• Meta Platforms, Inc. / Instagram, Inc. et al. v. VL Collective IP LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 5, 2024 · IPR2023-00924 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Zhao; claims 4, 8, 12, and 16 are not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “Decision is a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73 as to the patentability of claims 1–16 of the ’980 patent. We determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 5–7, 9–11, and 13–15 are unpatentable, and Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of evidence that claims 4, 8, 12, and 16 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “being present in another image or comparing that probability to a detection threshold.”). Dr. Saber was consistent with this testimony on cross-examination. Ex. 1051, 167–251. When I weigh the evidence, I find it to be one-sided, with all of the expert testimony weighing against Petitioner or avoiding the issue altogether. Thus, I would not find that Petitioner has met its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Zhao teaches claim limitation 1e. Moreover, even if the Majority is correct about how Zhao’s RCR algorithm works, all that shows is that the detection of object presence in a previous image can be used to disambiguate segments (e.g., limbs) of an already detected object (e.g., a person), not that it can be used to detect the object in the image in the first place, as required by the claim language. For this additional reason, I would not find that Petitioner has met its burden.” slip op. at 84

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Reasons for Obviousness Based on Zhao On a limitation-by-limitation basis, Petitioner’s contentions of” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Reasons for Obviousness Based on Zhao On a limitation-by-limitation basis, Petitioner’s contentions of “obviousness” are primarily assertions of how a POSITA would have understood Zhao’s disclosures. For example, with regard to claim 1, Petitioner repeatedly asserts how “a POSITA would have understood Zhao” (Pet. 13, 18, 21, 27) and for each limitation contends that Zhao “disclosed or at least rendered obvious” (or a variation thereof) the limitation (id. at 13– 15, 17–18, 21, 23, 25–27). We will, accordingly, address these “obviousness” contentions when addressing the respective limitations.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 7,436,980 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,436,980
• General Motors LLC v. Edward H. NortrupAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2023-00994 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–31 are unpatentable, principally as obvious over Knockeart and Feldman, with dependent claims also held obvious over additional combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “the proposed alternative configuration. See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Also, protecting the privacy of individuals provides further reason for combining Knockeart and Feldman. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–7, 9, 10, 12–21, 25, 26, 29, and 31 would have been obvious over Knockeart and Feldman, that claims 7 and 8 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Simske, that claims 10, 11, and 30 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Whitsell, that claims 22–24 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Boies, and that claims 27 and 28 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, and Peterson. See supra Parts III.B–III.F. Because these five asserted challenges are dispositive as to all the challenged claims, namely, claims 1–31, we need not reach either the asserted challenge based on Knockeart, Feldman, Boies, and Peterson, or the asserted challenge based on Knockeart, Feldman, and Craine with respect to any of these claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018) (holding that a petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”); Bos. Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cook Grp. Inc., 809 F. App’x 984, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (recognizing that the “Board need not address issues that are not necessary to the resolution of the proceeding” and agreeing that the Board has “discretion to decline to decide additional instituted grounds once the petitioner has prevailed on all its challenged claims”). Accordingly, we do not reach Petitioner’s arguments that claim 14 would have been obvious over Knockeart, Feldman, Boies, and” slip op. at 80

  Patent outcomesUS 10,444,028 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,444,028
• Netflix, Inc. v. Videolabs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00628 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 are unpatentable: claims 1–4 and 8–11 as anticipated by Mehta, and claims 1–14 as obvious over Mehta and Schläpfer.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe only those claim terms that require analysis to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Petitioner and Patent Owner agree that no claim terms require specific construction to resolve the unpatentability issues presented in the Petition. Pet. 23; PO Resp. 10–11. We agree and do not construe any terms.” slip op. at 9

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Analysis We agree with Petitioner. Mehta discloses storing “functionally equivalent programs having the same name that are capable of running on multiple kinds of devices that even may be written using different languages.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 98. Mr. Wechselberger testifies that this disclosure shows that Mehta’s “MAS receives, stores and supports functionally equivalent programs capable of running on multiple devices because each program corresponds to a different device having different device capabilities (e.g., written using different languages).” Ex. 1002 ¶ 66. This testimony is consistent with that of Dr. Goodrich, who testifies that “each application has a single version made for a particular device type.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 66. Dr. Goodrich later testifies that paragraph 98 of Mehta describes that there could be two functionally equivalent programs with the same name that are compatible with a single user’s computer. Id. at ¶ 88; see PO Resp. 31–32 (citing Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 87–88). We do not credit this later testimony, because it is inconsistent with Dr. Goodrich’s earlier testimony that “each application,” or program of Mehta, is “made for a particular device type.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 66. We agree with Mr. Wechselberger and find that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have understood that Mehta’s disclosure of functionally equivalent programs having the same name that are capable of running on multiple kinds of devices means that each program corresponds to a different device having different capabilities. Further, Mehta discloses that “the MAS only lists those applications that are supported by the subscriber’s device. This allows the subscriber to avoid the problem of having to explicitly select a compatible application.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 117; see Pet. 36–37 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 75, 77). Mr. Wechselberger testifies that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention would have understood this disclosure to mean that the MAS provides the subscriber with only a single subscriber-appropriate version that will work for the subscriber. Ex. 1002 ¶ 77. Although Patent Owner contends that Mehta is silent on whether only a single description would be provided if there were multiple implementations (PO Sur-Reply 10–11), we agree with Mr. Wechselberger and find that when multiple implementations have the same name, each implementation corresponds to a different device, and therefore, the MAS would only present to the subscriber the one implementation that works with the subscriber’s device. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 66, 75, 77.” slip op. at 28

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “piece of content, while the versions of Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs are different implementations.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 39. Dr. Goodrich, in his deposition, when asked if “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’790 patent would also understand that Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Mac are also functionally equivalent, correct?” answered “Yes . . . . But they would be even stronger than simply functionally equivalent. They would be different implementations of the same product.” Ex. 1029, 43:14–24. However, later in his deposition, Dr. Goodrich testifies that Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Mac are separate applications, not different implementations of the same application. Ex. 1029, 48:1–20. We disagree with this later testimony. Neither Dr. Goodrich nor Patent Owner persuasively explains why Dr. Goodrich changed his unambiguous position from both his declaration and his earlier deposition testimony. For example, Dr. Goodrich testifies in his deposition that “for the Lion King example, a .MP3 and a .MOV are different implementations of the same product. They’re also functionally equivalent, but functionally equivalent is broader.” Ex. 1029, 45:7–11. Dr. Goodrich continues, “when Mehta is disclosing functionally equivalent, it is not referring to it as different implementations of the same product. Instead, it’s [describing] how to disambiguate [applications] not clustered in terms of implementations . . . based on other metadata.” Id. at 45:14–21. This explanation is unpersuasive because it is inconsistent with Dr. Goodrich’s declaration testimony, in which Dr. Goodrich explicitly testifies that the different versions of Lion King, as well as the different versions of Microsoft Word, are different implementations of the same product. Ex. 2020 ¶ 39. Specifically, in his declaration, Dr. Goodrich testifies that the “various versions of Lion King (such as an .mp3 file or an .mov file) are the implementations of the Lion King. For another example, . . . the versions of Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs are different implementations.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 39. Dr. Goodrich testifies again that “Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs” are “multiple implementations of an individual item of digital content.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 70. Further, the reason given in the explanation in his deposition, that Mehta needs to disambiguate applications that are not clustered in terms of implementations based on other metadata, would also apply to the different versions of Lion King, yet Dr. Goodrich consistently testifies that these different versions are different implementations, both in his declaration and in his deposition. Id.; Ex. 1029, 45:7–10. Petitioner contends, and we agree, that the inconsistent testimony of Dr. Goodrich appears to be an attempt to cure Patent Owner’s and Dr. Goodrich’s incomplete analysis of Mehta’s disclosure. See Reply 7–8. In particular, the Petition quotes Mehta’s disclosure that the MAS stores “functionally equivalent programs having the same name that are capable of running on multiple kinds of devices that even may be written using different languages.” Pet. 28 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 98). Dr. Goodrich addresses this disclosure by explaining that two applications, such as Microsoft Word and Apple Pages, are functionally equivalent but are two different applications, not multiple implementations of a single application. Ex. 2020 ¶ 70. In this analysis, Dr. Goodrich does not address the full disclosure of Mehta, which describes that the “functionally equivalent programs hav[e] the same name” (Ex. 1003 ¶ 98), such as Dr. Goodrich’s example of Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs. See id. Thus, although Dr. Goodrich is correct in testifying that some functionally equivalent programs, such as Microsoft Word and Apple Pages, are not different implementations of an item of digital content, he is also correct in testifying that “Microsoft Word for Windows and Microsoft Word for Apple Macs” are “multiple implementations of an individual item of digital content.” Id. Yet Dr. Goodrich does not identify any difference between the multiple implementations of Microsoft Word and the functionally equivalent programs having the same name as described by Mehta.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,233,790 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,233,790
• Netflix, Inc. v. VL Collective IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 2, 2024 · IPR2023-00630 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable: claims 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 22 are anticipated by Cassin; all claims are also obvious over Cassin and Huston and over Huston.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We construe only those claim terms that require analysis to resolve the controversy. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Petitioner contends that “no claim terms require specific construction to resolve the unpatentability issues presented” in the Petition. Pet. 15–16. Similarly, Patent Owner contends that “no express construction of any term is required.” PO Resp. 18. For purposes of this decision, we do not construe any claim terms.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “is included in the indication. See PO Resp. 40. However, the ’559 patent does not describe what is included in the claimed “listing.” Rather, throughout the disclosure of the ’559 patent, the phrase “the listing of one or more pieces of content stored in memory” or a variation thereof is repeated without any further elaboration. Ex. 1001, 3:13–15, 3:26–36, 12:22–26, 12:50–52, 13:29–30. For example, the Specification does not disclose that the listing of one piece of content includes the title of the piece of content, nor an identification number of the piece of content, nor any other information about the piece of content. The disclosed listing is no more than an item of information that indicates that a specific piece of content is stored in the memory of the terminal. Therefore, the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim term “a listing of one . . . piece[] of content stored in the memory,” read in light of the Specification of the ’559 patent, encompasses an item of information that indicates that a specific piece of content is stored in the memory of the terminal. We agree with Petitioner and find that Cassin’s indication that the client currently has the media content item describes an item of information that indicates that a piece of content is stored in the memory of the terminal. Therefore, Cassin’s indication that the client currently has the media item describes “a listing of one . . . piece[] of content stored in the memory” as claimed.” slip op. at 33

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Analysis We agree with Petitioner and find that Cassin’s offer to download an item describes “a response . . . that instructs the terminal to perform one or more actions” as claimed. Reply 11 (citing Pet. 25–26), 13–14. Cassin discloses that the server uses the user information received from the client to query a database in the server for a list of content to which the user is entitled. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 162, 164. Cassin discloses that the server offers an item from the list to the client for downloading. Id. ¶ 163 (The server offers every item on the list), ¶ 164 (The server attempts to send an item on the list). Cassin discloses that the client checks to see if it already has the item. Id. ¶¶ 163, 164. If the client has the item, the client refuses the download offer. Id. If the client does not have the item, the client accepts the download of the item and stores the item in its content repository. Id. Thus, the client responds to the offer to download an item from the server by (a) checking to see if it has the offered item, and (b) either refusing the download if the client has the item or accepting the download if the client does not have the item. Therefore, we agree with Petitioner and find that “when the server offers a media item for the client to download, the server is ‘instructing the terminal to perform one or more actions to thereby control the flow of content.’” Reply 11 (citing Pet. 25–26). We agree with Petitioner that in response to the server’s offer, “the client will either ‘refuse the download’ (if it has the content) or ‘accepts the download of the media content item from the server and stores the media content in the local content repository’ (if the client does not have the content).” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 163). We agree with Petitioner and find that by checking to see if it has the item, and “by refusing or accepting the download offer, the client is doing ‘something to control the flow of content’ in response to the server’s instruction.” Id. (quoting PO Resp. 23). We disagree with Patent Owner’s contentions to the contrary. In particular, we disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that the server’s offer “has not instructed the client to do anything—the client takes action based on other factors (whether or not it already has the media content item).” PO Sur-Reply 3; see PO Resp. 31–32; Ex. 2002 ¶¶ 91–93. We find that the client performs the actions of checking to see if it already has the item and, depending on whether it has the item, either accepting or refusing the offer, in response to receiving the offer from the server. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 163, 164; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–75. Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the server’s offer instructs the client to (a) determine whether the client has the item and (b) depending on whether the client has the item, either accept or refuse the offer, which describes “instructing the terminal to perform one or more actions to thereby control the flow of content” as claimed. We further find that, because the offered item is from the server’s list which was determined using information from the user and information from the server’s database, the offer to download the item describes “a response to the content status . . . based upon the terminal status information and the server status information” as recited in claim 1.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,440,559 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,440,559
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-01193 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 14–16 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over the listed Jiang-based combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Relying on Mr. Schmandt’s testimony, Apple argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, with . . . two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, or a bachelor’s degree in the same fields with . . . four years of experience in the field of speech recognition.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30). Zentian does not contest Apple’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 5. Because Apple’s articulation of that level of skill is uncontested, supported by testimonial evidence, and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’277 patent, we adopt it for this decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:4–8:10.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Apple argues that all terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, except that the limitation “calculating means for calculating a distance indicating the similarity between a feature vector and a predetermined acoustic state of an acoustic model” in claim 14 (Ex. 1001, 39:6–8) is a means-plus-function limitation and thus invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2006). Pet. 5–6. Zentian does not contest these arguments or propose any explicit constructions. See PO Resp. We do not find it necessary to explicitly construe any terms for this decision. To the extent that we need to interpret claim language, we address that language below in the context of the prior art. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Apple’s arguments persuasive that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Jiang’s pruning technique not to rely on feedback, particularly because Jiang makes no mention of feedback, and Jiang as a whole appears consistent with Apple’s theory that Jiang does not teach feedback-based pruning. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 2:5–7, 8:52–64, 10:65– 11:15. We credit Mr. Schmandt’s testimony and supporting evidence that “[e]ven though Jiang still describes calculating all scores initially (for each state for example), Jiang explains that pruning thereafter saves on computational resources.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 194 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:65–11:25). We find this testimony more persuasive than Mr. Anderson’s contrary testimony which does not credibly find support in the text of Jiang. See Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 57–71. We also disagree that Apple’s arguments that Jiang’s distance calculations do not rely on pruning are untimely. PO Resp. 19. The Petition argues that Jiang teaches calculating distances, “namely a score for each phoneme branch of the prefix tree.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:29–33). Also, Mr. Schmandt clearly opined, in his initial declaration submitted with the Petition, that “each phoneme branch is scored” in Jiang’s search tree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. Thus, Zentian had clear notice in the Petition of Apple’s argument that Jiang performs distance calculations for the entire search tree. Apple’s later argument that this process does not necessitate feedback is a natural consequence of its argument in the Petition, and is not untimely.” slip op. at 27

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “(1) Apple’s Proposed Combination According to Apple, Brown teaches that processing stages in a speech-recognition system may be pipelined such that “as the frames of data are generated, the data is processed from one stage to another so that the operations are synchronized with the rate of frame generation.” Pet. 44–45 (citing Ex. 1036, 3:32–48; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 206–209). Apple contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to modify the combination of Jiang and Baumgartner by pipelining data sent from the CPU to the SLA and then back to the CPU because “[p]ipelining data offered numerous well-known advantages including greater throughput of the processor, improved performance, decreased cost, and simplified programming.” Pet. 45 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 210). Apple also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have realized pipelining keeps all processors operating efficiently in a multi-processor system, such that wasteful idle-processing time is minimized.” Pet. 46 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 212–213). And according to Apple, “Jiang already discusses the importance of time with respect to pruning.” Pet. 46 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:65– 11:25). Apple also argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in adding Brown’s pipelining to the Jiang–Baumgartner combination because “[p]ipelining was well-known in the art including in speech recognition systems,” and the three references “teach speech recognition systems using similar hardware, such as various processors to perform similar speech recognition functions,” such that the combination “would have been a trivial modification.” Pet. 46–47 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:60–65, 6:32–36, 6:39–42; Ex. 1007 ¶ 33, Fig. 19; Ex. 1036, 3:11– 15; Ex. 1003 ¶ 214).” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,979,277 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,979,277
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00034 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 14–16 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over the identified combinations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Relying on Mr. Schmandt’s testimony, Apple argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, with . . . two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, or a bachelor’s degree in the same fields with . . . four years of experience in the field of speech recognition.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28–30). Zentian does not contest Apple’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 5. Because Apple’s articulation of that level of skill is uncontested, supported by testimonial evidence, and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’277 patent, we adopt it for this decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:4–8:10.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Apple argues that all terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, except that the limitation “calculating means for calculating a distance indicating the similarity between a feature vector and a predetermined acoustic state of an acoustic model” in claim 14 (Ex. 1001, 39:6–8) is a means-plus-function limitation and thus invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2006). Pet. 5–6. Zentian does not contest these arguments or propose any explicit constructions. See PO Resp. We do not find it necessary to explicitly construe any terms for this decision. To the extent that we need to interpret claim language, we address that language below in the context of the prior art. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find Apple’s arguments persuasive that pruning is not required as part of its proposed combination of Jiang, Baumgartner, and Brown. Nothing in Jiang suggests that pruning is mandatory—it is presented as option, possibly a preferred option, but not a requirement. See Ex. 1004, 8:52 (“[A] pruning technique can be used.” (emphasis added)). Although Apple relied on the possibility of pruning in Jiang as part of the motivation to combine Jiang’s system with Baumgartner’s parallel-processing hardware, Apple never included pruning as an element needed to meet any limitation of claim 1. See Pet. 41, 46; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 194, 201, 213. Although Jiang teaches the desirability of using pruning, at least “for a large vocabulary” (Ex. 1004, 2:19), there is nothing in claim 1 limiting how small the acoustic model can be. Also, whether or not a person of ordinary skill in the art could have achieved real-time speech-recognition system without pruning is not pertinent to achieving the claimed invention because claim 1 does not require real-time speech recognition. Apple has persuasively shown that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to implement Jiang’s system on parallel-processing hardware, as Baumgartner teaches, using pipelining as Brown teaches to meet all the limitations of claim 1, even without Jiang’s pruning embodiment, and that this combination would have been within the ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 23

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Apple’s arguments persuasive that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Jiang’s pruning technique not to rely on feedback, particularly because Jiang makes no mention of feedback, and Jiang as a whole appears consistent with Apple’s theory that Jiang does not teach feedback-based pruning. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 2:5–7, 8:52–64, 10:65– 11:15. We credit Mr. Schmandt’s testimony and supporting evidence that “[e]ven though Jiang still describes calculating all scores initially (for each state for example), Jiang explains that pruning thereafter saves on computational resources.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 194 (citing Ex. 1004, 10:65–11:25). We find this testimony more persuasive than Mr. Anderson’s contrary testimony which does not credibly find support in the text of Jiang. See Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 57–71. We also disagree that Apple’s arguments that Jiang’s distance calculations do not rely on pruning are untimely. PO Resp. 19. The Petition argues that Jiang teaches calculating distances, “namely a score for each phoneme branch of the prefix tree.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1004, 8:29–33). Also, Mr. Schmandt clearly opined, in his initial declaration submitted with the Petition, that “each phoneme branch is scored” in Jiang’s search tree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 149. Thus, Zentian had clear notice in the Petition of Apple’s argument that Jiang performs distance calculations for the entire search tree. Apple’s later argument that this process does not necessitate feedback is a natural consequence of its argument in the Petition, and is not untimely.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,979,277 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,979,277
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-01192 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 46–51, 53, 54, 58, 59, 64, and 67 unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the specified combinations of Thelen, Bailey, Chen, and additional references.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Apple’s arguments persuasive notwithstanding Zentian’s arguments to the contrary. We credit Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that consolidating the overlapping data within similar lexical models (such as “sports” models like football or baseball) and storing the consolidated data in a shared memory that multiple processors may access in parallel would have resulted in memory and processing efficiency. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–84. This would have been an improvement over Thelen, where each processor has access to only one, distinct lexical model at a time and there is no shared memory in which multiple processors can access the same consolidated models data in parallel. See Ex. 1030, 7:30–34.11” slip op. at 27

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Because a person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person, we agree with Apple that Dr. Anderson’s inability to implement a particular computer vision application within the constraints of a particular Texas Instruments parallel-processing environment does not mean that more general knowledge and skill in parallel processing would have been beyond the level of ordinary skill. To the contrary, the evidence of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention, who, for example, had a master’s degree and two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, would have also had knowledge and experience with parallel processing.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Apple states that it “applies the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms,” and does not propose any explicit constructions. See Pet. 7. Likewise, Zentian does not propose any explicit constructions. See PO Resp. We do not find it necessary to explicitly construe any terms for this decision. To the extent that we need to interpret claim language, we address that language below in the context of the prior art. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “would not have been dissuaded from the memory-efficiency benefits of modifying Thelen–Bailey by grouping processors and memory into clusters because memory collisions would have allegedly made recognition slower. Although memory collisions may have been an issue for the ordinarily skilled artisan to consider, Apple has persuasively shown that there are other motivating considerations, such as the known flexibility12 and scalability of distributed processing systems in general, decreased cost because off-the-shelf components may be used, and the added efficiency of data sharing among related sub-context models. See Pet. 40–45. Apple persuasively shows, and we find Mr. Schmandt’s supporting testimony credible, that a skilled artisan would have expected to be able to minimize the effect of memory collisions based on Chen’s teachings and the background knowledge in the art. See Pet. 14–19. For the same reasons, we do not find credible Dr. Anderson’s testimony (see, e.g., Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 44–46)” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 7,587,319 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,587,319
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00033 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 46–51, 53, 54, 58, 59, 64, and 67 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the listed combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Because a person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person, we agree with Apple that Dr. Anderson’s inability to implement a particular computer vision application within the constraints of a particular Texas Instruments parallel-processing environment does not mean that more general knowledge and skill in parallel processing would have been beyond the level of ordinary skill. To the contrary, the evidence of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the claimed invention, who, for example, had a master’s degree and two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, would have also had knowledge and experience with parallel processing.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We find Apple’s arguments persuasive notwithstanding Zentian’s arguments to the contrary. We credit Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that consolidating the overlapping data within similar lexical models (such as “sports” models like football or baseball) and storing the consolidated data in a shared memory that multiple processors may access in parallel would have resulted in memory and processing efficiency. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–84. This would have been an improvement over Thelen, where each processor has access to only one, distinct lexical model at a time and there is no shared memory in which multiple processors can access the same consolidated models data in parallel. See Ex. 1030, 7:30–34.11” slip op. at 27

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Apple states that it “applies the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms,” and does not propose any explicit constructions. See Pet. 7. Likewise, Zentian does not propose any explicit constructions. See PO Resp. We do not find it necessary to explicitly construe any terms for this decision. To the extent that we need to interpret claim language, we address that language below in the context of the prior art. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find Apple’s arguments persuasive notwithstanding Zentian’s arguments to the contrary. We credit Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that consolidating the overlapping data within similar lexical models (such as “sports” models like football or baseball) and storing the consolidated data in a shared memory that multiple processors may access in parallel would have resulted in memory and processing efficiency. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–84. This would have been an improvement over Thelen, where each processor has access to only one, distinct lexical model at a time and there is no shared memory in which multiple processors can access the same consolidated models data in parallel. See Ex. 1030, 7:30–34.11 11 The dissent characterizes Thelen’s common storage 340 as a shared memory. However, each of Thelen’s recognizers only has access (indirectly The evidence of record suggests that the ordinarily skilled artisan would not have been dissuaded from the memory-efficiency benefits of modifying Thelen–Bailey by grouping processors and memory into clusters because memory collisions would have allegedly made recognition slower. Although memory collisions may have been an issue for the ordinarily skilled artisan to consider, Apple has persuasively shown that there are other motivating considerations, such as the known flexibility12 and scalability of distributed processing systems in general, decreased cost because off-the-shelf components may be used, and the added efficiency of data sharing among related sub-context models. See Pet. 40–45.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,587,319 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,587,319
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-01194 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1–5 over their listed combinations of Jiang, Smyth, Nguyen, Boike, or Baumgartner, and claim 6 over Jiang, Smyth, Nguyen, Boike, and Baumgartner.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have had a master’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field,” and would have had “at least two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, or a bachelor’s degree in the same fields with at least four years of experience in the field of speech recognition.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Patent Owner indicates that it does not “dispute the Petition’s proposed level of skill for a person of skill in the art,” but also emphasizes that such artisans who possess “ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition, [would] not [be] one of extraordinary creativity.” PO Resp. 4. We continue to determine, as we did in the Institution Decision, that Petitioner’s proposal consistent with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected by the prior art of record, see Inst. Dec. 7; Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 continue to adopt Petitioner’s unopposed position as to the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “of that claim against the prior art.” In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970). The recitation of claim 1 that FVs are extracted and/or derived means that FVs may not only be extracted from the digital audio stream, thus obtaining a FV based on the scale of the FV (“representing a point in an N-dimensional space,” depending on the value of N (Ex. 1001 13:19–23)). Such FVs, per claim 1, may also be representations of the digital audio stream, i.e., quantities derived therefrom. Any such derived quantities would perhaps even be lossy. See Ex. 1001, 13:13–18. As such, FVs, according to independent claim 1, are not limited to pure feature vectors, which are quantities extracted from the digital audio stream, but also include quantities derived from the stream, which are representations” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of obviousness or nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). An obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. “whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (requiring the adjudicator to provide “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)). Furthermore, Petitioner does not satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements,” but “must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “above, we determine that Jiang uses codewords, which are representative feature vectors within the scope of claim 1, and those codewords are used to calculate distances. The Petition discusses a motivation to modify Jiang to use Smyth’s DSP device to perform distance calculations (Pet. 40-41), but it does so in the context of “[t]o the extent Patent Owner argues that Jiang does not teach calculating distances.” Id. at 40. Given that we determine that Jiang does teach performing distancing calculations that meet the claim limitations, Patent Owner’s contention is not persuasive. Rather, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s motivation for using Smyth’s dedicated DSP to perform Jiang’s distance calculations, namely, for the benefit of allowing for segmentation of higher-load processing, resulting in a faster, more efficient, ¶¶ 176–180; Ex. 1004, 6:39–42). We agree with Mr. Schmandt, that “[i]t would have been obvious to modify Jiang’s tree search engine, which performs both distance calculation and word determination, to include Smyth’s distinct processors for performing each respective functionality,” because such a modification “results in a more efficient, faster, and more accurate speech recognition process by segmenting higher-load processing tasks.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 180 (citing Ex. 1012, 19, Ex. 1005, 5:49–53, 6:5–8, 6:43–51; Ex. 1004, 4:60–5:3). Additionally, Patent Owner argues that using Smyth’s probability calculation in the system of Jiang will dramatically increase the computation burden of the calculations, and this is contrary to the purpose of Jiang to reduce computational requirements, as evinced by the use of lossy codewords. PO Resp. 16–19 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 54–59). Petitioner asserts, with respect to this latter argument, that “the Board need not consider this argument if the Board determines that Jiang teaches limitation 1(g).” Pet. Reply 14. We agree with Petitioner. Given the discussion with respect to limitation 1(g) above, and that Jiang is sufficient to teach or suggest element 1(g), we need not further consider the combination of Smyth and Jiang in the claimed calculation of distances. Therefore, we determine that the motivation proffered by the Petition is sufficient to combine the teachings of Jiang and Smyth, as disclosed in the Petition.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 10,062,377 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,062,377
• Intel Corporation / Dell Technologies Inc. et al. v. 3d Surfaces, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00004 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 9–11, 17, and 18 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 9, 11, and 17 as obvious over Sfarti and Foley; claims 10 and 18 as obvious over Sfarti, Foley, and Möller.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “to the ’299 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years[’] work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these scientific fields.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–97. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 10–11; Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Based on the record presented, we now find as we did in the Institution Decision that Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’299 patent and the prior art of record, and is not disputed by Patent Owner. See Inst. Dec. 20–21. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s formulation in this Decision.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6, we conclude that they are. Because the Unit Terms do not use the word “means,” we apply a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Nonetheless, as Petitioner argues, the claim term “unit” does not connote any particular structure, and the terms “transform unit”, “lighting unit”, “renderer unit”, and “tessellate unit” recite function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. The “unit” term at issue here is closely akin to the “module” term at issue in Williamson, and similarly generic terms such as “element” and “device,” and is, therefore, in the context of the ’299 patent claims and specification, a “nonce” word used “in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51; see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1298–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the claim term “cheque standby unit” was subject to § 112, ¶ 6, because it failed to “recite any structure, much less ‘sufficiently definite structure,’” and the claim recited a function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function, despite an expert witness’s contrary testimony); WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2022-1066, 2023 WL 6210607, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) (stating “the term ‘unit,’ in a vacuum, is defined only by the function it performs, much like terms such as ‘element’ or ‘means’” and “[a] ‘unit’ could be almost anything”).4 We therefore agree with Petitioner’s position that the rebuttable presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome in this case, because the Unit Terms are not understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”).” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “transforming is performed by a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the disclosed microcode. See Ex. 1001, 5:20–29, 5:51–67, 7:1–8, 7:12–13, 12:24–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105. We construe “transform unit” as a means-plus-function limitation with the function of transforming graphic objects into transformed objects (claims 1 and 11) including control points (claims 2 and 11), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the microcode disclosed in the specification. The foregoing construction of “transform unit” is identical to the preliminary construction in the Institution Decision, with two exceptions. First, it adds that the corresponding structure is a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor. See Inst. Dec. 22–23. We agree with Patent Owner’s contention that the ’299 patent describes such pipeline hardware as being part of “[t]he present invention,” so we include it in our construction. Ex. 1001, 5:20–29. Second, our construction does not require a dedicated processor, which is part of Petitioner’s claim construction. See Inst. Dec. 22–23; Pet. 11–12. As Patent Owner points out, the ’299 patent specification does not include the term “dedicated.” To the extent Petitioner’s “dedicated” term is meant to require that the processor is programmed solely to perform the claimed transforming function, to the exclusion of any other processing, we conclude the claim is open to both a dedicated processor and a non-dedicated processor.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “7. Remaining Claim Terms Upon review of the arguments and evidence, we determine no further construction of any claim term is needed. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 7,245,299 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,245,299

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.