- PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00152 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–17 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6, and 11 are obvious over Sutardja, Donnelly, and Letendre.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Based on our review of the record,1 we conclude that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to incorporate Donnelly’s GUI into Sutardja’s display to more easily and conveniently communicate Sutardja’s state of charge information to a user in a graphical format. Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 242; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157–159. Petitioner also argues that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious to combine Donnelly’s GUI depicting a bar graph indicating the charged and uncharged capacity of a vehicle battery into Sutardja according to well-known methods that would have yielded predictable results. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 160). Petitioner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have reasonably expected to successfully combine Donnelly’s GUI as it relates to the state of charge into Sutardja’s vehicle, which already processed information about the state of charge of its battery and included a display showing charging parameters. Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 242, 243, Ex. 1003 ¶ 161).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“includes “at least” a bar graph as shown in Figure 7. Id. at 4. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s “proposed construction should be rejected” because it “would wrongly import embodiments from the specification.” Prelim. Resp. 20–21. Patent Owner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would recognize that the “unitary charge indicator is not limited to a bar graph representation.” Id. at 21. We discern no dispute over the meaning of “unitary vehicle charge indicator” because Petitioner does not argue that the term is “limited” to the embodiment shown in Figure 7, only that the term “at least includes” that embodiment. Patent Owner does not contend otherwise.” slip op. at 8
- Strike new argumentDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that Petitioner violates Rule 42.6(a)(3) by impermissibly incorporating arguments from Mr. Andrews’s Declaration into the Petition to avoid the word count limit. Prelim. Resp. 46–49. Patent Owner contends that the Andrews declaration is “over 140 pages” with a substantive portion containing “multiples of the allotted 14000 words” to a petition. Id. at 47. Patent Owner contends that “the only way to potentially understand the Petitioner’s proposed unpatentability challenges is to wade through the extraneous pages cited within the Andrews Declaration.” Id. Patent Owner also complains that Andrews supports his testimony relating to Petitioner’s first challenge by citing “many additional references in addition to references actually ‘relied upon’ by Petitioner.” Id. at 47–48. We discern no violation of Rule 42.6(a)(3). To the contrary, that Mr. Andrews’s supports his extensive explanations of his opinions with citations to dozens of pieces of objective evidence, is a feature, not a bug of his testimony. Mr. Andrews, and Petitioner by extension, leave virtually none of the substance of his testimony unsupported by objective evidence, a practice that we applaud.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,990,788 - Klipsta Pty Ltd v. Lindsay AlbaneseInstitutedPTAB · Jul 10, 2025 · IPR2025-00346 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is anticipated by KR ’458.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition and the evidence of record, we conclude that the information demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’047 Patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (“POSITA”) “would be a regular consumer/shopper with a rudimentary knowledge of the use of magnetic clips and a basic understanding of clip construction.” Pet. 13. We find, for purposes of this Decision, that the ’047 Patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’047 Patent is consistent with the definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The ’047 Patent discloses that in addition to being separate straps, the rear strap and the front strap “can be formed from a single piece of material.” Ex. 1001, 3:40–44, 5:24–32, 10: 18–25. In particular, Figures 5A–5B of the ’047 Patent illustrate rear strap 510 and front strap 520 as being “formed from a single piece of material that is folded approximately in half where a first half can be the rear strap 510 and a second half can be the front strap 520.” Id. at 10:18–21, Figs. 5A–5B. Indeed, Patent Owner acknowledges “[i]t should be noted that forming the first and second straps from a single piece of material is well within the scope of the claimed invention.” Ex. 1007, 5 (citing the ’047 Patent at 3:37–44). Moreover, we note the positions taken by the parties are consistent with the fact that claim 13, which depends from claim 1, recites “wherein the first strap and the second strap are formed from a single folded strap.” Ex. 1001, 14:47–48. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s construction of “the second strap joined to the first strap” to include “a single piece of material.”” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“The ’047 Patent discloses that the hook is used to attach the hat holder to another object. Ex. 1001, 8:31–33. In reference to Figures 3A–3C, the ’047 Patent discloses that “the hook 340 is formed from a strap of flexible material. The flexible material can be, for example, nylon, leather or leatherette. The hook 340 can be formed from the same material as the front or rear straps 310 and 320, respectively.” Id. at 8:26–31, Figs. 3A–3C; see also id. at 6:58–7:3. This disclosure is indicative that the term “hook” can be a strap in contrast to a structure that is typically regarded as being a hook, as shown in Figures 1A–1C, 2A–2C, 4A–4B, 6A–6B, 7, 8 of the ’047 Patent. Additionally, we note that consistent with the above disclosure, claim 10, which depends from claim 1, recites “wherein the hook is [a] flexible strap having a closure.” Ex. 1001, 14:41–42. We, therefore, adopt Petitioner’s construction of a “hook” to include “structure that serves to attach the hat holder to another object.”” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipationcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,413,047 - PTAB · Jul 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 because Tesla showed a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–18 would have been obvious over Wallen and Berggren.
RulingsInstitution decision- Director reviewOther
“Memorandum (“Memorandum”) issued on March 26, 2025, Patent Owner filed its Discretionary Denial Brief on April 7, 2025. Paper 6. Petitioner filed its Opposition Brief on May 27, 2025. Paper 8. On June 13, 2025, Acting Director Stewart issued a decision determining that discretionary denial of institution is not appropriate in this case and referring the Petition to us for merits and other non-discretionary statutory considerations. Paper 9.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the purpose of institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art. slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“establishes sufficiently for the purpose of institution that the combined teachings of Wallen and Berggren teach or suggest all of the limitations recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 14
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,206,670 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 on all four asserted § 103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“II. ANALYSIS A. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent, and we adopt it here.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties’ dispute on this issue turns on claim construction. Petitioner’s approach requires we read “accumulation” as updating transmission power for each received TPC command. That is consistent with some aspects of the ’153 patent’s description. See Ex. 1001, 9:29–42 (“[S]tep is the magnitude of the amount added to an accumulator upon receipt of each TPC command. . . . [T]he transmit power PTx(k) may be updated each time a new TPC command is received.”). Patent Owner’s approach requires only that TPC commands cumulatively affect transmission power. That also appears consistent with the ’153 patent’s description. See id. at 9:35–36 (“The transmit power PTx(k) may be updated for every frame period.”). Based on those disclosures, it appears that the Specification supports Patent Owner’s broader construction. We need not resolve the “accumulation” claim-construction dispute at this stage, because Petitioner’s Zeira-based ground justifies institution, as discussed below. The parties should address the proper construction for “TPC command accumulation” in the instituted trial.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We do not agree with Patent Owner that the present record shows Andersson’s and Khan’s approaches couldn’t or wouldn’t be combined in the manner Petitioner asserts. Although shared-channel applications may have motivated Khan’s approach, it seems that scheduling grants applicable to a particular UE could be transmitted to that UE along with Andersson’s TPC commands. Thus, Patent Owner does not undermine Petitioner’s prior-art combination on the present record. The additional record developed through trial may ultimately support Patent Owner on this point, but at present, this argument does not justify denial of institution. Patent Owner additionally takes issue with Petitioner’s asserted benefits such as “allowing for a larger number of active wireless units,” reducing complexity, and reducing latency. Prelim. Resp. 38 (quoting Pet. 26–27). Those disputes raise potential factual issues that are best resolved through trial.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,952,153 - PTAB · Jun 26, 2025 · IPR2025-00219 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 11–22 based on the Petition’s asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we institute review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Patent Owner submits that the asserted combination is unworkable and that skilled artisans would not have made it because Andersson’s DPCCH is a dedicated channel sent to a single UE, whereas Khan’s TPC commands and scheduling grants are sent using a shared channel—“a channel that is shared by the UEs attached to a particular base station.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Because Khan’s TPC commands and scheduling grants “are intended for different UEs that share the channel,” unlike Andersson’s TPC commands in a dedicated channel, Patent Owner asserts, “the two frame structures cannot be combined in the manner Petitioner suggests.” Id. at 20–21. Although Andersson describes “other bits” in its data structure, Patent Owner asserts that those “would necessarily be intended for the UE that the DPCCH is dedicated for” and would not work for Khan’s scheduling grants. Id.” slip op. at 8
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,706,500 - Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 11, 2025 · IPR2025-00218 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the Kim and Vayanos combination did not show that each individual bit indicates a separate time interval, as required by claims 1–12.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“limitation 1.2 because it is more consistent with the claim language and the specification of the ’416 patent. The language “each of the plurality of bits” clearly individualizes the “plurality of bits” and the language “indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels” clearly ascribes to each individual bit the function of identifying a time interval that is separate from the time interval(s) that the other individual bit(s) identify. Petitioner’s claim constriction argument largely ignores the words used in limitation 1.2. Petitioner fails to provide anything to explain how or why the plain meaning of “each” and “respective” in the context of limitation 1.2 could be understood by a skilled artisan to connote something other than the plurality of bits individually identifying a separate and distinct time interval (i.e., a “one-to-one correspondence”). Petitioner similarly does not identify anything from the specification of the ’416 patent that would support deviating from the plain meaning of limitation 1.2. And Petitioner’s reliance on 3M Innovative Properties appears to miss the mark. Pet. Reply 7. In that case, the Federal Circuit held that, when a claim term has an “ascertainable definition in the body of the claim,” their “cases do not support prescribing a more particularized meaning unless a narrower construction is required by the specification or prosecution history.” 3M Innovative Properties Co., 725 F.3d at 1329. Here, however, Patent Owner is not attempting to import a more particularized meaning into limitation 1.2, but to demonstrate that the ’416 specification is consistent with the ascertainable definition of “each” and “respective” within the context of limitation 1.2. In particular, Patent Owner highlights that the ’416 specification describes the resource allocation technique as using an indicator bit, within a plurality of indicator bits, that has a one-to-one correspondence to a specific time window established for a Forward Access Channel (FACH). See Ex. 1001, 13:63–14:25, 14:44–53, Figs. 7, 9; PO Resp. 11–14, 19–20; PO Sur-reply 2–3; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 36–40, 49. And we agree that the ’416 specification informs, and is consistent with, the plain reading of limitation 1.2. See Ex. 1001, 13:63–14:25, 14:44–53, Figs. 7, 9. Therefore, we determine that the plain and ordinary meaning of limitation 1.2 requires all the plurality of bits to individually identify a separate and distinct time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“PICH, which is communicated to Kim’s receiver, has a plurality of bits, the evidence fails to demonstrate sufficiently that each of those bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels, as limitation 1.2 recites. As Patent Owner correctly argues, the Vayanos paging indicators use multiple bits to indicate information about a single time interval in a frame, rather having several bits that individually identify a separate and distinct time interval. PO Resp. 39–41 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 67, 74–75). Vayanos teaches that “[t]he number of paging indicators (Np) in each PICH frame is configurable by the system and can take on a value of 18, 36, 72 or 144,” and that “[e]ach paging indicator is sent in 288/Np consecutive bits in the PICH frame, where 288/Np can take on a value of 16, 8, 4 or 2.” Ex. 1006, 3:26–34. As a result, if there are 18 (Np = 18) paging indicators, 288/NP = 288/18 = 16 (meaning that each paging indicator is 16 bits long), if there are 36 (Np = 36) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/36 = 8 (meaning that each paging indicator is 8 bits long), if there are 72 (Np=72) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/72= 4 (meaning that each paging indicator is 4 bits long), and if there are 144 (Np=144) paging indicators, 288/Np = 288/144 = 2 (meaning that each paging indicator is 2 bits long). Ex. 2001 ¶ 66. Each paging indicator (singular) taught by Vayanos includes multiple bits––each paging indicator (singular) has either 16, 8, 4 or 2 bits–– and Vayanos does not disclose or suggest a paging indicator that indicates a time interval with only a single bit. Id. And Petitioner does not cite Kim to show the number of bits used to indicate a time interval; only to show that a UE would receive broadcast information with paging information including paging indicators that identify a time interval in which physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. See Pet. 40–49. Even accepting that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses a UE receiving a paging indicator that is indicative of a time interval in which a Paging Channel PCH may be found or indicative of whether a frame will include a signaling channel (e.g., PCH) at a specific TTI within that frame, the combination does not disclose or suggest using a paging indicator that is a single bit indicating either of those time intervals. On the contrary, as noted above, Vayanos teaches that all paging indicators consist of multiple bits and, thus, the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses a UE that only receives and uses a plurality of bits to indicate a time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This is insufficient to show a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will be able to establish that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses or suggests receiving a plurality of bits wherein the individual bits each identify a separate and distinct time interval. Therefore, Petitioner has not shown sufficiently that the Kim/Vayanos combination discloses or suggests the subject matter limitation 1.2 recites. For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that the combination of Kim and Vayanos disclose or suggest broadcast information that includes a plurality of bits, wherein each of the plurality of bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This failing undermines Petitioner’s showing as to independent claims 1 and 7 (in the asserted Grounds 1 and 2) and, as a result, the same deficiency extends through to all of the dependent claims challenged in all of the grounds.4” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“sufficiently that the combination of Kim and Vayanos disclose or suggest broadcast information that includes a plurality of bits, wherein each of the plurality of bits indicates a respective time interval that physical shared channel resources are utilized to signal channels. This failing undermines Petitioner’s showing as to independent claims 1 and 7 (in the asserted Grounds 1 and 2) and, as a result, the same deficiency extends through to all of the dependent claims challenged in all of the grounds.4 IV. CONCLUSION Based on the arguments and evidence presented by the parties, we conclude that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one claim of the ’416 patent challenged in the Petition. Therefore, we do not institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,136,416 - Sram, LLC v. Fox Factory, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00216 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9, 11–15, and 19 are unpatentable, including by anticipation over Gartner and Nakaya and obviousness over Gartner and Kodama and Nakaya and Kodama.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’223 patent “would have a degree in Mechanical Engineering and at least three years’ experience in vehicle suspension technology, or a Master’s degree in Mechanical Engineering with a concentration in design of vehicle suspension technology and/or shock absorbers.” Pet. 5–6, n.1. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp. Based on the complete record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“As Petitioner discerns, claim 1 does not recite “dampening only at the end portion of a compression stroke.” Rather, claim 1 expressly requires “a fluid flow path formed in the bottom out cup for providing fluid communication from the cup to the compression portion of the chamber during a compression stroke of the damper[.]” Ex. 1001, 7:44–47 (emphasis added). In this way, claim 1 contemplates that the bottom out cup operates “during a compression stroke of the damper,” rather than only at the end portion of a compression stroke or only near an end of a compression stroke. Similarly, independent claims 11 and 19 do not require that the bottom out cup provide damping only at the end or near the end of a compression stroke. See Ex. 1001, 8:8–23, 8:61–9:5. Claim 11 recites “a bottom out cup in fluid communication with the damper chamber” and “an adjustable fluid flow path formed in the cup, the flow path providing fluid communication between the cup and the primary compression chamber in a compression stroke of the damper.” Id. (emphasis added). Claim 19 also recites “in a compression stroke of the damper” and does not limit damping to the end, or near the end of a compression stroke. See id. at 8:61–9:5 (“in to the compression chamber at a first rate with the valve in a first position and at a second rate with the valve in a second position where the first rate is greater than the second rate and the valve includes an adjuster accessible from an exterior of the shock absorber.”) (emphasis added). The ’223 patent as a whole also does not describe the bottom out cup as damping or providing dampening only at the end or near the end of the compression stroke, but more broadly as during the compression stroke. With reference to Figure 3A, the ’223 patent discloses that bottom out piston 250 enters “the bottom out cup 275 during a compression stroke of the shock absorber.” Ex. 1001, 3:38–50 (emphasis added). Additionally, we observe that the ’223 patent discloses “[a]s the piston completely engages the cup 275, dampening is increased.” Id. at 3:64–65 (emphasis added). We understand this to mean that bottom out dampening occurs at the end of the compression stroke, but may also occur “during” the compression stroke and “increase” as the piston completely engages the bottom out cup.” slip op. at 16
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Considering Gartner’s disclosure, we credit Dr. Wang’s testimony because his testimony is better supported by the reference. Dr. Wang configured for providing damping . . . [and] bottom out cup 260, 460 (pink) is formed at the end of compression portion 26.4 (light red) and provides additional damping to reduce bottoming out[.]” Ex. 1019 ¶ 58 (citing Ex. 1010, Abstract, annotated Fig. 12A, 1:15–33, 9:33–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 179– 180, 188–190; Pet. 108–110). As discussed above, internal shock absorber 400 contains cup-shaped compression volume 460.4 that provides additional damping after the initial portion of the compression stroke. See Ex. 1010, 7:49–51, 7:55–56, 7:62–67, 9:20–24. Gartner further discloses these features as accommodating or protecting from bottoming out. See id. code (57). Patent Owner’s position and Dr. Slocum’s testimony otherwise, requires Gartner to expressly invoke the term “bottom out cup” instead of compression volume. See Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 104–106. We disagree that is necessary. The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We find that Gartner discloses a “cup-shaped feature configured for providing dampening at the end of a compression stroke.” Gartner discloses that internal shock absorber 400 provides damping after the initial portion of the stroke and as compression continues, compression volume 460.4 reduces as part of that damping. Ex. 1010, 7:49–51, 7:55–56, 7:62–67, 9:20–24.” slip op. at 31
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Id. code (57) (emphases added). Though Gartner does not explicitly employ the term “bottom out cup,” it is not lost upon us that the internal shock absorber, e.g., shock absorber 400, functions during/in a compression stroke (e.g., after the initial portion of the compression stroke), to provide dampening while protecting from bottoming out. Considering Gartner’s disclosure, we credit Dr. Wang’s testimony because his testimony is better supported by the reference. Dr. Wang configured for providing damping . . . [and] bottom out cup 260, 460 (pink) is formed at the end of compression portion 26.4 (light red) and provides additional damping to reduce bottoming out[.]” Ex. 1019 ¶ 58 (citing Ex. 1010, Abstract, annotated Fig. 12A, 1:15–33, 9:33–48; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 179– 180, 188–190; Pet. 108–110). As discussed above, internal shock absorber 400 contains cup-shaped compression volume 460.4 that provides additional damping after the initial portion of the compression stroke. See Ex. 1010, 7:49–51, 7:55–56, 7:62–67, 9:20–24. Gartner further discloses these features as accommodating or protecting from bottoming out. See id. code (57). Patent Owner’s position and Dr. Slocum’s testimony otherwise, requires Gartner to expressly invoke the term “bottom out cup” instead of compression volume. See Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 104–106. We disagree that is necessary. The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1990). We find that Gartner discloses a “cup-shaped feature configured for providing dampening at the end of a compression stroke.” Gartner discloses that internal shock absorber 400 provides damping after the initial portion of the stroke and as compression continues, compression volume 460.4 reduces as part of that damping. Ex. 1010, 7:49–51, 7:55–56, 7:62–67, 9:20–24.” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 8,550,223 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Enfish · Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,550,223 - DBR Finance, Inc. v. Rugged Cross Hunting Blinds, LLCNo claims unpatentablePTAB · May 29, 2025 · IPR2024-00291 · APJ Cynthia L Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–19 not unpatentable because Petitioner did not prove the proposed Whybrew–Strength combinations disclosed the claimed mesh panels with spaced holes.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We question, therefore, whether someone having an education in textile engineering or physics, but no experience in the field of hunting blinds, would be consistent with the level of skill portrayed by the ’535 Patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note that Petitioner’s expert’s experience, education, and qualifications are rooted in textiles, fibers and physics, and sophisticated subjects related thereto. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 14–20. But his deposition revealed that he has little or no experience in the field of hunting blinds. See Ex. 2038, 8–14.5 5 The same might be said of Patent Owner’s expert. See Ex. 2031, ¶¶ 6–7; Ex. 1023, 16. However, our obviousness analysis leaned lightly, if at all, on her declarations and testimony.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. Mesh Material In the Petition, Petitioner asks that “the term ‘mesh material’” be interpreted in accordance with “a plain and ordinary usage.” Pet. 25. Per Petitioner, the “plain and ordinary” meaning of the term “mesh material” is “a woven material of open texture with spaced holes therein.” Id. Per Petitioner, “[o]ther typical terms used to describe a mesh-like material” are “a screen material, or a netting material, which are believed to be synonyms.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute that a mesh material would have an open texture with spaced holes therein. See PO Resp. 18. We find that Petitioner’s proposed construction aligns with the ’535 Patent’s specification. See Ex. 1001. The drawings in the ’535 Patent depict the mesh material 26 as having an array of uniformly spaced circular holes forming a net-like structure (see id., Fig. 1A, 1B, 4, 9) or an array of uniformly spaced rectangular openings (see id. Fig. 8) forming a screen-like structure. The embodiments of the mesh material 26 listed in the ’535 Patent (e.g., a mesh banner material, scrims, a network of fibers, etc.) are materials having net-like or screen-like structures. See id. at 6:47–7:28.6” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Our construction aligns with the claim language; Petitioner’s proposed construction does not. See Ex. 1001, 10:4–19. The independent challenged claims set forth “one or more panels of mesh material” and then set forth “said one or more panels comprising: a first side with a camouflage pattern; and a second side with a dark color coating.” Id. at 10:4–11. The recited “said one or more panels” corresponds to the previously recited “one or more panels of mesh material,” not panels comprising a material that was only a “mesh” prior to printing/coating. See id. Also, the independent challenged claims set forth that “the one or more panels of the mesh material define an outer surface of the camouflage structure.” See id. at 10:18–19, 1:23–24 (emphasis added). And the panel(s) defining a hunting blind’s outer surface would include the dark color coating. Our construction aligns with the ’535 Patent’s specification; Petitioner’s proposed construction does not. See Ex. 1001. The ’535 Patent repeatedly describes the relevant panel material in the hunting blind (i.e., post printing/coating) as a mesh material. See id., Abst., 1:19–5:34, 6:47–7:28, 9:16–54, Figs. 1A, 1B, 9. The ’535 Patent expressly describes and depicts the mesh material 26 as including the camouflage pattern and the dark-color coating. See id. at 1:52–56, 3:24–25, 3:31–33, Figs. 1A, 1B. The ’535 Patent says that “panels” of this coated mesh material 26 “are used to form” a hunting blind. Id. at 3:22–26. The ’535 Patent says that “[m]esh material is presented for a hunting blind with a camouflage pattern printed on a first side and a second side with a color coating.” Id. at Abst. The ’535 Patent says that “mesh material of interwoven fabric is provided for a hunting blind including a camouflage pattern printed on a first side and a second side with a dark color coating.” Id. at 1:19–22; see also id. at 1:44–49. Our construction aligns with the ’535 Patent’s prosecution history; Petitioner’s proposed construction does not. See Ex. 1006. As mentioned above, throughout prosecution of the ’535 Patent, the same prior art material was mapped to the claimed panel(s) of mesh material. See Ex. 1006, 64–72, 122–106. The mapped-to prior art mesh material was described during prosecution as an “interwoven fabric” with “a pattern” printed on a first side and “a dark color coating” on a second side. Ex. 1006, 64; see also id. at 122. And the mapped-to prior art mesh material (i.e., which included not only the interwoven fabric but also the printed pattern and the dark color coating) had a “net-like structure” with an array of uniformly spaced “net holes” that are “not closed.” Ex. 2021, 4:1–5, see also id. at 2:58–3:6, 4:34–45, Figs. 1, 2a. Thus, we understand that claimed panel(s) of mesh material must have” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“However, Patent Owner does not bear the burden of proving Strength’s camouflage material 10 does not have holes. Rather, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does have holes. And Petitioner’s arguments that undermine Patent Owner’s position that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does not have holes, concurrently undermine Petitioner’s position that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does have holes. Per Petitioner, “Strength is silent on whether visible holes exist in the fabric” (Pet. Reply 8) and “the Strength reference doesn’t discuss anything about holes” (Tr. 14). Petitioner’s expert testified that it was his “understanding that Strength is silent” on “whether or not there are holes.” Ex. 2038, 44. Petitioner contends that Strength’s silence about the presence/ absence of holes hinders Patent Owner from proving that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does not have holes. See Pet. Reply 8. We agree. But this same silence likewise hinders Petitioner from proving that Strength’s camouflage material 10 does have holes.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 11,399,535 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,399,535 - TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd. (F/K/A TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings, Ltd.) v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00135 · APJ John A Hudalla · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR on all challenged claims, exercising § 314(a) discretion under Fintiv because the parallel litigation was advanced and trial would precede a final written decision.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“Under the latest applicable guidance, Petitioner’s Sotera stipulation “is highly relevant, but [is] not . . . dispositive by itself.” CAPJ Memo at 2– 3. Accordingly, we consider Petitioner’s stipulation “as part of [our] holistic analysis under Fintiv.” Id. at 2. In theory, Petitioner’s stipulation could “mitigate[] any concerns of duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board, as well as concerns of potentially conflicting decisions” regarding unpatentability/ invalidity. Sotera, Paper 12 at 19. We note that Petitioner’s initial invalidity contentions included the two asserted references here, Bennett and Nashida. Although Petitioner served those contentions before the filing of the instant Petition—in which it proffered its stipulation—we cannot discern from the instant record whether Petitioner’s present invalidity positions in the underlying litigation incorporate any aspects of its grounds here based on Bennett and Nashida. Still, we view Petitioner’s stipulation as significantly mitigating potential conflict given the likelihood that the court would hold Petitioner (and its privies) to Petitioner’s representations made here.5” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Board, however, has discretion to deny a petition even when a petitioner meets that threshold. Id.; see, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”); NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (precedential) (“NHK”). For the reasons that follow, we exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) to deny institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“controller” that “receive[s] an identifier for identifying a second video content from [an] external mobile terminal” and “acquire[s] the second video content via the internet using said identifier.” Ex. 1001, 20:29–31, 20:46–47, 20:52–55 (alterations and emphasis added). In the Bennett obviousness ground, Petitioner cites Bennett’s control signal that directs display of a video stream on a television screen for teaching the recited “identifier.” Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 32). Petitioner further cites Bennett’s teaching of an Internet server as a media source for teaching the “acquire[s]” limitation. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 55). Petitioner alternatively cites its declarant’s testimony and contends that it would have been obvious “to use an identifier such as URL in Bennett’s system to retrieve video content from the Internet.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 87). Yet Patent Owner’s arguments (see Prelim. Resp. 59–64) call into question whether Bennett teaches or suggests the use of either Bennett’s control signal or a URL to “acquire the second video content via the internet.” In addition, we preliminarily agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments regarding the URL “focus on justifying an example of what an identifier could be, and fail[] to address a scenario that would justify the receipt of a URL from a phone/remote” in Bennett’s system. Id. at 63. Petitioner’s further contentions for these limitations in the Bennett– Nashida obviousness ground (see Pet. 73–75) do not necessarily cure the deficiencies mentioned by Patent Owner. Petitioner contends that “Nashida discloses the use of identifiers, such as URLs, for retrieving internet content” and cites Nashida’s teaching of “‘controller 1010 transmit[ting] a command of requesting a transmission of a URL’ for retrieving and displaying web content on a display apparatus.” Id. at 73 (quoting Ex. 1005 ¶ 120). Yet, according to Patent Owner, Nashida appears to show the URL moving in the opposite direction of Petitioner’s intended mapping: “It is therefore the image display apparatus (the alleged ‘display apparatus’) that sends the URL to the remote controller . . . , and not the other way around, as claimed by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 67 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 1216). At the very least, these issues preclude a finding of “particularly” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,219,020 - TCL Electronics Holdings Ltd. (F/K/A TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings, Ltd.) v. Maxell, Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2025-00134 · APJ Jason W Melvin · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of IPR challenging claims 1–11, 13, and 15–20, finding that the advanced Texas litigation and trial timing outweighed the Petition’s Sotera stipulation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“September 22, 2025, which is less than four months after the statutory deadline for this Decision and “almost eight months before the projected statutory deadline for a final written decision.” Prelim. Resp. 25 (citing Ex. 2004). Accordingly, the trial is currently set to occur several months before any Final Written Decision in this case will issue. Although trial delays are a possibility, there is no evidence before us that would indicate the likelihood of a trial postponement. Thus, this factor strongly favors discretionary denial.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied fintivInstitution denied
“transmits, over the USB cable, a first signal to the digital camera for causing the digital camera to output compressed first image information.” Petitioner addresses that requirement by asserting Lawther’s interface circuit “can also be adapted to enable exchange data with a connected external device.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 50). Although Lawther may “exchange data,” supporting that signals may be sent to a connected camera, Petitioner does not establish that such a signal would have been used as claimed. It may be that such a signal is inherently present in the interactions Lawther describes, but Petitioner does not assert or establish so, only that Lawther has the capability to “exchange data” with a connected camera. Because of this potential weakness in Petitioner’s showing, we cannot conclude that the Petition presents a particularly strong challenge.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“the Petition does not present a particularly strong challenge, because it inadequately addresses at least one claim limitation. In particular, limitation [1F] requires “USB interface circuitry [that] transmits, over the USB cable, a first signal to the digital camera for causing the digital camera to output compressed first image information.” Petitioner addresses that requirement by asserting Lawther’s interface circuit “can also be adapted to enable exchange data with a connected external device.” Pet. 39 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 50). Although Lawther may “exchange data,” supporting that signals may be sent to a connected camera, Petitioner does not establish that such a signal would have been used as claimed. It may be that such a signal is inherently present in the interactions Lawther describes, but Petitioner does not assert or establish so, only that Lawther has the capability to “exchange data” with a connected camera. Because of this potential weakness in Petitioner’s showing, we cannot conclude that the Petition presents a particularly strong challenge.” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,650,780
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.