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  • PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01133 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 1–13 are unpatentable: claims 1–5, 9, and 12–13 as anticipated by Weaver, and claims 6–8 and 10–11 as obvious over the stated combinations.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that absent evidence to the contrary, “the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art). In general, we agree with the areas of agreement in the parties’ proposals. In particular, Patent Owner proposes “at least a Bachelors’ degree in a field of engineering or physics,” which includes “electrical engineering or a comparable field of study” as Petitioner proposes. Pet. 4 (emphasis added); PO Resp. 10. We agree with Petitioner that by defining the engineering field as “electrical” or “comparable,” we can exclude engineering fields “having nothing to do with displays, such as biomedical, civil, chemical or environmental engineering.” Pet. Reply 1. Petitioner also proposes approximately “one or more years of professional experience” which includes Patent Owner’s “at least two years of professional experience.” Pet. 4; PO Resp. 10. Furthermore, both parties agree that “[a]dditional graduate education could [reduce . . . the time requirement] for professional experience.” Id. Thus, we adopt both parties’ proposed POSITA of having a Bachelors’ degree in electrical engineering or a comparable field of study, plus at least two years of professional experience, wherein additional graduate education could reduce the time requirement for professional experience. Id. Such proposal comports with the level of ordinary skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record.” slip op. at 10

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

      “The plain language in claim 1 of “auxiliary electrode” does not preclude that the “electrode” may be a power line, bus line, or resistor. Ex. 1001, 8:47–52. Nothing in the Specification clearly precludes “auxiliary electrode” from being a “bus line” or “power line,” as Patent Owner proposes. PO Resp. 25–27. We are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s contention that the Specification discloses that “the power line ‘PL’ is shown in Figure 1, but the power line PL is not an electrode that is shown in Figure 2.” Id. at 26–27. Here, Patent Owner points to no portions in the Specification that provide the requisite “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” to warrant interpreting the claim language at issue as supporting Patent Owner’s contention that an auxiliary electrode cannot be a power line, bus line, or resistor. Id.; In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1984). That is, although Patent Owner points to Figures 1 and 2 of the Specification for support of its contention, Figures 1 and 2 of the Specification merely show various examples of power line and an auxiliary electrode. PO Resp. 26–27. Thus, although the referenced portions of the Specification discuss various examples wherein an auxiliary electrode may be implemented, nothing in these referenced portions of the Specification clearly precludes the “auxiliary electrode” from being a power line or any electrode that is “the road to get to an end point,” as Patent Owner contends. Id. Patent Owner points to no special definition, implicit or explicit, for “auxiliary electrode” that is set forth in the Specification which supports Patent Owner’s construction with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1480.” slip op. at 15

    • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

      “We find Patent Owner’s arguments unavailing. In particular, we find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that “‘bus line 430’ is not an ‘auxiliary electrode’” (PO Resp. 28–33), because Patent Owner is relying on a claim construction of “auxiliary electrode” as precluding “essential” elements and requiring “more than the end structure of a conductor” (id.), that is not adopted by our construction discussed above. Here, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s reliance on Weaver’s bus line 430 for providing the claimed “electrode,” that is “supplemental to other electrodes in the structure.” Pet. 18; see also Ex. 1004 ¶ 26, Fig. 4; Ex. 1003 ¶ 92. We find availing Petitioner’s contention, supported by Dr. Baker’s testimony, that a POSITA would have understood that “anode 406 and bus line 430 are connected in parallel,” which means that “bus line 430 is a supplemental electrode that reduces the total resistance of the pixel structure.” Pet. 19; Ex. 1003 ¶ 94. Thus, we find availing Petitioner’s contention, supported by Dr. Baker’s testimony, that Weaver’s bus line 430 is an electrode supplemental to other electrodes in the structure that is electrically insulated from transistor 410 by passivation layer 409, wherein OLED 400, which includes cathode 422, organic layer 424, and anode 406, is disposed above bus line 430, and wherein anode 406 of OLED 400 is electrically connected to bus line 430 by via 428. Pet. 16–19; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 89–94. That is, we find availing Petitioner’s contention that, like the ’509 patent’s auxiliary electrode 120, bus line 430 is electrically insulated from transistor 410, wherein OLED 400 is disposed above bus line 430 and anode 406 electrically connected with bus line 430. Compare Pet. 2–3 (annotated” slip op. at 26

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

      “We also find unavailing Patent Owner’s contention that the proposed modifications to Weaver would involve changing the process. PO Resp. 33– 34. We agree with Petitioner, whose contentions are supported by Dr. Baker’s testimony, that “to provide additional components from the same layer is a layout change that a POSITA would have been able to perform without changing the process.” Pet. Reply 17–18 (citing Ex 1003 ¶ 157; Ex. 1020 ¶ 45). Further, contrary to Patent Owner’s contention that POSITA would not have combined Weaver with Lee ’053, Song, Lee ’149, or Bae without the use of hindsight (PO Resp. 33–45), as Petitioner points out, Lee ’149, for example, “explicitly teaches that ‘the electrode pattern 45 serves to lower the resistance of the first electrode 41.” Pet. Reply 58 (citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 38). Similarly, Bae “explicitly teaches that the “auxiliary electrodes 139 contact the first electrode 132 to commonly apply a voltage to the sub-pixels” and “reduces the resistance of the first electrode.” Id. at 66 (citing Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 37, 59). As such, Petitioner’s proposed combinations are supported by at least by Lee ’149’s and Bae’s teachings of applying a second electrode to lower the resistance and voltage drop between anode 406 and the VDD line of Weaver. See, e.g., Ex. 1011 ¶ 38; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 37, 59. We are persuaded by Dr. Baker’s testimony that a POSITA would have understood that higher resistance between the power or ground line to the light emitting device would consume more power and require higher operating voltages, and thus, would have been motivated to implement the solutions of Lee ’053, Song, Lee ’149, or Bae to lower the resistance between anode 406 and voltage source VDD in Weaver. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 145, 158, 184, 203. We agree with Petitioner, supported by Dr. Baker’s testimony, that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success the combining the references as suggested, wherein such modification “involves modifications of only routine skill in the art,” which “involve known method,” and “would have yielded predictable results. Pet. 42, 48–49, 59, 67–68; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 145, 158, 184, 203. That is, we determine that Petitioner has set forth reasoning with rational underpinning explaining why it would have been obvious to combine the teachings with a reasonable expectation of success. Based on the complete record presented, we determine Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 6–8 would have been obvious over the combination of Weaver and Lee ’053 or alternatively over the combination of Weaver and Song, and that claims 10 and 11 would have been obvious over the combination of Weaver and Lee ’149 or alternatively over the combination of Weaver and Bae.” slip op. at 33

    Patent outcomesUS 9,263,509 unpatentable
    Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 9,263,509
  • PTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01130 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Final written decision

    Claims 5 and 6 are unpatentable over the instituted grounds; claims 7–9 were not shown unpatentable because their scope could not be ascertained.

    RulingsFinal written decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

      “After the hearing, with our authorization,1 Patent Owner moved to dismiss this proceeding because, according to Patent Owner, the Petition did not identify all real parties-in-interest as required be 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2). 1 IPR2024-01131, Paper 43, 45:1–8. Paper 42. Petitioner opposed the motion. Paper 44. We denied the motion. Paper 46.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

      “arguments and evidence in support of its proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, we determine that Petitioner’s definition is too broad. Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “approximately one or more years of professional experience with electronic and optoelectronic system design.” Pet. 3. But Petitioner does not appear to dispute the testimony of Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Bretschneider, that “the field of optoelectronics” is “broad and expansive and encompasses solar cells, optical fiber, and any application of LEDs, not just the design of LED packages.” Ex. 2020 ¶ 78. Therefore, one having experience with optoelectronic system design would not necessarily have experience designing LED backlights for LCD displays. We have also carefully considered Patent Owner’s arguments and evidence in support of its proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In light of our analysis of the prior art and the AAPA, we determine that Patent Owner’s requirement of “at least one year of practical experience in design of LED packages and one year of practical experience in design of thermal management systems for LEDs” is not sufficiently precise. Patent Owner does not specify that the required experience is in the context of designing LED backlights for LCD displays. One having this experience would necessarily have experience addressing thermal-management concerns associated with such backlights.” slip op. at 18

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “Because Dr. Baker does not have the requisite experience designing LED backlights for LCD displays, he is not qualified to offer expert testimony from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art of designing LED backlights for LCD displays. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2022).” slip op. at 23

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner

      “Neither party asserts that “connecting” is a term of art requiring expert testimony to construe. We agree with Petitioner that “connecting” should be construed consistently with the “fastener” term, because it is the “fastener” (or the second portion thereof) to which the circuit board is “connecting.” Because the parties agree that “fastener” is “[a] feature that attaches or holds something in place, “connecting” means “attaching or holding.”” slip op. at 26

    Patent outcomesUS 7,168,842 mixed
    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 7,168,842
  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · IPR2025-00632 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Remand

    On remand, the Board reinstituted review of all challenged claims on all grounds after finding Petitioner sufficiently explained its differing claim-construction positions.

    RulingsRemand decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Id. The Director neither addressed the merits of Petitioner’s challenges nor found that our prior consideration of those merits was faulty. Accordingly, we understand that we need not reconsider our conclusion that Petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of proving that claims 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 12, and 20–24 were unpatentable or that the merits of patentability set forth in the Petition warranted institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 5

    • BurdenDecided for petitioner

      “The question before us, therefore, is whether the Petitioner’s proffered explanation that it has proposed a different claim interpretation before the Board because the District Court may decline to adopt the narrower claim interpretations it advocates there is sufficient. We find that Petitioner’s explanation is sufficient because it follows the Director’s exemplary logic. Whether a district court has already or might in the future decline to adopt constructions that a petitioner proposes in related district court litigation merely reflects the timing of when a dispute over claim interpretation will be resolved. The Director and Patent Owner both recognize that, to resolve the dispute over claim interpretation that exists here, a decision-maker must determine “a single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.” Remand 4; PO Remand Br. 3. Based on the record presented by the parties to date in this proceeding, no dispute exists that the disputed claim terms mean what Patent Owner says they mean in the Litigation. Accordingly, we find that, at this stage of the proceeding, it is undisputed that Patent Owner’s interpretations of the claim terms represent the “single claim construction that best captures the true meaning of the patent claim.”8 Under that claim interpretation, we” slip op. at 8

    None
    Patents in suitUS 11,835,421
  • PTAB · Jan 14, 2026 · PGR2025-00059 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Institution

    The Board instituted post-grant review of claims 1–4 on all four asserted grounds, finding a sufficient preliminary showing of obviousness and lack of enablement.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “V. CONCLUSION Petitioner has, at this stage, established that it will more likely than not prevail in showing that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. This determination is, however, based on a preliminary record and is not final on any issues of patentability. We will make a final determination on the patentability of the challenged claims, as necessary and applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, based on a fully developed record through trial. VI. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) post grant review of claims 1–4 of the ’233 patent is hereby instituted on the grounds set forth in the Petition, commencing on the entry date of this Order, and pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; and” slip op. at 40

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not proffer a description of a POSA. See generally, Prelim. Resp. For the purposes of this decision, on the record at this time, we find that Petitioner’s definition appears consistent with the level of skill shown in the prior art references of record, and apply it herein. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We invite the parties to further address the definition of a POSA during trial should they find it necessary.” slip op. at 7

    • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

      “In addition, the opinion stated in the Pomper Declaration that “the term of ‘low molecular weight’ is well accepted in the chemical arts” and the declarant “recognize[s] that low molecular weight compounds would have a molecular weight of typically from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons” is offered by a co-inventor. We, as factfinder, have discretion to weigh the credibility of expert witnesses and to give each item of evidence such weight as appropriate. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). In this case, we find that the published references on metabolites do not support the opinion. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1368 (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”) US-121, of which Dr. Pomper is lead inventor, also uses the term “low molecular weight”—without further characterization of the term—and is uninformative as to the meaning of the term. See Ex. 1006, ¶ 12. In addition, Patent Owner’s definition does not appear to apply to all compounds claimed in US-121.5” slip op. at 11

    • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

      “limited to Patent Owner’s proposed “from about 50 Daltons to about 1,500 Daltons.” The cited evidence relied on in the Pomper Declaration to define “low molecular weight” as a term well accepted in the chemical arts relates to metabolomics and metabolites. See Ex. 1002, 169, (specifically, ¶ 17 of Dr. Pomper’s declaration). Patent Owner admits that Dr. Pomper’s testimony is about molecules that differ from the claimed imaging and radiotherapeutic agents targeting FAP-α, but argues that the testimony is still relevant for purposes of explanation. Prelim Resp. 21. While it may be relevant, the testimony is not persuasive in light of the Specification. We find the uncontested fact that several of the B moieties alone—without the A moiety or L linker—specifically identified in the ’233 patent fall outside of Patent Owner’s proposed definition persuasive, as we normally do not interpret claim terms in a way that excludes examples disclosed in the specification. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (rejecting proposed claim interpretation that would exclude disclosed examples in the specification). The cases cited by Patent Owner supporting that a claim term may be construed to exclude embodiments where the prosecution history supports such construction are factually distinguishable from the instant case as they regard instances of specific prosecution history disclaimer, clear prosecution disavowal, or relate to a specific definition of the terms in the Specification for the term being construed. Here, “low molecular weight” is not defined in the Specification, but, as Petitioner argues (see Pet. 21–25) is characterized as “demonstrat[ing] faster pharmacokinetics and a higher specific signal within clinically convenient times after administration” and that it “can be synthesized in radiolabeled form more easily.” Ex.1001, 13:33–50, 14:56– 16:14, 17:9–20. We are persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Zeglis, Petitioner’s declarant, that compounds weighing over 1500 Da may share those same behaviors, along with certain identified B moieties disclosed as embodiments. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 83.” slip op. at 10

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 12,115,233
  • PTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01134 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s termination request and granted adverse judgment after it disclaimed the entire patent, leaving no claims in the trial.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. “Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner’s disclaimer of the entire term of the ’733 patent leaves no claims remaining in the trial. Although Patent Owner argues that entry of adverse judgment “has negative effects that would discourage Patent Owner from making efforts to streamline the issues” (PO Sur-reply 1–2), we deem such argument not a persuasive reason as to why we should not apply § 42.73(b)(2), or why termination is more appropriate. Therefore, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2), we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer as a request for adverse judgment, which we grant.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 9,406,733
  • PTAB · Jan 12, 2026 · IPR2024-01315 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Adverse judgment

    The Board denied Patent Owner’s termination request and entered adverse judgment after Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims, leaving no claims in the trial.

    RulingsAdverse judgment
    • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

      “C.F.R. § 42.73(b), a party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. “Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). “The application of the [adverse judgment] rule on its face does not turn on the patentee’s characterization of its own request.” Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In this case, Patent Owner’s disclaimer of claims 1 and 3 of the ’477 patent leaves no claims remaining in the trial. Although Patent Owner argues that entry of adverse judgment “has negative effects that would discourage Patent Owner from making efforts to streamline the issues” (PO Sur-reply 1–2), we deem such argument not a persuasive reason as to why we should not apply § 42.73(b)(2), or why termination is more appropriate. Therefore, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2), we construe Patent Owner’s disclaimer as a request for adverse judgment, which we grant.” slip op. at 3

    None
    Patents in suitUS 8,158,477
  • PTAB · Dec 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00897 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 combination renders claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may be instituted if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the papers, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’527 patent.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “invention of the ’527 patent “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology,” and that “[a]dditional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 40–43). Patent Owner at this stage of the proceeding does not provide an alternative definition for a level of skill in the art that one would have had at the time of the invention of the ’527 patent or identify any shortcoming in Petitioner’s formulation. See Prelim. Resp. 3–4. For purposes of this Decision on Institution, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art. Pet. 12. We view the definition for the level of ordinary skill is consistent with the ’527 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 6

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner argues that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. At this stage, Patent Owner agrees that no terms need construction. Prelim. Resp. 3. We determine that no express constructions are needed for us to render our Decision on Institution. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). Rather, at this stage of the proceeding, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms.” slip op. at 7

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “discloses the preamble and the remaining limitations of claim 1. Pet. 38–64. Petitioner identifies where the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 teaches these limitations, supported with testimony from Dr. Mandayam, which Patent Owner does not specifically rebut at this stage. We determine, on this record, that the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 teaches the preamble (whether or not limiting) and the remaining undisputed limitations of claim 1. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L., 759 F. App’x 917, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential) (“The Board is ‘not required to address undisputed matters’ or arguments about limitations with which it was never presented.”) (quoting In re NuVasive, Inc., 841 F.3d 966, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We also find that Petitioner has provided sufficiently articulated reasoning, which Patent Owner does not specifically address at this stage, to support combining Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966’s teachings in the manner Petitioner does. Pet. 21–38. 3. Summary In summary, based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner shows a reasonable likelihood that the combination of Kim, Dahlman, and Kim966 renders claim 1 obvious.” slip op. at 16

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 10,944,527
  • PTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00903 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the Kim, Dahlman, and Kim-966 combination renders the claims obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’110 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “966 renders obvious this limitation. See Pet. 50–53. With respect to the “first signaling,” Petitioner argues that the combination teaches “the UE [user equipment] receiving a ‘system information block (‘SIB’) (a first signaling) which can include various types of information such as ‘information about the allocation of subframes to uplink/downlink and configuration of the special subframe in the case of TDD [time division duplexing].” Id. at 43 (citing Ex. 1007, 358–62; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 21, 65; Ex. 1003 ¶ 100). Petitioner argues that “[b]ecause the SIB assigns time resources or an ‘allocation of subframes for uplink/downlink,’ an SIB would be understood to function as and render obvious as assigning the UE a collection of time intervals (e.g., subframes) or ‘time resource pools.’” Id. at 51 (citing Ex. 1007, 358–62; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 60–61, 64–78, 84; Ex. 1003 ¶ 113). Petitioner contends that “a POSITA would have understood and found obvious that the first signaling (SIB) is used to determine an ‘allocation of subframes to uplink/downlink’ (a first time resource pool) through an assignment of a Time Division Duplexing (TDD) configuration.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 113). Petitioner submits that “[t]he TDD configuration would identify a series of subframes available for uplink and downlink (a first time” slip op. at 13

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “Petitioner contends that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 2. Patent Owner agrees “that claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” Prelim. Resp. 2. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Relying on the declaration testimony of Dr. Mandayam, Petitioner contends that an ordinarily skilled artisan for the ’110 patent “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks, including long-term evolution LTE/4G or 5G new radio (NR) cellular technology.” Pet. 12. Petitioner additionally contends “[a]dditional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background.” Id. Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’110 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art). We note that our decision would be the same applying either party’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,546,110
  • PTAB · Dec 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00908 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 are obvious over Fakoorian-1 and Takahashi.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “institute an inter partes review. The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The Supreme Court has held that the Board, in a decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314(b), may not institute review on less than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355–56 (2018). Moreover, in accordance with our rules, “[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2024); see also PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (interpreting the statute to require “a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in the petition”). Applying those standards, and upon considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’639 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner “utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 3. Based on this record, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’639 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our obviousness evaluations below. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 8

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

      “Petitioner contends that “[a]ll claim terms should be construed according to the Phillips standard,” and that “no claim terms need be construed to resolve issues of controversy in the present Petition.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner agrees “that claim construction is not required to resolve any issues.” Prelim. Resp. 3. Having considered the record, we determine that no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted

      “We find that Petitioner has shown sufficiently on this record that the combination of Fakoorian-1 and Takahashi teaches limitations [1d] and [1e]. See Pet. 21–28. As Petitioner argues, Fakoorian-1 includes multiple SPS configurations and teaches that configuration parameters, related to a first and a second SPS configuration, may be sent to the UE in one or more RRC messages. See Pet. 21, 23–24. These parameters include a “periodicity,” “CS-RNTI,” “HARQ process number,” and “service type.” Id. at 21, 24. Petitioner has also shown sufficiently, based on the testimony of Dr. Mandayam, which at this stage stands unrebutted, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that a “HARQ process number” is “used to indicate which [SPS] configuration(s) are to be” released, and Fakoorian-1’s UE acknowledges the “release by transmitting the acknowledgement in a codebook through a physical uplink control channel (PUCCH) resource.” Id. at 23. As Dr. Mandayam testifies, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood, based on Fakoorian-1, that a HARQ process number indicates an identifier for the HARQ codebook to be used by the UE to transmit the acknowledgment. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 84). Dr. Mandayam provides sufficient reasoning, at this stage, to support his opinion, so we do not agree with Patent Owner that this testimony is conclusory. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 80–84. Thus, on this record, we find that this testimony is sufficient.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
    Patents in suitUS 11,108,639
  • PTAB · Dec 2, 2025 · IPR2025-00905 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Institution

    The Board instituted review of claims 1–5, 7–11, 13–17, and 19–23 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Yeo and TS36 render at least claim 1 obvious.

    RulingsInstitution decision
    • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

      “Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the challenged claims.” slip op. at 2

    • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

      “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art stating that “[f]or the purposes of this Preliminary Response only, Patent Owner utilizes Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 2. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’581 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 9

    • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

      “C. Claim Construction Neither party proposes any claim constructions at this stage. Pet. 19– 20; Prelim. Resp. 2. Where there is no dispute we conclude that no express interpretation of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 9

    • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted

      “c) Conclusion as to Independent Claim 1 We have considered and find persuasive, at this stage, Petitioner’s arguments and supporting evidence as set forth at pages 31–45 of the Petition with respect to the remaining limitations [1pre]–[1f] and [1i]. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s arguments as to these remaining limitations. Also, Dr. Ding’s testimony is currently unrebutted. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that Yeo alone, or the combined teachings of Yeo and TS36 render independent claim 1 obvious.” slip op. at 15

    Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
    Patents in suitUS 11,917,581

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.