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  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2024-01210 · APJ John G New · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17 and 48–52 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim was obvious over Racz, Fitz, and Lee.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “§ 314. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition … and any response … shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, a decision to institute may not do so on fewer than all of the claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yesor-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

      “Absent evidence or argument to the contrary, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition, as it appears to be consistent with the level of skill of the prior art and is supported by the presently unopposed testimony of Dr. Tucker. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected in the prior art itself). We note, however, that the open-ended language ‘at least’ expands the ranges of education and experience indefinitely with no upper bound, thereby also encompassing those of extraordinary skill as well. Therefore, we do not adopt this aspect of Petitioner’s formulation.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “With respect to the challenged claims, Petitioner contends that no claim term requires express construction. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1032 ¶ 120 (Dr. Tucker’s testimony that “the terms in the Challenged Claims would be understood by a POSA to have their plain and ordinary meaning and do not require a special construction or definition”)). We agree with Petitioner that, on the record presently before us, no claim term requires express construction.” slip op. at 14

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to implement Lee’s perimeter deployable filaments (22/1622) on the distal tip (14/38) of Racz’s cannula (10/33) for the purpose of expanding and controlling the energy coverage area of Racz’s device. Pet. 35. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to implement Lee’s perimeter filaments (22/1622) around Racz’s tip (14/38) to provide a desired ablation volume (e.g., in a full or partial “cone” shape) and omit Lee’s central filament. Pet. 38 (citing Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 179, 73–75, 79–83). Petitioner contends that, as both Lee and Fitz confirm, this would improve Racz’s device by providing an expanded and controlled energy coverage area. Id. (citing Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 9–10, Abstr.; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 12, 84, 123–131; Ex. 1032 ¶ 179). Petitioner argues further that, in implementing Lee’s perimeter filaments (22/1622) on Racz’s distal tip (14/38), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to modify Racz’s tip (14/38) to include internal deflection surfaces (12/1612) (e.g., channels and ramps as disclosed in Lee) to guide the perimeter filaments (22/1622) outwardly around Racz’s tip (14/38). Pet. 39 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 16, 18, 92, 102, claims 8, 10; Ex. 1032 ¶ 180). Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to provide openings in Racz’s distal tip (14/38) (e.g., in communication the internal deflection surfaces as disclosed in Lee) such that Lee’s perimeter filaments (22/1622) can, when deployed, exit Racz’s distal tip (14/38). Id. (citing Ex. 1010 ¶ 92, 102; Ex. 1032 ¶ 180).” slip op. at 29

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,736,688
  • PTAB · Feb 6, 2025 · IPR2024-01209 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–27 and all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is obvious over Racz, Fitz, and Lee.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “314. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, a decision to institute may not do so on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Absent evidence or argument to the contrary, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition, as it appears consistent with the prior art and is supported by the presently unopposed testimony of Dr. Tucker. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the level of ordinary skill in the art may be reflected in the prior art itself). We note, however, that Petitioner’s open-ended language “at least” expands the ranges of education and experience indefinitely with no upper bound, thereby encompassing those of extraordinary skill. Therefore, we do not adopt this aspect of Petitioner’s formulation. B.” slip op. at 12

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “With respect to the challenged claims, Petitioner contends that no claim term requires express construction. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1031 ¶ 106 (Dr. Tucker’s testimony that “the terms in the Challenged Claims would be understood by a POSA to have their plain and ordinary meaning and do not require a special construction or definition”)). On the presents record, we agree with Petitioner that no term requires express construction.” slip op. at 12

    Claim constructioncites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 10,966,782
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-00965 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution

    Instituted review of claims 1–6 on all asserted grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on the ground raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedInstituted

      “We agree with Patent Owner that testimony from a “custodian with any personal knowledge of arXiv.org or its regular practices” would have strengthened Petitioner’s argument that Gloor is prior art. See Prelim. Resp. 20; see also, e.g., Murray & Poole Enters. LTD v. Institut De Cardiologie De Montreal, IPR2023-01064, Paper 49 (PTAB Jan. 14, 2025) (considering testimony regarding the internet archive service known as the Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/) in determining public accessibility). At the institution stage, however, Petitioner needs to show that Gloor qualifies as prior art by “a reasonable likelihood” standard. See Hulu, LLC, v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29, 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (“[A]t the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.”). We find that, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood that Gloor was publicly accessible before the priority date of the ’200 patent. To prevail in this inter partes review, Petitioner must meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Thus, we encourage the parties to fully develop the record during trial to facilitate the ultimate resolution of this issue.” slip op. at 9

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner

      “institution under § 325(d). Prelim. Resp. 21–29. Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), in determining whether to institute an inter partes review, “the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Our § 325(d) analysis employs a two-prong framework: (1) whether the arguments presented in the petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office; and (2) if so, whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office in its prior consideration of those arguments. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. Med-El Electromedizinishe Gerӓte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 (“Advanced Bionics”), 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential).” slip op. at 11

    § 102 anticipationDiscretionary denialcites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,768,200
  • PTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-00964 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8 based on both asserted obviousness grounds: Parameswaran with Gloor and Parameswaran with Bentley.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of all challenged claims based on the ground raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

      “We agree with Patent Owner that testimony from a “custodian with any personal knowledge of arXiv.org or its regular practices” would have strengthened Petitioner’s argument that Gloor is prior art. See Prelim. Resp. 27; see also, e.g., Murray & Poole Enters. LTD v. Institut De Cardiologie De Montreal, IPR2023-01064, Paper 49 (PTAB Jan. 14, 2025) (considering testimony regarding the internet archive service known as the Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/) in determining public accessibility). At the institution stage, however, Petitioner needs to show that Gloor qualifies as prior art by “a reasonable likelihood” standard. See Hulu, LLC, v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29, 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential) (“[A]t the institution stage, the petition must identify, with particularity, evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.”). We find that, for the purposes of institution, with Dr. Gloor’s declaration and the supporting exhibits attached therein, Petitioner has met this burden. To prevail in this inter partes review, Petitioner must meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Thus, we encourage the parties to fully develop the record during trial to facilitate the ultimate resolution of this issue.” slip op. at 12

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “detailed analysis to support its argument that the combination of Parameswaran and Gloor teaches or suggests each limitation of claim 1. Pet. 23–36. Petitioner also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated combine the teachings of the two references and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Id. at 36–45. Patent Owner counters that the combination does not teach or suggest two limitations, namely the amplifying and discarding steps of the method. Prelim. Resp. 18–24. Patent Owner also challenges Gloor’s prior art status. Id. at 24–28. Based on the current record, we find Petitioner’s argument with respect to the amplifying and discarding steps more persuasive. With respect to the remaining limitations, we find persuasive Petitioner’s analysis on the prior art’s teachings. We also find persuasive Petitioner’s analysis on the motivation to combine and reasonable expectation of success. For the purposes of institution, we adopt those analyses as our own. We address Patent Owner’s counterarguments below.” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted

      “cross-over events (id. at 18–21). Based on the current record, we find Petitioner’s argument more persuasive. Petitioner relies on the combination of Parameswaran and Gloor as teaching the amplifying step. See Pet. 31–33. As such, Patent Owner cannot show non-obviousness “by attacking references individually.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Patent Owner argues that “because Parameswaran used pyrosequencing on the surface of beads in a Roche 454 sequencer, it does not disclose the formation of clusters.” Prelim. Resp. 21 (citing Pet. 31). Petitioner, however, relies on Gloor for teaching “amplifying said nucleic acid templates on a surface of a flow cell thereby to form clusters.” Pet. 31–32. Patent Owner does not challenge this reliance. See generally Prelim. Resp. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner “equat[es] the claimed chimeric sequences with ‘mismatched’ or ‘misassigned’ sequences containing an ‘unexpected’ pair of forward and reverse barcode motifs identified in Parameswaran.” Prelim. Resp. 18–19. But, according to Patent Owner, “Petitioner does not point to any disclosure in Parameswaran identifying these “mismatched” motifs as chimeric sequences—as opposed to mere sequencing or sample handling error—nor does Petitioner cite any disclosure in Parameswaran regarding such sequences resulting from cross-over events.” Id. at 19. We find Patent Owner’s characterization of Petitioner’s argument inaccurate. As we understand it, Petitioner does not “equat[e]” the claimed chimeric sequences with “mismatched” sequences in Parameswaran. Instead, as Patent Owner acknowledges, “Petitioner argues that ‘sequences with mismatched barcode motifs’ in Parameswaran ‘include chimeric sequences resulting from cross-over events.’” Id. (quoting Pet. 32) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 14

    § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,041,852
  • PTAB · Jan 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01156 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–30 on all grounds, finding it more likely than not that the claims are unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “On the current record, there is no controversy over the meaning of any of the claim terms and neither party identifies a claim construction that would impact our analysis. We therefore find that, at this stage of the proceeding, there are no terms that need claim construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “VIII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner asserts (without opposition): A person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) at the time of invention would have a working knowledge of microbiology and would have been involved in developing testing methodologies for analysis of samples such as food products (“validation methodologies”). The POSA would most likely have an advanced degree in microbiology, food science, or animal science and at least two years of work experience but may alternatively have a bachelor’s degree in those areas and at least four years of experience with validation methodologies. The POSA would have been familiar with relevant scientific literature and industry regulations, directives, and guidelines relating to validation methodologies.” slip op. at 8

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted

      “Determining whether claims are anticipated involves a two-step analysis. The first step involves construction of the claims of the patent at issue. Claim construction is a question of law reviewed de novo.” In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed.Cir.2011). “The second step [of an anticipation analysis] involves comparing the claims to the prior art. Anticipation is a question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence.” In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d at 1296. “A prior art reference anticipates a patent claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) if it discloses every claim limitation.” In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A reference may anticipate inherently if a claim limitation that is not expressly disclosed “is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Cox Fibernet Va., Inc., 602 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “The motivation-to-combine analysis is a flexible one. “[A]ny need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed,” [but the] “analysis ‘need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.’” Intel Corp. v. PACT XXP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 420 (emphasis added)). “[I]f there’s a known technique to address a known problem using ‘prior art elements according to their established functions,’ then there is a motivation to combine,” because KSR explains that “if a technique has been used to improve one device [or method], and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices [or methods] in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” Id. at 1380 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; and Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 797 (Fed. Cir. 2021)). If addressing a known problem, the prior art combination need not be “the best option, only . . . a suitable option.” Id. (quoting Intel, 21 F.4th at 800 (emphasis original)).” slip op. at 13

    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,845,486
  • PTAB · Jan 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00186 · APJ Jeffrey N Fredman · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted inter partes review on all challenged claims and all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” A decision to institute under § 314 may not institute on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). In addition, if the Board institutes trial, it will “institute on all grounds in the petition.” PTAB Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 5–6 (Nov. 2019); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, for the reasons described below, we institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Memorandum”)11, which states, among other things, that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have 11 Available at www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_ discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_2022 0621_.pdf. reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Memorandum 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). By email dated November 25, 2024, Petitioner requested leave to file a Reply to Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response to address, inter alia, its proposed submission of a Sotera stipulation. Ex. 3001. We denied Petitioner’s request for briefing, but granted its request to submit the stipulation. Id. The Sotera stipulation avers that “if IPR Nos. IPR2024- 00183, IPR2024-00185, and IPR2024-00186 are instituted, National Beef will not pursue in the related district court proceeding, Inst. for Envtl. Health, Inc. v. Nat’ / Beef Packing Co., LLC, No. 1:23-cv-00826 (D. Del. Aug. 1, 2023), any ground National Beef raised or reasonably could have raised in the aforementioned IPRs,” and that the stipulation “binds National Beef in the related district court proceeding, Inst. for Envtl. Health, Inc. v. Nat'l Beef Packing Co., LLC, No. 1:23-cv-00826 (D. Del. Aug. 1, 2023).” Ex. 1064. Applying the guidance provided in the Memorandum, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation.” slip op. at 20

    • BurdenInstituted

      “Thus, Petitioner has accounted for each step/element of independent claims 1 and 37 as taught by the combination of ICMSF and Gombas, and has also provided a reason why, with rational underpinnings, the prior art would have been combined and modified, with a reasonable expectation of success. On the current record, including Patent Owner’s arguments that we considered and are addressed in detail below, Petitioner’s evidence for this ground is sufficient to provide a reasonable likelihood of success in demonstrating unpatentability of at least one claim.” slip op. at 31

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the term “lots” does not require construction because on the current record, there is no controversy over the meaning of the term, and neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner identify any way that claim construction may impact our decision. We also agree with Patent Owner that the ’771 patent provides definitions that guide the understanding of the term “lots” including: The term “test lot” or “reportable lot” as used herein to refer to an assemblage of one or more specimens of a medium or process (e.g. assemblage of specimens of air, water, solids or of products of a production process, etc.), where such assemblage can be sampled by taking portions of the one or more specimens thereof, and where the one or more specimens of the assemblage are operationally linked in a manner (e.g., proximity, time, process step, etc.) whereby information derived about sampled portions is operationally applicable to all specimens of the assemblage, and thus to the test lot. In particular instances, portions are synonymous with specimens. Ex. 1003, 5:43‒54. The ’771 patent similarly provides definitions for “product portion,” “test lot sample,” and “composite lot-unit” that provide significant guidance and clarity as to the meaning of these terms. Ex. 1003, 5:60‒6:4, 6:12‒29, 7:49‒63. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We decline to expressly interpret this term at this time.” slip op. at 11

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,637,771
  • PTAB · Jan 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00185 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 11, 12, 14–20, 22–24, 26, and 29–36 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on obviousness.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “III. CONCLUSION After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one challenged claim of the ’143 Patent is unpatentable. In particular, because Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is rendered obvious by the asserted combinations of ICMSF, Hughes, and Price, we institute inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition. At this stage of the proceeding, the Board has not made a final determination as to the patentability of any challenged claim or the construction of any claim term. Thus, our view with regard to any conclusion reached in the foregoing could change upon consideration of Patent Owner’s merits response and completion of the record.” slip op. at 54

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the term “lots” does not require construction because on the current record, there is no controversy over the meaning of the term, and neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner identify any way that claim construction may impact our decision. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We also agree with Patent Owner that the ’143 patent provides definitions that guide the understanding of the term “lots” including teaching: The term “test lot” or “reportable lot” as used herein to refer to an assemblage of one or more specimens of a medium or process (e.g. assemblage of specimens of air, water, solids or of product of a production process, etc.) where such assemblage can be sampled by taking portions of the one or more specimens thereof, and where the one or more specimens of the assemblage are operationally linked in a manner (e.g. proximity, time, process step, etc.) whereby information derived about sampled portions is operationally applicable to all specimens of the assemblage, and thus to the test lot. In particular instances, portions are synonymous with specimens. Ex. 1002, 5:34–45. The Specification similarly provides definitions for “product portion,” “test lot sample,” and “single-unit production lot” that provide significant guidance and clarity as to the meaning of these terms. Id. at 5:52–63, 6:2–20.” slip op. at 16

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “validation” as used herein with respect to production lots refers to determining that a particular sample tests negative using the detection assay. Where a modular composite sample tests negative, all single-unit production lot samples comprising the composite sample are validated along with the respective single-unit production lots, which are thus cleared for release. Where a modular composite sample tests positive, individual single unit production lots may nonetheless yet be validated if particular respective single-unit production lot samples test negative. Ex.1002, 7:15–24 (emphasis added). The above text expressly equates “validation” to a determination that “a particular sample tests negative.” The initial definitional sentence makes no mention of “cleared for release” as necessary for “validation.” The subsequent sentence refers to “cleared for release” in the more limited situation where a particular composite sample “tests negative all single-unit production lot samples,” and, even then, the “cleared for release” language indicates a separate step that may happen after the samples are “validated.” slip op. at 21

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

      “On the current record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has insufficiently articulated a motivation to combine or modify the asserted references. With respect to Ground 1, for example, Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify ICMSF based on Gombas under the teaching-suggestion-motivation test so portions of the enriched, retained samples are further tested after a positive test of a composite sample by the same protocol, with a reasonable expectation of success for efficient validation. See § XII-A-1-h supra; Dickson ¶¶ 417-19. Pet. 53–54. Petitioner further argues that ordinarily skilled artisan would have sought to improve[] ICMSF with the similar methods of Gombas to yield efficient validation, which is a predictable result. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). In this combination, a POSA would have simply substituted steps of ICMSF, as described above, with those of Gombas so portions of the enrichment cultures are retained and are further tested after a positive test of a composite sample by the same protocol for predictably efficient validation. MPEP § 2143(I)(B); Dickson ¶ 420. Id. at 53. As such, the Petition provides specific reasons to combine ICMSF and Gombas that are consistent with the flexible test recited in KSR, including the benefit of efficient validation of the test and that the combination is a simple substitution of steps. As KSR notes, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 US at 417. Here, Petitioner has made its reasons to combine explicit. See Pet. 53–” slip op. at 47

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 8,822,143
  • PTAB · Jan 13, 2025 · IPR2024-00183 · APJ Robert A Pollock · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 10, 11, 13–20, 22, 23, and 26–33 because the asserted combinations of ICMSF, Hughes, and Price showed a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim was obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “314. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Further, a decision to institute may not do so on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). After considering the evidence and arguments presented in the Petition, we determine that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in showing that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’584 patent is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims of the ’584 patent on the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition. A.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention (POSA/POSITA), “would most likely have an advanced degree in microbiology, food science, or animal science and at least two years of work experience but may alternatively have a bachelor’s degree in those areas and at least four years of experience with validation methodologies.” Pet. 11. (citing Ex. 1041 ¶¶ 22–24). Petitioner further contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a working knowledge of microbiology,” “would have been involved in developing sampling and testing methodologies for analysis of food products (“validation methodologies”),” and “would have been familiar with relevant scientific literature and industry regulations, directives, and guidelines relating to validation methodologies.” Id.” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “We agree with Patent Owner that the term “lots” does not require construction because on the current record, there is no controversy over the meaning of the term, and neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner identify any way that claim construction impacts the decision. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

      “This definition requires that a “validation” determines that “a particular sample tests negative.” The initial definition sentence makes no mention of “cleared for release” as necessary for “validation.” Rather, the definition only refers to “cleared for release” in the more limited situation where a particular composite sample “tests negative all single-unit production lot samples,” and even then, the “cleared for release” is a separate step that occurs after the samples are “validated.”” slip op. at 21

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
    Patents in suitUS 7,534,584
  • PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-01012 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–16 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability and declining Fintiv discretionary denial.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the Petition in view of the record at this stage, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial of the Petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we grant institution of an inter partes review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted

      “parties on the present record, we are persuaded Petitioner sufficiently shows the combination of Bosnyak-392 and Son teaches or suggests all of the limitations of claim 1, and sufficiently explains how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Bosnyak-392’s teaching of using exfoliated, open-ended carbon nanotube fibers having two different aspect ratios in a composition with improved electrical and mechanical properties, with Son’s implementation of a specific bimodal distribution of aspect ratios, to arrive at the composition of claim 1 with a reasonable expectation of success. We do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that Bosnyak- 392 teaches away from using nanotubes with a lower aspect ratio, or that Bosnyak-392 has an objective of maintaining longer nanotubes. See Prelim. Resp. 5–9. Patent Owner’s arguments appear to be based on a mischaracterization of Bosnyak-392, which read as a whole, discusses methods for exfoliating carbon nanotubes and physical properties of exfoliated nanotubes, such as length and diameter, that are not apparent when the nanotubes are aggregated. E.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 37. Although Bosnyak-392 recognizes that nanotube exfoliating techniques tend to reduce nanotube length (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 28), it does not discourage the use of shorter nanotubes. Rather, it recognizes that using short and long nanotubes together can produce a composite with improved electrical and mechanical properties. See id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 73). See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (a reference does not teach away from a claimed invention unless it “criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages” the claimed solution).” slip op. at 17

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

      “We do not find persuasive Patent Owner’s arguments that Bosnyak- 392 teaches away from using nanotubes with a lower aspect ratio, or that Bosnyak-392 has an objective of maintaining longer nanotubes. See Prelim. Resp. 5–9. Patent Owner’s arguments appear to be based on a mischaracterization of Bosnyak-392, which read as a whole, discusses methods for exfoliating carbon nanotubes and physical properties of exfoliated nanotubes, such as length and diameter, that are not apparent when the nanotubes are aggregated. E.g., Ex. 1005 ¶ 37. Although Bosnyak-392 recognizes that nanotube exfoliating techniques tend to reduce nanotube length (see Ex. 1003 ¶ 28), it does not discourage the use of shorter nanotubes. Rather, it recognizes that using short and long nanotubes together can produce a composite with improved electrical and mechanical properties. See id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 73). See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (a reference does not teach away from a claimed invention unless it “criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages” the claimed solution).” slip op. at 18

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner

      “Having considered both sides’ arguments as to Fintiv factors 2 and 3, we determine that the considerations of these factors weigh against exercising discretionary denial. Neither party directs us to any substantive order issued by the district court in the parallel litigation, which indicates the court has not yet considered claim construction or potential invalidity of the ’282 patent. The Markman hearing will not occur until June 2025, and the expert discovery cutoff is not until August 2025. Ex. 2002. Thus, although the parties have begun discovery as to invalidity issues, much further work remains in the parallel district court litigation. We also take into account Petitioner’s prompt filing of the Petition, as weighing against exercising discretionary denial. See Fintiv 11 (“If the evidence shows that the petitioner filed the petition expeditiously, such as promptly after becoming aware of the claims being asserted, this fact has weighed against exercising the authority to deny institution . . . .”).” slip op. at 34

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,608,282
  • PTAB · Dec 16, 2024 · IPR2024-01005 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–23 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would have been shown unpatentable.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. We also determine that the arguments and evidence of record do not support discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2

    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied

      “under the sixth Fintiv factor only after a determination that the first five Fintiv factors favor discretionary denial. CommScope, 4–5. Here, we do not find the first five factors cumulatively weigh in favor of discretionary denial. Therefore, we determine that the circumstances here do not warrant an analysis of whether the Petition presents compelling merits, and the considerations of the sixth Fintiv factor weigh against exercising discretionary denial. F. Conclusion Having considered the parties’ arguments in view of the Fintiv factors, and taking into account Petitioner’s stipulation, we determine that the circumstances here do not warrant exercising discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution. IV.” slip op. at 35

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

      “Thus, although both parties indicate that no claim construction is necessary at this stage of the proceeding, it is apparent that they disagree as to the meaning of “discrete carbon nanotubes.” While Petitioner appears to construe “discrete carbon nanotubes” as “nanotubes that are generally individually distinct” (Pet. 13), Patent Owner argues a more restricted construction requiring that “discrete carbon nanotubes” not be reacted with other components. Prelim. Resp. 3. The evidence relating to claim 10 In quotations from the Preliminary Response throughout this Decision, we have retained bolding and underlining added to the text by Patent Owner. construction that Patent Owner offers on the current record, however, does not address its proposed restriction. See id. at 9, n. 4, citing Ex. 1001, 3:9, 5:39–40 (“The ’649 Patent describes the ‘discrete carbon nanotubes’ as, for example, ‘individually dispersed’, ‘individualized carbon nanotubes’, ‘dispersed as individual nanotubes’, and ‘essentially discrete individual fibers, not entangled as a mass.’”). As discussed in Section II.D.2 below, we determine based on the record at this stage of the proceeding that Petitioner demonstrates sufficiently for purposes of institution that Sun discloses or suggests “discrete carbon nanotubes.” Therefore, we do not explicitly construe any claim terms in this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). If either party intends to argue a claim construction at trial, however, including what is the ordinary meaning of a term, they should do so in a clearly designated section of their briefing. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 21, 2019) (“CTPG”), 46, 49 (available at https://www.uspto.gov/TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A determination that a claim term ‘needs no construction’ or has the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ may be inadequate when a term has more than one ‘ordinary’ meaning or when reliance on a term’s ‘ordinary’ meaning does not resolve the parties’ dispute.”). Claim construction arguments should not be relegated to patentability arguments on the facts.” slip op. at 7

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had at least [a] Master’s degree in materials science, chemistry, chemical engineering, a field relevant to polymer science and engineering, or the equivalent, and at least three years of experience in nanomaterials, electrochemistry, batteries, or polymer related activities.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19). Petitioner further argues that “[a]dditional work experience can compensate for less formal education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 4. For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the ’649 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,636,649

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.