• Wolfspeed, Inc. / Ideal Industries Lighting, LLC D/B/A Cree Lighting v. Cao Lighting, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2023 · IPR2022-00848 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 21, 22, 25, 26, 28–30, 32–36, 40, 42–44, 47–49, 52, 53, 56–59, 62, 63, 65–68, 71–73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, and 88–91 are unpatentable under § 103; claim 41 is not shown …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “declaration addresses the Patent Owner Response and is relevant to the issues at hand. We start with an important observation: claim 18 (the only independent claim at issue) is an apparatus claim; the claim is directed to a “semiconductor light source.” Ex. 1001, 9:52, EPRC 1:32. One requirement of this apparatus is that it comprise “a semiconductor chip” (id. at 9:66) where “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip EPRC, 1:34–36. As we explain when addressing claim construction, infra, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction (Resp. 14) of “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as referring to “a semiconductor LED chip capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” See Section III.D, infra (emphasis added). Because of these recitations, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the prior art teaches or suggests a semiconductor LED chip “capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” As explained herein, we determine that in the Petition, Petitioner met this burden by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Krames reference teaches an LED chip that has this capability. Pet. 53 (quoting Ex. 1008, 10). Notably, claim 18 does not require actual operation of anything at greater than 40 milliwatts because claim 21 is not a method claim. Petitioner never had a burden of establishing a method of running the Krames reference’s LED at this power output within a semiconductor light source.” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims relate to light fixtures, LED packaging, and LED chip layer structure and that the ’770 patent claims reflect “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Resp. 16. The prior art of record, for example, Begemann, likewise reflects “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Id. (quoting Pet. 28). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lebby, agreed that a person having ordinary skill in 28:16. While Petitioner’s proposed description of a person having ordinary skill in the art could, in some instances, be sufficient to qualify a person as having ordinary skill, Patent Owner’s proposal is a more complete and accurate description of the level of skill commensurate with the scope of the challenged ’770 patent claims. Patent Owner’s description appears consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by witness testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s description. We further note that the outcome of our decision would be the same under either party’s asserted skill level.” slip op. at 15

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Delaware held, with respect to related U.S. Patent 6,465,961, construed “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 1024, 15–18). Petitioner responds that the phrase “needs no construction” and that Petitioner’s grounds meet this construction. Reply 1. We note that the language of claim 18 does not precisely match the language the District Court considered, it is substantively the same. The record supports a construction very similar to the construction the District Court adopts, and we reference the District Court’s reasoning. Ex. 1024, 15– 18. We, thus, construe claim 18’s recitation that “said semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as referring to “a semiconductor LED chip that is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” It is unnecessary to construe any other claim terms in this Decision because none of the parties’ disputes turn on the meaning of other terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedReference is prior artDecided for petitioner

    “The facts above are evidence of the Krames reference’s publication as of June 29, 2000, because the facts tend to make the Krames reference’s publication as of June 29, 2000, more probable than it would be without the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a) (defining evidence as relevant “if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence”). The evidence is sufficient to support publication. Meanwhile, no evidence of record suggests that Krames was not a printed publication as of June 29, 2000. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports Krames’s prior art status. Patent Owner argues that Ms. Watters “never establishes a firm date when Krames was purportedly available to the relevant public.” Resp. 21. Patent Owner bases this argument by taking a tortured reading of Ms. Watters’s statement that “[m]embers of the interested public could locate a copy of [the Proceedings] on or after June 29, 2000, the date it was catalogued.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1020, 3); see also Sur-Reply 12–13. The best understanding of Ms. Watters’s statement, in view of the context of Ms. Watters explaining the library’s cataloguing process, is that a member of the interested public had two options: the person could choose to locate the Proceedings on June 29, 2000, or the person could choose to locate the Proceedings after June 29, 2000. Thus, the statement supports public availability as of June 29, 2000.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 6,634,770 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,634,770
• Wolfspeed, Inc. / Ideal Industries Lighting, LLC D/B/A Cree Lighting et al. v. Cao Lighting, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2023 · IPR2023-00129 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 21–40, 42–44, 47–49, 52–53, 56–59, 62–63, 65–68, 71–73, 77–78, 81–82, 85–86, and 88–91 are unpatentable over Begemann, Krames, and Allen; claim 41 is not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In the Reply, Petitioner uses the Krames declaration (Ex. 1028) to argue, for example, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used a lower amperage than the 1.5 A dc that Patent Owner’s Response focuses on. Reply 8 (citing Ex. 1028 ¶ 22). This use of the Krames declaration is timely because it responds to an argument Patent Owner makes in the Patent Owner Response. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“A reply may only respond to arguments raised in . . . patent owner response.”). As to relevancy and whether the Krames declaration is applicable to the facts of this case, the issues at hand are (1) whether or not a person having ordinary skill would have had reason to use the Krames LED with Begemann with a reasonable expectation of success and (2) whether or not the Krames LED is capable of outputting light at greater than about 40 milliwatts. Again, we emphasize that claim 21 does not recite a method where the LED within the recited semiconductor light source actually outputs greater than about 40 milliwatts. The Krames declaration is relevant to the facts of this case because the declaration has bearing on whether or not a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the Krames reference’s LED with Begemann’s lightbulb design. See, e.g., Ex. 1028 ¶ 22. Patent Owner argues that evidence must be relevant to motivation to combine “an LED chip from the Krames article (operating at 1.5 amps to produce 170 milliwatts of output)” but claim 21 has no “operating at 1.5 amps to produce 170 milliwatts of output” requirement. What is relevant is that Krames discloses a single chip that has the capability of outputting more or less light depending on operating conditions. Pet. Opp. 3; see also Ex. 1008, 8 (providing that Figure 12 of the Krames reference is described as illustrating “[l]ight output vs. current characteristic of a blue … 1x1 mm2 AlGaInN LED in a power package, compared to a conventional AlGaInN LED in a 5 mm lamp a package”). Because claim 21 does not require actually running the recited LED at any particular wattage or amperage, it is appropriate for the Krames declaration to rebut Patent Owner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill would not have considered using the Krames LED with Begemann at high amperage by explaining that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have considered using the exact same Krames LED with Begemann at a low amperage instead and that at this lower amperage the Krames LED would generate an amount of heat that would be easily dissipated by Begemann’s lamp while still providing an optical output of “greater than about 40 milliwatts” as recited by claim 21. Ex. 1028 ¶¶ 23–24 (citing Ex. 1008, 8). The fact that the Krames LED is configured to run at the high amperage if desired for a different application does not negate the rationale for combining the Krames LED to run at a lower amperage.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims relate to light fixtures, LED packaging, and LED chip layer structure and that the ’961 patent claims reflect “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Resp. 19. The prior art of record, for example, Begemann, likewise reflects “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Id. (quoting Pet. 28). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lebby, agreed that a person having ordinary skill in the art would need to be “familiar with thermal issues.” Ex. 2015, 26:15– 28:16. While Petitioner’s proposed description of a person having ordinary skill in the art could, in some instances, be sufficient to qualify a person as having ordinary skill, Patent Owner’s proposal is a more complete and accurate description of the level of skill commensurate with the scope of the challenged ’961 patent claims. Patent Owner’s description appears consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by witness testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s description. We further note that the outcome of our decision would be the same under either party’s asserted skill level.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “particularly relevant.” Resp. 14–15. First, Patent Owner argues that “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” means “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater 9 Petitioner states that “Patent Owner thus contends the recited ‘reflective layers’ can include transparent or semi-transparent layers that exhibit some reflectivity (e.g., SiO2) or an interface between two layers (e.g., the buffer and substrate layers) that exhibit differing indices of refraction.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner frames this as being Petitioner’s “novel construction” (Resp. 16), but Petitioner does not expressly endorse this Patent Owner contention. than about 40 milliwatts.” Resp. 14–15. Patent Owner notes that a district court already adopted this construction and notes that the “LED chip” includes LEDs, LED modules, and LED arrays but excludes laser chips, laser modules, and VCSEL chips. Id. (citing Ex. 2003, 15–18). Petitioner argues that the phrase “needs no construction” and that Petitioner’s grounds meet this construction. Reply 1–2. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is well supported by the record including the District Court’s reasoning. Ex. 2003, 15–18. slip op. at 20

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s claim construction is well-supported by the record including the reasoning provided by the California and Delaware district courts. Ex. 2002, 19–21 (California district court explaining why the “reflective layers” must be distinct layers based on how claim 8 is structured and also explaining why the amount of reflection must be non-negligible); Ex. 2003, 2, 13 (Delaware district court explaining why reflection has to be more than negligible but need not reflect more light than the light absorbed or transmitted). We, thus, agree that “first and a second reflective layers . . . 10 Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction combines various statements made by the district courts into one statement. Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2002, 19–21; Ex. 2003, 2, 13). serving to reflect light emitted by said active layer” means that the “first and second reflective layers are distinct from each other and reflect more than negligible light.” We further note that the preponderance of the evidence supports that as little as one percent light reflectance is “non-negligible” in this context. Reply 4; also Ex. 1032, 188:7–14 (Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Shealy, testifying that reflection “on the order of one percent” would be more than negligible); see also Tr. 53 (counsel for Patent Owner agreeing that Dr. Shealy opined that “three percent reflection is enough to be non-negligible”).” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 6,465,961 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,465,961
• Wolfspeed, Inc. / Ideal Industries Lighting, LLC D/B/A Cree Lighting et al. v. Cao Lighting, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2023 · IPR2023-00123 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 21–40, 42–44, 47–49, 52–53, 56–59, 62–63, 65–68, 71–73, 77–78, 81–82, and 85–91 are unpatentable over Begemann, Krames, and Allen; claim 41 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “declaration addresses the Patent Owner Response and is relevant to the issues at hand. We start with an important observation: claim 21 (the only independent claim at issue) is an apparatus claim; the claim is directed to a “semiconductor light source.” Ex. 1001, 9:52. One requirement of this apparatus is that it comprise “at least one semiconductor chip” (id. at 10:1) where the “at least one semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts.” Id. at EPRC, 1:34–36. As we explain when addressing claim construction, infra, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as meaning “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” See Section III.D, infra (emphasis added). Because of these recitations, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the prior art teaches or suggests a semiconductor chip “capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” As explained herein, we determine that in the Petition, Petitioner met this burden by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Krames reference teaches an LED chip that has this capability. Pet. 54 (quoting Ex. 1008, 10). Notably, claim 21 does not require actual operation of anything at greater than 40 milliwatts because claim 21 is not a method claim. Petitioner never had a burden of establishing a method of running the Krames reference’s LED at this power output within a semiconductor light source.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims relate to light fixtures, LED packaging, and LED chip layer structure and that the ’961 patent claims reflect “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Resp. 19. The prior art of record, for example, Begemann, likewise reflects “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Id. (quoting Pet. 28). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lebby, agreed that a person having ordinary skill in the art would need to be “familiar with thermal issues.” Ex. 2015, 26:15– 28:16. While Petitioner’s proposed description of a person having ordinary skill in the art could, in some instances, be sufficient to qualify a person as having ordinary skill, Patent Owner’s proposal is a more complete and accurate description of the level of skill commensurate with the scope of the challenged ’961 patent claims. Patent Owner’s description appears consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by witness testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s description. We further note that the outcome of our decision would be the same under either party’s asserted skill level.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “particularly relevant.” Resp. 14–15. First, Patent Owner argues that “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” means “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater 9 Petitioner states that “Patent Owner thus contends the recited ‘reflective layers’ can include transparent or semi-transparent layers that exhibit some reflectivity (e.g., SiO2) or an interface between two layers (e.g., the buffer and substrate layers) that exhibit differing indices of refraction.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner frames this as being Petitioner’s “novel construction” (Resp. 16), but Petitioner does not expressly endorse this Patent Owner contention. than about 40 milliwatts.” Resp. 14–15. Patent Owner notes that a district court already adopted this construction and notes that the “LED chip” includes LEDs, LED modules, and LED arrays but excludes laser chips, laser modules, and VCSEL chips. Id. (citing Ex. 2003, 15–18). Petitioner argues that the phrase “needs no construction” and that Petitioner’s grounds meet this construction. Reply 1–2. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is well supported by the record including the District Court’s reasoning. Ex. 2003, 15–18. slip op. at 20

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “The facts above are evidence of the Krames reference’s publication as of June 29, 2000, because the facts tend to make the Krames reference’s publication as of June 29, 2000, more probable than it would be without the facts. See Fed. R. Evid. 401(a) (defining evidence as relevant “if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 13 We note that Dr. Lebby does not directly state when the Proceedings were widely available. See Sur-Reply 14. evidence”). The evidence is sufficient to support publication. Meanwhile, no evidence of record suggests that Krames was not a printed publication as of June 29, 2000. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports Krames’s prior art status. Patent Owner argues that Ms. Watters “never establishes a firm date when Krames was purportedly available to the relevant public.” Resp. 25. Patent Owner bases this argument by taking a tortured reading of Ms. Watters’s statement that “[m]embers of the interested public could locate a copy of [the Proceedings] on or after June 29, 2000, the date it was catalogued.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1020, 3); see also Sur-Reply 13–14. The best understanding of Ms. Watters’s statement, in view of the context of Ms. Watters explaining the library’s cataloguing process, is that a member of the interested public had two options: the person could choose to locate the Proceedings on June 29, 2000, or the person could choose to locate the Proceedings after June 29, 2000. Thus, the statement supports public availability as of June 29, 2000.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 6,465,961 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,465,961
• Wolfspeed, Inc. / Ideal Industries Lighting, LLC D/B/A Cree Lighting et al. v. Cao Lighting, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 28, 2023 · IPR2022-00847 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 21, 22, 25, 26, 28–30, 32–36, 40, 42–44, 47–49, 52, 53, 56–59, 62, 63, 65–68, 71–73, 77, 78, 81, 82, 85, 86, and 88–91 are unpatentable over Begemann, Krames, and Allen; claim 41 is …

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive because the Krames declaration addresses the Patent Owner Response and is relevant to the issues at hand. We start with an important observation: claim 21 (the only independent claim at issue) is an apparatus claim; the claim is directed to a “semiconductor light source.” Ex. 1001, 9:52. One requirement of this apparatus is that it comprise “at least one semiconductor chip” (id. at 10:1) where the “at least one semiconductor chip is a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts.” Id. at EPRC, 1:34–36. As we explain when addressing claim construction, infra, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” as meaning “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” See Section III.D, infra (emphasis added). Because of these recitations, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the prior art teaches or suggests a semiconductor chip “capable of emitting light greater than about 40 milliwatts.” As explained herein, we determine that in the Petition, Petitioner met this burden by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the Krames reference teaches an LED chip that has this capability. Pet. 54 (quoting Ex. 1008, 10). Notably, claim 21 does not require actual operation of anything at greater than 40 milliwatts because claim 21 is not a method claim. Petitioner never had a burden of establishing a method of running the Krames reference’s LED at this power output within a semiconductor light source.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the challenged claims relate to light fixtures, LED packaging, and LED chip layer structure and that the ’961 patent claims reflect “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Resp. 19. The prior art of record, for example, Begemann, likewise reflects “a hybrid of the light bulb art and semiconductor art.” Id. (quoting Pet. 28). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Lebby, agreed that a person having ordinary skill in the art would need to be “familiar with thermal issues.” Ex. 2015, 26:15– 28:16. While Petitioner’s proposed description of a person having ordinary skill in the art could, in some instances, be sufficient to qualify a person as having ordinary skill, Patent Owner’s proposal is a more complete and accurate description of the level of skill commensurate with the scope of the challenged ’961 patent claims. Patent Owner’s description appears consistent with the prior art and patent specification before us and is supported by witness testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill). For the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s description. We further note that the outcome of our decision would be the same under either party’s asserted skill level.” slip op. at 19

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “particularly relevant.” Resp. 14–15. First, Patent Owner argues that “a light emitting diode (LED) chip configured to output light at greater than about 40 milliwatts” means “at least one LED chip is capable of emitting light greater 9 Petitioner states that “Patent Owner thus contends the recited ‘reflective layers’ can include transparent or semi-transparent layers that exhibit some reflectivity (e.g., SiO2) or an interface between two layers (e.g., the buffer and substrate layers) that exhibit differing indices of refraction.” Pet. 20. Patent Owner frames this as being Petitioner’s “novel construction” (Resp. 16), but Petitioner does not expressly endorse this Patent Owner contention. than about 40 milliwatts.” Resp. 14–15. Patent Owner notes that a district court already adopted this construction and notes that the “LED chip” includes LEDs, LED modules, and LED arrays but excludes laser chips, laser modules, and VCSEL chips. Id. (citing Ex. 2003, 15–18). Petitioner argues that the phrase “needs no construction” and that Petitioner’s grounds meet this construction. Reply 1–2. We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is well supported by the record including the District Court’s reasoning. Ex. 2003, 15–18. slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “It is unnecessary to construe any other claim terms in this Decision because none of the parties’ disputes turn on the meaning of other claim terms. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 6,465,961 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,465,961
• Nanya Technology Corporation / Nanya Technology Corporation, U.S.A. et al. v. Monterey Research, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 2, 2022 · IPR2021-00170 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over McClure in view of Merritt, Issa, or Kawasumi; Petitioner did not prove claims 2 and 3 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been a technical person having “a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, applied physics, or a related field, and approximately two years of experience working in the design, development, and/or testing of memory circuits, related hardware design, or the equivalent, with additional education substituting for experience and vice versa.” Pet. 11. For purposes of this inter partes review, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s definition. Resp. 13. Based on the totality of the record including the ’429 patent specification, cited references, and expert testimony, we find that Petitioner’s definition for a person of skill in the art is appropriate.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “amplifiers “by the strobe reset generator instead [of] by the strobe global word line (gwlstrobe) 52”). The Figure 1 apparatus, at the location of the purple oval, merely conveys a strobe signal (gwlstrbuf 20) on a line without substantially changing that signal. Id. Fig. 1. The Figure 2 apparatus, however, illustrates main amp strobe 60 generating output signal 88 by delaying the gwlstrbuf signal output by buffer 58. Id. at 4:6–9, Fig. 2. Given the context of the ’429 patent specification, we decline to construe “main amplifier strobe” in a manner that would fail to distinguish Figure 2’s main amplifier strobe from Figure 1’s unlabeled strobe-carrying line (identified with a purple oval above). See id. (identifying main amp strobe 60 as a “main amplifier strobe circuit 60”). If Figure 2’s identification of a “main amplifier strobe 60” is to be distinguishable from Figure 1’s lack of any identified main amplifier strobe 60, the main amplifier strobe has to be more than just a mere strobe signal or line that carries a strobe signal. The ’429 patent specification explains that “first main amplifier strobe circuit 60 delays the rising edge of the output of the buffer 58” to “ensure[] that the local amplifiers 82, 84, 86 stay on until the main amplifier 108 is on.” Id. at 4:6–9. While we decline to import this exact functionality from the specification into claim 1’s “main amplifier strobe,” based on the discussion above, the main amplifier strobe must affect the transmitted signal and it must affect the signal consistent with the word “strobe.” See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”).” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified McClure’s memory core “such that each sense amplifier 602 is coupled to a pair of global read data lines as taught by Winograd, Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi.” Pet. 66. The preponderance of the evidence supports this position at least as to Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Chmelar, states that a person of skill in the art would have modified McClure to “reduce power consumption, circuit areas, and/or readaccess time because the plurality of global data bus drivers 606 . . . could be eliminated.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 215. Dr. Chmelar’s testimony on this point is credible and well-supported by the evidence. As explained above, Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi all teach local amplifiers coupled to global read data lines, and a person of skill in the art would have recognized the advantages of the global read data line configuration by studying those references. Petitioner’s position is further supported by the ’429 patent which admits that a structure of local amplifiers connected to global read data lines was known prior art. In particular, Figure 1 of the ’429 patent illustrates “conventional solution” prior art having local amplifiers 22, 24, and 26 connected to global read data lines 38 and 40. Ex. 1001, Fig. 1, 1:26–48 (“The local amplifiers 22, 24, 26 then drive the gdrd (global read data) lines 38, 40.”); see also Pet 8–9 (mapping claim elements to Figure 1). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not establish reason to combine the references’ teachings. Resp. 60–62. We disagree for the reasons explained above. The record as a whole, even if the ’429 patent’s disclosure were not considered, supports by a preponderance of the evidence that connecting local amplifiers to global read data lines was a well-known configuration. See supra 27–32. Connecting McClure’s local amplifiers to global read data lines is no more than use of a known method to yield predictable results. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007). Patent Owner also argues that Kawasumi criticizes its Figure 1 prior art “for its arrangement of having multiple amplifiers connected to global data lines.” Resp. 61–63; see also Ex. 2001 ¶ 176 (Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Hassoum stating that Kawasumi says the Figure 1 arrangement is problematic). Patent Owner does not, however, persuasively dispute that use of main amplifiers with global read data lines was a known configuration or that implementation of such a configuration would have been within the abilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Reply 28–29. Instead, Kawasumi, for example, teaches that its arrangement of local sense amplifiers 1 providing data to the data bus 2 is a workable configuration. Ex. 1010, 1:49–63. Although Kawasumi teaches that this configuration may” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have modified McClure’s memory core “such that each sense amplifier 602 is coupled to a pair of global read data lines as taught by Winograd, Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi.” Pet. 66. The preponderance of the evidence supports this position at least as to Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi. Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Chmelar, states that a person of skill in the art would have modified McClure to “reduce power consumption, circuit areas, and/or readaccess time because the plurality of global data bus drivers 606 . . . could be eliminated.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 215. Dr. Chmelar’s testimony on this point is credible and well-supported by the evidence. As explained above, Merritt, Issa, and Kawasumi all teach local amplifiers coupled to global read data lines, and a person of skill in the art would have recognized the advantages of the global read data line configuration by studying those references. Petitioner’s position is further supported by the ’429 patent which admits that a structure of local amplifiers connected to global read data lines was known prior art. In particular, Figure 1 of the ’429 patent illustrates “conventional solution” prior art having local amplifiers 22, 24, and 26 connected to global read data lines 38 and 40. Ex. 1001, Fig. 1, 1:26–48 (“The local amplifiers 22, 24, 26 then drive the gdrd (global read data) lines 38, 40.”); see also Pet 8–9 (mapping claim elements to Figure 1). Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not establish reason to combine the references’ teachings. Resp. 60–62. We disagree for the reasons explained above. The record as a whole, even if the ’429 patent’s disclosure were not considered, supports by a preponderance of the evidence that connecting local amplifiers to global read data lines was a well-known configuration. See supra 27–32. Connecting McClure’s local amplifiers to global read data lines is no more than use of a known method to yield predictable results. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007).” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,158,429 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,158,429
• Scentair Technologies, LLC v. Prolitec, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2022 · IPR2021-00014 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–14, 21, 24, and 25 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 7, 15–20, 22, and 23 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We determine that “toward” in the context of these claims means “in the direction of.” This definition is consistent with the ordinary dictionary definition that Patent Owner advances. Resp. 10; Ex. 2003, 3 (ordinary dictionary defining toward as “in the direction of” or, alternatively, as “along a course leading to”). Patent Owner argues that the ’976 patent describes embodiments supporting Patent Owner’s construction of “toward,” but directs us to no disclosure that requires “aiming.” To the contrary, the ’976 patent suggests that liquid moves “toward” something such as an end point so long as it advances along a path leading to the end point. Reply 1–4 (Petitioner collecting examples). For example, ’976 patent Figures 5 and 6 illustrate fluid taking a spiral flow pattern to outlet zone 174. The specification explains that the liquid takes a “curvilinear path . . . as it moves from the inlet 172 toward the outlet zone 174.” Ex. 1001, 10:50–55; see also Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 8–16 (Dr. Morse providing testimony regarding this and other ’976 patent embodiments). Thus, contrary to Patent Owner’s position, the specification uses the word “toward” to describe liquid that moves in the direction of the outlet––without reference to aiming––and even where the liquid’s movement encounters obstacles or otherwise fails to travel in a straight line to the outlet. We agree with Petitioner that “‘aimed’ is found nowhere in the intrinsic evidence and is contrary to the specification” of the ’976 patent. Reply 1. Further, Patent Owner’s own extrinsic evidence does not include the word “aimed” in the definition of “toward.” Ex. 2003, 3. Against that backdrop, for reasons stated above, we determine that “toward” in the context of the challenged claims means “in the direction of.”” slip op. at 10

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “least three years of experience working with, designing, or studying liquid diffusion devices or similar devices.” Pet. 14; Ex. 1003 ¶ 13. Patent Owner does not dispute that definition or advance an alternative definition. The prior art asserted in the Petition appears, on this record, as representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To the extent a more specific definition is required, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition (Pet. 16) because it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’976 patent and the prior art references that form the basis for Petitioner’s challenges. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:7–43 (abstract and overview of technical field of invention of the ’976 patent); Ex. 1004, code (57), ¶ 3 (abstract and background of Rosener’s invention); Ex. 1005, code (57), 1:1–13:12 (abstract and background of Rubin’s invention).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, the preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner’s position. King is concerned with delivering small particles to a patient: King states, for example, that an object of its invention is to “deliver to the patient essentially the same particle size distribution of the aerosol mist that originates from the nebulizer itself.” Ex. 1006 2:19–22; see also id. at [57] (stating that its apparatus delivers medication “in essentially the same particle size distribution of the aerosol mist”); 1:7–10 (stating that invention “delivers a mist of properly sized aerosol particles”); 1:60–65 (stating that invention “functions in a manner to assure that the medicament particles delivered to the patient will be of optimum size”). King states that in “this latest form of the invention this important baffle means comprises a generally spiral-shaped wall 100 (Fig. 20).” Id. at 6:20– 22. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that design of the passage, through which aerosolized particles pass, will affect the size of output particles. Ex. 1003 ¶ 60; Ex. 1004 ¶ 27 (teaching that, for example, “tight bends” may be use to separate small airborne particles from big particles). We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the spiral structure of King’s passage is an example of a “tight bend” (as referenced by Rosener) that can help control what size of particle progresses through the entire passage. Ex. 1006 6:16–22 (explaining that “this important baffle means comprises a generally spiral-shaped wall 100” and serves to “provid[e] a circuitous fluid flow path through the first chamber”)8; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 56–61. A person of ordinary skill in the art’s use of a spiral structure, as taught by King, to further control particle size via tight bends, as taught by Rosener, would have been obvious because it would have been a “predictable use of a prior art elements according to their established function.” KSR Int’l, Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Rather than a spiral disrupting Rosener’s separation as Patent Owner argues, the combined teachings of Rosener and King suggest that King’s spiral would assist in achieving separation and particle size control (as Rosener and King teach). Dr. Morse’s testimony is credible in this regard and supports our findings and conclusion along with the references themselves. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–56. Thus, for the reasons explained above, Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter of claims 2 and 11 of the ’976 patent would have been obvious over Rosener in view of King.” slip op. at 24

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Ultimately, to determine whether Rosener’s suggested tortuous passage is a structure capable performing the functionality of claims 7 and 16, we would need to determine that, because of Rosener’s tortuous passage, liquid would take more time to leak when the device is upended than if the tortuous passage was not present. The record before us, however, does not adequately support such a finding. Here again, the paucity of information provided by Petitioner, who bears the burden of showing unpatentability, tips against a conclusion that these claims are proven unpatentable. Although tight bends and corners might make the flow take longer to leak from the cartridge (as Petitioner urges at Reply 4–6), Petitioner does not establish that this is the case and, moreover, does not establish that it is not the case that the tight bends and corners might make the liquid take less time to leak from the cartridge. As Patent Owner argues, where a channel narrows in a direction of flow, a fluid’s speed may increase in accordance with Bernoulli’s principle. Sur-Reply 7–8.10 This principle is evidenced by the Svoboda reference, which explains that gas will travel faster through the “necked down portion 29” of its venturi tube. Ex. 1008, 4:4–8, Fig. 1, 2 (illustrating necked down portion 29). Accordingly, the record is unclear as to whether the tight bends and corners would speed up or slow down the flow of liquid from the cartridge. Additionally, Rosener does not refer to its tortuous passage as preventing leaking, and if the tortuous passage were capable of doing so, it is unclear why the valve would be necessary. See 10 The record also lacks evidence regarding to what extent other factors such as fluid viscosity, pressure differentials, and friction losses could potentially also affect flow speed. This lack of evidence, again, underscores Petitioner’s failure to meet its burden to show unpatentability of these claims. generally Ex. 1004; see also Ex. 2005 ¶ 68 (Dr. Mello’s written testimony on point). In any event, for reasons explained by Patent Owner, Petitioner’s analysis regarding the path and speed of liquid flow when Rosener’s device is upended is insufficient to support the unpatentability of claims 7 and 16 (Sur-Reply 1–18), at least because Petitioner fails to take account of leakage through orifice 401 or because of Rosener’s express need for a valve to provide for a device that “may be inverted without causing the fragrance oil to pour out” (id. at 12). See Ex. 1004 Fig. 2D (illustrating position of orifice 401), ¶ 33 (describing Rosener’s valve); see also Resp. 11–17 (Patent Owner’s arguments); Pet. 29–30, 33; Reply 4–6 (Petitioner’s analysis).” slip op. at 37

  Patent outcomesUS 9,745,976 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,745,976
• Scentair Technologies, LLC v. Prolitec, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 22, 2022 · IPR2021-00012 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 5, 6, 8–10, 13–16, 18, and 22 are unpatentable as obvious; the Board did not find claims 1–4, 7, 11, 12, 17, 19–21, 23, and 24 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “factual determination that provides a primary guarantee of objectivity in an obviousness analysis. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would typically have a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or chemical engineering as well as at least three years of experience working with, designing, or studying liquid diffusion devices or similar devices.” Pet. 16; Ex. 1003 ¶ 13. Patent Owner does not dispute that definition or advance an alternative definition. See Resp. 79 (repeating Petitioner’s definition). The prior art asserted in the Petition, on this record, is representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To the extent a more specific definition is required, we adopt Petitioner’s unopposed definition (Pet. 16) because it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’004 patent and the prior art references that form the basis for Petitioner’s challenges. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:7–43 (abstract and overview of technical field of invention of the ’004 patent); Ex. 1004, code (57), ¶ 3 (abstract and background of Rosener’s invention); Ex. 1005, code (57), 1:1–13:12 (abstract and background of Rubin’s invention).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We determine that “toward” in the context of these claims means “in the direction of.” Ex. 2003, 3. That definition is consistent with the dictionary definition advanced by Patent Owner. Resp. 7–11; Ex. 2003, 3 (ordinary dictionary defining toward as “in the direction of” or, alternatively, as “along a course leading to”). Patent Owner argues that the ’004 patent describes embodiments supporting Patent Owner’s construction of “toward,” but directs us to no disclosure that requires “aiming.” Id. To the contrary, the ’004 patent suggests that liquid moves “toward” something, such as an end point, so long as it advances along a path leading to the end point. Reply 1–4 (Petitioner collecting examples). For example, in the ’004 patent, Figures 5 and 6 illustrate fluid taking a spiral flow pattern to outlet zone 174. The specification explains that the liquid takes a “curvilinear path . . . as it moves from the inlet 172 toward the outlet zone 174.” Ex. 1001, 10:34–36; see Ex. 1015 ¶¶ 8–16 (Dr. Morse providing testimony regarding this and other ’004 patent embodiments). Thus, contrary to Patent Owner’s position, the specification uses the word “toward” to describe liquid that moves in the direction of the outlet––without reference to aiming––and even where the liquid’s movement encounters obstacles or otherwise fails to travel in a straight line to the outlet. We agree with Petitioner that “‘aimed’ is found nowhere in the intrinsic evidence and is contrary to the specification” of the ’004 patent. Reply 1. Further, Patent Owner’s own extrinsic evidence does not include the word “aimed” in the definition of “toward.” Ex. 2003, 3. Against that backdrop, for reasons stated above, we determine that “toward” in the context of the challenged claims means “in the direction of.”” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “We recognize, in that regard, that a witness “must at minimum possess ordinary skill in the art” in order to opine about the level of skill in the art. Kyocera Secco Indus. Tools Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Dr. Morse has at least the qualifications of an ordinarily skilled artisan and is qualified to provide opinions as to what an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood as of April 22, 2014. Based on Dr. Morse’s statement of qualifications and curriculum vitae, as well as his stated familiarity with the state of the prior art at the time of the invention, we find Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Morse is qualified to provide opinions keyed to the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 2–5, 9, 11, App’x pp. 69–73. In any event, to the extent we agree that Petitioner establishes unpatentability as explained above, the prior art references themselves are adequate for Petitioner’s showing of unpatentability even if we were to provide little or no weight to Dr. Morse’s testimony.” slip op. at 61

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “It is not clear, on this record, that guiding surfaces 10 are formed as spirals, as opposed to flat surfaces arranged to “project” and “extend[]” into the atomizing space in a helical pattern. Id.; see Resp. 37–38. Nor is it clear, on this record, how guiding surfaces 10 relate, if at all, to the formation of the transient airflow path defined by the “spiral vortex” described in Knoch, which forms only during normal operation of the device. Id. Knoch indicates that the spiral vortex is formed as a result of the placement and orientation of openings 2 and 3, and that “homogenization” of the aerosolized particles occurs, not via impaction with guiding surfaces 10, but rather, as a result of particles traveling a transient airflow path defined by the spiral vortex. Ex. 1006, Figs. 1, 2, 2:48–61, 3:10–4:25, 5:14–38, 5:56–63; see Pet. 31–32 (relying on “homogenization” that occurs when “vaporized liquid” traverses a transient airflow path defined by the “spiral vortex” in Knoch’s device) (quoting Ex. 1006, 3:26–29 5:28–32); see supra 44 n.13. To be clear, Knoch’s spiral vortex is a transient path of airflow that forms only during normal operation of the device, and Petitioner directs us to no persuasive information that Rosener employs any comparable approach “to perform the same functions within the same general structure.” Pet. 24. The lack of analysis provided in the Petition on that key point undermines this challenge. Id. at 23–25, 31–32; Reply 9–10 (totality of Petitioner’s information on that point); see supra 44 n.13. Even if we set aside that problem, however, we find, in the alternative, that Petitioner fails to explain adequately how or why Knoch would have suggested a tortuous passage (as opposed to a transient airflow path) that spirals between the inlet and outlet zone of Rosener’s insert. Without adequate analysis, Petitioner merely refers us to Figure 2E of Rosener, which shows a tortuous passage extending from inlet 401 to outlet zone 240, then directs us to guiding surfaces 10 illustrated in Knoch’s Figure 1. Pet. 31–32. The paucity of analysis provided in the Petition, particularly on the question of where, how, and why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have included a spiraling impaction surface extending from Rosener’s inlet 401 to outlet zone 240 in view of Knoch, persuades us that the proposed modification is driven, not by any suggestion in the prior art, but rather, by an impermissible hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention. Id.; see Resp. 27–39 (Patent Owner’s arguments on that point). Petitioner does not establish that Knoch teaches a spiraling” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 9,162,004 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,162,004
• TRW Automotive U.S. LLC v. Magna Electronics Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 16, 2015 · IPR2014-01351 · APJ James P Calve · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 60, 61, 70–74, and 77 are unpatentable as obvious over Blank, Kakinami, and Schofield; the other challenged claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Nranian testifies that the proposed modification would require substantial reconstruction or a redesign of Blank or a change in the principle of operation. Ex. 2005 ¶¶ 106–110. Dr. Nranian does not elaborate on this opinion or explain what redesigns and reconstructions would be required. We find persuasive the testimony of Dr. Kazerooni that designing a housing to hold components therein is a basic engineering concept within the level of ordinary skill in the art, particularly in view of, and as evidenced by, the disclosures of Blank and Schofield. Ex. 1016 ¶¶ 21–23. Blank discloses that circuit board 150 may be configured for a supplemental vision system. Ex. 1005, 7:51–59. TRW proposes to use this principle of operation and include Kakinami’s camera with Blank’s module 26. Pet. Reply 15–17. As discussed above, Blank and Schofield disclose reconfiguration and redesign of accessory housings, both internally and externally, to accommodate a variety of different accessories. Ex. 1005, 3:8–11, 7:6–10; Ex. 1006, 9:24– 36. Kakinami also discloses mounting of video camera 20, which includes lens 14, video device 15, and signal processing unit 16. Ex. 1010, 2:15–26, Fig. 2a. Physical incorporation is not required to demonstrate obviousness. See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1573.” slip op. at 25

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “sophistication of the technology, all as addressed herein, it is submitted that the person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’590 Patent at the time of the invention would have had at least the qualifications of or equivalent to either a undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or mechanical engineering with course work or research in automobile accessory systems with at least two years of work making automobile accessory systems. Ex. 1012 ¶ 30. This discussion appears in Dr. Kazerooni’s Declaration in a section entitled “LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL.” Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 29–30. This definition of a skilled artisan in paragraph 30 immediately precedes Dr. Kazerooni’s discussion of the “STATE OF THE ART IN THE RELEVANT TIMEFRAME.” See id. ¶¶ 31–48. This definition of a skilled artisan in paragraph 30 of Dr. Kazerooni’s Declaration matches TRW’s definition of a skilled artisan in the Petition and is cited as the basis of TRW’s definition of a skilled artisan. See Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 29–30); Ex. 1012 ¶ 30. Another definition of a skilled artisan appears in Dr. Kazerooni’s Declaration in a section entitled “SUMMARY OF OPINIONS.” Ex. 1012 ¶ 10. It is unclear what use, if any, is made of this definition. Accordingly, we understand TRW and Dr. Kazerooni to assert the same definition of a skilled artisan, which definition appears at page 17 of the Petition and paragraph 30 of Dr. Kazerooni’s Declaration. Dr. Kazerooni identifies November 4, 1999 as the priority date of the ’590 patent invention. Ex. 1012 ¶ 26. Magna does not dispute this date. PO Resp. 57. Dr. Kazerooni testifies to the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention. Id. ¶ 30. Dr. Kazerooni provides a detailed discussion of the state of the art at the time of the invention by discussing the disclosures of Blank, Kakinami, Schofield, Carter, Anderson, and Klappenbach. Id. ¶¶ 31– 48. These references were filed and issued before November 4, 1999. TRW” slip op. at 32

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We interpret “bus communication” as “information transferred over a set of signal lines between devices connected to the signal lines.” We are not persuaded that a bus must include an interface. The IEEE Standard 969 Interface Devices (Ex. 1004) defines a bus in that context. The’590 patent discloses a CAN bus without disclosing an interface. Ex. 1002, 4:15–17. An ordinary meaning of “bus” includes “[a] set of signal lines to which a number of devices are connected and over which information is transferred between them.” See ANSI/IEEE Standard 1196-1987 IEEE Standard for a Simple 32-Bit Backplane Bus: NuBus (Ex. 3001).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner

    “We construe “cluster of individual sensors” as “a group of individual sensors or components of individual sensors positioned close together.” Pet. 6–7; Prelim. Resp. 11–12. This interpretation is consistent with an ordinary meaning of “cluster” which includes “a group of things or people that are close together” (Pet. 6) and the claims, which recite “a cluster of individual sensors resides on or near said in-cabin surface of said windshield.” This interpretation is consistent with the ’590 patent specification, which discloses that housing 10 is divided by wall 16 into adjacent first and second compartments 18, 20. Ex. 1002, 3:29–31, Fig. 2. One embodiment contains rain sensor 26 in first compartment 18 and printed circuit board 30 bearing a compass sensor 30 in second compartment 20. Id. at 5:62–6:12, 7:52–55, Figs. 2, 8. The ’590 patent specification discloses that the housing may accommodate a plurality of electrical accessories. Id. at 6:42–44. The ’590 patent further discloses that component 30 “can be any of a number of sensors or circuits which can be made small enough to fit in the compartment 20.” Id. at 7:64–67 (emphasis added). Preferably, component 30 is provided as a unitary module received in compartment 20. Id. at 7:67– 8:1. An ordinary meaning of “any” is one or more. Thus, the ’590 patent specification discloses that component 30 may include more than one sensor.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 8,513,590 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,513,590

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.