- Synaffix B.V. v. Hangzhou Dac Biotech Co., Ltd.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 26, 2025 · IPR2022-01531 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17, 20, 21, 24, 26, and 29–31 are unpatentable; claims 25 and 32–34 were not shown unpatentable, and the motion to exclude was dismissed as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- RemandOther
“review of claims 1–17, 20, 21, 24–26, and 29–34 of the ’682 patent. Paper 2 (“Pet.”), 1, 3. Patent Owner, Hangzhou DAC Biotech Co., Ltd., filed a Preliminary Response (Paper 9, “Prelim. Resp.”). We initially determined that the information presented in the Petition did not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and did not institute inter partes review. Paper 17. Petitioner requested Director review of our decision denying institution (Paper 18 (“Request”)). The Director delegated review of the decision to a Delegated Rehearing Panel (“DRP”). Paper 19. Patent Owner was granted the option to file a response to Petitioner’s Request (Paper 22 (“Request Resp.”)). The Delegated Review Panel vacated our decision and remanded the case to this panel with a revised claim construction for claim 1. Paper 23 (“DRP Dec.”). On August 30, 2024, we instituted an inter partes review after remand from the Director. Paper 25 (“Inst. Dec.”). Patent Owner subsequently filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 31, “Resp.”), Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 36, “Reply”), Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply (Paper 44, “Sur-reply”), and Petitioner filed a Sur-sur-reply (Paper 48, “Sur-sur-reply”).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsOther
“I. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Evidence Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1089 and 1090. Paper 50. As we did not rely on either of Exhibits 1089 or 1090 in deciding this matter, Patent Owner’s motion is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 96
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableMixed
“For these reasons, Patent Owner’s arguments and cited evidence also” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“function as R2, and the ethyl group may function as R4, which can be a linear alkyl having 1–6 carbon atoms. We note that claim 3 permits R5 and R6 to be absent. For these reasons, the arguments presented in the Petition demonstrate that claim 3 would have been obvious over Singh’s Compound 3 when modified in view of Harris.” slip op. at 73
Patent outcomesUS 10,131,682 mixed§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,131,682 - PTAB · Aug 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00147 · APJ Linda E Horner · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8–20 after finding a reasonable likelihood that Samsung would prove at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition and the preliminary response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Upon consideration of the Petition and the Preliminary Response, and for the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we grant the Petition and institute an inter partes review of claims 1‒6 and 8‒20 of the ’124 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“At this stage of the proceeding, there is no dispute about the level of ordinary skill in the art.7 Based on the testimony of Dr. Anthony, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, optical engineering, or related field of study, or equivalent experience, and at least two years’ experience in academia or industry studying or developing physiological monitoring devices such as non-invasive biosensors. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have also been familiar with, for example, sensor system design, including inertial and other motion sensor system design, signal processing, and human-machine interfaces. A higher level of education or skill can substitute for less experience, and vice versa. Ex. 1002 ¶ 29. We determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted above is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’124 patent Specification and the asserted prior art references, based on our review of the limited record.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached
“We need not reach the issue of whether the preamble is limiting for purposes of determining institution. Even were we to agree with Patent Owner that the preamble is limiting and the claims are limited to a fingerworn ring, at this stage Petitioner has demonstrated that the cited art teaches or suggests such a limitation. That is, Petitioner relies on the fingerring of Schroder for the claimed form factor of a “wearable computing device configured to be worn around a finger of a wearer.” Pet. 22 (Ground 1), 45 (Ground 2, relying on Yuen for adding the functionality of light sources with a photodetector, temperature sensors, and varying the sampling frequency of sensor data acquisition), 56 (Ground 3). Further, to the extent Petitioner contends that Yuen’s toe band or earring is structurally and functionally equivalent to a finger-ring (Pet. 45, 57), Patent Owner has not, at this stage of the proceeding, structurally distinguished a device configured to worn around a finger from a toe band or earring. For instance, Patent Owner has not explained how a device to be worn around a finger differs in size, configuration, or design from a toe band or earring. And the ’124 patent recognizes that “a human being’s finger can come in various different sizes and so should the [wearable computing device].” Ex. 1001, 12:64‒65. For instance, challenged dependent claim 10 recites that the width of the external housing of the wearable computing device is within a range of 3 mm to 8 mm and a thickness of the device is within a range of 1.5 to 3 mm. Id. at 35:8‒12. Should Patent Owner pursue this argument during the proceeding, the record would benefit from further development on the structural similarities and dissimilarities between a fingerworn ring and a toe band.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine that Petitioner’s showing of reasons to combine Mestas and Schröder is sufficient for purposes of granting institution of an inter partes review. Although general similarities between the references are usually not by themselves sufficient to show a reason to combine particular teachings, Petitioner here also provides more particularized contentions, such as “[i]mplementing Mestas’s device in Schröder’s ‘finger-ring’ form factor would ensure a tighter fit than a device worn, e.g., on the user’s arm or wrist, reducing motion artifacts, providing better shielding against ambient light, and permitting higher quality reading from device sensors (e.g., accelerometer, heart rate, temperature)” and that Mestas’s concern with “slippage around a user’s wrist or other body part” would have motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art “to consider placing the device on the finger, as in Schröder, to improve traction and prevent slippage.” Pet. 19‒20 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 169; Ex. 1010 ¶ 152). These reasons are sufficient to present a reasonable likelihood of prevailing as to at least one challenged claim based on the proposed combination of Mestas and Schroder for purposes of institution. Patent Owner will have an opportunity to further address Petitioner’s reasoning during the proceeding.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,188,124 - PTAB · Apr 17, 2025 · IPR2024-01473 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 6, 7, 17, and 22–25 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim, including its Cai-based grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Considering the arguments and evidence currently of record, we determine the Petition demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that [P]etitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute inter partes review of claims 1–4, 6, 7, 17, and 22–25 of the ’360 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficient. According to the ’360 patent, “[t]he field of the invention is related to sensor arrays for the detection and diagnosis of disease states.” Ex. 1001, 1:28–29. The Specification describes accomplishing such by analysis of protein coronas using techniques such as LC-MS/MS. See id. at 4:43–5:2 (describing Figure 1). The prior art cited by Petitioner also describes the analysis of protein coronas using similar analytical techniques. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 584; Ex. 1007, 1870; Ex. 1008, 355–356. Accordingly, the present record supports that a POSA would have an understanding of both proteins and the analytical techniques, e.g., mass spectrometry, that can be used to characterize them. We understand Petitioner’s definition of a POSA to encompass these elements. It requires a formal degree in chemistry,5 which itself entails some knowledge of proteins and related analytical techniques, along with several years’ additional experience in proteomics, protein analysis, or mass spectrometry. Moreover, Petitioner’s definition is flexible in that it allows higher education or skill with, e.g., mass spectrometry, to make up for a lack of specific experience with proteomics assay and protein coronas. This explanation is reasonable and supported on the current record.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Third, and perhaps most importantly, there is “no requirement for perfect match between an expert’s experience and the relevant field.” See Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) 34, available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/tpgnov.pdf (“CTPG”). (citing SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). A person need not be a person of ordinary skill in the art to testify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, but rather must be “qualified in the pertinent art.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, there is no dispute that Dr. Vargas is qualified in the art of mass spectrometry and, on the current record, we discern no reason why she is not qualified to offer the testimony in her declaration. At most, Patent Owner’s argument that Dr. Vargas lacks experience “perform[ing] mass spectrometry techniques specifically for protein analysis,” goes to the weight we should afford her testimony at trial. See Prelim. Resp. 28–29. It is not a sufficient reason to deny institution, particularly given that Dr. Vargas’s testimony is only part of the showing offered in support of the Petition. 6 Patent Owner’s narrow characterization of Dr. Vargas’s experience (see Prelim. Resp. 28–29) is arguably inconsistent with the description in her CV (Ex. 1004). In any event, Patent Owner will have an opportunity to examine Dr. Vargas regarding her qualifications.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “submits that no express construction of terms is necessary.” Pet. 15. Patent Owner agrees no construction is needed at this stage. See Prelim. Resp. 26. We agree that no formal claim construction is necessary for this decision. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To the extent we have concerns regarding the parties’ apparent interpretation of the claim language, or in some instances Patent Owner’s attempt to read-in unrecited limitations, we address those arguments below.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,435,360 - PTAB · Mar 24, 2025 · IPR2024-01235 · APJ Hubert C Lorin · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–3, 6–11, and 14–16 on all proposed grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the §103 ground over Mañosa and Patel.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an [inter partes review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 815 F.3d at 1363 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in inter partes review). slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedPrinted publication not establishedMixed
“[T]here is no presumption in favor of institution or in favor of finding a reference to be a printed publication under § 42.108(c) or any other authority. . . . [T]he burden is on the petitioner to identify with particularity evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent, and therefore that there is a reasonable likelihood that it qualifies as a printed publication.” slip op. at 20
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“May” expresses a possibility. The Specification reflects this interpretation of “may” when it states that “[i]n one embodiment, the organic material is not lyotropic. Thus, the organic material may not be a phospholipid.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28 (emphasis added). One of ordinary skill would understand from this that the organic material “may not be” a phospholipid if the organic material is not lyotropic. It follows that if the organic material is lyotropic, then the organic material may be a phospholipid. Reading the statement “[t]he organic material may not be . . . a phospholipid” (id. at 8:59–63) in light of the earlier stated possibility that the organic material may be a phospholipid if the organic material is lyotropic, one of ordinary skill in the art would interpret “may not be” as excluding phospholipids under some conditions, not under all conditions. Taking the Specification’s discussion about phospholipids as exemplifying the permissive nature of the word “may,” we are unpersuaded that in stating that “[t]he organic material may not be [PMMA], a polyvinylidene difluoride-containing polymer, such as [PVDF] or PVDF- TrFE-CTFE, or a phospholipid, such as [DHPE]’” (Ex. 1001, 8:59–63), the specification “contains a clear and unmistakable disavowal of the compounds PMMA, PVDF, PVDF-TrFE-CTFE, and DHPE” and “disclaims the listed compounds” from the “organic material” of the claims under all conditions, as Patent Owner argues. Prelim. Resp. 6–7. Moreover, the claims themselves limit the “organic material” only to the extent that it is “barocaloric cooling or heating agent” and can perform in the manner claimed. See Ex. 1001, claim 1, supra. As broadly worded, the claims do not exclude PMMA, PVDF, PVDF-TrFE-CTFE, and DHPE per se from the group of organic materials employed by the claimed method. Adopting Patent Owner’s construction would impermissibly import a limitation (i.e., not exclude PMMA, PVDF, PVDF-TrFE-CTFE, and DHPE) into the claims. For the reasons stated, at this stage of the proceeding, we agree with Petitioner’s broad construction of “organic material.” We do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction whereby PMMA, PVDF, PVDF- TrFE-CTFE, and DHPE are excluded from the scope of the claim term “organic material.” The parties are invited to address this issue further during trial, if desired. slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner shows that (a) Mañosa (i.e., inorganic compounds such as Ni-Mn-In, Gd5Si2Ge2, and La-Fe-Co-Si) and (b) Patel (i.e., PVDF-TrFE- CTFE) teach materials exhibiting inverse BCEs. Pet. 59 (citing, inter alia, Ex. 1007, pages 4–8; Ex. 1009, 1, 4–5; Ex. 1004 ¶ 108). In our view, at this stage, Petitioner sufficiently shows (via the five reasons listed supra) why it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to substitute the barocaloric cooling or heating agent of Patel for that taught in Mañosa, thereby reaching the claimed method with a reasonable expectation of success. Cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (U.S., 2007) (“The Court recognized that when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.”)” slip op. at 32
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,230,656 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00104 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–18 on all petition grounds and granted joinder to IPR2024-00770.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“1. The “Reasonable Likelihood” Standard for Instituting Trial In the 770 IPR, we determined that Petitioner TikTok Inc. (“TikTok”) satisfied the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. See IPR2024-00770, Paper 8 (“770 IPR Inst. Dec.”) at 13–48. Here, Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–18 of the ’030 patent based on the same prior art, the same evidence, and the same unpatentability theories as TikTok presents in the 770 IPR. Compare Pet. 10–81, with IPR2024-00770, Paper 2 (“770 Pet.”) 11–81; see also Mot. 5 (asserting that “[t]here are no substantive differences between the LifeScan Petition and the [770] IPR Petition”). Because Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 1, 2, 4–7, and 9–18 of the ’030 patent based on the same prior art, evidence, and unpatentability theories in the 770 IPR, Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial for the same reasons the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial was satisfied in the 770 IPR. See 770 IPR Inst. Dec. 13–48.” slip op. at 9
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“If joined to the 770 IPR, Petitioner agrees “to adhere to all applicable deadlines set forth in the [770] IPR Scheduling Order.” Id. at 7. Petitioner also stipulates that it “will act as an ‘understudy’ and will not assume an active role unless Petitioner TikTok ceases to participate in the proceeding.” Id. a 2. Petitioner agrees that the following conditions will apply “[u]nless and until Petitioner TikTok ceases to participate in the [770] IPR”: a) The Joining Petitioners shall not make any substantive filing and shall be bound by the filings of Petitioner TikTok, unless a filing concerns termination and settlement, or issues solely involving the Joining Petitioners; b) The Joining Petitioners shall not present any argument or make any presentation at oral hearing unless an issue solely involves the Joining Petitioners, or when addressing Board-approved motions that do not affect Petitioner TikTok, or its respective position; c) The Joining Petitioners shall not seek to cross-examine or defend the cross-examination of any witness, unless the topic of cross-examination concerns issues solely involving the Joining Petitioners; d) The Joining Petitioners shall not seek discovery from Patent Owner on issues not solely involving the Joining Petitioners; e) The Joining Petitioners will not rely on expert testimony beyond that submitted by Petitioner TikTok unless Petitioner TikTok is terminated from the case. Id. at 7–8. For the reasons stated by Petitioner in the Motion, and in the absence of any opposition by Patent Owner, we agree that Petitioner’s joinder to the 770 IPR is appropriate and will not materially affect the trial schedule for the 770 IPR. See Mot. 4–9.” slip op. at 11
NonePatents in suitUS 8,904,030 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00103 · APJ Gregg I Anderson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all asserted grounds for claims 1–15 and granted LifeScan, Senseonics, and Ascensia’s motion to join the TikTok IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Here, Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 1–15 of the ’766 patent based on the same prior art, the same evidence, and the same unpatentability theories as TikTok presents in the 769 IPR. Compare Pet. 15–111, with IPR2024-00769, Paper 2 (“769 Pet.”) 15–118; see also Mot. 5 (asserting that “[t]here are no substantive differences between the LifeScan Petition and the [779] IPR Petition”). Because Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 1–15 of the ’766 patent based on the same prior art, evidence, and unpatentability theories in the 769 IPR, Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial for the same reasons the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial was satisfied in the 769 IPR. See 769 IPR Inst. Dec. 15–55.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Here, Petitioner asserts that joinder is appropriate because the Petition “challenges the validity of the same claims of the ’766 patent on identical grounds to those in the [769] IPR,” and “[t]here are no substantive differences between the LifeScan Petition and the [769] IPR Petition.” Mot. 5. Petitioner’s “supporting materials―including its supporting expert declaration, exhibits, and exhibit numbering―are substantively identical to those presented in the [769] IPR.” Id. at 6. As such, Petitioner argues that a joined proceeding would “will not raise any new issues of unpatentability and will not impose any additional burden on the Board or Patent Owner, or add additional complexity to the case.be more efficient and less wasteful, as only a single trial on these common grounds would be required.” Id. If joined to the 769 IPR, Petitioner agrees “to adhere to all applicable deadlines set forth in the [769] IPR Scheduling Order.” Id. at 7. Petitioner also stipulates that it “will act as an ‘understudy’ and will not assume an active role unless Petitioner TikTok ceases to participate in the proceeding.” Id. a 2. Petitioner agrees that the following conditions will apply “[u]nless and until Petitioner TikTok ceases to participate in the [769] IPR”:” slip op. at 12
NonePatents in suitUS 9,900,766 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00102 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all asserted grounds against claims 1–10 and granted LifeScan, Senseonics, and Ascensia’s motion to join the TikTok IPR.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because Petitioner presents substantively identical challenges to claims 1–10 of the ’121 patent based on the same prior art, evidence, and unpatentability theories as TikTok presents in the TikTok IPR, Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial for the same reasons TikTok satisfied the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. See TikTok Inst. Dec. 16–55.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“challenges the validity of the same claims of the ’121 patent on identical grounds to those in the TikTok IPR,” and “[t]here are no substantive differences between the LifeScan Petition and the TikTok IPR Petition.” Mot. 5. Petitioner’s “supporting materials―including its supporting expert declaration, exhibits, and exhibit numbering―are substantively identical to those presented in the TikTok IPR.” Id. at 6. As such, Petitioner argues that a joined proceeding would “be more efficient and less wasteful, as only a single trial on these common grounds would be required.” Id. at 5. If joined to the TikTok IPR, Petitioner agrees “to adhere to all applicable deadlines set forth in the TikTok IPR Scheduling Order.” Id. at 7. Petitioner also agrees it “will act as an ‘understudy’ and will not assume an active role unless Petitioner TikTok ceases to participate in the proceeding.” Id. at 2. Petitioner agrees that the following conditions will apply “as long as Petitioner TikTok remains a party to the TikTok IPR”: (1) The Joining Petitioners shall not make any substantive filing and shall be bound by the filings of Petitioner TikTok, unless a filing concerns termination and settlement, or issues solely involving the Joining Petitioners; (2) The Joining Petitioners shall not present any argument or make any presentation at oral hearing unless an issue solely involves the Joining Petitioners, or when addressing Board-approved motions that do not affect Petitioner TikTok, or its respective position; slip op. at 12
NonePatents in suitUS 11,234,121 - PTAB · Mar 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01467 · APJ Michael A Valek · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–8 and 11–22 based on the §103(a) challenge over Xu-752 and Jones, after finding a reasonable likelihood of success on claims 16–22.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Having reviewed Petitioner’s showing, we find that it demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 16 is unpatenable over Xu-752 and Jones. Patent Owner’s arguments in the Preliminary Response are unavailing on the current record. We address those arguments below.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Having reviewed Petitioner’s showing, we find that it demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 16 is unpatenable over Xu-752 and Jones. Patent Owner’s arguments in the Preliminary Response are unavailing on the current record. We address those arguments below.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that Oka is not cumulative of Jones. Jones discloses an impedance measuring system for measuring the impedance of each well of a multiwell plate. Ex. 1006, code (57). Moreover, Jones clearly teaches that the daughter boards in its system “may be equipped with multiple analog-to-digital converters.” Id. ¶ 18. Oka, in contrast, does not. As Patent Owner acknowledges, “Oka is a planar multielectrode array that 11 Oka et al., “A new planar multielectrode array for extracellular recording: application to hippocampal acute slice,” 93 J. of Neuroscience Methods 61– 67 (1999) (Ex. 1026) (“Oka”). measures via extracellular recording instead of impedance.” Prelim. Resp. 51 n. 10 (emphases added). This is consistent with the applicants’ arguments during prosecution that Oka does not disclose a multiwell plate, plurality of wells, or even measuring cell-substrate impedance. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, 191–193. Moreover, as Petitioner points out, Oka appears to disclose only a single ADC connected to a switch. See Ex. 1026, 63 (Fig. 2); see also Ex. 1002, 188 (applicant urging that “Oka uses a switch to connect the AD-C to different electrodes at different times” and therefore is not performing measurements for individual electrode arrays). Thus, unlike Jones, Oka does not disclose a plurality of ADCs, much less multiple ADCs arranged and operated in parallel such that impedances for multiple wells are measured at a time.12” slip op. at 28
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of May 2009 “would have had a B.S. in electrical/mechanical/biomedical engineering or biological science, or a related field, and approximately 2 years of relevant experience or equivalent study in systems and methods for bioanalysis of cells.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 23–25). Patent Owner does not dispute or otherwise respond to Petitioner’s description of a POSA in its Preliminary Response. At this stage, we find Petitioner’s description of the level of ordinary skill in the art to be sufficiently supported by the record and apply it for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,906,508 - PTAB · Jan 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01077 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1, 11, and 13–20 based on the Schröder and Mestas obviousness challenge; it did not decide whether the Yuen and Mestas challenge met the institution threshold.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“2. Discussion Part I of the Advanced Bionics framework asks whether the same or substantially the same art was previously presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments were previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8.” slip op. at 17
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons that follow, we determine that the reasonable likelihood standard is met, and we institute an inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art. Based on the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) would have had a four-year degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, optical engineering, or related field of study, and two years of experience in academia or industry studying or developing physiological monitoring devices such as non-invasive biosensors. A POSA would have been familiar with sensor system design and signal processing. A higher level of education or skill can substitute for less experience, and vice versa. Ex. 1002 ¶ 29. We find that the level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’859 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 22
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We agree with the parties that it is not necessary for us to provide an express construction for any claim term for purposes of determining whether to institute an inter partes review. Pet. 8; Prelim. Resp. 21. Nevertheless, there appears to be a dispute about the meaning of the term, “ring,” which we discuss below for purposes of providing guidance.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,139,859 - PTAB · Jan 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01078 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 11–15, and 38–43 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Schröder and Mestas.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. We institute an inter partes review of claims 1–6, 11–15, and 38–43 based on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“In view of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Mestas as cumulative. Noting that the Office allowed claims of the ’686 Application over U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2013/0106603 (Ex. 2006, “Weast”), Patent Owner argues that Mestas discloses the same wristband as Weast. Prelim. Resp. 10–12, 58. Patent Owner overlooks that the Office’s consideration of Weast in the prosecution of the ’686 Application occurred after the ’953 patent issued, which does not show consideration of Weast’s or Mestas’s wristband configuration in the allowance of the ’953 patent’s claims. Ex. 2009, 1, 3; Ex. 1001, code (45); Prelim. Resp. 10–12, 58.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 7 (Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s explanation of the level of skill in the art. See Prelim. Resp. 12. Based on the testimony of Dr. Anthony, we agree with Petitioner’s stated understanding of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1002 ¶ 29. We find that the level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’953 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art references. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner expresses that it “does not believe that any term requires express construction.” Pet. 8. Patent Owner does not dispute this assertion. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage, we need not and do not construe expressly any claim language. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that only claim terms in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,281,953
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.