• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 22, 2026 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 not unpatentable under four §103 grounds because the petitioner did not establish the claimed enabled-accumulation indication or single-channel combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 US 6,334,047 B1, iss. Dec. 25, 2001 (Ex. 1009). 3 US 2001/0036238 A1, pub. Nov. 1, 2001 (Ex. 1010) 4 US 2004/0190485 A1, pub. Sept. 30, 2004 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 2004/0077370 A1, pub. Apr. 22, 2004 (Ex. 1008). 6 US 6,600,772 B1, iss. July 29, 2003 (Ex. 1004). 7 US 6,529,741 B1, iss. Mar. 4, 2003 (Ex. 1007). unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references].” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “apparent agreement between the parties: “TPC command accumulation” refers to a process that collects and uses TPC commands from a network device to cumulatively affect transmission power. And having studied the intrinsic record of the ’153 patent, we are in accord. But, we decline to further limit the construction of “TPC command accumulation” in the manner proposed by either party––i.e., (1) each TPC command adjustment must be summed to cumulatively affect transmission power (as proposed by Petitioner) or (2) a TPC command value must be added to an integrator. Although both parties are able to point to disclosures in the ’153 Patent where the TPC command accumulation of an exemplary embodiment is described as using an integrator and/or summing each TPC command adjustment to cumulatively affect a UE’s transmission power (PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:15–29, 9:27–42; Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 35–42); Pet. Reply 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:2–6, 7:8–22, 9:28–40)), neither party has demonstrated persuasively that the intrinsic record of the ’153 Patent demonstrates a clear intent to limit “TPC command accumulation” to those particular embodiments.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “A rationale supports obviousness only where the proffered benefit would flow from the specific modification proposed; a benefit that the prior art realizes in a different structural context does not, without more, establish that the same benefit would result from inserting one reference’s element into the other. On this record, the nexus between Khan’s benefits and Petitioner’s “other bits” modification is missing.” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 10,952,153 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,952,153
• Microsoft Corporation v. X1 Discovery, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00254 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because Petitioner failed to establish motivation to combine and a reasonable expectation of success.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “29. In my opinion, the POSITA at the time of the alleged invention of the Asserted Patents would have had a (1) a Bachelor’s degree in a pertinent discipline, such as computer science, electric engineering, computer engineering, or a related field and (2) have 2–4 years of experience in working with computing devices and have an understanding of indexed search systems utilized by such computing devices. 30. I am aware that Petitioner has provided its own definition . . . . 31. I believe Petitioner’s definition is not meaningfully different from my definition of a POSITA. My opinions would not change regardless of which definition of POSITA is applied. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 29–31. In our Decision on Institution, we adopted Mr. Haeberli’s formulation, finding it to be consistent with the evidence then of record, including the asserted prior art and the ’490 patent. Dec. 9. Following a review of the full record, we agree with Mr. Haeberli’s statement that Petitioner’s definition of one of ordinary skill in the art is “not meaningfully different” from Mr. Haeberli’s for the purposes of this proceeding. We continue to view Mr. Haeberli’s proposed definition as consistent with the ’490 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below. However, our analysis of the issues below would have been the same had we instead adopted Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “In our Decision on Institution, the only term that we found it necessary to construe was the term “string separator character” in claim 1. We preliminarily construed this term to mean “a single-character string separator.” Dec. 11, 30–31. We invited the parties to address the appropriateness of this construction over the course of the trial. Id. at 11, 31. In its briefing, Patent Owner agrees with the Board’s preliminary construction, arguing that it is “consistent with the intrinsic evidence.” PO Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 1001, claims 8 and 20). Patent Owner further argues that a person of ordinary skill would have understood a multi-character Boolean operator such as “AND” to be “a search syntax instruction rather than a string separator.” Id. at 9 (citing Ex. 1059, 162; Ex. 2001 ¶ 112). Petitioner’s Reply Brief does not address the issue of claim construction. See generally Reply Br.; see also Pet. 11 (“Unless otherwise noted, Petitioner applies the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms below.”). Following our review of the full record, we determine that it is not necessary to construe this or any other claim term for the purposes of this Decision.2 See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.). In our analysis below, we interpret the language of the claims according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Having reviewed the evidence of record, we find Mr. Haeberli’s testimony to be more persuasive and better supported by the evidence. According to Dr. Terveen, “[r]obust programming languages such as C and C++, together with well-developed operating system and UI frameworks, . . . allowed an ordinary programmer to build a UI that supported incremental searching, as evidenced by the numerous prior art systems that implemented such functionality, including Entourage, Eudora, Emacs, Canon Cat, SwyftWare, and others. Ex. 1100 ¶ 43 (citing Ex. 1004, 8–9, 161; Ex. 1021, 125, 127, 129; Ex. 1039, 102–103; Ex. 1043, 385–389). The relevant question, though, is not whether it would have been possible to build a user interface that supported incremental search, but whether it would have been “simple and straightforward” to execute an incremental search of multiple partial search strings on large, indexed multi-file databases such as those described in the Lotus Notes references, as Dr. Terveen alleges. None of the prior art discussed in the “State of the Art” section of Dr. Terveen’s initial declaration, taken individually or together, discloses incrementally searching a plurality of files using two partial search strings. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 32–33, 37, 40; Ex. 2001 ¶ 100. Thus, creating a user interface might be “simple,” but the evidence suggests that the back-end execution of an incremental search is not. See, e.g., Ex. 1021, 126 (Raskin, concluding that “almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “different approach from that taken in Lotus Notes. The difference between Raskin’s sequential scanning method and the index-based system described in Wilcox is that sequential scanning by definition can only scan one document at a time as each document is loaded into a “buffer.” See, e.g., Ex. 2020 ¶ 35. Lotus Notes, however, only needs to load the index into memory for a user to be able to locate the single index entry identifying all instances of an indexed term across all indexed files. In fact, Raskin acknowledges that indexing may be necessary to maintain an acceptable response time. Ex. 1021, 132 n.10; see also id. at 129 (indexing speeds search times). Mr. Haeberli’s third and final reason for concluding that one of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to combine Raskin’s incremental search with Lotus Notes is that at the time using incremental searches would have presented “extreme technical difficulties.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 101. Here again we find Mr. Haeberli’s explanation more persuasive than Dr. Terveen’s opinion that combining the teachings from Raskin with Lotus Notes’ teachings “would have required only simple and straightforward software modifications.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 80. According to Mr. Haeberli, “there are serious technical challenges with implementing the complex search strategies of the challenged claims in the systems on which Dr. Terveen relies.” Id. ¶ 96. As Patent Owner argues: searching across a set of files to find specific files requires the system to identify which files are in the set, access those files (which are often not loaded in active memory), search their contents, determine which files contain matches to search criteria, and then present results to the user; all tasks that do not exist in the same way (or at all) for a search confined to text in a single open file already loaded into memory. Sur-Reply 9; see Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 15, 35–36. There would have been other challenges as well. For example, “[t]he type of sequential scanning typically employed to search a single open document is very time and resource intensive if employed to search a large set of documents.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 15. Also, “[i]mplementing incremental search in the Lotus Notes indexed system would necessarily require a larger index, which would slow down, rather than increase the search speed.” PO Resp. 23; see Ex. 2020 ¶ 33. Finally, Raskin itself concludes that “even if incremental searching is advantageous, ‘almost all interface-building tools make it easy to implement delimited searches and difficult or impossible to implement incremental searches.’” Ex. 2001 ¶ 96 (emphasis added by Mr. Haeberli) (quoting Ex. 1021, 126). In short, Mr. Haeberli presents three significant reasons why there would have been no motivation or expectation of success in combining the teachings of Wilcox with those of Raskin. Dr. Terveen’s opinion to the contrary, on the other hand, is not supported by evidence. Dr. Terveen testifies that “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to perform Lotus Notes’ multi-string search incrementally for the reasons stated by Raskin: speed, effectiveness, and ease of use.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 78 (citing Ex. 1021 ¶¶ 125–127). The evidence, however, not only fails to support Dr. Terveen’s testimony, but also demonstrates that one attempting to make the proposed combination would not have reasonably expected the proposed combination to result in greater speed or effectiveness.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 10,552,490 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,552,490
• Jumio Corporation v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00109 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner failed to establish motivation to combine the references and failed to show the claimed different-distance image capture.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 11–12. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’910 Patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’910 Patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that these reasons would not have adequately motivated a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine and modify the references in Petitioner’s asserted manner to reach the claimed features. Petitioner’s motivations — “substitution,” “obvious alternative . . . approaches,” “use of a known technique,” and “complimentary” techniques — are all similarly based on swapping or adding techniques for verifying three dimensionality. See Pet. 13–17; Pet. Reply 16–17. Those motivations might have been suitable had Tanii described techniques to verify three dimensionality, but Petitioner has not shown that Tanii describes any technique to verify three dimensionality. See Pet. 13–17, 25–28. Instead, as discussed above, Tanii describes the existence of the perspective distortion phenomenon and a technique for correcting it. As such, substituting the knowledge that perspective distortion exists and techniques to correct it does not correspond adequately motivate Petitioner’s combination. Put another way, because Tanii does not teach an approach for verifying three-dimensionality, Tanii’s techniques cannot be used as a substitute for approaches that do verify three dimensionality simply because Tanii discloses the concept of perspective distortion.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 13 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Ex. 1005, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Ex. 1005, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject. Zhang also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Petitioner acknowledges as much stating “[a]lthough Zhang does not expressly say that the second image is captured at a second distance different from the distance of the first image, this would have been obvious to a POSITA.” Pet. 61 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 1046). Because Zhang does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance, Petitioner once again relies on expert testimony to argue that the multiple images disclosed in Zhang would have been taken at different perspectives resulting from rotating or translating the position of the camera and that taking images at different distances would have enhanced Zhang’s homography-transformation procedure. Pet. 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 1046). From here Petitioner repeats many of the same arguments it made regarding the parallax approach from Derakhshani, except that these arguments are on even weaker footing because Zhang does not mention taking images by translating the position of the camera, nor even that the multiple images taken should be from different perspectives. Each of these assertions are made solely on the basis of Petitioner’s expert testimony, and as such are not persuasive. Pet. 61–62 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 1046). Petitioner’s argument that Zhang teaches capturing a second image at a second distance simply lacks sufficient support from Zhang’s disclosure.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,874,910 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,874,910
• Jumio Corp. v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00108 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations lacked adequate motivation to combine and did not teach capturing images at different distances.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues Petitioner’s proffered level of skill is too broad with respect to work experience. PO Resp. 27–28. Patent Owner counters that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and two years’ work experience related to biometric security, facial authentication, and three-dimensional computer vision such that they would have had significant academic and/or work experience in both facial biometrics and computer vision. Id. at 28–29. Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 13–14. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’938 patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’938 patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We interpret claim terms using “the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “images are three dimensional—let alone a technique that captures two images at different distances, compares the images for certain differences, and verifies three dimensionality based on those differences, as recited by the claim. Instead, Tanii describes a system that “corrects warp in which the perspective is exaggerated when an image is captured with the user’s face at close range.” Ex. 1007, code (57). In particular, Tanii recognizes the physical phenomenon of perspective distortion (fish-eye distortion) where “[i]f the image of the face of a person or the like is captured from a point that is relatively nearby, an image is obtained in which the perspective appears exaggerated,” i.e., the user image is warped or distorted. Id. ¶ 6; see id. ¶ 48, Fig. 4B. Tanii corrects such warped images by enlarging peripheral areas of the user image. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches: (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 12 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Derakhshani, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, instead, focused specifically on the use of the word “slid” in Derakhshani as indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Derakhshani, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,693,938 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,693,938
• Jumio Corp. v. Facetec, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 17, 2026 · IPR2025-00106 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board determined claims 1–20 were not unpatentable because Jumio did not show sufficient motivation to combine the references or that they taught capturing images at different distances.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner argues Petitioner’s proffered level of skill is too broad with respect to work experience. PO Resp. 28. Patent Owner counters that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or a related field, and two years’ work experience related to biometric security, facial authentication, and three-dimensional computer vision such that they would have had significant academic and/or work experience in both facial biometrics and computer vision. Id. at 28–29. Having considered the full record at trial, we maintain the preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Inst. Dec. 11–12. In particular, based on the teachings of the ’471 patent and the asserted prior art, we are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a work experience related to biometrics, facial authentication, computer vision, and/or optics as at least one of those fields is respectively implicated by the ’471 patent and the asserted prior at. Moreover, our decision would be the same under either proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under the principles set forth by the Federal Circuit, the “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’” as would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The parties do not dispute any claim terms or phrases and our decision does not require construing any particular claim terms or phrases, therefore, we do not expressly construe any particular claim term or phrase. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We find that these reasons would not have adequately motivated a person having ordinary skill in the art to combine and modify the references in Petitioner’s asserted manner to reach the claimed features. Petitioner’s motivations—“substitution,” “obvious alternative . . . approaches,” “use of a known technique,” and “complimentary” techniques—are all similarly based on swapping or adding techniques for verifying three dimensionality. See Pet. 12–16; Pet. Reply 6–7. These motivations might have been suitable had Tanii described techniques for verifying three dimensionality, but Petitioner has not shown that Tanii describes any technique to verify three dimensionality. See Pet. 13–17, 25–28. Instead, as discussed above, Tanii describes the existence of the perspective distortion phenomenon and a technique for correcting it. As such, substituting the knowledge that perspective distortion exists and techniques to correct it does not correspond with approaches for verifying three-dimensionality, and so does not adequately motivate Petitioner’s combination. Put another way, because Tanii does not teach an approach for verifying three-dimensionality, Tanii’s techniques cannot be used as a substitute for approaches that do verify three dimensionality simply because Tanii discloses the concept of perspective distortion.” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “none of the relied upon references teach capturing two images at two different distances, as required by limitations 1[d3] and 1[d4]. These limitations recite “moving the camera from a first location to a second location, the second location being a second distance from the user” and “capturing at least one second image of the user taken with the camera of the computing device at the second distance from the user, the second distance being different than the first distance.” Derakhshani does not teach capturing a second image at a second distance from the user. Derakhshani teaches two different approaches: (1) focus-distance approach and (2) parallax approach. Petitioner acknowledges that the focus-distance approach does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. Pet. 13 (distinguishing “focus distances” from “actual distances.”). This is because focus-distance, by definition, is not actual distance. Ex. 1005, 16:47–48 (“Focus distance is the distance from a sensor to a point in its field of view that is perfectly in focus.”) In Derakhshani’s focus-distance approach the camera stays the same distance from its subject—only the focus distance changes. Id. at 16:66–17:2 (“By comparing degree of focus for a landmark in images with different focus distances, the distance from the sensor to the landmark may be estimated.”) Derakhshani’s parallax approach also does not expressly disclose capturing a second image at a second distance. In the parallax approach the camera is rotated or slid about the user to create images with different perspectives. Ex. 1005, 17:59–64 (“In some implementations, the sensor is moved about the subject during image capture to collect image data from different orientations relative to the subject. For example, a single camera may be rotated or slid slightly or multiple cameras at different positions may be used for image capture.”). Rotating a camera around a user does not change the distance of the camera from the user. At the hearing Petitioner, instead, focused specifically on the use of the word “slid” in Derakhshani as indicating that Derakhshani takes a second image at a second distance. Tr. 16:9–12 (“[Petitioner’s Counsel: . . . Dr. Daft is talking about some of the terms that Derakhshani is using. For example, the term slid and shown in the images, he talks about how slid refers to the different distances between the sensor and the user.”). We determine that it is more likely that the word “slid,” as used in the relevant portion of Derakhshani, further describes the rotation of the camera about the user. Derakhshani indicates as much by describing that both rotating and sliding the camera are examples of how the camera sensor is “moved about the subject during image capture.” Derakhshani, 17:60–61. Thus, sliding the camera does not necessarily disclose moving the camera to a second distance from the subject.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 10,776,471 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,776,471
• Innoscience America, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies Americas Corp.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 12, 2026 · IPR2025-00094 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–16 were not shown unpatentable under any asserted obviousness ground because Petitioner failed to establish the proposed modifications and combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering or a closely related field, and at least two years of experience in semiconductor device design.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 67–69). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional education could substitute for professional experience and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 1–76. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of the proffered definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, and because it appears to be consistent with the ’003 patent and the asserted prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party proposes construing any claim terms. Pet. 6; Prelim. Resp. 1–76. In addition, as discussed below, we are able to determine the outcome of this proceeding without expressly construing any terms. Thus, we do not construe any terms for the purposes of this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “challenged claim. Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “This is so because inventions in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–419. On the other hand, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418; accord In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, a petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, a petitioner must articulate a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined or modified the prior art references. In re NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In determining whether there would have been a motivation to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention, it is insufficient to simply conclude the combination would have been obvious without identifying any reason why a person of skill in the art would have made the combination.”); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”) (citing InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGO Commc’ns, Inc., 751 F.3d 1327, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). In arguing for the obviousness of claim 1 over the combination of Bonn and Mizuta, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Bonn to perform high-frequency signal amplification. Pet. 19–25. In particular, Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to modify the circuit of Figure 1 [of Bonn] and use Figure 7’s structure for high frequency signal amplification in place of mixer 40,” followed by additional modifications to the circuit of Figure 1. Id. at 22–25. These additional modifications include removing LO port 55, removing FET 20 (along with voltage source 80, capacitors 16, 26, and 34, resistor 18, and inductors 22 and 24), removing capacitor 34 and shorting gate structure 324 to ground, and removing resistors 46 and 48 and shorting terminal 51 to ground. Id. According to Petitioner, the motivation for these modifications was that “Bonn . . . teaches using its dual gate structures for signal amplification without signal mixing.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1006, 11:26–37). On the record developed at trial, we disagree. Bonn does, as Petitioner argues, teach that “the dual gate FET structure of the present invention can be tailored to provide superior performance over the prior art dual gate FET structures in high frequency signal mixing as well as other applications such as high frequency signal amplification.” Ex. 1006, 11:33–37. But the tailoring that Bonn refers to relates to changes to the structure of the field-effect transistor itself, not to the circuitry surrounding that transistor. Id. (teaching that the reason that “the dual gate FET structure of the present invention can be tailored” is that “the parameters such as gate width, dopant concentration, and channel depth, under each gate of the dual gate FET are individually adjusted for optimum performance”). Thus, although Bonn might have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to have made changes to the dual-gate FET itself, we are not persuaded that it would have motivated the additional changes to the circuit of Bonn’s Figure 1.” slip op. at 11

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “Mishra’s Figure 5 is a second gate in favor of a new position. Petitioner’s new argument is that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to connect the field plate of Mishra’s Figure 5 to the source instead of the gate, converting the field plate into a second gate. Compare Pet. 83 (equating “drain side gate” with “field plate 66, Figure 5”), 86–88 (identifying field plate 66 as a “second gate”), with Reply 21–22 (identifying only the embodiment of Mishra’s Figure 10 as a source-connected field plate), 22–23 (arguing that Mishra teaches that the Figure 5 embodiment “could be arranged as ‘a single transistor with a dual gate structure’”). Although “the introduction of new evidence in the course of the trial is to be expected in inter partes review trial proceedings,” Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. LP v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the shifting of arguments is not, Wasica Fin. GmbH v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Accordingly, Petitioner’s change of arguments here is inappropriate. Moreover, even if we were to consider Petitioner’s inappropriate new argument, we would conclude that Petitioner does not support the argument with sufficient evidence. “Whether [an obviousness ground] is based on combining disclosures from multiple references, combining multiple embodiments from a single reference, or selecting from large lists of elements in a single reference, there must be a motivation to make the combination and a reasonable expectation that such a combination would be successful, otherwise a skilled artisan would not arrive at the claimed combination.” In re Stepan, 868 F.3d 1342, 1346 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Petitioner’s new argument relies on a person of ordinary skill in the art modifying the Figure 5 embodiment of Mishra to connect the field plate to the source rather than the gate. Reply 21–24. Petitioner does not, however, show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a motivation to make this modification or a reasonable expectation that this combination would be successful. Id. Petitioner argues instead that “[n]o ‘reason’ is needed.” Id. at 24. Thus, Petitioner does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over the combination of Mishra and Ren.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 8,264,003 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,264,003
• Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00232 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held that Petitioner did not prove any challenged claims of the ’207 patent unpatentable under the Strub, Woo, Nagai, and Gleissner obviousness ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “in these respects. The preambles of claims 17 and 59 recite the “audio device wearable by a user for storing locally generated audio.” There is neither mention of “multi-track” audio in the claim, nor is the audio device limited to capturing a single source of sound, such as a single performer. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the ’443 and ’207 patent claims support the limited scope that Patent Owner urges for the term “locally generated audio.” None of Patent Owner’s citations to the specification define or require that the “locally generated audio” correspond to audio generated only by a single performer. See, e.g., 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 8:59−62 (stating that the local audio input device “may be worn by the performer and connects to local audio device 102 at local audio input device port 314”). Patent Owner’s argument that the specification “teaches a single creator/performer per local audio device” is well-taken, but the teachings do not indicate the intent to exclude other sounds from being captured at the local audio device (or indicate how the device would prevent the capture of other sounds, such that the audio would be “isolated” as Patent Owner contends). See 230 Sur-Reply 10 (citing 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 4:28−32, 10:29−34, and Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contr., Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[C]laim 1 refers to ‘a cup’ and ‘the cup’ repeatedly, suggesting that only one cup is involved . . . . [N]either the specification nor the drawings disclose the use of more than one cup.”)). For instance, the specification describes that the “independent track of audio is received from one of the performer’s local audio device 102.” 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 10:33−34. Thus, in this description the audio track corresponds to the audio captured by a particular audio device—which was worn by the performer— but does not limit that captured audio to only sounds made by the performer. As to the “local audio data” term, Patent Owner argues that “audio data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 20

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Skepticism / industry praiseObjective indicia with nexusDecided for patent owner

    “1. Industry Praise: Academy and Emmy Awards Patent Owner argues that it “revolutionized [the] industry with the” slip op. at 97

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for patent owner

    “2. Long-Felt Need Patent Owner further proffers the testimony of two witnesses as” slip op. at 104

  Patent outcomesUS 10,276,207 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,276,207
• Røde Microphones, LLC / Freedman Electronics Pty Ltd. v. Zaxcom, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00230 · APJ Miriam L Quinn · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board determined that Petitioner had not shown any challenged claims of the ’443 or ’207 patents unpatentable, including under the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonySkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “E. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Based on the argument and evidence presented in the Petition and Patent Owner’s preliminary response, we determined, as stated in our Decision on Institution, that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and two or more years of experience working with audio and wireless communications systems.” 230 Dec. on Inst. 16; 232 Dec. on Inst. 22−23. Patent Owner reiterates its position that a person of ordinary skill the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or a related subject and two to five years’ experience working with multi-track audio and wireless communications systems in the professional performance industry.” 230 IPR, PO Resp. 6−7 (emphasis added) (identical passage in 232 PO Resp. 8). Thus, the dispute centers on whether the level or ordinary skill includes specific work experience with multi-track audio in the professional performance industry. We do not agree that this specific work experience is necessary to the level of ordinary skill in the instant proceedings. In determining whether an invention would have been obvious at the time it was made, we consider the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the invention. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17−18 (1966). “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu‑Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The “person of ordinary skill in the art” is a hypothetical construct, from whose vantage point obviousness is assessed. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In determining the level or ordinary skill, we may consider various factors including “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Patent Owner’s proposed specificity of work with multi-track audio in a professional performance industry is not supported by the record. First, Patent Owner submits conclusory declaration testimony of James DeFilippis—repeating verbatim, and without any supported reasoning, Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. Ex. 2140 ¶ 15. As such, the testimony is not persuasive. Second, Patent Owner’s additional declaration testimony of Jack” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “data” means “mono or stereo audio files created from independent, isolated locally generated audio files, such files suitable for creation of a multi-track audio file.” 230 PO Resp. 9−10 (citing Ex. 2140 ¶¶ 131, 134). This argument is unsupported by the claim language or specification. The claim does not require the creation of audio files, much less a “multi-track audio file.” The specification describes storing audio files in memory without the specificity that Patent Owner urges we adopt. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “local audio data.” Rather, we understand “audio data” to have a plain and ordinary meaning, such as the one given to the term by the District Court in the underlying litigation. 230 IPR, Ex. 1037, 10. We adopt the District Court’s construction of “audio data” to mean “data comprising audio signals in digital form.” Id. This finds support in the specification as the audio is described as being converted into digital audio and stored in a file. See 230 IPR, Ex. 1001, 13:1−14. Our conclusion is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term as that would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art, and we see no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the District Court on this point.” slip op. at 21

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “irrelevant under Federal Rules of Evidence 401–403. Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has failed to establish that these documents reflect the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art, or that they are consumer-oriented documents, but not technical references or sources for understanding the meaning of claim terms. 230 IPR, Paper 64, 3−4. According to Patent Owner, these exhibits lack a “technical foundation” that establishes the technical meaning of a claim term. Id. We do not agree with Patent Owner as it conflates relevance with sufficiency of evidence to prove a contention on claim construction. Dictionary definitions are often useful when determining a claim term’s plain and ordinary meaning in the context of the specification, and as such are relevant when claim terms are disputed. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. Furthermore, the evidence of record shows testimony as to whether the “Sweetwater” glossary entry for “body pack” would be relevant to the meaning of the term in the “world of wireless performance.” 230 IPR, Paper 67, 4 (citing Ex. 1073 ¶ 42). Patent Owner’s objections are overruled as to relevance.” slip op. at 116

  • BurdenFwd all claims patentableNot shown unpatentable

    “after a full and fair hearing, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the challenged claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 125

  Patent outcomesUS 7,711,443 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,711,443
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SANo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00116 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–5, 7, 10, 16–24, 26, and 28 not unpatentable under any of the four § 103 grounds because the petition failed to prove required limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that the ’077 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’077 patent is consistent with the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, which we adopt. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We further find that our determinations in this Decision would be the same if we were to instead adopt the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that “axially adjacent” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis.” PO Resp. 5–6; see also Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 73–79 (Mr. Leschinsky addressing the claim term “axially adjacent” and explaining that a person of ordinary skill would have understood it to mean that the “first magnetic device and the rotor are ‘adjacent’ to one another, i.e., disposed next to one another, as measured along the central axis about which the rotor spins”). Patent Owner’s construction also is supported by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Crosby, who agrees that “adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis,” could be “one meaning,” along with “many other meanings.” Ex. 2014,8 19:13–20:11. In sum, consistent with our Institution Decision, we conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of “axially adjacent” is “at a position adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis.” See Dec. on Inst. 12.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Second, for the reasons below, we determine that we do not need to construe any other claim terms to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. As we discuss above, we find “axially adjacent” to mean “adjacent to one another as measured along a central arguments that rest on Petitioner’s assertion that in the Parallel Litigation, Patent Owner “asserts that a magnetic element sealed within a rotor is . . . ‘axially adjacent.’” Id. at 20–21, n.6 (citing Ex. 1019, 5–7). In particular, we find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that Wampler teaches that magnetic pieces 88 (“a first magnetic device”) “are inserted [‘axially adjacent’] in…the impeller.” Id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 80, Fig. 13; Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). We also find unavailing Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler’s Figure 13 and Mr. Crosby’s cited testimony that “the ‘impeller’ and ‘magnetic pieces’ are axially adjacent—situated next to each other on the same axis.” Id. at 21–22 (annotating Ex. 1008, Fig. 13; citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 174–176). Petitioner does not sufficiently explain this argument, but appears to conflate being adjacent along a central axis with about an axis. Id. We also find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that under Patent Owner’s construction, Wampler also teaches this limitation, because Patent Owner “concedes that ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have positioning that is next to one another, perhaps touching or sharing a common side, when measured along the axis.’” Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing PO Resp. 14). Petitioner mischaracterizes Patent Owner’s arguments and ignores Patent Owner’s showing that “axially adjacent” components are “distinct from components that are aligned with one another such that they overlap or occupy the same portion of an axis upon which they are positioned.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 78). For the preceding reasons, Petitioner fails to show by a” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,754,077 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,754,077
• Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther

    “On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,421,713

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.