- Samsung Bioepis Co., Ltd. / Celltrion, Inc. et al. v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jul 23, 2024 · IPR2023-00884 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–30 after their disclaimer and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.72, “[t]he Board may terminate a trial without rendering a final written decision, where appropriate . . . .” Further, 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1) and (2) together state that, “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include . . . [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent [and] [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Thus, in disclaiming every claim in the ’572 patent, Patent Owner has constructively requested adverse judgement. Ex. 3005. We grant Patent Owner’s request. Several exhibits filed in this proceeding were done so under seal as” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,253,572 - PTAB · Jan 31, 2024 · IPR2024-00298 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–30 of the ’572 patent on all asserted grounds and granted Biocon’s motion to join IPR2023-00884.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We explained in our Institution Decision in IPR’884 why we conclude that Samsung demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial in showing that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See generally IPR’884 DI. The present Petition advances identical arguments, challenging the same claims over the same combinations of prior art. We consequently adopt the same reasoning here as in our IPR’884 Institution Decision, and conclude that Petitioner is likely to prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of the same challenged claims. Id. We incorporate our previous analysis regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to at least one claim of the ’572 patent challenged in the Petition for the same reasons as in IPR’884. See id. Therefore, we determine that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“joinder is discretionary. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.122. We determine whether to grant joinder on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular facts of each case, substantive and procedural issues, and other considerations. When exercising that discretion, we are mindful that patent trial regulations, including the rules for joinder, must be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); see also, USPTO, America Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions,” available at: uspto.gov/patents/laws/americainvents-act-aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked#type-inter-partesreview_3244 (last visited February 2, 2022). B.” slip op. at 10
NonePatents in suitUS 11,253,572 - PTAB · Jan 30, 2024 · IPR2024-00260 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds and granted Celltrion’s motion to join IPR2023-00884.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We explained in our Institution Decision in IPR’884 why we conclude that Samsung demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial in showing that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See generally IPR’884 DI. The present Petition advances identical arguments, challenging the same claims over the same combinations of prior art. We consequently adopt the same reasoning here as in our IPR’884 Institution Decision, and conclude that Petitioner is similarly likely to prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of the same challenged claims. Id. We incorporate our previous analysis regarding the asserted grounds of unpatentability and conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to at least one claim of the ’572 patent challenged in the Petition for the same reasons as in IPR’884. See id. Based on the record before us, we determine that the Petition warrants institution of inter partes review on all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Petitioner certifies and we agree that the Petition is substantively identical to that of IPR’884, where we found Samsung had met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail at trial in establishing at least one challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted grounds. Mot. 5; see generally IPR’884 DI. Petitioner also certifies, and we agree, that it relies on the same evidence here as in IPR’884. Mot. 5. Patent Owner waives its right to file a preliminary response in this proceeding, for the sake of efficiency. See Paper 7, 2. Petitioner also certifies that it will be a “silent understudy” to Samsung in IPR’884 if the proceedings are joined, thus, there will be no impact to the schedule of that instituted trial. Mot. 5–6. Moreover, Petitioner asserts that, structured in this way, the joined proceeding will simplify briefing and discovery (i.e., they will be singular, rather than occurring in two proceedings). Id. at 6–7.” slip op. at 12
NonePatents in suitUS 11,253,572 - PTAB · Jan 16, 2024 · IPR2024-00201 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 10–12, 17–19, 21, 25–28, and 33 on three §103 grounds, and granted Biocon’s motion to join IPR2023-00739.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“concluded that Samsung had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial in showing that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See, generally, -00739 IPR, Paper 9 (“Inst. Dec.”). The present Petition advances essentially identical arguments, challenging the same claims over the same combinations of prior art. We consequently adopt the same reasoning as in our -00739 Institution Decision, and conclude that Petitioner is similarly likely to prevail in demonstrating the unpatentability of the same challenged claims.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“(c) JOINDER. — If the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a preliminary response under section 313 or the expiration of the time for filing such a response, determines warrants the institution of an inter partes review under section 314. As the moving party, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested relief. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). A motion for joinder should: (1) set forth the reasons joinder is appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; and (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); see also, USPTO, America Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions,” available at: uspto.gov/patents/laws/americainvents-act-aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked#type-inter-partes-review_3244 (last visited February 2, 2022). We are persuaded by Petitioner’s arguments that joinder in these circumstances is appropriate. Petitioner undertakes to act as a “silent understudy” in the joined inter partes reviews and to take no active role in the joined inter partes reviews, unless Samsung ceases to act as a party. Mot. 6–7. The challenged claims and grounds of the Petition are identical to those of the -00739 IPR. Id. at 7. Petitioner’s Motion is timely and should have no effect upon the trial schedule established for the -00739 IPR. Id. at 8.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“As for the Fintiv factors, we considered Patent Owner’s arguments in the Institution Decision of the -00739 IPR, and we find the substantially same arguments in Patent Owner’s Opposition no more persuasive upon repetition. See Inst. Dec. 55–61. Again, we emphasize that although trial may have concluded in the district court litigation, as well as in the -01226 IPR, there nevertheless remains a substantial number of ’601 patent claims that have been challenged only in the -00739 IPR. We conclude that this fact warrants exercise of our discretion to institute inter partes review and to grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder of the present inter partes review with the -00739 IPR.” slip op. at 9
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,888,601 - BTC Corporation v. TG Biotech Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 13, 2023 · IPR2022-00998 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds; Patent Owner’s motion to strike Exhibit 1038 was granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that we should disregard Dr. Naumovski’s testimony because she may have taken a leave of absence from work for a couple of years. The record supports that Dr. Naumovski not only meets the requirements of the person of ordinary skill in the art, but also appears to have relevant knowledge with respect to Gynostemma pentaphylum (“GP”) saponins. See Ex. 2015 (Appendix A). related field, and at least two years of experience using techniques for extraction and characterization of plant-based materials.” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 74). Because there are more than 400 species of plants that contain saponins, Patent Owner disagrees that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be familiar with the structure and utility of saponins. Id. The level of skill in the art is a reference point for gauging what would have been obvious based on the reference disclosures. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. In other words, the lens of the level of ordinary skill in the art does not change a prior art’s disclosure, though it may change one’s understanding of what is disclosed. Patent Owner, however, does not explain how its definition provides a reference point that would meaningfully alter the Petition’s assertions of obviousness. For purposes of this decision, we analyze the asserted prior art with respect to the level of skill set forth by Petitioner, but there would be no difference in the outcome of this Decision if we were to apply the level of skill in the art set forth by Patent Owner. C.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“during the full trial, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that applying the methods of Kim 460 to the G. pentaphyllum starting material of Razmovski necessarily results in the damulin levels as claimed. We agree with Dr. Naumovski’s explanation that the use of an impure damulin B standard containing a double peak renders the results as shown in Exhibit 1013 unreliable. Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 141–143, 162–173; see Ex. 2007. Dr. Naumovski further explains that the use of an impure standard would require the application of a correction factor, but this correction factor would need to be reassessed as the purity of the standard decreases over time. See Ex. 2015 ¶ 166. As Dr. Naumovski explains that applying a correction factor to the linear regression would result in a shallower slope. Ex. 2015 ¶ 165 (citing 2006, 71:12–73:5; 99:2–9). “Reducing the calibration curve slope increases the amount of damulin B calculated from the experimental extracts.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 165. However, in the Experimental Report-1 the same correction factor for the damulin B standard was used to” slip op. at 41
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner requests construction of the terms “an effective amount for improving or treating the metabolic syndrome,” which is found in claims 11–13, as meaning “an amount that produces any measurable amount of improvement in the metabolic syndrome” (Pet. 13–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 91)) and “[a] pharmaceutical composition for improving and treating a metabolic syndrome, comprising at least one of at least 0.7% damulin A and at least 0.5% damulin B . . . and a pharmacologically acceptable carrier or excipient,” which is found in claim 8, as meaning “a pharmaceutical composition that includes an extract with 0.7% and 0.5% of damulin A and damulin B[, respectively,] along with a carrier or excipient” (id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1002, 64–65, 251–52, 280; Ex. 1001, 12:15–67, Table 2)). Patent Owner argues that “constructions are not necessary.” PO Resp. 11–12. We agree with Patent Owner and determine that it is not necessary for purposes of this Decision to construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only terms” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re Droge, 695 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed.Cir.1988)); Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the expectation of success issue involves a showing of “a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed”) (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner relies on Kim 460 to show that heating ginseng, which contains the ginsenosides Rb1, Rb2, Rc, Rd, Rg3, and Rg5, results in a teaches that ginseng with the higher Rg3 and Rg5 content is 50-fold more potent in their vasodilation studies than the non-treated samples. Razmovski teaches that G. pentaphyllum contains over 100 saponins and eight of those saponins are the same as protoparaxadiol-type ginsenosides Rb1, Rc, Rb3, Rd, F2, Rg3, malonyl-Rb1, and malonyl-Rd that are found in P. ginseng. Ex. 1007, 4. Knowing that G. pentaphyllum also contains ginsenosides Rb1, Rb2, Rc, Rd, Rg3, and Rg5, we find Petitioner’s conclusion that heating a G. pentaphyllum extract that contains these ginsenosides would similarly increase the ginsenoside levels of Rg3 and Rg5 is a reasonable inference from the cited references. Based on the teachings in Kim 460, we agree with Petitioner that it would have been reasonable to expect that the same source material, although derived from a different plant, would behave similarly to heat treatment. See Pet. 24. Because G. pentaphyllum is a less expensive starting material, we also agree with Petitioner that there is sufficient motivation to substitute G. pentaphyllum for ginseng in the methods of Kim 460. slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,357,786 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,357,786 - Ford Motor Company v. Safe Driving Technologies LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 10, 2023 · IPR2021-01446 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6, 10, 12–14, 16, 17, and 19–21 are unpatentable under §103; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedGranted
“Our rules and Consolidated Trial Practice Guide are clear on this prohibition. And, the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide explains: “[w]here a party believes it has a basis to request relief on a ground not identified in the rules, the party should contact the Board and arrange for a conference call with the Board and opposing party to discuss the requested relief with the judge handling the proceeding.” CTPG 75. Thus, the Board identifies appropriate ways for a party to address matters that it considers to be beyond the specific procedures outlined in the rules. Merely submitting new evidence was not authorized by Board rules or guidance and Patent Owner did not seek authorization to file the new evidence. The facts warrant excluding Exhibits 2030–2032 and we grant the Motion. See CTPG 81.” slip op. at 83
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“underpinnings, why a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to modify the prior art to achieve the claimed invention. In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner . . . must . . . articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418)). Nonetheless, “a disclosure that anticipates under § 102 also renders the claim invalid under § 103, for ‘anticipation is the epitome of obviousness.’” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792 (CCPA 1982)); see also Application of Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402 (CCPA 1974) (“[T]his court has sanctioned the practice of nominally basing rejections on § 103 when, in fact, the actual ground of rejection is that the claims are anticipated by the prior art. The justification for this sanction is that a lack of novelty in the claimed subject matter, e.g., as evidenced by a complete disclosure of the invention in the prior art, is the ‘ultimate or epitome of obviousness.’” (citations and footnote omitted)).” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 9,047,170 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,047,170 - Ford Motor Company v. Safe Driving Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 7, 2023 · IPR2021-01341 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4 and 7–10 are unpatentable as obvious over Tan, Boies, Tan with Shuman and Behr, or Hardouin; Petitioner’s motion to exclude is granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“example, the types of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Petitioner asserts: An ordinary artisan would have been a person having, as of October 24, 2001, a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Computer Science, or an equivalent degree with at least two years of experience in electronic user interface systems and vehicle sensor systems or related technologies. Additional education may substitute for lesser work experience and vice-versa. (Ex.1003, ¶40.) Pet. 3 (citing Andrews Declaration). Patent Owner does not address the definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art, either to contest Petitioner’s proposal or to offer a different definition. See generally Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art (or ordinarily skilled artisan), which appears to be consistent with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the disclosure of the ’994 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” as evidence of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We find Patent Owner’s reliance on the ’994 patent’s FIELD OF THE INVENTION Section misplaced. To quote it in its entirety, it states: The present invention relates to the field of telematics, namely to the field of integrating information, communication, computing and entertainment technologies into vehicles for civilian or military use. The invention particularly relates to safety control systems for vehicles to reduce driver distraction, avoiding potentially dangerous conditions tending to produce accidents. Ex. 1001, 1:21–27 (emphasis added). Thus, even were we to consider this portion of the Specification informative of the meaning of “telematic device,” it does not limit such to “a central multifunction device,” as argued by Patent Owner, but states that the field of telematics relates to integrating information, communication, computing, and entertainment technologies into vehicles, generally. Id. Nothing about this statement requires all these features to be integrated into a single device, unless the vehicle is considered the single device (which neither party suggests). See Reply 4 (discussing this section of the ’994 patent). Further, we find nothing in the ’994 patent supporting Patent Owner’s contention that the claim term “telematic device” should be restricted to a central multifunction device that integrates together the features of information, communication, computing, and entertainment technologies. The ’994 patent never states this. See Ex. 1001. Moreover, we find the ’994 patent to be much more inclusive than exclusive when describing what a telematic device can be, i.e., the scope of the term. Upon reviewing the written description of the ’994 patent, we find it makes the following statements (all emphasis added):” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the disputed claim language is, indeed, somewhat confusing. It appears to us from reading the language of claim 2 as a whole that Patent Owner understood that the phrase “include at least one of” could have been used rather than the language “including at least” because Patent Owner used these different phrases at different portions of claim 2. Compare Ex. 1001, 23:2, with id. at 23:14–15. Had Patent Owner intended that the disputed claim language require only one of the listed devices, it appears that Patent Owner understood how to claim that. Further, the full disputed phrase of claim 2 recites a “communication device including at least a pager, a telephone, a global location sensor, a temporal sensor, an optical sensor, a heading sensor, a bearing sensor, and an altitude sensor.” Id. at 23:14–17. However, adding to the ambiguity of the claim, this list of communication device components is tacked onto the end of a clause listing software applications (e.g., a telephone application and a wireless communication application), not devices. And, moreover, the term “communication device” is not preceded by an associated “a” or “the,” and there is no other “communication device” recited earlier in claim 2 (or claim 1 from which it depends), which further adds to the claim’s ambiguity. Patent Owner asserts that “at least” means “at least one” and Petitioner, at least in an alternative argument, appears to potentially agree and presented a case for unpatentability based on such an interpretation. See Pet. 9 (compare Grounds 1 and 2 with Ground 3). Furthermore, following Patent Owner’s stated position on this claim language in its Response (at page 19), Petitioner does not argue the matter in its Reply, other than stating at one point (not at the claim construction section) that “at least” means “all.” See Reply 1–7; but see id. at 14 (stating that the plain language of claim 2 requires all of the devices). Thus, we could adopt Patent Owner’s interpretation of claim 2’s” slip op. at 24
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to the ordinarily skilled artisan to combine Shuman with Tan because Shuman’s teachings on its GPS would illuminate the capabilities of and data provided by Tan’s GPS; these are the same or similar devices and may have the same or similar capabilities. Id. at 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 261). Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to the ordinarily skilled artisan to also combine Behr with Tan because Behr’s disclosure of monitoring the time of day to ensure its GPS provides relevant, safe, and legal instructions would also similarly support Tan’s GPS functioning, and also because there would have been a benefit to including Behr’s pager’s functionality in Tan’s system because such was a relevant communication technology. Id. at 64–65 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 263, 265). We agree with Petitioner’s assertions and reasoning regarding combining these prior art references with a reasonable expectation of success, and Patent Owner does not argue otherwise. See generally Resp.” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 9,713,994 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,713,994 - Edwards Lifesciences Corporation / Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cardiovalve Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 6, 2022 · IPR2021-01051 · APJ John G New · IPR · Final written decision
The Board granted the non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 1–10 and replacing them with claims 11–20, which Petitioner failed to prove unpatentable over Goldfarb ’267.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“We conclude that Petitioner’s arguments are insufficient to meet its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Goldfarb ’267 anticipates, or renders obvious, the limitation of proposed substitute claim 11 reciting “advancing the end of the first-clip arm and the end of the second-clip arm out of the delivery tube before advancing the support portion out of the delivery tube” merely requires advancing the ends of the clip arms out of the delivery tube “before advancing the support portion out of the delivery tube.” Moreover, Petitioner’s arguments are not persuasive with respect to proposed substitute dependent claims 12–20 due to their dependence from, and incorporation of, the limitations of proposed substitute claim 11. See Supp. Mot. Amend. 1, Reply Supp. Mot. Amend. 1. We therefore conclude that these proposed substitute claims are similarly neither anticipated by, nor obvious over, Goldfarb ’267. III. CONCLUSION We GRANT Patent Owner’s non-contingent Motion to Amend and Supplemental Motion to Amend, canceling original claims 1–10 and replacing them with substitute claims 11–20. Additionally, for the foregoing reasons, and after having analyzed the entirety of the record and assigning appropriate weight to the cited supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that proposed substitute claims 11–20 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 57
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Having weighed the evidence and Petitioner’s argument, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art as: (1) a mechanical or biomedical engineer with at least three years of experience in designing or developing medical devices who would, where necessary or desired, work or consult with others including a physician to develop such a medical device; or (2) an interventional cardiologist or cardiac surgeon with at least three years of experience developing and/or using medical devices in the heart, and who would, where necessary, work or consult with others including an engineer to develop such a medical device. See Pet. 15–16.” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Vesely. Ex. 1003. We have reviewed the credentials of Dr. Vesely and consider him qualified to provide the opinions for which his testimony has 4 Goldfarb et al. (US 7,563,267 B2, July 21, 2009) (“Goldfarb ’267”) (Ex. 1005). 5 Petitioner refers to Goldfarb’s ’267 disclosure of a further alternative at Ex. 1005 col. 27 ll. 57–60 as Embodiment A. See Pet. 19. We understand the asserted Embodiment A to encompass the description that extends to Ex. 1005 col. 28, l. 9. See Pet. 24–48. 6 Goldfarb et al. (US 7,635,329 B2, December 22, 2009) (“Goldfarb ’329”) Ex. 1006. 7 Ex. 1005 cols. 17–23, ll. 66–29, Figs. 9–16; see Pet. 21–22. been submitted. See id. ¶¶ 1–9; see also Ex. 1004 (Dr. Vesely’s curriculum vitae).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther
“is described in Goldfarb ’267 as plainly a single, unitary structure and, as such, each portion argued as separate elements by Petitioner (i.e., male element (yellow), female element (green), coupling member 19 (blue) and flexible arms 19A and 19B (dark blue)) together form a solid, single component. Thus, all of the “elements” described by Petitioner as being “separate” are in fact a single unit that: (1) bears the weight of the fixation device during delivery; (2) absorbs and transfer the axial and rotational forces imposed by the shaft 12; and (3) holds the device in the correct orientation. Petitioner points to no disclosure of Goldfarb ’267 that suggests these elements act independently or separately to perform the functions of the unitary component, nor can we discern any such disclosure. We therefore find that Petitioner’s argument that only the “male element” portion of coupling member 19 constitutes the “support portion” recited in proposed substitute claim 11 is an arbitrary and unduly restrictive interpretation of the reference’s disclosure. This is particularly true given that Petitioner points to no portion of the male element of coupling member 19 performing a supporting function that is not shared by the other elements of coupling member 19. We conclude that the better understanding of the reference is that the entirety of coupling member 19 (including flexible arms 10A and 19B11) constitutes an analogous support portion, as recited by substitute claim 11, because it provides a unitary structure that performs the supporting functions enumerated by Petitioner.” slip op. at 41
Patent outcomesUS 10,702,385 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,702,385 - Ford Motor Company v. Safe Driving Technologies LLCAdverse judgmentPTAB · Nov 14, 2022 · IPR2021-01353 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner after it disclaimed claims 1–7 and 14–16, the only claims at issue, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Actions constituting a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” Id. Patent Owner has disclaimed, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(a), claims 1–7 and 14–16 of the ’709 patent, and has requested that the Board enter adverse judgment against it with respect to these claims, the only claims at issue in this proceeding. Ex. 3002; Paper 14. Having reviewed Patent Owner’s disclaimer and request, we determine that entry of judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–7 and 14–16 of the ’709 patent is appropriate.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,532,709 - PTAB · Oct 19, 2022 · IPR2022-01513 · APJ Tina E Hulse · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 on all five grounds previously instituted in IPR2022-00517 and granted Teva’s motion to join that proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Teva’s Petition here is substantively identical to Mylan’s Petition in the -517 IPR, challenging the same claims based on the same art and the same grounds. Compare IPR2022-00517, Paper 1 with IPR2022-01513, Paper 2. For the same 1 European Medicines Agency, Assessment Report, Xarelto, EMA/CHMP/794349/2012 (2013). Ex. 1005 (“EMA”). 2 Foley et al., Antithrombotic therapy in peripheral artery disease, 21 VASCULAR MED. 156–69 (2016). Ex. 1006 (“Foley”). 3 Plosker, Rivaroxaban: A Review of Its Use in Acute Coronary Syndromes, 74 DRUGS 451–64 (2014). Ex 1007 (“Plosker”). reasons stated in our Decision Granting Institution of Inter Partes Review in IPR2022-00517, we institute trial in this proceeding on the same five grounds. See IPR2022-00517, Paper 15.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Motion for Joinder. Based on authority delegated to us by the Director, we have discretion to join an inter partes review to a previously instituted inter partes review. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). Section 315(c) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the Director institutes an inter partes review, the Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that inter partes review any person who properly files a petition under section 311.” Id. When determining whether to grant a motion for joinder, we consider factors such as timing and impact of joinder on the trial schedule, cost, discovery, and potential simplification of briefing. Kyocera Corp. v. SoftView, LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013).” slip op. at 4
NonePatents in suitUS 10,828,310
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.