- Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 8, 2018 · IPR2018-00792 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no abuse of discretion in timely issuing institution decisions and leaving the § 315(b) contention open for post-institution submissions.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached
“than one year prior to the filing of the Petition. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 10 (contending that Patent Owner put § 315(b) at issue). Patent Owner has not. During the September 17th conference call, Patent Owner mentioned several documents, including indemnification policies, license agreements, and correspondence as materials that Patent Owner is either aware of or seeking from Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 6:24–8:3 (discussing these documents), 10:19–11:14 (same). Neither party, however, has placed those documents in evidence, nor has Patent Owner advanced its argument regarding § 315(b) in any briefing. See World Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We agree, however, that a patent owner must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest. A mere assertion that a third party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support for that assertion, is insufficient to put the issue into dispute.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, at this time, Patent Owner has not “put at issue” whether Petitioner is barred under § 315(b). Additionally, Patent Owner’s Rehearing Request fails to identify where it previously raised the question of § 315(b) in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). As explained above, Patent Owner has not. Thus, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked an issue not raised previously.” slip op. at 7
NonePatents in suitUS 6,742,021 - Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 8, 2018 · IPR2018-00791 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no abuse of discretion in issuing the institution decisions before resolving the § 315(b) time-bar contention.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“deadline set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). Req. Reh’g 10 n.2. Patent Owner contends that “[t]he deadline under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) should not be an obstacle because Congress has recognized that there should be some flexibility with respect to deadlines.” Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11)). Section 316(a)(11) provides up to six additional months to issue a final written decision when good cause is shown. Section 316(a)(11) does not, however, address extending the three-month time period after a preliminary response is filed to issue an institution decision. That three-month time period is governed by § 314(b), and Patent Owner fails to offer any support for its argument that we can extend the deadline under § 314(b). Accordingly, we are unaware of any statutory authority by which we may extend the deadline to determine whether to institute an inter partes review under § 314(b), even with a showing of good cause.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached
“than one year prior to the filing of the Petition. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 10 (contending that Patent Owner put § 315(b) at issue). Patent Owner has not. During the September 17th conference call, Patent Owner mentioned several documents, including indemnification policies, license agreements, and correspondence as materials that Patent Owner is either aware of or seeking from Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 6:24–8:3 (discussing these documents), 10:19–11:14 (same). Neither party, however, has placed those documents in evidence, nor has Patent Owner advanced its argument regarding § 315(b) in any briefing. See World Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We agree, however, that a patent owner must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest. A mere assertion that a third party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support for that assertion, is insufficient to put the issue into dispute.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, at this time, Patent Owner has not “put at issue” whether Petitioner is barred under § 315(b). Additionally, Patent Owner’s Rehearing Request fails to identify where it previously raised the question of § 315(b) in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). As explained above, Patent Owner has not. Thus, we could not have misapprehended or overlooked an issue not raised previously.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Owner”) filed a Request for Rehearing and Reconsideration (“Rehearing Request” or “Req. Reh’g”)2 of our Decision instituting inter partes review (“Decision” or “Dec.”).3 In instituting the inter partes reviews, we determined that Petitioner established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of each challenged patent. See, e.g., Dec. 2, 22.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 6,742,021 - Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 8, 2018 · IPR2018-00794 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied the Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no abuse of discretion in issuing the institution decisions before resolving the § 315(b) time-bar contention.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached
“telephone conference call with the Board, “put at issue” the question whether an inter partes review may not be instituted under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because Petitioner, a real party in interest, or a privy of Petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement of the ’021 patent more than one year prior to the filing of the Petition. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 10 (contending that Patent Owner put § 315(b) at issue). Patent Owner has not. During the September 17th conference call, Patent Owner mentioned several documents, including indemnification policies, license agreements, and correspondence as materials that Patent Owner is either aware of or seeking from Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 6:24–8:3 (discussing these documents), 10:19–11:14 (same). Neither party, however, has placed those documents in evidence, nor has Patent Owner advanced its argument regarding § 315(b) in any briefing. See World Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We agree, however, that a patent owner must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest. A mere assertion that a third party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support for that assertion, is insufficient to put the issue into dispute.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, at this time, Patent Owner has not “put at issue” whether Petitioner is barred under § 315(b).” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 6,742,021 - Microsoft Corporation v. Ipa Technologies Inc.Rehearing deniedPTAB · Nov 8, 2018 · IPR2018-00734 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Patent Owner’s rehearing requests, finding no abuse of discretion in timely instituting review; Patent Owner may raise its § 315(b) contention in post-institution submissions.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, specifically, all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was addressed previously in a motion, opposition, or reply. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot reached
“than one year prior to the filing of the Petition. See, e.g., Req. Reh’g 10 (contending that Patent Owner put § 315(b) at issue). Patent Owner has not. During the September 17th conference call, Patent Owner mentioned several documents, including indemnification policies, license agreements, and correspondence as materials that Patent Owner is either aware of or seeking from Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 2001, 6:24–8:3 (discussing these documents), 10:19–11:14 (same). Neither party, however, has placed those documents in evidence, nor has Patent Owner advanced its argument regarding § 315(b) in any briefing. See World Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We agree, however, that a patent owner must produce some evidence that tends to show that a particular third party should be named a real party in interest. A mere assertion that a third party is an unnamed real party in interest, without any support for that assertion, is insufficient to put the issue into dispute.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, at this time, Patent Owner has not “put at issue” whether Petitioner is barred under § 315(b).” slip op. at 7
NonePatents in suitUS 6,523,061 - Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 21, 2018 · IPR2016-01738 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple's rehearing request, leaving intact its decision that the proposed substitute claims were not shown patentable over the cited art because Settsu did not disclose preloading during the same boot sequence.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“First, as explained in the Decision, when construing the claims at issue (1) we looked at the language of the claims themselves, (2) we consulted the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms, because the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part,” Trading Techs. Int’l, v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)), and (3) we reviewed “the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the [US Patent and Trademark Office] for a second review” (Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See Decision, 6–7.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructioncites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 8,880,862 - Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Aug 21, 2018 · IPR2016-01737 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied Apple’s rehearing request, leaving intact its finding that the prior art did not disclose the substitute claims’ preloading limitation.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. ANALYSIS A request for rehearing “must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d). The party challenging a decision bears the burden of showing the decision should be modified. Id.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITADecided for patent owner
“First, as explained in the Decision, when construing the claims at issue (1) we looked at the language of the claims themselves, (2) we consulted the patent’s specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms, because the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part,” Trading Techs. Int’l, v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)), and (3) we reviewed “the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the [US Patent and Trademark Office] for a second review” (Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See Decision, 6–7.” slip op. at 3
Claim constructioncites MarkmanPatents in suitUS 8,880,862 - Apple, Inc. v. Realtime Data LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 16, 2018 · IPR2016-01738 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 8–12, 14–22, 59–82, 101–104, 114, 115, and 117 are unpatentable as obvious; the motion to amend is granted for substitute claims 174–218.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“substitute claims “without placing the burden of persuasion on the patent owner.” Aqua Products, 872 F.3d at 1328. Yet, Patent Owner’s proposed substitute claims still must meet the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and the procedural requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. See also “Guidance on Motions to Amend in view of Aqua Products” (Nov. 21, 2017) (https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_ on_motions_to_amend_11_2017.pdf) (“Guidance”). Accordingly, Patent Owner must demonstrate (1) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (2) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter; (3) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; and (4) the proposed claims are supported in the original disclosure. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” slip op. at 51
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“substitute claims. Furthermore, Patent Owner’s arguments on this exhibits goes to the weight to be accorded to the evidence. The Board is capable of determining and assigning the appropriate weight to the evidence. For these reasons, we deny Patent Owner’s motion as to Exhibit 1043.” slip op. at 72
- Strike new argumentOther
“IV. CHALLENGE TO PETITIONER’S REPLY ARGUMENTS Patent Owner filed a list of alleged improper reply arguments (Paper 34) to which Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 35). Patent Owner lists several portions of Petitioner’s Reply and evidence allegedly beyond the scope of what can be considered appropriate for a reply. See Paper 34. We have considered Patent Owner’s listing, but disagree that the cited portions of Petitioner’s Reply and reply evidence are beyond the scope of what is appropriate for a reply. Replies are a vehicle for responding to arguments raised in a corresponding patent owner response. Petitioner’s arguments and evidence that Patent Owner objects to are not beyond the proper scope of a reply; rather, we find that they fairly respond to Patent Owner’s arguments raised in Patent Owner’s Response. See Idemitsu Kosan Co. v. SFC LTD, 870 F.3d 1376, 1381: This back-and-forth shows that what Idemitsu characterizes as an argument raised “too late” is simply the by-product of one party necessarily getting the last word. If anything, Idemitsu is the party that first raised this issue, by arguing—at least implicitly—that Arkane teaches away from non-energy-gap combinations. SFC simply countered, as it was entitled to do. We also note for each of the items in Patent Owner’s list, Petitioner cites to pages in the Petition for support. See e.g., Paper 35, 2 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found at, for example, pages 13–16 of the Petition.”), 4 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found at, for example, pages 39–41 of the Petition.”); 5 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found, for example, at pages 6–16, 28–29, and 32–34 of the Petition.”); 6 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found, for example, at pages 11–16 of the Petition.”); 8 (“Support for Petitioner’s argument can be found, for example, at pages 11–16 of the Petition.”).” slip op. at 72
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedOther
“updating boot data lists by removing an association of control information that is associated with management information Table 3A. Specifically, we credit the testimony of Dr. Neuhauser, who explains how and why Sukegawa renders obvious updating a boot data list by disassociating non-accessed boot data from the boot data list. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 474–478 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:40–55). Dr. Neuhauser concludes an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have []found it obvious based on their knowledge of cache operation that upon the deletion of the non-accessed control information, or boot data, that management information table 3A is updated to reflect the deletion.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 474. Accordingly, we find Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 20, 102, and 104 of the ’862 patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Sukegawa and Dye.” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 8,880,862 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Markman · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,880,862 - Facebook, Inc. v. Sound View Innovations, LLCRehearing deniedPTAB · Oct 19, 2017 · IPR2017-00985 · APJ James B Arpin · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing and left institution denied for claims 1–3 because the petition lacked required means-plus-function constructions under the adopted claim-construction standard.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c), “[w]hen rehearing a decision on petition, a panel will review the decision for an abuse of discretion.” An abuse of discretion occurs when a “decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or clearly erroneous factual findings, or . . . a clear error of judgment.” PPG Indus. Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). The request must identify, with specificity, all matters that the moving party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked. 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Not reached
“Under our Rules setting forth the requirements for the content of the petition, “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function . . . limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. [§ 112, ¶ 6], the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (emphasis added); see Inst. Dec. 13. Thus, where the challenged claim contains a means-plus-function limitation, the petition must provide a means-plus-function construction for that limitation. Consequently, it was not our task to determine first whether the word “controller” is a nonce word potentially subjecting the claim terms to treatment under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and only then to receive arguments from Petitioner on their construction. See Reh’g Req. 4 (“Without a predicate finding that § 112, ¶ 6 applies, the Petition’s silence on the identity of a ‘corresponding structure’ had no relevance to the issue of claim construction.” (emphasis added)). Our Rules do not require such a “predicate finding,” and we made no such finding regarding the construction of the “controller” terms. See Inst. Dec. 11 (“For the reasons set forth below, we do not need to construe this claim term or determine its definiteness.”). In the absence of arguments under the appropriate standard from at least Petitioner during the Preliminary Proceeding, we have no basis for construing the “controller” terms. See id. at 13–14 (“The analysis of Petitioner’s arguments regarding claims 1–3 begins and ends with Petitioner’s failure to provide constructions of the claim terms including “controller” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and we cannot evaluate Petitioner’s asserted ground with respect to claims 1–3 in the absence of such constructions.”).” slip op. at 6
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Under our Rules setting forth the requirements for the content of the petition, “[w]here the claim to be construed contains a means-plus-function . . . limitation as permitted under 35 U.S.C. [§ 112, ¶ 6], the construction of the claim must identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (emphasis added); see Inst. Dec. 13. Thus, where the challenged claim contains a means-plus-function limitation, the petition must provide a means-plus-function construction for that limitation. Consequently, it was not our task to determine first whether the word “controller” is a nonce word potentially subjecting the claim terms to treatment under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and only then to receive arguments from Petitioner on their construction. See Reh’g Req. 4 (“Without a predicate finding that § 112, ¶ 6 applies, the Petition’s silence on the identity of a ‘corresponding structure’ had no relevance to the issue of claim construction.” (emphasis added)). Our Rules do not require such a “predicate finding,” and we made no such finding regarding the construction of the “controller” terms. See Inst. Dec. 11 (“For the reasons set forth below, we do not need to construe this claim term or determine its definiteness.”). In the absence of arguments under the appropriate standard from at least Petitioner during the Preliminary Proceeding, we have no basis for construing the “controller” terms. See id. at 13–14 (“The analysis of Petitioner’s arguments regarding claims 1–3 begins and ends with Petitioner’s failure to provide constructions of the claim terms including “controller” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and we cannot evaluate Petitioner’s asserted ground with respect to claims 1–3 in the absence of such constructions.”). It was Petitioner’s task to determine the necessary claim term constructions to support its request for inter partes review and to present those constructions as part of its Petition. Petitioner failed to do that here with respect to the “controller” terms. Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, we did not misapply the law governing interpretation of means- plus-function claim limitations; rather, due to the lack of any arguments or evidence from Petitioner, we did not and could not apply it at all. Consequently, we deny Petitioner’s request that we reconsider our Institution Decision and institute inter partes review of claims 1–3 of the ’371 patent.” slip op. at 6
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“It is hard to see where efficiency is achieved by having two tribunals simultaneously consider different claim constructions under the same standard.4 Nevertheless, we cannot find where Petitioner made this argument in its Petition or its Reply, nor does Petitioner identify where it previously raised this argument. See id. at 7–8; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (“The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.”). It goes without saying that we could not have overlooked or misunderstood an argument not made, and it is not an abuse of discretion not to consider such an argument.” slip op. at 11
Claim constructionPatents in suitUS 6,125,371 - PTAB · Aug 30, 2016 · IPR2014-01448 · APJ Debra K Stephens · IPR · Rehearing
The Board denied rehearing of its final written decision, leaving claims 1 and 7 unpatentable over He and Korodi under § 103.
RulingsRehearing decision- RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied
“decision should be modified, and “[t]he request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d).” slip op. at 4
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73, concluding Petitioner had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable. Specifically, we determined Petitioner had established by a preponderance of the evidence claims 1 and 7 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over He and Korodi (Final Dec. 11–25). In light of our determination that Petitioner had established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 7 of the ’279 Patent are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over He and Korodi, we took no position on whether the same claims are also obvious over the combination of the teachings and suggestions of Gustafsson and He (id. at 25).” slip op. at 3
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 7,671,279
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.