- Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. / Google LLC et al. v. Headwater Research LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00341 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17, 19, 21–27, 29, and 30 are unpatentable as obvious over TS-23.140 and Ogawa.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Based on the full record, we find that Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the ’733 patent and the asserted prior art. PO Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31). We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner’s proposal is encompassed by Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. Reply 4. Our analysis below would not change, if we used Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on the full record, we do not need to interpret expressly any claim term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsNot reached
“o) Objective Indicia of Non-obviousness Patent Owner does not present any arguments or evidence regarding any objective indicia of nonobviousness for any of the challenged claims. See PO Resp.” slip op. at 49
Patent outcomesUS 8,406,733 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,406,733 - Apple Inc. v. THL Holding Company, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00398 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1, 4, 7, and 8 over Kalliola and Vauclair; claims 2, 3, and 6 with Kalayjian; claim 5 with Turunen; and claim 9 with Trimble.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner agrees with the qualifications proposed by Petitioner: “this description reasonably represents the level of ordinary skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’680 Patent, as well as the prior art cited in this proceeding.” PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 22). For the purposes of this Decision, we adopt the assessment offered by Petitioner as it is consistent with the ’680 patent and the prior art before us. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that, based on Patent Owner’s proposed construction in the parallel litigation, we construe “pairing signal” as “[p]rocessor signal to initiate a wireless device pairing sequence.” Pet. 6 (quoting Ex. 1009, 15–168). In Response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s interpretation of this term. PO Resp. 14. We adopt the parties’ proposed construction for this term. We determine that we need not construe any other claim terms. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Second, Petitioner demonstrates that the combination of Kalliola and Vauclair teaches claim limitations 1(d)(iv) and 1(d)(v). As discussed and cited to above, the Petition identifies that, with Kalliola’s touch screen as the claimed “touch screen,” Kalliola’s processor presents a graphical user interface via its touch screen as set forth for limitation 1(c) and 1(d)(ii), and Kalliola’s processor operates in conjunction with its graphical user interface to perform claimed steps as set forth for limitation 1(d)(iii). See Pet. 20–29. We agree that the assertions are supported by Kalliola’s disclosure of a touch screen with a graphical user interface presented thereon, where “tactile elements” “allow the user . . . to enter data . . . into the device.” See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 26, 40, 42, 44, 51, 71, Figs. 3, 5. Petitioner also asserts, and we agree, that Kalliola teaches the use of Bluetooth-enabled emitters in remote devices that communicate with its wireless communication device with a signal emitter. Pet. 29–31 (citing Ex. 104 ¶¶ 9, 71, 73–75, 77, 107, Fig. 5). Petitioner contends, and we agree, that Vauclair provides additional specificity regarding the pairing process between two devices with its disclosures of a pairing process between devices using protocols that include Bluetooth, wherein a user can select a pairing option from a menu on a display. Id. at 31–32 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 22, 24, 28, 30, 34–36, 49, Fig. 1; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 164–167). Petitioner argues, and we agree, that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to configure Kalliola to use its processor to present “a pairing menu to enable a user to initiate a Bluetooth pairing process between the WCD and the signal emitter by selecting a pairing option via the WCD’s touchscreen,” with Vauclair teaching at least the selection of a pairing option presented on its display, because the presented pairing menu on Kalliola’s touch screen would allow the user to pair the WCD with the user’s personal item signal emitters and would also allow the devices to recognize each other on subsequent connections. Id. at 34–35 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 172); see also Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 30, 36. Consequently, we also agree with Petitioner’s assertion that it would have been obvious to a person of skill of ordinary skill in the art that Kalliola’s graphical user interface on its touch screen would have generated signals corresponding to the user’s inputs at least to carry out designated functions, like the initiation of a pairing process, and “the signals generated by the GUI from interaction at the touchscreen would be sent to the WCD’s processor so that the processor can interpret the user’s inputs and take the appropriate action.” Pet. 35; see also Pet. Reply 2–7. Petitioner also asserts, and we agree, that generating processor signals in response to a user indication was a known mechanism for wireless devices, as were Bluetooth pairing and corresponding pairing menus, and there would be no change to the respective functions of Kalliola’s’ wireless communication devices and Vauclair’s pairing menu. Pet. 36 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 175). The Petition argues, and we agree, that because Bluetooth pairing and pairing menus were conventional prior to time of the invention, there would have been a reasonable expectation of success configuring Kalliola’s wireless communication device. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 176); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–75 (Dr. Buehrer providing evidence on Bluetooth-connected devices and associated pairing). Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence of rationale to combine Kalliola and Vauclair, a reasonable likelihood of success in the combination, and that the prior art teaches limitation 1(d)(iv). As to limitation 1(d)(v), we also agree with Petitioner that in response to a generation of a pairing signal as discussed in limitation 1(d)(iv), Vauclair discloses that wireless transceivers communicate a series of RF signals back and forth to pair the devices. Pet. 37–38. Petitioner asserts, and we agree, that, in combination, it would have been obvious to configure Kalliola’s Bluetooth transceiver with Vauclair’s teachings for the communication of RF signals to pair devices. Id. at 39. Petitioner contends, and we agree, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Kalliola teaches that its wireless communication device performs Bluetooth communications with signal emitters, with the user selecting a desired signal emitter for locating objects, and that this pairing would also allow two Bluetooth devices to recognize each other on subsequent connections. Id. (Ex. 1003 ¶ 184). Petitioner asserts, and we agree, that applying Vauclair’s known technique of communicating RF signals to pair devices would improve Kalliola’s wireless communication device and yield the predictable result of Bluetooth-paired devices. Id. We also agree with Petitioner’s argument that this pairing was an understood and conventional feature of Bluetooth mobile communication devices, so there was a reasonable expectation of success in the combination. Id. at 40 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 186); see also Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–72 (Dr. Buehrer providing evidence on Bluetooth-connected devices). Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has provided sufficient evidence of rationale to combine Kalliola and Vauclair, reasonable likelihood of success in the combination, and that the prior art teaches limitation 1(d)(v).” slip op. at 40
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“Ex. 1003 ¶ 172. The Petition also asserts that, in the combination, there would be no change to the respective functions of either Kalliola’s WCD or Vauclair’s pairing menu. Pet. 36. Thus, the Petition relies on Kalliola’s processor, and its touchscreen, and graphical user interface with Vauclair’s teachings for the pairing menu displayed, wherein pairing signals are generated by Kalliola’s graphical user interface by interaction with the screen. As we discuss further below, Petitioner includes assertions that Vauclair itself teaches that the pairing signal is generated by its graphical user interface. See id. at 33, 37. The Petition, however, also relies on the combination of Kalliola and Vauclair to teach generating a pairing signal by Kalliola’s graphical user interface by interaction with its screen, as discussed above. Id. at 35. Accordingly, it is not necessary to reach the issue of whether Vauclair alone teaches that its graphical user interface generates the pairing signal. Additionally, we do not find that Petitioner’s further arguments in its Reply concerning interaction with Kalliola’s wireless communication device through its graphical user interface were impermissibly presented in view of the Petition’s specific assertions on the teachings of the combination of Kalliola and Vauclair, as discussed above, and its reliance on user interaction with Kalliola’s graphical user interface for the teaching of generating the pairing signal. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b).” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 11,265,680 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,265,680 - Apple Inc. v. THL Holding Company, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 3, 2025 · IPR2024-00399 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 11–19 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 11–14 over Kalliola, Turunen, Oswald, Vauclair, and Kalayjian; claims 15–18 with Thorn; and claim 19 with Thorn and Sharp.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that the level of ordinary skill in the art corresponds to “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a similar technical field and 2-4 years of experience with wireless ranging and positioning systems, wireless communication devices, and associated computer programming.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). “Patent Owner agrees that this description reasonably represents the level of ordinary skill required to understand and implement the teachings of the ’246 Patent, as well as the prior art cited in the Petition.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2002 ¶ 22). Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“device.” This term appears twice in claim 11, once in the phrase “an orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device,” and once in the phrase “rotation of the mobile communication device detected by the orientation sensor.” Ex. 1001, 39:13–14, 39:36–38. Patent Owner argues that we should construe this term as limited to “detecting the rotation of the mobile communication device as a whole, not the movement of individual components.” PO Resp. 15–18. Petitioner disputes this, arguing that “rotation of the mobile communication device” should be construed not only to cover rotation of the device as a whole but also should “encompass[] any rotation of the mobile communication device relative to any object, including itself,” which would extend to rotation of “any component of the device.” Reply 4–5. We need not resolve this dispute to determine the outcome of Petitioner’s asserted challenges to the ’246 patent. As discussed more fully below, under either party’s proposed construction of “rotation of the mobile communication device,” Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyOther
“On the record developed during trial, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Kalliola teaches “an orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device,” where “rotation of the mobile communication device” includes rotation of the device as a whole, regardless of whether it also includes rotation of one portion of the device relative to another. Kalliola teaches “motion sensors integrated in WCD 100” that are “used to detect when WCD 100 is being moved,” as well as to detect “when user 110 moves WCD 100 too quickly for an accurate DoA estimation.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 84, 86. Although Patent Owner argues that Kalliola’s motion sensors do not detect rotation of the device, this is incorrect on the record as developed at trial. Kalliola teaches that the motion sensor may take “the form of a semiconductor gyroscope chip.” Id. ¶ 84. There is ample evidence that gyroscopes detect rotation. Ex. 1013, 38 (identifying as an “orientation sensor” a “[t]hree-axis gyro” and a “[d]ynamic [h]igh [r]ange [gyro]”); Ex. 1046, 49:18–20 (Dr. Feuerstein testifying that gyroscopes “can be used to detect angular velocity”); Ex. 1047 ¶ 47 (citing Ex. 1051, 170; Ex. 1053, 9) (Dr. Buehrer testifying that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would understand that gyroscopes are well-known inertial sensors that specifically detect rotational motion”). Thus, by a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner has shown that Kalliola teaches the “orientation sensor to detect rotation of the mobile communication device” of this limitation.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“whether Kalliola’s teaching of pausing and resuming its DoA estimation based on detected rotational motion, or Kalliola’s teaching of speeding up its DoA estimation based on detected rotational motion, amounts to determining direction based on rotation. Pet. 63–64; PO Resp. 25–27; Reply 24–27; Sur-Reply 11–14. On the record developed during trial, we are persuaded that the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that Kalliola teaches determining direction based on rotation. First, Kalliola discloses “pausing a DoA estimation until the motion of the WCD is detected by the motion sensors,” then resuming “the updating of the DoA estimation” when motion is detected. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 14, 84. Second, Kalliola discloses a “correction or compensation mode” that is “employed when user 110 moves WCD 100 too quickly for an accurate DoA estimation,” with this “increase[d] speed of the DoA estimation” being triggered by the “[i]ncreased activity detected by motion sensors in WCD 100.” Id. ¶ 86. As discussed above with respect to limitation 11(d), the detected motion that triggers either of these modes can be rotational motion of the WCD detected by a gyroscope.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,350,246 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,350,246 - Jumio Corporation v. Facetec, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00107 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barDecided for patent owner
“interest to this proceeding and is in privity with Petitioner and that the Petition is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because it served iProov 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285–88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the challenged patent claims the benefit of applications filed after this date, the post-AIA version of §§ 102, 103 apply. Ex. 1001, codes (22), (60), (63). with a complaint for infringement of the ʼ606 patent more than one year before this Petition was filed. Prelim. Resp. 5–22. We addressed this same issue in our institution decision in IPR2025-00106. See IPR2025-00106, Paper 17 at 16–27. For the reasons we explained there, we do not agree that this Petition is not time-barred under 35 U.S.C. 315(b).” slip op. at 6
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“B. Discretionary Denial under § 314(a) Patent Owner argues the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in light of two co-pending district court cases. Prelim. Resp. 47–56. We addressed this same issue in our institution decision in IPR2025-00106. See IPR2025-00106, Paper 17 at 6–9. For the same reasons we explained there, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution based on the related district court cases.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“C. Discretionary Denial under § 325(d) Patent Owner argues we should deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because Petitioner’s asserted references are the same or substantively as those the Office previously considered during prosecution. Prelim. Resp. 22–36. We addressed this same issue in our institution decision in IPR2025-00106. See IPR2025-00106, Paper 17 at 9–16. For the same reasons we explained there, we decline exercising our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“D. Claim Construction Neither party proposes an express construction for any claim terms. Pet. 5–6; see generally Prelim. Resp. We agree that no claim terms require express construction to determine whether to institute inter partes review. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSRPatents in suitUS 11,157,606 - Jumio Corporation v. Facetec, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00109 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Derakhshani and Tanii.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“3. Institution of Inter Partes Review As discussed above, at this stage in the proceeding, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that the combination of Derakhshani and Tanii teaches the limitations of claim 1 and a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Derakhshani and Tanii. Because we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in demonstrating that the subject matter of claim 1 would have been obvious over Derakhshani, alone or combined with Tanii, we institute an inter partes review of all claims and all challenges raised in the Petition. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 365 (2018) (stating 35 U.S.C. § 314 “simply requires [the Director] to decide whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on ‘at least 1’ claim. Once that single claim threshold is satisfied, it doesn’t matter whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on any additional claims; the Director need not even consider any other claim before instituting review.”); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 22
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner acknowledges that, in this IPR, “the time-bar is not implicated.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6. Nevertheless, Patent Owner argues that we should reach the RPI question here because other IPRs challenging different patents implicate the time bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Id. at 5–6. Patent Owner’s request effectively asks us to extend the § 315(b) time bar to implicate patents not asserted in an applicable infringement complaint. We decline to do so. The plain language of § 315(b) does not extend the time bar to any patent other than the patent subject to the instant petition: An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent (emphasis added). Nor are we aware of any other authority which requires us to interpret § 315(b) to extend the time bar to patents other than the challenged one. Because Patent Owner admits this Petition challenging the ’910 Patent is not time barred, the treatment in SharkNinja controls. Accordingly, on this record, we need not consider whether iProov must be named as an RPI and decline to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2).” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“A. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner argues the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in light of two co-pending district court decision in IPR2025-00106. See IPR2025-00106, Paper 17 at 6–9. For the same reasons we explained there, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution based on the related district court cases.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“B. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) Patent Owner argues we should deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because Petitioner’s asserted references are the same or substantively as those the Office previously considered during prosecution. Prelim. Resp. 18–33. We addressed this same issue in our institution decision in IPR2025-00106. See IPR2025-00106, Paper 17 at 9–16. For the same reasons we explained there, we decline exercising our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 9
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,874,910 - Jumio Corp. v. Facetec, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00108 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–24 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“We need not consider whether iProov must be named as an RPI because Patent Owner does not allege that the failure to name iProov would implicate time bar, estoppel, or anything else material to this case. Our precedential authority, SharkNinja Operating LLC et al. v. iRobot Corp., controls this case, and explains that we need not determine whether a third party is an RPI to the Petitioner because “even if it were, it would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 315.” IPR2020-00734, Paper 11, 18–19 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential).” slip op. at 3
- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherDenied
“EXERCISE OF DISCRECTION A. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) Patent Owner argues the Board should exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) in light of two co-pending district court cases. Prelim. Resp. 47–56. We addressed this same issue in our institution decision in IPR2025-00106. See IPR2025-00106, Paper 17 at 6–9. For the same reasons we explained there, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution based on the related district court cases.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“f) Conclusion – Claim 1 For the foregoing reasons, we determine Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that the combination of Derakhshani and Tanii teaches the limitations of claim 1 and a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Derakhshani and Tanii. Our determination is not final and based only on the current record and arguments. At this stage of the proceeding, we have not made a final determination with respect to the patentability of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 23
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,693,938 - Jumio Corp. v. Facetec, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00106 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of success and declining discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“appointment of new counsel for Petitioner and a motion to stay pending IPR(s) was denied without prejudice to being refiled once new counsel has appeared for Petitioner. Ex. 2030. In the Nevada litigation, iProov moved to stay the case pending IPR(s) in February 2025, but the court has not decided whether to grant the stay. Prelim. Resp. 57. We decline to speculate about how the district court might rule on any refiled motion to stay in the California litigation (or the pending motion to stay in the Nevada litigation). Thus, the first factor is neutral.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“framework, determining, first, “whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (“Advanced Bionics”). That first determination considers: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“contends indicate that iProov is a real party in interest to this proceeding. For example, Patent Owner points to the overlap in prior art references asserted in this Petition and the prior art references relied upon in the California and Nevada litigations. Prelim. Resp. 14–15, 18. Patent Owner also points to indemnity obligations between iProov and Petitioner. Id. at 15–16. And finally, Patent Owner emphasizes the benefit that iProov would get from this Petition. Id. at 17–18. Having reviewed these arguments and evidence of record we determine that, even in light of the issues raised by Patent Owner, Petitioner was not acting at the behest of iProov in filing this Petition and that iProov did not direct, control, or fund this Petition. Ex. 1049 ¶ 4 (counsel for Petitioner attesting that “iProov did not direct, control, or fund the Petitions. iProov did not work on the Petitions nor was it involved with the Petitions in any way. Petitioner never provided drafts of the IPR Petitions to iProov, and Petitioner never discussed the IPR Petitions or their substance with iProov.”) We, therefore, determine that iProov is not” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“between the purported ‘privy’ and the relevant other party is sufficiently close such that both should be bound by the trial outcome and related estoppels.” TPG 14–15. “[T]he rationale behind § 315(b)’s preclusion provision is to prevent successive challenges to a patent by those who previously have had the opportunity to make such challenges in the prior litigation.” WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1319. Therefore, “it is important to determine whether the petitioner and the prior litigant’s relationship—as it relates to the lawsuit—is sufficiently close that it can be fairly said that the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent in that lawsuit.” Id.” slip op. at 22
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,776,471 - Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Gosecure, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00069 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show that the prior art teaches creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor, as claims 1–18 and 21–23 require.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the present record and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review on the grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Petitioner’s arguments. Claim 1 recites “a decoy computer system [that] comprises . . . a virtual machine monitor,” and “at the virtual machine monitor: . . . creating, from the stored activities, a fingerprint.” Ex. 1001, 19:4–22. Thus, the claim’s plain language requires creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor, not just at the decoy system, as Petitioner asserts. When, as here, a claim term has “ordinary, simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable,” we may not redraft those words to mean something different. Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Petitioner offers no explanation how one skilled in the art might read “at the virtual machine monitor” to mean at the decoy system, rather than at the virtual machine monitor. Although the claim’s plain language is decisive, we also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that the ’697 patent’s specification describes only fingerprint creation outside the virtual machine monitor because, as Patent Owner explains, the specification describes fingerprint generation inside and outside the virtual machine monitor. See Sur-reply 1– 2; see id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:65–7:2, 10:13–22). Claim 1’s plain language, however, only covers the latter. Last, Petitioner’s characterization of Patent Owner’s infringement allegations in the related district-court proceedings, even if correct, do not undermine the claim’s plain language.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner does not contest that Capalik’s fingerprint generation occurs outside the components that Petitioner identifies as the claimed virtual machine monitor. Reply 1–3; see Pet. 18–23 (mapping Capalik’s hypervisor kernel 516 to the claimed virtual machine monitor); id. at 30–31 (mapping Capalik’s processing module 508 and signature generation engine 530 to the claimed fingerprint creation); see also Prelim. Resp. 21–23 (explaining Petitioner’s mapping). Instead, Petitioner asserts that the at-issue claim language—“at the virtual machine monitor”—does not require “that each of the subsequently recited steps must be performed by or in the [virtual machine monitor],” but instead only requires “that the fingerprint is generated by the same decoy system that contains the [virtual machine monitor].” Reply 2. Petitioner argues that the intrinsic record supports its position because “[n]owhere in the ’697 Patent is there any teaching or suggestion that a [virtual machine monitor] creates a fingerprint/signature indicative of attack activity,” and instead, “[t]he ’697 Patent teaches that its signature generation engine is separate from the [virtual machine monitor].” Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:12–19). In addition, Petitioner asserts that requiring fingerprint creation at the virtual machine monitor “directly” slip op. at 8
- Adverse judgmentOther
“D. Statutory Disclaimer and Remaining Challenged Claims The Petition challenges claims 1–23. Pet. 10. However, because Patent Owner disclaimed claims 19 and 20 (Ex. 2010), the remaining challenged claims are 1–18 and 21–23. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.107(e) (2020) (“No inter partes review will be instituted based on disclaimed claims.”). Of the remaining challenged claims, only claim 1 is independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below:” slip op. at 4
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,106,697 - Crowdstrike, Inc. v. Gosecure, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · May 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00067 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 1–23 because the cited art did not teach or suggest creating the claimed fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“Given the deficiencies outlined above, Petitioner has not shown that the prior art teaches or suggests creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor as the challenged claims require. Thus, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. III. CONCLUSION After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the current record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’697 patent is unpatentable. We therefore do not institute trial on any challenged claims or grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner
“We disagree with Petitioner’s arguments. Claim 1 recites “a decoy computer system [that] comprises . . . a virtual machine monitor,” and “at the virtual machine monitor: . . . creating, from the stored activities, a fingerprint.” Ex. 1001, 19:4–22. Thus, the claim’s plain language requires creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor, not just at the decoy system, as Petitioner asserts. When, as here, a claim term has “ordinary, simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable,” we may not redraft those words to mean something different. Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373–75 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Petitioner offers no explanation how one skilled in the art might read “at the virtual machine monitor” to mean at the decoy system, rather than at the virtual machine monitor. Although the claim’s plain language is decisive, we also disagree with Petitioner’s assertion that the ’697 patent’s specification because, as Patent Owner explains, the specification describes fingerprint generation inside and outside the virtual machine monitor. Sur-reply 1–2; see id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:65–7:2, 10:13–22). Claim 1’s plain language, however, only covers the latter. Sur-reply 1–2; see id. at 2 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:65–7:2, 10:13–22). Last, Petitioner’s characterization of Patent Owner’s infringement allegations in the related district-court proceedings, even if correct, do not undermine the claim’s plain language.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“Given the deficiencies outlined above, Petitioner has not shown that the prior art teaches or suggests creating a fingerprint at the virtual machine monitor as the challenged claims require. Thus, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 9,106,697 - Wiz, Inc. v. Orca Security Ltd.Institution deniedPTAB · May 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00095 · APJ Michael R Zecher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Orca disclaimed all challenged claims 1–18, so no trial could be instituted on them.
RulingsInstitution decision- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther
“Based on our review of Exhibit 2002 and the USPTO’s public records, we conclude that a disclaimer of claims 1–18 of the ’855 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 253(a) has been recorded in the Office as of April 24, 2025. Ex. 2002. Because we cannot institute an IPR based on disclaimed claims and all of the challenged claims of the ’855 patent have been disclaimed, no trial will be instituted. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., IPR2017-00491, Paper 9 (PTAB July 6, 2017) (precedential) (Decision” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,637,855
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.