- PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01047 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–44 on all presented challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that FreightCar would prevail on at least one claim based on Hart, the 1906 Cyclopedia, and Wong.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–44 of the ’515 patent on all presented challenges. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2024) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”); see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars.” Pet. 29; Prelim. Resp. 9. Patent Owner, however, disagrees that the experience should include designing or analyzing “similar vehicles.” Prelim. Resp. 9. At this stage, for the reasons below, limiting the ordinary skill in the art to “at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars” does not affect our analysis of the parties’ dispute or our determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill to determine whether review should be instituted. Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge of rail cars would not.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 35). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge of rail cars would not.” Prelim. Resp. 9–10 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 35). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“to further support the upper, outboard end of the slope sheet with a crosswise, L-shaped beam as in Wong,” and one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to do so, because of “the benefits of reinforcing the slope sheet at its upper end, where its connection with another structure creates a stress concentration.” Pet. 63 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 108). Petitioner points to Hart’s transverse beam b3 and argues that it suggests using a transverse beam like Wong if Hart is modified so that upper beam b3 no longer supports the slope sheet. Id. (citing Ex. 1008, Fig. 1). Petitioner also argues that the references are in the same field and that there would have been a reasonable expectation of success. Id. at 63–64 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 108; Ex. 1008, Fig. 1). Based on the preliminary record, Petitioner shows that its proposed combination of Hart, the 1906 Cyclopedia, and Wong teaches or suggests the above-quoted limitations of claim 24 and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined those references in the manner asserted with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 19
§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 8,132,515 - Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2024-01070 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 and 12–19 are unpatentable; claims 10 and 11 were not shown unpatentable, because the asserted grounds failed to establish unpatentability for those claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“The parties do not identify, and we do not discern, any material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. Based on the record currently before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“The parties agree that “constrain” means to retain the module in a fixed position. Patent Owner further interprets “constrain” not to allow minor movement. This interpretation is consistent with the ’174 patent, which states, In some embodiments, the first electrical conductor may be configured to constrain or substantially constrain the electronics module. As used in this context, “constrain” may refer to when the first electrical conductor is configured to provide support (i.e. a restraining force) for the electronics module to retain the module in a fixed position within the temple. That is, the first electrical conductor may be configured to hold the electronics module in place. . . . The term “substantially constrain” is used in this context to account for some minor movement of the electronics module within the temple, but the conductor may generally hold the electronics module within the temple in place (such that it remains in an operative position). Ex. 1001, 11:50–12:3 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’174 patent distinguishes between an electrical conductor configure to “constrain” an electronics module and an electrical conductor configured to “substantially constrain” an electronics module, with the latter allowing for “some minor movement of the electronics module.” We therefore adopt Patent Owner’s interpretation of “constrain” as used in claim 1 to mean the first and second electrical conductors are configured to provide a restraining force that retains the module in a fixed position without allowing for minor movement of the electronics module.7 This interpretation also is consistent with Petitioner’s interpretation, which includes retaining the module in a fixed position within the temple. See Pet. 20.” slip op. at 24
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“therefore, are unavailing. As correctly noted by Petitioner, Brunton discloses that “the [hearing aid] units may be provided with any suitable number of contact pins and the sockets provided with a corresponding number of tubular contacts that are positioned to receive the pins and in which the pins are frictionally retained.” Ex. 1003, 3:61–65 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s witness, Dr. Feland, testifies, Frictionally retaining the hearing aid unit’s pins in the cavity means that the socket contacts couple the hearing aid unit to the temple and constrain the hearing aid unit. Brunton’s socket contacts (corresponding to the claimed first and second electrical conductors) accordingly are configured to couple the hearing aid unit (corresponding to the claimed electronics module) to the temple to constrain the hearing aid unit. Ex. 1002 ¶ 64. We credit this testimony of Dr. Feland, which is consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of a friction-fit connection. We give less credit to the testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Oliver. Dr. Oliver testifies that “Brunton describes a cover plate that physically secures the sockets.” Ex. 2016 ¶ 87 (citing Ex. 1003, 3:71–4:1). However, this assertion is contradicted by the very disclosure Dr. Oliver quotes in his declaration, which explains that the material of the temple retains the sockets in place: “The sockets for the transistor and unit, such as the sockets 19 and 20, may be frictionally held in the cavity or may be embedded in the material of the temple, as may be desired.” Ex. 1003, 3:71–74 (emphases added); see also Ex. 2016 ¶ 87 (quoting same). Brunton does disclose a cover plate to cover the cavity, but Brunton does not disclose or suggest that the cover plate contacts or otherwise influences the hearing aid: “In the design shown, the temple is provided with a cover plate 31 that is secured in position over the unit 77 and the transistor 29 with screws 32.” Ex. 1003, 3:74–4:1; see also Ex. 2016 ¶ 87 (quoting same).” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We are persuaded that Petitioner has set forth adequate reasoning to combine the teachings of Eichelberger and Howell-596. Howell-596 teaches electronic circuitry having UV radiation monitoring capability that can be used within eyewear. Ex. 1015, code (57). Howell-596 discloses that the UV detection system can be activated by a switch, which can be a capacitive touch switch. Id. ¶¶ 88, 191; Ex. 1019, 172. As discussed above, Eichelberger teaches a capacitive touch switch with electronic components disposed thereon. Ex. at 3:6–14, 3:43–50. We are persuaded that using Eichelberger’s capacitive touch switch in place of Howell-596’s would have been obvious. See Pet. 83–84; Ex. 1002 ¶ 221. e. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 15 would have been obvious in view of the combination of Howell-596 and Eichelberger.” slip op. at 55
Patent outcomesUS 8,801,174 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,801,174 - Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2024-01069 · APJ Sean P O’Hanlon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 are unpatentable as obvious, including under Blum, Sikonowiz, and Howell-719; the Board rejected the separate Howell-719, Sikonowiz, and Blum ground for claims 14–21.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require construction to resolve the obviousness challenges here.” Pet. 16. Petitioner contends that, in its mappings of the challenged claims, it “identifies passages from the specification demonstrating that the prior art discloses claim terms in the manner [that] the ’355 patent uses them.” Id. at 17. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s contentions or proffer any constructions of its own. See generally PO Resp. We determine that no express construction of any term is necessary. slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or manufacturing engineering; mechatronics; electrical engineering plus coursework in mechanical engineering, manufacturing engineering, or mechatronics; or a similar technical degree,” and “would have also had at least 2 years of experience designing consumer electronics, such as eyewear with electronics.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Petitioner contends that “[w]ork experience could substitute for formal education and additional formal education could substitute for work experience.” Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 32). Patent Owner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or computer engineering, or an equivalent degree and, in addition, approximately two years of work experience with embedded electronic devices” and “[m]ore advanced degrees or training in a related discipline or both can compensate for shorter work experience.” PO Resp. 10 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 29–32). The parties do not identify, and we do not discern, any material difference between the parties’ proposed definitions. Based on the record currently before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We note that we would reach the same conclusions under either proposed standard.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). The Supreme Court’s decision in [KSR] directs us to construe the scope of analogous art broadly, stating that “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” [KSR, 550 U.S.] at 402 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“electronic components . . . comprising . . . at least one of an accelerometer or a gyroscope.” Ex. 1001, 30:15–28. Petitioner relies on Howell-719 to disclose a switch that the user operates “to control audio while wearing the glasses.” Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 93). Petitioner relies on Blum to disclose glasses including an accelerometer or gyroscope that allows the user to control a switch, thereby “allowing the user to use a head movement to change the functionality of the glasses.” Id. at 46–47 (citing Ex. 1006, 30:39–45). Petitioner argues that it would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan to [i]ncorporat[e] [Blum’s] accelerometer- or gyroscope-based switch controls into Howell-719 [as] a simple substitution of one known alternative (accelerometer/gyroscope-based motion detector allowing for head movement to activate switch) for a component (physical switches) serving the same purpose (allowing the user to activate switch to control functionality while the user is wearing the glasses and cannot see the switches) with the added benefit of hands-free control. Id. at 47 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 130). Thus, Petitioner’s modification is to replace Howell-719’s “physical switch” with Blum’s “accelerometer/ gyroscope-based motion detector.” Claim 14 also recites “a capacitive touch switch operably coupled to an electronic component in the plurality of electronic components.” Ex. 1001, 30:26–28. Petitioner argues that “Howell-719 discloses a capacitive touch switch operably coupled to the speaker to control the speaker.” Pet. 48. However, as noted above, Petitioner modifies Howell-719’s glasses to replace its switch with an accelerometer/gyroscopebased motion detector. Thus, the glasses as modified by Petitioner do not include Howell-719’s switch, and it is not clear, based on the record, how the requirement for a capacitive touch switch is satisfied in this combination of references. See PO Resp. 18–20; see also PO Sur-reply 7. 2. Conclusion For at least these reasons, on this record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 14–21 would have been obvious in view of Howell-719, Sikonowiz, and Blum.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 10,613,355 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,613,355 - Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Dec 11, 2025 · IPR2024-01071 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable as obvious; the Board found each challenged claim unpatentable under at least one asserted § 103 ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We find that the proposals from the parties substantially overlap, such that it remains unclear whether any substantive difference exists. Notably, neither party argues that the minor differences in the proposals lead to a different outcome on any issues in this proceeding. Based on our review of the proposals, we apply Patent Owner’s proposal because it is consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’541 patent and prior art of record. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). The outcome of the issues addressed in this Decision would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), we apply the claim construction standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under that standard, we give the words of a claim their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by one skilled in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Id. at 1312–13. Only terms in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, Petitioner posits that “no claim terms require construction to resolve the obviousness challenges here.” Pet. 12. Patent Owner does not oppose Petitioner’s position or proffer any constructions of its own. See generally PO Resp. We determine that no express construction of any claim element is necessary to resolve the issues in this proceeding.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the motivation to combine Howell-596 and Howell-158 persuasive. Importantly, the references themselves support the combination because Howell-158 expressly teaches the advantages of using an insulating layer with metal frames and incorporates by reference Howell-596 and its embodiments that disclose all but the insulating layer limitations of claim 1. See Pet. 15–21. While Patent Owner correctly notes that the references do not expressly teach the use of the insulating layer in the Howell-596 embodiments, the references do not teach away from that approach and at least implicitly support Petitioner’s proposed combination, which involves using an advantageous design element (an insulating layer) with another embodiment incorporated into the same document. See id.; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 3 (incorporating Howell-596), 52–53 (disclosing the use of metal frames and the advantages of using an insulating layer with metal frames). Patent Owner does not dispute that the stated advantages of the insulating layer— preventing short circuits and reducing leakage current—would apply to the embodiments of Howell-596 when those designs incorporate a metal frame. See PO Resp. 18 (arguing that the advantages of the insulating layer only apply if metal frames are implemented in Howell-596’s system). In short, the references themselves amply support Petitioner’s motivation to combine arguments and the expert testimony Petitioner relies on in support of those arguments. See Pet. 21–24; Pet. Reply 2–10; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 63–69.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundUnpatentable
“POSITA would have found it obvious, through routine optimization, to select a housing module with the claimed thickness of less than or equal to 0.7 mm. See Aller, 220 F.2d at 456; In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272, 276 (CCPA 1980) (“[D]iscovery of an optimum value of a result effective variable . . . is ordinarily within the skill of the art.”); see also Power- Kennedy Contracting Corp. v. Concrete Mixing & Conveying Co., 282 U.S. 175, 184–85 (1930) (“[O]bviously a mere change in proportion would involve no more than mechanical skill and would not amount to invention.”). Several reasons support Petitioner’s arguments, which we address in turn.” slip op. at 33
Patent outcomesUS 8,905,541 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,905,541 - Exotec Product France SAS / Exotec North America Inc. et al. v. Opex CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00850 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3–12, 14, and 23–27 are unpatentable as obvious over Raizer and Hangzhou.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes an express construction” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. In this case, we must determine whether one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Hangzhou’s disclosure of driving its auto-guided trolleys 200 under shelves 100 would improve the operation of Raizer’s system in the same way. For us to resolve this question in Petitioner’s favor, Petitioner must provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). However, bodily incorporation, i.e., “an actual physical substitution of” Hangzhou’s auto-guided trolleys or operating software into Raizer’s system, is not required. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 11,472,632 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,472,632 - Alpinestars S.P.A. / Alpinestars USA Inc. v. Dainese S.P.A.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 15, 2025 · IPR2025-00750 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–22 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of its three obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Because Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of establishing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined EP’536 (with or without Hatton) and CN’180 in the proposed manner, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to claims 1 and 18. 5. Claims 2–17 and 19–22 Because Petitioner has not shown a reasonably likelihood of prevailing with respect to independent claims 1 and 18, Petitioner also has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to the claims that depend therefrom (claims 2–17 and 19–22).” slip op. at 20
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not offer its own definition of the level of ordinary skill or dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally Prelim. Resp. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s unchallenged description of an ordinarily skilled artisan appears consistent with the subject matter discussed in the references and that of the challenged claims, for purposes of this Decision we apply Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other
“For purposes of our analysis, we need only address the meaning of “planar structure,” and only to note that this limitation requires that all portions of the casing body, when inflated against the first mesh portion, second mesh portion, and tie elements, “form a planar structure” when the casing body is inflated. This is evident from both the claim language and the written description of the ’065 patent. Limitation [1e] of claim 1 recites that in the inflated condition, “said portions of the casing body” are “inflated against said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements.” We understand “said portions of the casing body” to refer to all of the portions of the casing body. Likewise, “said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements” refers to the entire mesh structure recited in limitation [1a]. Thus, this limitation requires all of the casing-body portions to inflate against the entire mesh structure to form the “planar structure.” This reading is consistent with the Specification. The Specification teaches that “[t]he first mesh portion and the second mesh portion together with the tie elements determine with the casing body the final shape of the inflatable element,” which “can reach a generally flat and planar final shape.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–23; see also id. at 4:59–5:3 (teaching that the casing body inflated within the mesh structure results in a “globally planar structure”). Here, “inflatable element” refers to the entire structure because it is comprised of the mesh structure and casing body. Id. at 3:11–18. Thus, the entire structure, when inflated, is “generally flat and planar.”” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“portions of the casing body, when inflated against the first mesh portion, second mesh portion, and tie elements, “form a planar structure” when the casing body is inflated. This is evident from both the claim language and the written description of the ’065 patent. Limitation [1e] of claim 1 recites that in the inflated condition, “said portions of the casing body” are “inflated against said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements.” We understand “said portions of the casing body” to refer to all of the portions of the casing body. Likewise, “said first mesh portion, said second mesh portion, and said tie elements” refers to the entire mesh structure recited in limitation [1a]. Thus, this limitation requires all of the casing-body portions to inflate against the entire mesh structure to form the “planar structure.” This reading is consistent with the Specification. The Specification teaches that “[t]he first mesh portion and the second mesh portion together with the tie elements determine with the casing body the final shape of the inflatable element,” which “can reach a generally flat and planar final shape.” Ex. 1001, 4:19–23; see also id. at 4:59–5:3 (teaching that the casing body inflated within the mesh structure results in a “globally planar structure”). Here, “inflatable element” refers to the entire structure because it is comprised of the mesh structure and casing body. Id. at 3:11–18. Thus, the entire structure, when inflated, is “generally flat and planar.”” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,012,065 - PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00747 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Buttiker was not prior art, so Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 5, 6, 9, or 10 were unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“establish a reasonable likelihood of proving that any of the challenged claims would have been obvious because all of the challenges rely on Buttiker for specific limitations, and Buttiker is not prior art to the challenged claims of the ’271 patent. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner
“When claiming the benefit of priority to a provisional application, the provisional application must provide written description support for the claims in question. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (referring to “an invention 10 Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s arguments on this point in its Preliminary Reply. See Prelim. Reply 2–4. disclosed in the manner provided by section 112(a)”); see also New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]o be afforded the priority date of the provisional application, . . . the written description of the provisional must adequately support the claims of the non-provisional application.”). Patent Owner argues that the ’688 provisional application supports claims 5, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’271 patent because they describe the method of controlling the pumps and thermal modulators to achieve selected temperatures upstream of the brewing chamber and creating a resulting solvent used to infuse a solute, creating an infused beverage. See Prelim. Sur-reply 3–4 (citing Prelim. Resp. 16–18, 35–37; Ex. 1012, 12–15). Patent Owner also refers to Figure 2 of the ’688 provisional application, which discloses the device that performs the method described in the application. See id. at 4–5. With one exception that we address immediately below, Petitioner does not contest these assertions or argue that the ’688 provisional application fails to disclose the subject matter claimed in claims 5, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’271 patent. See Pet. 18–20; Prelim. Reply 2–4. Based on our review of the record, the ’688 provisional application provides adequate written description support for the challenged claims of the ’271 patent.11 See Ex. 1012, 11–15 (describing Figure 2 of the ’688 provisional application and related methods), Fig. 2.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference not prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for patent owner
“only qualify as prior art under section 102(a)(1) because section 102(a)(2) does not apply to purely foreign patent publications like Buttiker. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (describing scope of prior art as including “a patent issued under section 151” (addressing issued U.S. patents) and “an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b)” (addressing published U.S. applications)); MPEP § 2152 (“The documents upon which a prior art rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) may be based are U.S. patent documents only.”).10 Under section 102(a)(1), Buttiker may be prior art if it “was patented [or] described in a printed publication . . . before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). Buttiker published after the ’688 provisional application was filed, but before the other applications to which the ’271 patent claims priority were filed. See Ex. 1010, 1; Ex. 1001, code (60). Accordingly, whether the ’271 patent claims at issue here have adequate support in the ’688 provisional application determines whether Buttiker is prior art to those claims because Buttiker’s publication predates later applications to which the ’271 patent claims priority.” slip op. at 12
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“When claiming the benefit of priority to a provisional application, the provisional application must provide written description support for the claims in question. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (referring to “an invention 10 Petitioner does not dispute Patent Owner’s arguments on this point in its Preliminary Reply. See Prelim. Reply 2–4. disclosed in the manner provided by section 112(a)”); see also New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]o be afforded the priority date of the provisional application, . . . the written description of the provisional must adequately support the claims of the non-provisional application.”). Patent Owner argues that the ’688 provisional application supports claims 5, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’271 patent because they describe the method of controlling the pumps and thermal modulators to achieve selected temperatures upstream of the brewing chamber and creating a resulting solvent used to infuse a solute, creating an infused beverage. See Prelim. Sur-reply 3–4 (citing Prelim. Resp. 16–18, 35–37; Ex. 1012, 12–15). Patent Owner also refers to Figure 2 of the ’688 provisional application, which discloses the device that performs the method described in the application. See id. at 4–5. With one exception that we address immediately below, Petitioner does not contest these assertions or argue that the ’688 provisional application fails to disclose the subject matter claimed in claims 5, 6, 9, and 10 of the ’271 patent. See Pet. 18–20; Prelim. Reply 2–4. Based on our review of the record, the ’688 provisional application provides adequate written description support for the challenged claims of the ’271 patent.11 See Ex. 1012, 11–15 (describing Figure 2 of the ’688 provisional application and related methods), Fig. 2.” slip op. at 12
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 11,957,271 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00705 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 7–9 and 11 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“(1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering, chemical engineering, or a similar engineering field, with at least two years of work experience in fluid dynamics or fluid systems engineering; or (2) a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering, chemical engineering, or a similar engineering field, with at least one year of work experience in fluid dynamics or fluid systems engineering.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Although a final conclusion of obviousness must be supported by findings and analysis establishing a reason to combine or modify the known elements as proposed, the analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner “fails to explain how Zeng’s noise reduction head 20 and inner cover 30, designed for a different atomizer configuration, could be integrated into Sevy’s system without changing the principles of Sevy’s operation.” Prelim. Resp. 13–14; see also id. at 16 (arguing that “Zeng’s components are not mere drop-in replacements”). Although the relied-upon structures from Zeng are, of course, disclosed in that reference as part of another atomizer, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). “Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. As to the alleged change in the principle of operation, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why Sevy’s principle of operation would change with the proposed combination, which replaces Sevy’s alleged “silencer assembly” with similar teachings of Zeng.” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,527,094 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00706 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1, 4, and 7–10 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant prior art. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that would be used in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), as described in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, we generally give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. Although extrinsic evidence, when available, may also be useful when construing claim terms under this standard, extrinsic evidence should be considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1317–19. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose explicit constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 12–13; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Motivation foundInstituted
“On the current record, this argument does not identify a deficiency in Petitioner’s position as to clauses 1C and 1D. Patent Owner implies that the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D require functionality recited elsewhere in the claim—namely, forming a “fluid dispersion” (Prelim. Resp. 4)—but Patent Owner does not adequately present evidence supporting this implied claim construction. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982) (rejecting arguments “not based on limitations appearing in the claims”). Instead, Patent Owner cites to the entirety of claim 1 in support of these implied functional requirements. See Prelim. Resp. 4. Stated differently, Patent Owner has not adequately explained why any particular component (or collection of components) must perform the function of forming the “fluid dispersion” recited in clause 1G. Moreover, even assuming as correct Patent Owner’s assertion that Sevy “requires downstream separation,” Patent Owner has not explained why such a 8 In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner appears to use different terms for the same concept: “downstream separation”; “post-formation correction”; and “post-atomization correction.” See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 3 (“downstream separation”), 4 (“post-formation correction”), 5–6 (“post-atomization correction”). In any response, Patent Owner should clarify the scope of these terms. requirement would fall outside of the scope of claim 1. See Elbit Sys. of Am., LLC v. Thales Visionix, Inc., 881 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“‘[A]ttorney argument is not evidence’ and cannot rebut other admitted evidence.” (quoting Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc., 849 F.3d 1034, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2017))). On the current record, we determine that Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that Sevy discloses or suggests the structures recited in clauses 1C and 1D.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,583,449 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1 and 3–8 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 As Paper 7 in this proceeding, Patent Owner mistakenly filed the Preliminary Response in a related proceeding. one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears generally consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Patent Owner does not argue at this stage of the proceedings that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, as revised above.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“At this stage of the proceeding, the record on the analogous art issue is incomplete. Petitioner seems to take the position that Kaiser is in the same “field” (Pet. 47), but Petitioner does not fully address the issue of analogous art. Although Petitioner was not required to anticipate this argument with its initial filing (see Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharma., Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023)), Petitioner may wish to address this issue as appropriate in future briefing. We will consider the full record on this issue, if necessary, as part of our analysis in any final written decision. On the current record and in view of our decision to institute based on other grounds, we reach no conclusion as to whether Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Goubet and Kaiser as proposed.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,092,918
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.