24; Reply 9. For example, Trigui describes that “[t]he antenna arrays 256 may consist of sub-arrays where the antenna elements of each sub-array are combined passively to achieve a predefined pattern.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 50. To that end, Figure 6 shows one antenna array that consists of two Passive Antenna Sub-arrays (i.e., the plurality of antenna elements), and Figure 10 shows two antenna arrays that each consist of two Passive Antenna Sub-arrays (i.e., the plurality of antenna elements). See Pet. 28–32; Reply 9–11. Given this disclosure in Trigui, we do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that Figure 6 does not show a single antenna array, or that Figure 10 does not show two antenna arrays. PO Resp. 17–18. Patent Owner also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that Trigui’s sub-arrays are not intended to be combined. PO Resp. 18. This argument contradicts Trigui’s disclosure, which shows multiples of the hardware of Figure 2A in Figures 6 and 10, and encourages multiple operator sharing of passive antenna arrays and transceivers. See, e.g., Reply 4 (describing Trigui as “providing building blocks that should be combined to understand Trigui’s full teachings”); Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 48, 68. Trigui even states as much: Although FIG 2A illustrates only a single MIMO branch DIAA, the present invention contemplates the use of multiple MIMO branches (as will be illustrated below with reference to FIGS. 6–11) . . . Similarly, I/Q signals 215 from any of the modems, as well as the beamforming weights 214, can be sent to other MIMO branches. Patent Owner’s argument that “Trigui does not teach any relationship between the number of beams and the number of MIMO transceivers” is not well developed and is unpersuasive in light of Petitioner’s showing. Petitioner has demonstrated that Trigui’s Figure 6 depicts one antenna array with two bi-directional beams. Pet. 27–28. Petitioner has further demonstrated that Trigui’s Figure 10 depicts two antenna arrays, i.e., where m=2, where each array comprises a beamformer configured to produce n different bi-directional beams, i.e., where n=2. Id. at 28–29. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 10 is reproduced below: Id. at 29. Petitioner’s annotated Figure 10 shows two copies of the arrangement shown in Figure 6, where Petitioner has identified in red the two antenna arrays, and identified in blue the beams. That is, Trigui’s Figure 10 shows two antenna arrays that each produce two beams. Figures 3 and 4 of Trigui (PO Resp. 16–17) do not address Petitioner’s contentions. See Reply 6–7. Petitioner relies on Figures 4A and 4B to support that “[e]ach of Trigui’s arrays can produce multiple beams.” Pet. 26; Reply 7. Dr. Cooklev agrees. PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 91). However, as described above, Petitioner relies on Figure 6 to show “n” different bidirectional beams where n=2. Pet. 27. Petitioner does not rely on Figures 3 and 4 to teach the “n” number of beams. See Reply 7. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition provides no evidence for the “n different bidirectional beams.” See Sur-reply 11–12; see Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 9, 14, 74, 77, 81; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 189, 192, 193).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Trigui explicitly discloses that its system may have multiple modems. See Pet. 38; Reply 15. For example, Figure 2A shows Modem A, Modem B, and Modem C for a single MIMO branch. Ex. 1004 Fig. 2A; see also id. ¶37 (“one or more modems 204, such as, for example, baseband modules of cellular base stations”) ¶ 41 (“I/Q signals 215 from any of the modems . . . can be sent to other MIMO branches”); see Pet. 34. We find persuasive Petitioner’s explanation, supported by testimony from Dr. Negus, that “Trigui teaches use cases in which two separate wireless network operators would share certain tower [equipment,] such as the antenna arrays, but each wireless network operator would have its own baseband unit (i.e., modems A for the first operator and B for the second operator).” Pet. 33 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 226–232); e.g., Ex. 1004 ¶ 48 (stating that “the present invention . . . enable[s] multiple operator sharing of a passive antenna array, transceivers, and the total available power of the DIAA”); id. (“[S]plitting resources between the multiple operators is flexible and should be done on the basis of the individual operator needs”); ¶ 2 (“enabling a versatile solution for sharing antenna elements and active electronics between multiple operators servicing the same geographic area”); see also Pet. 38–41 (providing further explanation that one modem would be implemented for each operator); Reply 18–21. Patent Owner agrees that the second modem would be for a different operator. PO Resp. 20 (stating that “[E]ven if a second modem is added, it would be for a different operator”).5 Therefore, we are persuaded 5 In the Sur-reply, Patent Owner argues the opposite; that the operators would not have separate modems. Sur-reply 4. We rely on Patent Owner’s modems that share the two DIAA arrays in Figure 10. Pet. 42; Reply 18; In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A reference must be considered for everything that it teaches, not simply the described invention or a preferred embodiment.”). Thus, we find that Petitioner’s proposed modification for Figure 10 is derived from Trigui’s disclosures, not through hindsight. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.3d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971) (“Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper”).” slip op. at 26
Patent outcomesUS 8,737,511 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,737,511 - Texas Instruments Incorprated v. Parkervision, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2024-00934 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over DeMaw and, separately, over Macnally.
RulingsFinal written decision- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“1. Principles of Law A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 7,496,342 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,496,342 - PTAB · Nov 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00959 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 5-9, 13-17, and 25-27 across all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of obviousness.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any [preliminary] response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons given below, on this record, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims on all grounds raised in the Petition. B. Real Parties in Interest” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the field of the ’016 Patent would have had: a degree in computer science or computer engineering, along with 2 years of professional experience working with telecommunications systems, or an equivalent level of skill, knowledge, and experience. . . . This POSITA would have been aware of and generally knowledgeable about the standard features and functionality of emergency calling, geolocation, and text messaging systems. Pet. 15. For the purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner “does not challenge that definition.” Prelim. Resp. 5. We find Petitioner’s formulation to be consistent with the evidence of record at this stage of the proceedings, including the asserted prior art and the ’016 Patent, and we adopt and apply that definition for purposes of this Decision. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“During the reissue proceedings that led to the ’016 Patent, Patent Owner represented that “the ’016 patent claim limitations requiring a ‘call reception module,’ ‘presentation module,’ ‘outgoing message module,’ and ‘transmission module’ are not means-plus-function limitations and instead require only “computer program modules that are executed by processors, rather than a generic description for software or hardware.” Ex. 1003, 156– 169; see Pet. 14. For the purposes of these proceedings only, Petitioner accepts these representations and asserts that “[n]o terms require further construction and all terms can be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 14–15. For the purposes of its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 5. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that no express constructions of any terms are needed for us to render our Decision on Institution. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“To establish a motivation to combine multiple prior art references, it is not necessary to identify some deficiency in the primary reference that can only be remedied by combining that reference with another. The proposed the primary reference. See, e.g., Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. 3G Licensing, S.A., 124 F.4th 1345, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (Obviousness “does not require that a particular combination must be the preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in order to provide motivation for the current invention.”); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (“[T]he problem motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed by the patent’s subject matter.”). The relevant question is not whether the proposed combination is the most desirable combination available. Rather, it is “whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus the obviousness, of the claimed invention.” Honeywell, 124 F.4th at 1355 (citations omitted). Here, Petitioner has identified reasons why it would have been desirable to modify the system of Brooks to include the texted URL link of SARLOC: the caller would not need any special technical skills or equipment; existing smartphone functionality would be capable of collecting the location information; and SARLOC simply represents a specific example of a general concept taught in Brooks, that of exchanging location information through text messages. Pet. at 38–39. Because the claimed modification need only be a suitable option, rather than the “best” or “preferred” approach, Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham - Apple Inc. v. Proxense, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01399 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 8–15, and 17–20 are unpatentable under § 103, based on Buer alone or in the combinations listed.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“1 Apple Inc. filed a motion for joinder and a petition in IPR2024-01399, which were granted, and, therefore, Apple Inc. has been joined as petitioner in this proceeding. We also granted a Joint Motion to Terminate Inter Partes Review Proceeding as to the other petitioner, leaving Apple Inc. as the sole petitioner.” slip op. at 1
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyDecided for petitioner
“Here, as Petitioner points out, “[n]one of the elements of the Challenged Claims . . . use the word ‘means,’” similar to the challenged claims in the previous related proceedings. Pet. Reply 2–3; see also IPR2024-00405, Ex. 1001, 22:43–60; IPR2024-00407, Ex. 1001, 22:36–49; IPR2024-00573, Ex. 1001, 21:51–65. As the Federal Circuit stated, when a disputed claim limitation does not employ “means for” language, the presumption is that each of the terms conveys sufficiently definite structure or act and, thus, is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6. See Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1367. Based on the record before us, this presumption that each of the terms is not subject to § 112 ¶ 6 is not overcome.” slip op. at 17
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See PO Resp. 4; Pet. Reply 2; PO Sur-reply 8. However, we addressed similar arguments with respect to this issue in previous related proceedings. See IPR2024-00405, Paper 24 at 8–25; IPR2024-00407, Paper 25 at 8–26; IPR2024-00573, Paper 27 at 8–29. In fact, during Oral Argument in this proceeding, Patent Owner acknowledged that “this panel construed the claims at issue in [previous proceedings,] IPR2024-573 and 2024-407.” Tr. 20:3–5. In particular, Patent Owner acknowledged that “the Board would rely on and import the construction from those IPRs, . . . 2024-407 and ’573 for the sake of consistent office determination.” Id. at 20:9–11. That is, Patent Owner agreed that the Board should use the prior constructions for the same claim terms at issue in this proceeding. Id. at 26:12–16 (“JUDGE MCKONE: -- it sounds like everybody agrees, that we should use the prior claim constructions from [the] other proceedings . . . Do you agree? MR. HECHT: -- if the Board agrees, absolutely.”). Petitioner also agreed that the Board should use the prior constructions. See id. at 31:23–32:3 (“JUDGE MCKONE: And so I assume you want us to use the same claim construction in this case as the previous case[s]; is that correct? MR WOO: That is correct, Your Honor.”). We agree with the parties that, for the sake of consistency, we apply our claim constructions from the previous proceedings. Tr. 20:22–25. As set forth in the previous related proceedings, we determined that the claims do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See IPR2024-00405, Paper 24 at 8–25; IPR2024-00407, Paper 25 at 8–26; IPR2024-00573, Paper 27 at 8–29. Thus, for consistency, and for the reasons given in the previous related proceedings, in this proceeding, we also determine that the claims do not invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, as discussed below.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. In particular, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that the District Court provided a construction for “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service,” as recited in claim 1. Although Patent Owner points to the District Court’s Memorandum in Support of Claim Construction Order (id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2002, 26)) to support its contention that the District Court construed the term “enabled,” as we determined in the Decision to Institute, this portion of the District Court’s Memorandum merely discusses that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, and discusses exemplary operations of the “hybrid device” from which a POSITA “could reasonably ascertain the scope of the claim.” See Dec. Inst. 9. As we explained, a determination of whether a term is indefinite is not the same thing as construing a claim term. Id. Thus, as we previously explained, by determining that “hybrid device” is not indefinite, the District Court did not construe the term “enabled.” Id.; see also Ex. 2002, 26. Accordingly, nothing in the Memorandum provides a construction of “enabled” as Patent Owner contends. Id. Thus, we find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that Buer does not disclose the “enabled” limitation because, in Buer, “no key is provided in exchange for the information.” PO Resp. 33. That is, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction that an application, function or service is “enabled” by a PDK “when it receives information from a PDK in exchange for an access key.” Id. at 32. Here, as Petitioner points out, Buer discloses an authentication component for providing credentials to a service provider to authenticate access to secured services, wherein the authentication component generates an RF signal providing the necessary authentication information to a service provider. Pet. 45; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 152, 174. Buer further discloses a mobile device with an RFID client to authenticate a user to another processing system, the mobile device transmitting an enablement signal to a computer with a point-of-sale device. Pet. 47; see Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 192–195. We find availing Petitioner’s contention that Buer’s authentication component “enables” a wide variety of applications, functions, or services. Pet. 56. Petitioner’s contention is supported by Dr. Wolfe’s testimony and is consistent with the teachings of Buer. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 229. Based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has persuasively shown that Buer teaches “one or more of the integrated RDC and integrated PDK enabling one or more of an application, a function, and a service on one or more of the hybrid device and a device associated with the external RDC,” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 8,646,042 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,646,042
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.