- Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-01195 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10, 12–14, 16–18, 20–23, 25–28, 35, 37–39, and 42–45 are unpatentable; the remaining challenged claims were not shown unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “a master’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, with at least two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, or a bachelor’s degree in the same fields with at least four years of experience in the field of speech recognition,” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner contends that the Petition and supporting evidence, including the testimony of Mr. Schmandt, does not demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition would have been able to fabricate an integrated circuit. PO Resp. 1. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition would not also be expected to have specialized knowledge in integrated circuit fabrication in Petitioner does not present arguments to the contrary. See generally Reply. We agree with Petitioner, that a person of ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition would have had a master’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, with two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, or a bachelor’s degree in the same fields with four years of experience in the field of speech recognition.3 Ex. 1001, 1:25–2:27 (describing in the “Background of Invention” section of the ’789 patent various speech recognition systems and methods). We also agree with Patent Owner, and rely on the supporting testimony of Dr. Anderson, in finding that a person of ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition would not have been a person of ordinary skill in the field of integrated circuit fabrication, and would not have had the education, experience, or skill necessary to fabricate an integrated circuit.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that state memory 342 of Smyth is fabricated on the same integrated circuit as processor 341. Petitioner, in asserting that processor 341 and state memory 342 are on the same integrated circuit, cites the following testimony of Mr. Schmandt: In my opinion, the Motorola DSP56000 provides both memory and a processor fabricated on a single integrated circuit (IC). Kloker (Ex. 1009), 1 (discussing the Motorola DSP56000 includes “a core processor, RAM, ROM, peripheral interfaces, and a memory expansion interface on a single, 88-pin chip[”)]. . . . A POSITA would have understood or at least found obvious that Smyth thus teaches a single IC on which both classifier processor 341 and state memory 342 are fabricated. Ex. 1003 ¶ 165; Pet. 39. We do not credit Mr. Schmandt’s testimony because it is inconsistent with Smyth’s disclosure. Smyth discloses that classifier 34 comprises classifying processor 341 and state memory 342, and that “classifying processor 341 may be a suitably programmed digital signal processing (DSP) device.” Ex. 1005, 5:55–57, 6:5–6. Thus, Smyth itself, in discussing classifier 34, distinguishes processor 341 from state memory 342 in stating that only processor 341, and not both processor 341 and state memory 342, may be located on the DSP. describe processor 341 and state memory 342 as being fabricated on a single integrated circuit. Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 34–37. Dr. Anderson persuasively explains that processor 341 and state memory 342 could not be fabricated on the same integrated circuit, because the design of the DSP for processor 341 does not include any memory that meets the requirements of state memory 342. Id. ¶¶ 38–45. We rely on the testimony of Dr. Anderson in finding that Petitioner has not shown that Smyth teaches that processor 341 and state memory 342 are fabricated on a single integrated circuit.” slip op. at 17
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“Therefore, we disagree with Petitioner’s contention that “the Petition did not map a POSITA physically fabricating an IC, but rather mapped a single IC on which a calculating apparatus and acoustic model memory were already fabricated.” Reply 23–24. We find that this contention was untimely presented in the Reply. We do not permit Petitioner to propose a mapping of the prior art in the Petition and then completely change that mapping after Patent Owner argues the initial mapping was flawed. A “petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” TPG 73; see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the Board did not err in refusing the reply brief as improper under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) because petitioner relied on an entirely new rationale to explain why one of skill in the art would have combined the references at issue); 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); Apple Inc. v. eWatch, Inc., IPR2015-00412, Paper 50, 44 (PTAB May 6, 2016) (“‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean embark in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the position originally taken in the Petition. Accepting such belatedly presented new arguments would be unjust to the Patent Owner and we decline to do so.”).” slip op. at 28
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“We agree with Patent Owner. Petitioner has not shown that any of the integrated circuits cited in the Petition would have been able to include the claimed acoustic model memory. Further, we find, contrary to Petitioner’s contention, that Patent Owner did not admit that procuring a processor and a memory capable of storing an acoustic model memory fabricated on an integrated circuit was within the level of ordinary skill. To the contrary, throughout the entire proceeding, Patent Owner has consistently argued that the claimed “calculating apparatus and the acoustic model memory are fabricated on a single integrated circuit” was unknown in the prior art. Petitioner has not shown that using the prior art elements relied on in the Petition according to their established functions would have resulted in “the calculating apparatus and the acoustic model memory are fabricated on a single integrated circuit” as recited in claim 1. In summary, Petitioner relies on Mozer to teach the benefits of fabricating a calculating apparatus and an acoustic model memory on the same integrated circuit, but Mozer does not teach a calculating apparatus and an acoustic model memory fabricated on the same integrated circuit. Further, the benefits of Mozer identified by Petitioner are benefits that both Mozer and Smyth already have, without fabricating the calculating apparatus and the acoustic model memory on the same integrated circuit. Also, even if Petitioner had shown there was a reason to combine Smyth and Mozer, Petitioner does not persuasively show that the combination teaches “the calculating apparatus and the acoustic model memory are fabricated on a single integrated circuit” as recited in claim 1. The Petition identifies only model memory for storing an acoustic model defining a plurality of acoustic states” as claimed, which is the one that “a POSITA would have been motivated . . . to fabricate” (Pet. 44), which was beyond the level of ordinary skill. We find that the Petition has not shown that claim 1 is unpatentable over Smyth and Mozer.” slip op. at 38
Patent outcomesUS 10,839,789 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,839,789 - Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. et al. v. Zentian LimitedSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2023-00036 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10, 12–14, 16–18, 20–23, 25–28, 35, 37–39, and 42–45 are unpatentable; claims 1, 2, 4, 6–9, 11, 24, and 29 were not shown unpatentable, principally because the asserted combinations did not establish the claimed …
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“(“POSITA”) would have had “a master’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, with at least two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, or a bachelor’s degree in the same fields with at least four years of experience in the field of speech recognition,” and that “[a]dditional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner contends that the Petition and supporting evidence, including the testimony of Mr. Schmandt, does not demonstrate that a person of ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition would have been able to fabricate an integrated circuit. PO Resp. 1. Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition would not also be expected to have specialized knowledge in integrated circuit fabrication in Petitioner does not present arguments to the contrary. See generally Reply. We agree with Petitioner, that a person of ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition would have had a master’s degree in computer engineering, computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, with two years of experience in the field of speech recognition, or a bachelor’s degree in the same fields with four years of experience in the field of speech recognition.3 Ex. 1001, 1:25–2:27 (describing in the “Background of Invention” section of the ’789 patent various speech recognition systems and methods). We also agree with Patent Owner, and rely on the supporting testimony of Dr. Anderson, in finding that a person of ordinary skill in the field of speech recognition would not have been a person of ordinary skill in the field of integrated circuit fabrication, and would not have had the education, experience, or skill necessary to fabricate an integrated circuit.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “applies the plain and ordinary meaning of all claim terms as understood by a POSITA for all terms.” Pet. 5. We conclude that no terms require express construction to resolve a dispute. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Because we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy,’ we need not construe [a particular claim limitation] where the construction is not ‘material to the . . . dispute.’” (internal citation omitted)).” slip op. at 10
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that state memory 342 of Smyth is fabricated on the same integrated circuit as processor 341. Petitioner, in asserting that processor 341 and state memory 342 are on the same integrated circuit, cites the following testimony of Mr. Schmandt: In my opinion, the Motorola DSP56000 provides both memory and a processor fabricated on a single integrated circuit (IC). Kloker (Ex. 1009), 1 (discussing the Motorola DSP56000 includes “a core processor, RAM, ROM, peripheral interfaces, and a memory expansion interface on a single, 88-pin chip[”)]. . . . A POSITA would have understood or at least found obvious that Smyth thus teaches a single IC on which both classifier processor 341 and state memory 342 are fabricated. Ex. 1003 ¶ 165; Pet. 39. We do not credit Mr. Schmandt’s testimony because it is inconsistent with Smyth’s disclosure. Smyth discloses that classifier 34 comprises classifying processor 341 and state memory 342, and that “classifying processor 341 may be a suitably programmed digital signal processing (DSP) device.” Ex. 1005, 5:55–57, 6:5–6. Thus, Smyth itself, in discussing classifier 34, distinguishes processor 341 from state memory 342 in stating that only processor 341, and not both processor 341 and state memory 342, may be located on the DSP. describe processor 341 and state memory 342 as being fabricated on a single integrated circuit. Ex. 2020 ¶¶ 34–37. Dr. Anderson persuasively explains that processor 341 and state memory 342 could not be fabricated on the same integrated circuit, because the design of the DSP for processor 341 does not include any memory that meets the requirements of state memory 342. Id. ¶¶ 38–45. We rely on the testimony of Dr. Anderson in finding that Petitioner has not shown that Smyth teaches that processor 341 and state memory 342 are fabricated on a single integrated circuit.” slip op. at 17
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner
“In our Decision to Institute, we understood Petitioner’s theory based on the combination of Smyth and Mozer to include fabricating an integrated circuit in stating that we were sufficiently persuaded “that fabricating a single integrated circuit that includes a calculating apparatus and an acoustic model memory . . . was within the level of ordinary skill.” Dec. 23. Our understanding was based on the Petition’s multiple contentions that a person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to fabricate Smyth’s processor and state memory on a single integrated circuit. See Pet. 41–44. For example, the Petition contends that “[a] POSITA would have found it obvious . . . to fabricate [Smyth’s processor and state memory] on a single integrated circuit” (Pet. 41–42 (emphasis added)); “a POSITA would have understood and found obvious . . . to fabricate a calculating apparatus and acoustic model memory on a single integrated circuit” (Pet. 42 (emphasis added)); “[s]uch a use of a known technique of fabricating a memory and processor on a single integrated circuit” (id. (emphasis added)); “it would have been obvious to modify Smyth to form the classifier processor and associated memory on a single IC” (Pet. 43 (emphasis added)); (“it was well known in the prior art to fabricate a single integrated circuit” (Pet. 43–44 (emphasis added)); “[t]hus, a POSITA would have been motivated . . . to fabricate [Smyth’s processor and state memory] on a single integrated circuit” (Pet. 44 (emphasis added)). integrated circuit to using integrated circuits that were already fabricated. Reply 22–25. According to Petitioner, “the Petition did not map a POSITA physically fabricating an IC, but rather mapped a POSITA modifying Smyth according to Mozer’s undisputed teachings of a single IC on which a calculating apparatus and acoustic model memory were already fabricated.” Id. at 23–24. However, as discussed in the previous paragraph, when discussing the combination of a processor and an acoustic model memory on an integrated circuit, the Petition used the verb “to fabricate” four times in the future tense and once in the present tense, as well as the verb “to form” once in the future tense. The Petition did not use the past tense phrase “were already fabricated” as alleged in the Reply. Moreover, the Petition did not map Smyth’s state memory (which the Petition contends teaches the claimed “acoustic model memory” (see Pet. 11)) to a memory already fabricated on an integrated circuit in the prior art. Rather, the Petition relied on Mozer to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill would have fabricated the calculating apparatus and acoustic model memory of Smyth on an integrated circuit. See Pet. 42, 44. The Petition cited Boike and Ozcelik in contending that fabricating an integrated circuit with processors and memories was well known, and cited Toyoda in contending that fabricating an integrated circuit with a calculating apparatus and an acoustic model memory was well known. Pet. 43–44 (citing Ex. 1006; Ex. 1029; Ex. 1034). However, the Petition did not explain how a memory located in one of the integrated circuits of Mozer, Boike, Ozcelik, or Toyoda would have been able to store Smyth’s state memory. Therefore, we disagree with Petitioner’s contention that “the Petition did not map a POSITA physically fabricating an IC, but rather mapped a single IC on which a calculating apparatus and acoustic model memory were already fabricated.” Reply 23–24. We find that this contention was untimely presented in the Reply. We do not permit Petitioner to propose a mapping of the prior art in the Petition and then completely change that mapping after Patent Owner argues the initial mapping was flawed. A “petitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g., to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” TPG 73; see also Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the Board did not err in refusing the reply brief as improper under 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) because petitioner relied on an entirely new rationale to explain why one of skill in the art would have combined the references at issue); 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b); Apple Inc. v. eWatch, Inc., IPR2015-00412, Paper 50, 44 (PTAB May 6, 2016) (“‘Respond,’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b), does not mean embark in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the position originally taken in the Petition. Accepting such belatedly presented new arguments would be unjust to the Patent Owner and we decline to do so.”).” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 10,839,789 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,839,789 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01197 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
Instituted review of claims 1–8 on all petition grounds and joined Amazon to the Apple IPR, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability and no basis for discretionary denial.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied discretionary otherDecided for petitioner
“deny institution in the absence of a Sotera stipulation from Amazon. First, we find no unfairness or prejudice in the fact that Apple has submitted a Sotera stipulation but Amazon has not. In this proceeding, Fintiv factors 1– 5, as a whole, weigh heavily against discretionary denial even without Amazon offering a Sotera stipulation and without any showing of compelling merits. Most significantly, the Board will be deciding the patentability issues raised in the Petition well before the scheduled trial date in the parallel district court proceeding. Thus, even if Amazon had submitted a Sotera stipulation, this would not change our decision to institute an inter partes review and join this case to the Apple IPR. Although a petitioner has the option to submit a Sotera stipulation, no such stipulation is required where the Fintiv factors as a whole do not otherwise weigh in favor of discretionary denial. For the above reasons, we determine that the efficiency and integrity of the patent system are best served by instituting inter partes review, and we decline to deny institution discretionarily under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the issues presented in Amazon’s Petition are identical to those in the Apple IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Amazon would prevail in showing that at least one of claims 1–8 is unpatentable under the grounds of the Petition. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the Apple IPR. See IPR2023-00037, Paper 10.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“discretion, when warranted, to join as a party to an instituted inter partes review any other party who properly files a petition, after the patent owner has had the opportunity to file a preliminary response. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). As the moving party, Amazon bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested joinder. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In deciding whether to join a case, we consider (1) the reasons why joinder is appropriate, (2) whether the petition raises any new grounds of unpatentability, (3) any impact that joinder would have on the cost and trial schedule for the existing review, and (4) whether joinder will add to the complexity of briefing or discovery. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. According to Amazon, its “Petition is intentionally identical in substance to the Apple Petition.” Mot. 2; see also Mot. 4. Amazon also argues that the schedule of the joined cases “would be unaffected, no additional briefing or discovery would be required, and no additional burdens would be placed on [Zentian].” Mot. 3; see also Mot. 4. Further, Amazon “agree[s] to take an ‘understudy’ role as long as Apple remains a party to the Apple IPR,” and that it “will not make any substantive filings and shall be bound by the filings of Apple,” and will not pursue its own arguments, evidence, or discovery unless the matter of termination or settlement arises or there are issues involving only Amazon. Mot. 5–6. Thus, according to Amazon, Zentian would not suffer prejudice if the two proceedings are joined. Mot. 6. Apart from its arguments discussed above in the context of discretionary denial, Zentian does not dispute the above contentions by Amazon and does not point to any particular prejudice relating to joining the two proceedings. In light of these considerations, Amazon has shown that joinder to the Apple IPR is appropriate in this case. Therefore, we grant Amazon’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,971,140 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01194 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–6 on all petition grounds and granted Amazon Web Services, Inc. and Amazon.com Services LLC’s motion to join the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“to Patent Owner, trial is scheduled for September 23, 2024. Opp. 1. However, a final written decision in the instituted Apple IPR (and in the combined proceeding after joinder) will be due on June 12, 2024, more than three months before the trial date in district court. Thus, factor 2 weighs heavily against discretionary denial. The other factors do not outweigh factor 2. As to factor 1, there is no evidence as to whether there will be a stay in the parallel case, so we regard this factor as neutral. As to factor 3, there has been some preliminary activity in the parallel case, but overall, the proceeding is in its early stages, so we do not regard this factor as weighing substantially in favor of discretionary denial. As to factor 4, the district court may ultimately consider Jiang, Nguyen, and Smyth, cited in the invalidity contentions (Ex. 2001, 24), but not Boike and Baumgartner, and not necessarily in the same combinations as asserted in the Petition. See Ex. 2001, 20–26. As such, factor 4 weighs somewhat but not heavily in favor of discretionary denial. As to factor 5, the parties in the parallel proceeding are not different from the parties here, so we regard this factor as neutral.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the issues presented in the instant Petition are identical to those in the Apple IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one of claims 1–6 of the ’377 Patent is unpatentable under the grounds of the Petition. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the Apple IPR. See IPR2023-00035, Paper 10.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“appropriate; (2) identify any new grounds of unpatentability asserted in the petition; (3) explain what impact (if any) joinder would have on the trial schedule for the existing review; and (4) address specifically how briefing and discovery may be simplified. See Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, Case IPR2013-00004, 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013) (Paper 15); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf. Petitioner’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 1–6.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,062,377 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01195 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 16–18, 20–29, 35, 37–39, and 42–45 on all petition grounds and granted Amazon’s motion for joinder.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“in the parallel case) most significant under these circumstances. According to Zentian, trial is scheduled for September 23, 2024. Prelim. Resp. 1. However, a final written decision in the instituted Apple IPR (and in the combined proceeding after joinder) will be due on June 12, 2024, more than three months before the trial date in district court. Thus, factor 2 weighs heavily against discretionary denial.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Director of the USPTO, we may institute an inter partes review when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (2023). Applying that standard, we institute an inter partes review of all the challenged claims of the ’789 patent for the reasons explained below. This is a preliminary decision, and we will base our final written decision on the full trial record. We also grant Amazon’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“As the moving party, Amazon bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested joinder. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In deciding whether to join a case, we consider (1) the reasons why joinder is appropriate, (2) whether the petition raises any new grounds of unpatentability, (3) any impact that joinder would have on the cost and trial schedule for the existing review, and (4) whether joinder will add to the complexity of briefing or discovery. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf.” slip op. at 13
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,839,789 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01193 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 14–16 on all petition grounds and joined Amazon to the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“in the parallel case) most significant under these circumstances. According to Zentian, trial is scheduled for September 23, 2024. Prelim. Resp. 1. However, a final written decision in the instituted Apple IPR (and in the combined proceeding after joinder) will be due on June 12, 2024, more than three months before the trial date in district court. Thus, factor 2 weighs heavily against discretionary denial. The other factors do not outweigh the second factor. As to factor 1, there is no evidence as to whether there will be a stay in the parallel case, so we regard this factor as neutral. As to factor 3, there has been some preliminary activity in the parallel case, but overall, the proceeding is in its early stages, so we do not regard this factor as weighing substantially in favor of discretionary denial. As to factor 4, the district court may ultimately consider Jiang, Baumgartner, Smyth, and Brown, but not necessarily in the same combinations as asserted in the Petition. See Ex. 2001, 8–10. So factor 4 weighs in favor of discretionary denial, but not so much as to outweigh factor 2. As to factor 5, the parties in the parallel proceeding are not different from the parties here, so we regard this factor as neutral.” slip op. at 10
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. IPR2023-00034, Paper 10. Amazon’s Petition challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as those on which we instituted the Apple IPR, relying on substantially the same testimonial evidence. See Mot. 2 (“The Instant Petition is intentionally identical in substance to the Apple Petition.”); Ex. 1062 ¶ 26 (adopting the opinions set forth in the declaration of Christopher Schmandt (Ex. 1003) that Apple relied on in Apple IPR). Because the issues presented in Amazon’s Petition are identical to those in the Apple IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Amazon would prevail in showing that at least one of claims 1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, and 14–16 is unpatentable under the grounds of the Petition. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the Apple IPR. See IPR2023- 00034, Paper 10.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“discretion, when warranted, to join as a party to an instituted inter partes review any other party who properly files a petition, after the patent owner has had the opportunity to file a preliminary response. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). As the moving party, Amazon bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested joinder. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In deciding whether to join a case, we consider (1) the reasons why joinder is appropriate, (2) whether the petition raises any new grounds of unpatentability, (3) any impact that joinder would have on the cost and trial schedule for the existing review, and (4) whether joinder will add to the complexity of briefing or discovery. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf.” slip op. at 14
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,979,277 - PTAB · Jan 10, 2024 · IPR2023-01192 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 46–51, 53, 54, 58, 59, 64, and 67 on all petition grounds and joined Amazon to the Apple IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)InstitutedDecided for petitioner
“Of the first five Fintiv factors, we consider factor 2 (proximity to trial in the parallel case) most significant under these circumstances. According to Zentian, trial is scheduled for September 23, 2024. Prelim. Resp. 1. However, a final written decision in the instituted Apple IPR (and in the combined proceeding after joinder) will be due on June 12, 2024, more than three months before the trial date in district court. Thus, factor 2 weighs heavily against discretionary denial. The other factors do not outweigh the second factor. As to factor 1, there is no evidence as to whether there will be a stay in the parallel case, so we regard this factor as neutral. As to factor 3, there has been some preliminary activity in the parallel case, but overall, the proceeding is in its early stages, so we do not regard this factor as weighing substantially in favor of discretionary denial. As to factor 4, the district court may ultimately consider Thelen, Bailey, and Jiang (the latter being asserted solely for claims 53, 58, and 59), but not Chen or the other references, and not necessarily in the same combinations as asserted in the Petition. See Ex. 2001, 8–10, 38. So factor 4 weighs somewhat but not heavily in favor of discretionary denial. As to factor 5, the parties in the parallel proceeding are not different from the parties here, so we regard this factor as neutral.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“claims and all asserted grounds of unpatentability. IPR2023-00033, Paper 10. Amazon’s Petition challenges the same claims and asserts the same grounds of unpatentability as those on which we instituted the Apple IPR, relying on substantially the same testimonial evidence. See Mot. 2 (“The Instant Petition is intentionally identical in substance to the Apple Petition.”); Ex. 1043 ¶ 26 (adopting the opinions set forth in the declaration of Christopher Schmandt (Ex. 1003) that Apple relied on in Apple IPR). Because the issues presented in Amazon’s Petition are identical to those in the Apple IPR, we determine for the same reasons that there is a reasonable likelihood that Amazon would prevail in showing that at least one of claims 46–51, 53, 54, 58, 59, 64, and 67 is unpatentable under the grounds of the Petition. Therefore, we institute inter partes review for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the Apple IPR. See IPR2023-00033, Paper 10.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“discretion, when warranted, to join as a party to an instituted inter partes review any other party who properly files a petition, after the patent owner has had the opportunity to file a preliminary response. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). As the moving party, Amazon bears the burden of proving that it is entitled to the requested joinder. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). In deciding whether to join a case, we consider (1) the reasons why joinder is appropriate, (2) whether the petition raises any new grounds of unpatentability, (3) any impact that joinder would have on the cost and trial schedule for the existing review, and (4) whether joinder will add to the complexity of briefing or discovery. Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, IPR2013-00004, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2013); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, 76 (Nov. 2019), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/tpgnov.pdf. Amazon’s Motion addresses each of these considerations. Mot. 1–6. According to Amazon, its “Petition is intentionally identical in substance to the Apple Petition.” Mot. 2; see also Mot. 4. Amazon also argues that the schedule of the joined cases “would be unaffected, no additional briefing or discovery would be required, and no additional burdens would be placed on [Zentian].” Mot. 3; see also Mot. 4. Further, Amazon “agree[s] to take an ‘understudy’ role as long as Apple remains a party to the Apple IPR,” and that it “will not make any substantive filings and shall be bound by the filings of Apple,” and will not pursue its own arguments, evidence, or discovery unless the matter of termination or settlement arises or there are issues involving only Amazon. Mot. 5–6. Thus, according to Amazon, Zentian would not suffer prejudice if the two proceedings are joined. Mot. 6. Apart from its arguments discussed above in the context of discretionary denial, Zentian does not dispute the above contentions by Amazon and does not point to any particular prejudice relating to joining the two proceedings. In light of these considerations, Amazon has shown that joinder to the Apple IPR is appropriate in this case. Therefore, we grant Amazon’s Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 12
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 7,587,319 - Qualcomm Incorporated v. Fedex Corporate Services, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 6, 2023 · IPR2022-00586 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 and 26–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Lau and Benson; claim 28 also relies on Harring. Qualcomm did not show claims 16–25 unpatentable.
RulingsFinal written decision- Exclude
“We do not rely on Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, or 1027 for any determinations or findings in this decision. See infra note 10 (noting the context in which Ex. 1014 has been cited). When we use the phrase “evidence of record” or other similar terms or phrases, we are referring to the evidence of record except that evidence that is the subject of FedEx’s Motion to Exclude, that is, Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, 1027, and 2049. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude as to Exhibits 1010, 1014, 1026, and 1027 is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Almeroth essentially agrees with Qualcomm’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill as expressed above. See Ex. 2200 ¶¶ 45–46. Because Qualcomm’s uncontroverted articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by testimonial evidence by both parties and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’231 patent, we adopt it for this decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:16–2:37 (“Field of the Disclosure” and “Background” sections of the ’231 patent, describing background knowledge about methods for tracking packages using wireless sensor devices). Qualcomm also contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan “would have been familiar with the field of technology described [on pages 7–13 of 6 Qualcomm argues that this is “at least” the level of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 7. As we did in our instituting decision, we disregard this qualification to avoid vagueness. Dec. 19 n.6; Dr. Almeroth agrees. Ex. 2200 ¶ 46. the Petition].” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 41). The “Field of Technology” section of the Petition refers to background knowledge of RFID technology and hierarchical sensor networks. See Pet. 7–13. Because whether this subject matter is part of the background knowledge in the art is not determinative of our decision, we need not adopt this part of Qualcomm’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed
“Although the ’231 patent does appear to describe these as two separate embodiments, the embodiments both include smartphone 200. See Ex. 1001, 110:13–14, 19–20, 23–26. We find persuasive Qualcomm’s argument that the only apparent difference between the two embodiments is that in the second one, smartphone 200 has an app that allows it to use hardware capable of directly communicating with the server. In other words, the distinction is a matter of programming: the smartphone 200 is both “unable” and “not operable to” communicate with a server when it is not presently configured that way through software. This is inconsistent with Dr. Almeroth’s opinion that a device would not be “unable to directly communicate with the server” if it “ha[s] the circuitry components necessary to communicate with a server but simply lack the programming to do so presently.” Ex. 2200 ¶ 54. Thus, we do not find his testimony credible on this point.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction needed
“Although the ’231 patent does appear to describe these as two separate embodiments, the embodiments both include smartphone 200. See Ex. 1001, 110:13–14, 19–20, 23–26. We find persuasive Qualcomm’s argument that the only apparent difference between the two embodiments is that in the second one, smartphone 200 has an app that allows it to use hardware capable of directly communicating with the server. In other words, the distinction is a matter of programming: the smartphone 200 is both “unable” and “not operable to” communicate with a server when it is not presently configured that way through software. This is inconsistent with Dr. Almeroth’s opinion that a device would not be “unable to directly communicate with the server” if it “ha[s] the circuitry components necessary to communicate with a server but simply lack the programming to do so presently.” Ex. 2200 ¶ 54. Thus, we do not find his testimony credible on this point. Regarding FedEx’s term-differentiation argument, we agree with Qualcomm that, based on the above evidence in the ’231 patent disclosure, there does not appear to be any meaningful difference between “unable to” and “not operative to” as those terms appear in the claims. Thus, we disagree with FedEx’s proposed construction of “unable to directly communicate with the server.” Our prior-art analysis below will be informed by the discussion above, but we need not explicitly construe this term to resolve the issues raised in the Petition. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’ . . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 9,182,231 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,182,231 - Snap Inc. / Facebook, Inc. et al. v. Palo Alto Research Center LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 24, 2023 · IPR2021-01294 · APJ Sheila F Mcshane · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held all challenged claims 1–25 unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds and denied Patent Owner’s contingent motions to amend.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“2. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Snap proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the ’599 patent would have possessed “an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science or a related field along with at least two years of work experience in the field of content presentation and context-based systems/processes.” Snap Pet. 3 (citing Snap IPR, Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 30–32); Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 32. Snap further asserts that additional “education can supplement practical experience and vice versa.” Id. In the Decision on Institution, we determined that Snap’s proposed description of the qualifications of a person of ordinary skill in the art aligned with the technology and claims of the ’599 patent. Snap Inst. Dec. 6–7. For this proceeding, Patent Owner and Dr. Martin apply this level of skill in the art. Snap PO Resp. 11–12; Snap IPR, Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 48–50. Accordingly, for the reasons given in the Decision on Institution, we adopt Snap’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Snap Inst. Dec. 6–7.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“Dr. Martin also provides consistent testimony on this issue. Snap IPR, Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 81–82. Put simply, the Specification’s disclosure is that the set of rules for multiple content packages includes an expected response, and actions are then performed based on whether an expected response is or is not provided. Moreover, as Dr. Almeroth testifies, neither the claims nor the Specification use the term “unexpected response”—rather the Specification only identifies an “expected response.” Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 42. Accordingly, the disclosures in Table 1 and the Specification support Dr. Almeroth’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill would have understood that “the claimed ‘determin[e/ing]’ limitation requires what it plainly recites: ‘determin[e/ing] whether the received response matches the expected response[]’. . . . [i]t does not require an unexpected response not known to the system.” Snap IPR, Ex. 1022 ¶ 51.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“time,’ ‘type of location,’ and other contextual information to automatically determine whether users would like to undertake learning activities.” Twitter Pet. Reply 18 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 1005, 2 3, 5 (“A check . . . to see if the information from the database corresponds with the location sensor (i.e. a check on whether the learner is really keeping his/her schedule).”), Fig.1; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1025 ¶ 49; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85, 157–162, 238, 435, 451, 517; Twitter Pet. 20–21). Accordingly, the evidence of record support that Yau teaches that context triggers the display of a content piece, such as an exercise/test/quiz. Patent Owner also argues that Twitter asserts that PALLES’ content piece is “‘exercise[s],’ ‘test[s],’ and/or ‘MP Quiz[zes],’” but also contends that Yau’s “formal assessment” is the claimed content piece. Twitter PO Resp. 32. Patent Owner argues that “Twitter points back to its limitation 12.1 PALLAS evidence for the purported ‘content piece’” and also does not mention Yau for limitation 12.5 and 12.6 and “only conclusorily states that ‘PALLAS in view of Yau renders obvious triggering an exercise/test/quiz.’” Id. Patent Owner’s arguments overlook Twitter’s assertion, with Dr. Turnbull’s supporting testimony, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that Yau’s formal assessments are “tests with answers for comparing against learner’s responses to assess knowledge/performance/skill (contrasting with ‘un-assessed’ exercises whose responses are unchecked).” Twitter Pet. 43; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1003 ¶ 154. Further, Patent Owner overlooks Petitioner’s assertion that it is implementing PALLAS’s context-triggerbased content display using Yau’s teachings of displaying assessments/questions based on context. Twitter Pet. 43. Patent Owner also asserts that in the PALLAS-Yau combination, Twitter does not explain how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art in the manner Petitioner alleges. Twitter PO Resp. 42. Patent Owner argues that “PALLAS says nothing about forcing quizzes, tests, or exercises on its users without the users asking for such exercises,” and a person of skill would understand that the combined system still requires that a student select a learning activity and that PALLAS’s system should be unobtrusive because learners “may have small time slots to engage in learning.” Id. (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶ 168; Twitter IPR, Ex. 1004, 54). Patent Owner further contends that “Twitter’s conclusory, hindsight-driven statements” do not suffice and PALLAS teaches away from the modifications suggested by Twitter. Id. at 42–43 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶ 144). Patent Owner argues that because a learner may not have time to complete a test, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not be motivated to change PALLAS to trigger exercises/tests/quizzes based on location or time. Id. at 43 (citing Twitter IPR, Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 142–144). The evidence of record does not support Patent Owner’s arguments.” slip op. at 115
- ScopeMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“2. Enlarging Scope of Claims Patent Owner asserts that it proposes narrowing limitations in direct response to the grounds of unpatentability involved in this proceeding. See, e.g., Snap Mot. 3–4. Facebook argues Patent Owner is “improperly attempting to enlarge the scope of the original claims.” Facebook Pet. Opp. 1. Facebook asserts, “[i]f ‘an expected response’ means one or more expected responses, therefore, determining whether the received response ‘matches the expected response’ means that the received response must match [all of] the one or more previously-recited expected responses in the content package.” Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). Facebook then argues “the term ‘predefined response’ is broader than ‘expected response,’” because “an ‘expected response’ does not include any conceivable or possible response; it is a response that is expected.” Id. at 4–5 (emphasis omitted). Twitter argues that “‘predefined response’ is broader than ‘expected response’ because a ‘predefined response’ can include any possible response as long as that response has been somehow defined in advance.” Twitter Pet. Opp. 2. We consider the amendments in view of the claim as a whole. Although the term “one predefined response” may be broader than “an expected response,” we also consider the amended portion “wherein the received response is expected if the received response matches one or more of the at least one predefined response,” and “the received response is unexpected if the received response does not match any of the at least one predefined response.” Unless the response had been predefined within the content package, any “received response” could not be considered “expected” under the claims, and the additional clause requires a match of the response with the predefined response to be deemed “expected.” This equates to an equivalent scope to the original claim. This is consistent with Dr. Martin’s testimony, which we credit, that he is not aware of a situation where the substitute but not original claims are infringed because “[t]he substitute claims would only be satisfied when a ‘predefined response’ in the substitute claims is an ‘expected response’ in the original claims.” Facebook IPR, Ex. 2023 ¶ 59.” slip op. at 136
Patent outcomesUS 8,489,599 unpatentableClaim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Electric Power · Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,489,599 - PTAB · Mar 16, 2023 · IPR2022-01391 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 30–33, 35, 37–40, 43, 45–48, 51, 53, 54, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, and 75 on all petitioned grounds, and joined Samsung to IPR2022-01232.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons expressed below, we (1) institute inter partes review on the same grounds instituted in the Meta IPR, and (2) grant the Motion, subject to the conditions set forth below. B. Related Proceedings” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“We decline to exercise our discretion under Fintiv to deny institution of inter partes review. On June 21, 2022, the Director of the USPTO issued an Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Postgrant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation, available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_ discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_ 20220621_.pdf (the “Interim Procedure”). The Interim Procedure provides that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure 7. Here, Petitioner stipulates that it “will not pursue the grounds raised, or that reasonably could have been raised, in this IPR in the parallel litigation if IPR is instituted.” Pet. 9; Reply 1. We therefore adhere to the Interim Procedure in this Decision and decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review upon this basis.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Based on our review of the before us, we find that Petitioner demonstrates that allowing it to join the Meta IPR as a party will not materially lengthen the schedule, increase cost, or add to the complexity of briefing or discovery in the Meta IPR. Accordingly, we grant Petitioner’s Motion and add it as a party to the Meta IPR.” slip op. at 8
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,630,234
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.