• Incyte Corporation v. Concert Pharmaceuticals, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 11, 2022 · PGR2021-00006 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · PGR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–7 and 9–21 not shown unpatentable over either obviousness ground because Petitioner did not establish motivation to select Compound (I) from Silverman’s genus.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “It is not necessary for an expert’s experience or expertise to precisely match the art at issue. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, one offering expert testimony must at least have ordinary skill in the art to provide relevant and reliable testimony that is helpful to the factfinder. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools, Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 35 (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ tpgnov.pdf?MURL=). Dr. Patterson has a Ph.D. in Chemistry and over 30 years of experience in drug design, drug administration, evaluation of drug effectiveness, and participated in drug design for over 20 years. Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 4–10; Ex. 1008, 1–2. He is author or co-author on over eight peer-reviewed journal articles involving medicinal chemistry. Ex. 1007 ¶ 5. We find this level of skill to meet the qualifications for the level of skill in the art under the training and experience portion of the definition we have adopted for purposes of this opinion (see § II.B.), reproduced below: a Ph.D. in chemistry, pharmaceutical sciences, molecular biology, or a similar field, or an M.D. with similar background. A POSA would also have had at least several years of experience with drug design, drug development, clinical trials, or access to other individuals with that knowledge and experience. Likewise, a POSA would have had knowledge and experience in treating hair loss disorders, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience. We note that Dr. Patterson himself also proposes this definition. Id. ¶ 102. However, Dr. Patterson does not have “knowledge and experience in treating hair loss disorders” and did not opine that, in regards to his testimony, he had access to a person with that knowledge and experience, as is proposed in the definition. See generally, Ex. 1007. Accordingly, we find Dr. Patterson qualified to opine on the level of ordinary skill with regard to issues of drug design, evaluation of effectiveness, and drug administration, but we find he is not adequately qualified to opine on the level of ordinary skill with regard to issues of treating hair loss disorders.” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proposes the same definition as Petitioner, but adds that the skilled artisan “would also have had experience in JAK inhibition, deuteration, and AA [alopecia areata] formulations, or access to a person with that knowledge and experience.” Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 2059 ¶ 14). Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Ko critiques Petitioner’s proposed definition as “incomplete, because it lacks any requirement for experience, or access to individuals with experience, in JAK inhibition, deuteration, and AA formulations.” Ex. 2059 ¶ 16. However, neither Dr. Ko nor Patent Owner explains what difference this additional direct experience would have provided to an artisan with the skill level proposed by Petitioner, particularly when Petitioner’s definition includes “experience in treating hair loss disorders,” and for which the record contains evidence that existing JAK inhibitors such as ruxolitinib had been identified as causing reversal of hair loss caused by AA. Ex. 1003, 1043. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition as consistent with the level of skill apparent in the cited prior art. In any event, as Patent Owner does not explain why its alternative definition would have any bearing on the outcome of the present case, and as we discern no appreciable difference in the parties’ definitions, we note our findings and conclusions would be the same regardless of which definition were adopted. We further note that the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown”) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “C. Claim Construction We construe claims using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100. Therefore, we construe the challenged claims under the framework set forth in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under this framework, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”), at the time of the invention, in light of the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history of record. Id. Only those terms that are in controversy need be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We have considered Petitioner’s claim construction proposals (see Pet. 21–23), which are uncontested (see generally Resp., not addressing construction), and find that it is not necessary to expressly construe any claim term for purposes of rendering this Decision.” slip op. at 13

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artReference not prior artDecided for patent owner

    “Section 102(b)(1) provides two exceptions to § 102(a)(1) for disclosures made within one year of the effective filing date. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) provides that a disclosure made one year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) with respect to the claimed invention if: (A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1).” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 10,561,659 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,561,659
• Shenzhen Buxiang Network Technology Co., Ltd. v. Sun Pleasure Co. LimitedNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2022 · IPR2021-00080 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 were not shown unpatentable because Metzger lacked the claimed fluid passage, and Wu was not prior art based on the claims’ earlier reduction to practice.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Relying on the testimony of Mr. Kuchel, Petitioner submits that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have either (i) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, or an equivalent field, or (ii) would have an associate degree in mechanical engineering, or an equivalent field, and two years of practical experience in inflatable product design.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 26). In the Decision on Institution, we adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, stating it was “consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art.” Dec. Inst. 9. In its Response, Patent Owner makes arguments that rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, but does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See PO Resp. 35, 39–53 (citing Ex. 2014 ¶ 66). Based on our review of the complete record, we continue to apply the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the Decision on Institution.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Petitioner proposes claim constructions for the terms “substantially below” and “substantially inwardly” recited in claims 1 and 6. Pet. 40–41. In the Decision on Institution, we determined that it was not necessary to construe the terms at that stage of the proceeding. Dec. Inst. 9–10 (citing Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Patent Owner contends “the claim terms ‘substantially below’ and ‘substantially inwardly’ are sufficiently clear on their face to preclude any need for claim construction,” but proposes claim constructions that differ somewhat from Petitioner’s proposed constructions in the event the Board determines that these terms require claim construction. PO Resp. 13, 15–16. Patent Owner also proposes a claim construction for the term “upper tubular periphery” recited in claims 1 and 6 that Petitioner opposes. Id. at 17–19; Pet. Reply 7–10. Only terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and then only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017. Because the outcome of our decision does not depend on either parties’ construction of the terms “substantially below,” “substantially inwardly,” or “upper tubular periphery,” we need not construe these terms to resolve the issues in dispute in this proceeding.” slip op. at 11

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Metzger’s gaps define fluid passages located between adjacent side support beams 25 (i.e., “internal walls”) and are not formed in any of the side support beams. We are not directed to any written description in Metzger indicating that the gaps are formed in a side support beam.7 Instead, Figures 5 and 6 of Metzger depict the gaps as being defined between four distinct side support beams 25. Furthermore, as Patent Owner points out, Mr. Kuchel appears to agree that there are no passages formed through the side support beams 25 of Figures 5 and 6. Ex. 2003, 107:12–108:9, 108:17–108:21. For these reasons, we determine that Metzger’s gaps are not formed through an internal wall, as required by claim 1. In the Reply, Petitioner asserts that, even if Metzger discloses four discrete, spaced-apart beams or walls, “the gaps or slices between walls are apertures in a structure through which air can pass.” Pet. Reply 15 (emphasis added). This argument is not persuasive because claim 1 recites that the fluid passage is formed through the internal wall (which Petitioner asserts is met by Metzger’s side support beam 25), not just any structure. Petitioner’s general assertion that air passes through “a structure” fails to establish that the gaps are formed in a side support beam.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Specifically, Petitioner argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from Metzger “that an air passage would be necessary to bypass the side support beam 25 and inflate the upper tubular periphery for the air mattress to function as intended.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 200). According to Petitioner, because Metzger discloses only a single air inlet valve, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that providing openings, or fluid passages, through the side support beam 25, in lieu of or in addition to the gaps between the side support beam 25, would have been a simple solution to adequately inflate the peripheral frame of the mattress defined by the side support beam(s) 25. Id. at 74–75 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 200). Petitioner thus presents two alternate theories for modifying Metzger: (1) providing fluid passages in at least one side support beam 25 in addition to the gaps, and (2) providing fluid passages in lieu of the gaps. In support of the first theory, Petitioner only argues that providing fluid passages in the side support beams, in addition to the gaps between the ends of the side support beams, would have allowed the peripheral frame to inflate more freely. Id. at 75 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 201). In its Response, Patent Owner contends that “Petitioner is just wrong.” PO Resp. 45 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 146–149). Dr. Letton testifies that pumps used to inflate air mattresses are low flow and low pressure and generally inflate an air mattress to a maximum pressure of around 1 psi. Ex. 2001 ¶ 147. Dr. Letton further testifies that, with Metzger’s design, the” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 7,353,555 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,353,555
• Yantai Jereh Petroleum Equipment & Technologies Co., Ltd v. BJ Energy Solutions, LLCInstituted
  PTAB · Feb 8, 2022 · PGR2021-00102 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–28 on all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” After considering the Petition and Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response, as well as all supporting evidence, we determine that Petitioner has satisfied the burden under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) to show that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied

    “These arguments are not persuasive, however, because Patent Owner does not explain adequately how the disclosures of Oehring and Shampine are cumulative of the disclosure of Mu. In this case, the mere fact that 8 We note that Exhibit 2007 does not have ¶ 95 cited by Patent Owner. not mean necessarily that the references are cumulative of Mu. For instance, Petitioner relies on Mu for allegedly disclosing several claim limitations including “receiving a demand hydraulic horse power (HHP) signal,” “the first output power being in a selected range of a maximum continuous power (MCP) level,” and “the second output power . . . being in a selected range of the MCP level to a maximum intermittent power (MIP) level.” Pet. 19–41. Patent Owner does not direct us to any disclosure in Oehring or Shampine that are cumulative of these alleged teachings in Mu. Accordingly, we do not agree with Patent Owner that either of Oehring or Shampine is cumulative of Mu. As such, we determine that Petitioner’s reliance on Mu does not involve the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously presented to the Office, and the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is not satisfied with respect to Mu. And although Crowe is cited in the ’459 patent (see Ex. 1001, code (56)), Petitioner’s reliance on Crowe is minimal. The ground based on Mu and Crowe, thus, does not implicate § 325(d).” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelOther

    “This dispute presents a factual issue best decided on a complete record. Accordingly, for purposes of the Decision, we determine that no express finding is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We note, however, that our obviousness analysis in this Decision would not differ if we adopted either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionTerm construed board ownOther

    “We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not explained sufficiently what a “maximum power output value” means in the context of the ’459 patent. Nor has Petitioner explained sufficiently why “maximum intermittent power” should be tied to the “maximum power output value.” In contrast, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is supported by the Specification, although we do not agree with the last clause of the construction because the references to “typical” values do not assist in understanding the claim language. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision, we preliminarily construe “maximum intermittent power” to mean “an elevated operating output level that the pump unit may operate intermittently throughout its operating life without excessive damage to the pump unit.”” slip op. at 14

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,907,459
• St. Jude Medical, LLC v. Snyders Heart Valve LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 2, 2019 · IPR2018-00107 · APJ Mitchell G Weatherly · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 8, 9, 22, 23, 31–35, 37–39, and 45 are unpatentable, including as obvious over Bessler and Johnson; anticipation by Bessler succeeds only for claims 38, 39, and 45.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Factual indicators of the level of ordinary skill in the art include “the various prior art approaches employed, the types of problems encountered in the art, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology involved, and the educational background of those actively working in the field.” Jacobson Bros., Inc. v. U.S., 512 F.2d 1065, 1071 (Ct. Cl. 1975); see also Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting with approval Jacobson Bros.). We find, based on our review of the record before us, that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the record, including the asserted prior art and, for the purposes of this Final Written Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “direct attachment” of the flexible valve element to the frame. Id. at 8. However, the portion of the Specification on which Patent Owner relies also describes indirectly attaching the flexible valve element to a frame by securing it to a band that is directly attached to the frame. Ex. 1001, 7:55–66. This type of indirect attachment is illustrated in Figure 3, reproduced below right. The Specification describes Figure 3 as follows: As illustrated in FIG. 3, the flexible valve element 22 is attached to the central portion 36 of the frame 20 at a position substantially centered between the anchors 34. Although the valve element 22 may be attached to the frame 20 by other means without departing from the scope of the present invention, the valve element of the preferred embodiment is attached to the frame by adhesive bonding. Further, the flexible valve element 22 is attached to the frame 20, and more particularly to the band 40, at several attachment points 56 around the frame. Id. at 7:57–66 (emphasis added). This passage indicates that the flexible valve element is attached to the frame in two ways: (1) directly by being bonded to the central portion 36 of frame 20 and (2) indirectly by being attached to band 40 at attachment points 56. The Specification later expresses a preference for bonding valve element 22 to band 40 with adhesive. Id. at 8:11–14. Interpreting “attached to” to mean “directly attached to” as suggested by Patent Owner would be inconsistent with the Specification’s broader description of how valve element 22 is attached to frame 20. We interpret claim language “in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018). Doing so requires us to interpret claim language in a manner that “corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the specification.” In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The inventor describes both direct and indirect methods of attaching the flexible valve element to the frame. Accordingly, we interpret “attached to” as encompassing both direct and indirect ways of attaching the flexible valve element to the frame.” slip op. at 12

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Petitioner’s argument that Bessler’s valve is attached to the central part of the frame of claims 1 and 31 fails. Bessler’s valve is undeniably attached to its frame because the cuff portion of the valve is sutured to its stent. Claims 1 and 31 require the valve element to be attached to a portion of the frame located along the radial centerline. Ex. 1001, 19:19–20 (claim 1), 22:67–23:2 (claim 31). Bessler’s valves fail to meet this requirement. Bessler’s stent 32 is a hollow cylinder devoid of structure located along its centerline,3 and the “central portion of the frame” identified by Petitioner, straight sections 33, is part of walls 31 located on the radial periphery of stent 32. Id. at 5:28–43, Figure 4. Regardless of how Bessler’s valve is attached to the wall of its stent, the valve is not attached to structure “located along a centerline” as recited in claims 1 and 31. Therefore, we determine that Petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of evidence that Bessler anticipates claims 1 and 31 or their respective dependent claims 2, 3, 8, 9, 32–35, and 37.” slip op. at 19

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “For all these reasons, Dr. Chronos’s assertion that incorporating Johnson’s strut-based frame and membrane into Bessler’s stent would render the combined structure too large is not supported by the objective evidence of record. Patent Owner’s argument rests upon Dr. Chronos’s testimony. Accordingly, we find Patent Owner’s argument unpersuasive. Instead, we determine that Petitioner has proven that an ordinarily skilled artisan would 5 Ex. 1009, 1:12–13. have been motivated to combine the teachings of Bessler and Johnson as alleged.” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 6,821,297 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,821,297
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 8, 2017 · IPR2015-01637 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 30, 31, 37–41, and 45–57 are unpatentable as obvious over Iwata and Stephan, with claim 53 additionally relying on Capps.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1202 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Prior to our Institution Decision, Petitioner proposed constructions for “contact-sensitive transducer . . . which produces an output signal.” Pet. 10– 12. Patent Owner did not propose any express constructions or challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. 2–27. In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction. Inst. Dec. 6. In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 29. We determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We find Petitioner’s argument persuasive. The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a reference may be bodily incorporated into another reference to produce the claimed subject matter; rather, it is what the combination of references makes obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”). Furthermore, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). In this case, we determine that a skilled artisan, using ordinary creativity, would not be dissuaded from combining Iwata and Stephan even if Stephan’s scroll regions have fixed locations.” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2017 · IPR2015-01646 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 58–69 are unpatentable as obvious over Iwata and Stephan; Petitioner’s motion to exclude is dismissed in part and denied in part.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1204 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “As discussed above, Petitioner asserts four reasons supporting why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to make the proposed modification. See supra Section III.D.3.a.iv. After considering all evidence and arguments, we determine that Petitioner has provided a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason or motivation to combine Iwata and Stephan in the manner provided. We also determine that Petitioner has provided analysis explaining how the combination would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the claim limitations. See supra Section III.D.3.a. c) Conclusion In view of the above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 58 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as directed to subject matter that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of Iwata and Stephan.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2017 · IPR2015-01761 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 16–26, 29, and 33–36 are unpatentable as obvious over Palatsi and Moore.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “’931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1207 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “Second, and more importantly, we credit Dr. Wolfe’s testimony that the express disclosure of Moore would have conveyed enabling or disabling the touch strips and, which in combination with Palatsi’s processor, would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art “a second mode wherein the controller is unresponsive to contact with one of the banks of touch strip” (Ex. 1207 ¶ 180). Dr. Wolfe’s testimony relies on an express disclosure of Moore (switching touch strip banks) and explains how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that teaching. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). We accord Mr. Ward’s testimony less weight than Dr. Wolfe’s testimony because Dr. Wolfe’s testimony better comports with the express description of Moore of switching between banks of touch strips. In re Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). Dr. Wolfe’s testimony also addresses what the combined teachings of Palatsi and Moore would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art (see Ex. 1207 ¶ 180), whereas Mr. Ward’s testimony unduly focuses on Moore’s isolated disclosures (see, e.g., Ex. 2057 ¶ 78 (“Again, I” slip op. at 31

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Prior to our Institution Decision, Petitioner proposed constructions for “contact-sensitive transducer . . . which produces an output signal” and “graphical object(s).” Pet. 11–13. Patent Owner did not propose any express constructions or challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction. See generally PO Resp.; Paper 6 (Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response). In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction. Inst. Dec. 6. In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 23. We determine that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction for this Final Written Decision. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “3. Analysis We agree with Petitioner’s analysis described above and adopt it as our own. We, therefore, determine that the combination of Palatsi and Moore as set forth by Petitioner would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art all the limitations recited by independent claim 16. Our inquiry continues because “[a] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Rather, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” Apple, 839 F.3d at 1058 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2017 · IPR2015-01641 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 16–26, 29, and 33–36 are unpatentable: claims 16–17 and 18–26, 29 as obvious, and claims 33–36 as anticipated or, alternatively, obvious over Iwata.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1203 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 29. We determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “As discussed above, Petitioner asserts four reasons supporting why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to make the proposed modification. See supra Section III.D.3.a.iv. After considering all evidence and arguments, we determine that Petitioner has provided a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason or motivation to combine Iwata and Stephan in the manner provided. We also determine that Petitioner has provided analysis explaining how the combination would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the claim limitations. See supra Section III.D.3.a.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 25, 2017 · IPR2015-01602 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12 and 15 are unpatentable under § 103 over Iwata and Stephan (claims 1, 2, and 15), and Iwata, Stephan, and Capps (claims 3–12).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1201 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDenied

    “given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). There is a presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Furthermore, only those terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Prior to our Institution Decision, Petitioner proposed constructions for “contact-sensitive transducer . . . which produces an output signal” and “graphical object(s).” Pet. 10–13. Patent Owner did not propose any express constructions or challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. 2–15. In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction. Inst. Dec. 6. In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 29. Accordingly, we determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “As discussed above, Petitioner asserts four reasons supporting why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to make the proposed modification. See supra Section III.D.3.a.v. After considering all evidence and arguments, we determine that Petitioner has provided a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason or motivation to combine Iwata and Stephan in the manner provided. We also determine that Petitioner has provided analysis explaining how the combination would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the claim limitations. See supra Section III.D.3.a. c) Conclusion In view of the above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as directed to subject matter that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of Iwata and Stephan.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
• Actifio, Inc. v. Delphix Corp.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 29, 2016 · IPR2015-00108 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 9–13 and 21–23 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over Sanders, Edwards, and Patel; claims 13 and 23 also rely on Chapman.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “printed publications” in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 311(b). PO Resp. 1‒5. We look to the underlying facts to make a legal determination as to whether a document is a printed publication. Suffolk Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc., 752 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The determination of whether a document is a “printed publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) involves a caseby-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding its disclosure to members of the public. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Public accessibility is a key question in determining whether a document is a printed publication and is determined on a case-by-case basis. Suffolk Techs., 752 F.3d at 1364. To qualify as a printed publication, a document “must have been sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art.” In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009). slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “The first phrase in the cited passage above explicitly defines the term, by stating “[a] database block is a unit of data used by a database.”4 Ex. 2102, 2:7–8. Although the sentence following shortly thereafter states that a database block “stores metadata,” that sentence by itself is insufficient to limit the disputed term by requiring the unclaimed “metadata” feature because it does not state unambiguously that all “database blocks” must include metadata. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing a claim term broadly because “[n]o statement in the written description [ ] constitute[d] a limitation on the scope of the invention”) (quoting Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Further, the cited passage also does not exclude the possibility of some database blocks not having any metadata. See id. at 908 (passages in the Summary of the Invention section of a patent did not limit the scope of the invention because the passages, “although focusing on the use of the invention in conjunction with pressure jackets, do not disclaim the use of the invention in the absence of a pressure jacket”). More importantly, the rest of the ’361 patent is consistent with a definition of database blocks that does not require metadata in all database blocks.” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. The crux of these arguments appears to be that, because a Snapshot copy allegedly is an exact copy of the current state of the volume, SnapMirror does not utilize database blocks from different points in time to create a Snapshot copy. The claim language, however, does not require database blocks for different point-in-time copies to be utilized in this manner. Rather, the claim language merely requires receiving and storing database blocks for different point-in-time copies. We agree with Petitioner that the combined teachings of Sanders and Edwards disclose receiving and storing database blocks for different point-intime copies. Sanders discloses that “[t]he SnapMirror initialize command creates a Snapshot copy of the source volume and transfers data from the source to the destination volume,” such that the transferred data is received and stored at the destination volume. Ex. 1104, 22. We also credit Dr. Zadok’s testimony that a Snapshot copy is a point-in-time copy. Ex. 1117 ¶¶ 44, 123. Thus, each Snapshot copy would result in transferred data (i.e., database block) for different point-in-time copies being received and stored. Lastly, even if Patent Owner is correct that a given Snapshot copy uses only database blocks from the same point in time, we agree with Petitioner that this does not mean that database blocks for different point-in-time copies are not received and stored. We conclude that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill would have found the limitation of loading the first database at multiple points in time, including receiving and storing database blocks for different point-in-time copies, obvious.” slip op. at 47

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “1132, 1133, 1135, 1136, 1138, 1141–1145, 1147, 1148, 1150, 1154, 1155, 1157, 1159, 1160, 1164, 1166, and 1167. Paper 36 (“Mot. to Exclude”), 1. In inter partes reviews, documents are admitted into evidence subject to an opposing party asserting objections to the evidence and moving to exclude the evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64. As movant, Patent Owner has the burden of showing that an Exhibit is not admissible. 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Patent Owner contends that Petitioner does not rely on Exhibits 1132, 1133, 1135, 1138, 1144, 1148, 1150, 1154, 1157, 1159, 1164, 1166, and 1167. Mot. To Exclude 1 n.1. Petitioner does not dispute this contention. See Paper 46 (“Opp. Mot. to Exclude”). We, therefore, grant Patent Owner’s motion as it pertains to Exhibits 1132, 1133, 1135, 1138, 1144, 1150, 1154, 1157, 1159, 1164, 1166, and 1167. We note, however, that Petitioner does rely on Exhibit 1148. See Reply 11. For reasons discussed below, we deny Patent Owner’s motion as it pertains to Exhibit 1148. Further, Petitioner has moved, unopposed, to expunge Exhibit 1128 (see Paper 34), which motion we hereby grant. Of the remaining objected-to Exhibits, our Final Written Decision discusses and relies on only Exhibits 1106, 1120, 1147, and 1148. We determine, for reasons set forth above, that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are unpatentable, without need for Petitioner’s additional arguments or evidence in relation to the remaining additional Exhibits. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s motion to exclude Exhibits 1136, 1141–1143, 1145, 1155, and 1160 is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 57

  Patent outcomesUS 8,566,361 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,566,361

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.