- Arashi Vision (U.S.) LLC (D/B/A Insta360) v. Gopro, IncNo claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · IPR2024-01164 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Shi does not disclose the claimed low-light high-pass parameter required by the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Given the teachings of the specification, we agree with Patent Owner that a low-light high-pass parameter is a parameter of a smoothing function that favors high frequencies (high pass) when exposure times are long (low light). See Tr. 42:10–18 (Patent Owner’s counsel stating that “high-pass” means “there’s a bias or preference for high frequencies”); Ex. 2020, 93:23– 94:15 (Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Katsaggelos, agreeing that a high-pass system attenuates the low frequency of a signal). Although we acknowledge Petitioner’s position that the specification provides other ways or considerations in implementing a smoothing function, based on our above analysis of the specification, we find that the specification describes the lowlight high-pass parameter as a specific component of a smoothing function. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:17–25 (setting out several parameters besides the low-light high-pass parameter used in trajectory smoothing).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“position and a real device position. Id. at 18:27–40. In other words, the blur is addressed by analyzing the image to identify motion and then shifting the image. Shi, however, does not disclose how its parameter is based on low light (or the long exposure times indicative of low light). In its Petition, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “blurs can be caused by low light conditions.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 111). Although this is true, that does not mean that Shi’s blurs are identified by a parameter that considers low light. As we just described, Shi identifies the blur by quantifying the amount of motion of the points in an image, not by identifying low light. This is simply a different way to determine the presence of motion blur. In Shi, blur is measured, whereas in the ’840 patent, it is inferred based on low-light conditions (e.g., by observing the exposure time). See, e.g., Ex. 1007, 18:7– 26; Ex. 1001, 19:12–26. In its Reply, Petitioner does not point to any further disclosures. Accordingly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “low-light” aspect of the claimed low-light high-pass parameter. This is sufficient to determine that Petitioner’s ground does not meet all claim limitations. Similarly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “high-pass” aspect of the parameter. Shi’s blur compensation uses a spherical interpolation to modify the image. Ex. 1007, 18:27–40. The low-light high-pass parameter, as we have construed the term, allows more high frequencies. To allow more high frequencies, this necessarily means either allowing fewer low frequencies, or allowing more high frequences as opposed to some counterfactual situation in which fewer high frequencies were going to be allowed. See Ex. 2020, 94:23–95:15; Ex. 2022. We are directed to no persuasive evidence from Petitioner that Shi’s spherical interpolation favors high frequencies over low frequencies. Accord Ex. 2018 ¶ 107 (Patent Owner’s expert stating that Shi’s spherical interpolation “reintroduce[es] both high- and low-frequency motion”). Even if Shi allows the viewing window to track the camera position “consistent with the natural blur in the image” (Ex. 1007, 17:63–67), we are not provided with sufficient evidence to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that providing a similar visual goal as a high-pass parameter (Ex. 1001, 22:16–18, “the output motion may include high frequencies that mask motion blur”) is the same as having a high-pass parameter. Again, merely preserving high frequencies is not the same as having a “high-pass parameter” because, as construed, a “high-pass parameter” also involves some degree of attenuation of low frequencies or relative increase of high frequencies. Accordingly, we find that Shi does not disclose the “high-pass” aspect of the claimed low-light high-pass parameter.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 10,958,840 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,958,840 - Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. The Johns Hopkins UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 17, 2025 · IPR2024-00648 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable: claims 1–2, 4–7, 9–12, 14–17, and 19–30 are anticipated by the MSI-H Study Record; claims 3, 8, 13, and 18 are obvious over the cited combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the phrase “in response to” in claim 1 requires a causal relationship wherein the patient must be tested for MSI-H and, if he or she is determined to be MSI-H or dMMR, then the patient is treated with 10 mg/kg of pembrolizumab every 14 days. In claim 1, a biological sample from the patient must be tested to determine if the cancer is MSI-H and, if so, the patient is treated with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab. For this reason, if the prior art teaches the limitations of 1) testing a biological sample obtained from a patient having cancer to determine that the patient’s cancer is microsatellite instability high or mismatch repair deficient, and 2) treating the patient with a therapeutically effective amount of pembrolizumab if the patient’s cancer is determined to be microsatellite instability high or DNA mismatch repair deficient, the art anticipates claim 1. We are not persuaded that claim 1 requires or excludes anything else because nothing else is recited in the claim.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityReference is prior artDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not direct us to evidence that it attempted to file any patent application before the publication date of the MSI-H clinical study and was denied an earlier filing date. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument that it could not file a patent application without results from the MSI-H clinical study, we note that the inventors filed a provisional patent application on November 13, 2014, which, although also filed more than a year after the publication of the MSI-H clinical study, disclosed no clinical results or data. Ex. 1001, cover; Ex. 1030, 1. After considering the parties’ arguments, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s assertion that the inventors could not have filed an earlier application to at least attempt to secure a priority date before the MSI-H clinical study was publicly available. an earlier filing date. Instead, we are persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that because the MSI-H clinical study was published before the inventors filed an application to protect their patent rights the MSI-H clinical study is prior art for the information it discloses. Accordingly, we proceed to analyze Petitioner’s contentions in Ground 1.” slip op. at 24
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“the genus disclosed in the MSI Study Record and does not argue or provide evidence to show that one of ordinary skill in the art could have envisaged each species within that genus. PO Resp. 11–14. We are not persuaded that either the size of the genus in the MSI Study Record or whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to envisage every species within it is dispositive of whether the MSI Study Record anticipates claim 1, where one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that specific cancers recited in claim 1 would be included in the MSI Study Record. As Petitioner argues, claim 1 requires that “a patient…selected from the group consisting of [the listed cancers]” be tested and treated. Pet. Reply 10 (emphasis original). Claim 1 does not require that the patient have each and every one of the sixteen listed cancers to anticipate the claim. Rather, claim 1 requires testing a sample from “a patient” with one of the recited types of cancer and treating the patient. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“When a claim covers several structures or compositions, either generically or as alternatives, the claim is deemed anticipated if any of the structures or compositions within the scope of the claim is known in the prior art.”).” slip op. at 31
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“In contrast, the testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Goldberg, supports Petitioner’s argument of the knowledge in the art at the time, wherein Dr. Goldberg testifies that “[w]hile many clinical oncologists were aware that patients with Lynch Syndrome had a defect in DNA mismatch repair, they associated MSI testing with young onset colorectal and endometrial cancer and patients with a family history of colorectal and/or endometrial cancer.” Ex. 2090 ¶ 79. Similarly, during his deposition, Dr. Goldberg also agreed that endometrial, gastric, and small-bowel cancers would come to mind when he saw a reference to MSI-high non-colorectal cancer. See Ex. 1243, 115:5–116:22 (Q. And so does endometrial cancer come to mind when you see reference to MSI-high non-colorectal cancers? . . . A. Yes. Q. As . . . a person of skill in the field, when you see reference to MSI-high non-colorectal cancers, does gastric cancer come to mind? . . . A. comes to mind. So the answer is yes. Q. As a person of skill in the field, when you see reference to MSI-high non-colorectal cancers, does small bowel cancer come to mind? . . . A. Yes.”). Patent Owner does not direct us to other evidence contradicting Petitioner’s argument that MSI-H was known to occur in endometrial, small bowel, and gastric cancer. Pet. 18.” slip op. at 30
Patent outcomesUS 11,643,462 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,643,462 - Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. The Johns Hopkins UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 6, 2025 · IPR2024-00623 · APJ Devon Zastrow Newman · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–7 are unpatentable: claims 1–3 and 5–7 are anticipated by the MSI-H Study Record, and claim 4 is obvious over the MSI-H Study Record and other cited references.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“On balance, we find Petitioner’s evidence more persuasive of what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from the MSI-H Study Record. We find Dr. Neugut’s and Dr. Oberstein’s testimony, and Dr. Lonberg’s lack of clear testimony to the contrary, persuasive as to this issue. In addition, we are not persuaded by the case law cited by Patent Owner regarding inherent anticipation. See PO Resp. 6–7. Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the correct inquiry is whether the skilled artisan would have understood that all limitations are disclosed in the prior art. See Pet. 34–35; Pet. Reply 12–13. In light of the cited testimony, we are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden of proving that a skilled artisan would reasonably have understood or inferred that the limitation for a patient having received a prior cancer therapy drug to treat the tumor was disclosed in the MSI-Study Record. Petitioner demonstrates what one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from the MSI-H Study Record, not what it inherently discloses. Contra PO Resp. 6–9.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“In light of the extent of the relevant field, we determine that the level of skill in the art relevant to the claims of the ’974 patent is not limited to knowledge of and experience with conducting research relating to oncology or developing and conducting clinical trials, but includes knowledge of and experience with treating cancer patients with immunotherapy compounds, identifying the conditions these patients may have, and understanding the literature regarding clinical trials for such colorectal cancers and the associated conditions and immunotherapy.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
Patent outcomesUS 11,325,974 unpatentable§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,325,974 - Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. The Johns Hopkins UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2024-00624 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–10, and 12–15 are unpatentable, principally because the MSI-H Study Record anticipates them.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19). To Patent Owner, the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a medical or graduate-level degree, or equivalent work experience, in the fields of immunology, genetics, or a related field and would have experience (i) conducting immunology research relating to oncology, (ii) conducting genetics research relating to oncology, or (iii) developing and conducting clinical trials on novel cancer therapies in those fields. PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 2072 ¶¶ 31–32, 86–94). Thus, Petitioner and Patent Owner characterize one of ordinary skill in the art differently. Petitioner emphasizes medical and treatment aspects in its characterization of an ordinarily skilled artisan, whereas Patent Owner emphasizes research aspects.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties do not assert constructions of any terms recited in the challenged claims other than that their ordinary and customary meanings should apply. Pet. 11–12; PO Resp. 6. We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We construe” slip op. at 7
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“record, we are persuaded that the results recited in claim 1 would follow from the steps taught in the MSR, for the reasons and based on the evidence Petitioner cites above. For these same reasons, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that it was unknown whether the amount of pembrolizumab recited in claim 1 would be effective in producing an improved outcome compared to a reference patient without a tumor that was not MSI-H or dMMR, and Patent Owner does not dispute that the amount of pembrolizumab disclosed in the MSR (10 mg/kg every 14 days; see Ex. 1005, 4) is the same as the amount provided in the ’975 patent as being effective (10 mg/kg every 14 days; Ex. 1001, 8:48–52, 13:50–52). Regardless of the inventors’ intent in publishing the MSR as a Stage II clinical trial on the www.clinicaltrials.gov website, as discussed above, we determine that the MSR teaches selecting a patient with a metastatic MSI-H or dMMR tumor and administering an amount of pembrolizumab that would be effective. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 4 (Arms and Interventions). The result of drug treatment inherently follows its administration. The MSR does not merely suggest that pembrolizumab may be useful in some unidentified subset of patients or suggest that some unidentified drug may be useful for MSI-H cancer patients. Instead, the MSR discloses selecting a patient with a condition recited in claim 1 and treating with the drug at the amount recited in claim 1. Contra Metabolite Labs. Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the prior art did not inherently anticipate where it failed to mention specific vitamin deficiencies, instead merely inviting further experimentation to find associations with metabolic perturbations). requirement, efficacy is inherent in carrying out the claim steps,” referring to a claimed method of treating or preventing stroke, which was held to be anticipated by the publication of a proposed study. 677 F.3d at 1381. Patent Owner attempts to distinguish the size and apparent surety of the study in Montgomery from the MSR. PO Resp. 15. But because we find that the MSR teaches performing the steps recited in claim 1 for the purpose of determining and treating MSI-H cancer, we are persuaded that the MSR inherently discloses the results of selection of patients and administration of the drug treatment recited in those steps. See Bristol-Myers, 246 F.3d at 1376. Whether or not the MSR could have provided results or was sufficient for full regulatory approval does not change that the MSR teaches Patent Owner’s claimed steps. We have no reason to doubt that the disclosure in the MSR of the steps recited in claim 1 produces the efficacy element required in claim 1, whether or not this efficacy was disclosed in the MSR or was known when it was published. See Mehl/Biophile, 192 F.3d at 1366 (“Where, as here, the result is a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, it is of no import that the article’s authors did not appreciate the results.”).” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“use that does not qualify as prior art. PO Resp. 18–25. Patent Owner argues that an inventor can be granted latitude to experiment in the public eye until her invention is ready for patenting. Id. at 18 (citing Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998). According to Patent Owner, the experimental use negation applies to the MSR under a 13-factor analysis provided in Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002). PO Resp. 19–25. For example, Patent Owner argues that to establish that treatment of MSI-H cancers was effective, the inventors had to test treatment in humans, there being no animal models, and had to publish the MSR on the government website under federal law. Id. at 20–22. Patent Owner argues further that the inventors had control over the MSI-H clinical study and that the field of cancer treatment was highly unpredictable, among other facts. Id. at 21. Patent Owner argues that “[a]t the time of the MSR’s posting, the claimed invention was not, nor could it have been, ready for patenting. The clinical study that ultimately collected the data reported in the patent specification and supporting the patent claims had not and could not have commenced before the MSR was posted.” Id. at 23. sometimes said that an inventor acquires an undue advantage over the public by delaying to take out a patent, inasmuch as he thereby preserves the monopoly to himself for a longer period than is allowed by the policy of the law,” but held that “when the delay is occasioned by a bona fide effort to bring his invention to perfection, or to ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended,” the experiment use exception can preserve the inventor’s rights. City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 137 (1877). Because we are not persuaded that Patent Owner could not have filed an earlier application, we are not persuaded that the experimental use doctrine is properly applied in this case. Given that clinical trial protocols published on the ClinicalTrials.gov website have been successfully asserted as prior art in other cases, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that the MSR is not available as prior art against the challenged claims. See, e.g., Salix Pharms., Ltd. v. Norwich Pharms. Inc., 98 F.4th 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 567 (2024), and cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 983 (2024).” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,325,975 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,325,975 - Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC v. The Johns Hopkins UniversityAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 28, 2025 · IPR2024-00622 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–28 are unpatentable: claims 1, 6–11, 13–20, 22–24, and 26–28 as anticipated by the MSI-H Study Record; claims 2–5, 12, 21, and 25 as obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenUnpatentable
“(“the claimed process here is not directed to a new use; it is the same use, and it consists of the same steps as described by [the prior art]. Newly discovered results of known processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.”). After analysis of the full record, we are persuaded that the results recited in claim 1 would follow from the steps taught in the MSR, for the reasons and based on the evidence Petitioner cites above. For these same reasons, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that it was unknown whether the amount of pembrolizumab recited in claim 1 would be effective in producing an improved outcome compared to a reference patient without a tumor that was not MSI-H or dMMR, and Patent Owner does not dispute that the amount of pembrolizumab disclosed in the MSR (10 mg/kg every 14 days; see Ex. 1005, 4) is the same as the amount provided in the ’356 patent as being effective (10 mg/kg every 14 days; Ex. 1001, 8:48–52, 13:50–52). Regardless of the inventors’ intent in publishing the MSR as a Stage II clinical trial on the www.clinicaltrials.gov website, as discussed above, we determine that the MSR teaches selecting a patient with a metastatic MSI-H or dMMR tumor and administering an amount of pembrolizumab that would be effective. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 4 (Arms and Interventions). The result of drug treatment inherently follows its administration. The MSR does not merely suggest that pembrolizumab may be useful in some unidentified subset of patients or suggest that some unidentified drug may be useful for MSI-H cancer patients. Instead, the MSR discloses selecting a patient with a condition recited in claim 1 and treating with the drug at the amount recited in claim 1. Contra Metabolite Labs. Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the prior art did not” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner and Patent Owner characterize one of ordinary skill in the art differently. To Petitioner, the ordinarily skilled artisan would have been a medical doctor, or a professional in a related field, with experience treating cancer or access to those with experience in clinical studies of therapeutics and to a pathologist with this experience. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 19). To Patent Owner, the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had a medical or graduate-level degree, or equivalent work experience, in the fields of immunology, genetics, or a related field and would have experience (i) conducting immunology research relating to oncology, (ii) conducting genetics research relating to oncology, or (iii) developing and conducting clinical trials on novel cancer therapies in those fields. PO Resp. 5–6 (citing Ex. 2072 ¶¶ 31–32, 86–94). Petitioner emphasizes medical and treatment aspects in its characterization of an ordinarily skilled artisan, whereas Patent Owner emphasizes research aspects. The ’356 patent claims a method of treating a human patient with cancer having certain characteristics using pembrolizumab and the main prior art reference cited by Petitioner, MSR, discloses testing Ex. 1005. Accordingly, the relevant field of Patent Owner’s claims is treating human patients for cancer, as well as testing existing compounds for use in treatment modalities. In light of the extent of the relevant field, we determine that the level of skill in the art relevant to the claims of the ’356 patent is not limited to knowledge of and experience with conducting research relating to oncology or developing and conducting clinical trials, but includes knowledge of and experience with treating cancer patients with immunotherapy compounds, identifying the conditions these patients may have, and understanding the literature regarding clinical trials for such colorectal cancers and the associated conditions and immunotherapy.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties do not assert constructions of any terms recited in the challenged claims other than that their ordinary and customary meanings should apply. Pet. 10–11; PO Resp. 6. We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We construe claims “in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency foundUnpatentable
“(“the claimed process here is not directed to a new use; it is the same use, and it consists of the same steps as described by [the prior art]. Newly discovered results of known processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.”). After analysis of the full record, we are persuaded that the results recited in claim 1 would follow from the steps taught in the MSR, for the reasons and based on the evidence Petitioner cites above. For these same reasons, we are unpersuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that it was unknown whether the amount of pembrolizumab recited in claim 1 would be effective in producing an improved outcome compared to a reference patient without a tumor that was not MSI-H or dMMR, and Patent Owner does not dispute that the amount of pembrolizumab disclosed in the MSR (10 mg/kg every 14 days; see Ex. 1005, 4) is the same as the amount provided in the ’356 patent as being effective (10 mg/kg every 14 days; Ex. 1001, 8:48–52, 13:50–52). Regardless of the inventors’ intent in publishing the MSR as a Stage II clinical trial on the www.clinicaltrials.gov website, as discussed above, we determine that the MSR teaches selecting a patient with a metastatic MSI-H or dMMR tumor and administering an amount of pembrolizumab that would be effective. See, e.g., Ex. 1005, 4 (Arms and Interventions). The result of drug treatment inherently follows its administration. The MSR does not merely suggest that pembrolizumab may be useful in some unidentified subset of patients or suggest that some unidentified drug may be useful for MSI-H cancer patients. Instead, the MSR discloses selecting a patient with a condition recited in claim 1 and treating with the drug at the amount recited in claim 1. Contra Metabolite Labs. Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the prior art did not” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 10,934,356 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,934,356 - Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00983 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–6, 10, 17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103 over Alexander and Cosper; the alternative Gregorio-based grounds did not establish unpatentability.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for patent owner
“112(f). Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But if the term does not use the word “means,” then it is presumed not to be subject to Section 112(f). Id. “That presumption can be overcome, but only if the challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Prisua Eng’g Corp., 948 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2020). “The correct inquiry, when ‘means’ is absent from a limitation, is whether the limitation, read in light of the remaining claim language, specification, prosecution history, and relevant extrinsic evidence, has sufficiently definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2014).” slip op. at 12
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“both parties have asserted in the Apple Litigation that the “control component” requirement is a means-plus-function limitation subject to 35 U.S.C. §112(f), despite the fact that the control component limitation does not recite “means for.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1012, 3–8; Ex. 1013, 13); PO Resp. 6–7. Indeed, the court in the Apple Litigation has concluded that the control component requirement is subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), and has construed that requirement accordingly: Function: receiving control signals input to the oscillating resonant module; receiving outputs from the one or more sensors; controlling oscillation of the mass to produce a vibration response according to the received control signals by generating, using one or more of the received sensor outputs, control outputs to an actuator that drives the mass to oscillate. Structure: a microcontroller, a processor, a microprocessor, or a CPU that performs the algorithm shown in Figure 45 or the algorithm described in the corresponding text. See, e.g., 31:19–32:13, and equivalents thereof. Ex. 2001, 10; Ex. 2002, 40. Because of the Apple Litigation record, Petitioner presents its challenges in the alternative, first applying a plain meaning approach to the control component requirement, and also analyzing the requirement under the construction adopted in the Apple Litigation. Pet. 3–5. We adopt the court’s construction in the Apple Litigation. 35 U.S.C.” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of vibration-generating systems; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 27. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 2. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’882 patent specification.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“(1) Analogous Art Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 419.” slip op. at 22
Patent outcomesUS 11,152,882 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,152,882 - Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems Inc., D/B/A/ RevelhmiAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00698 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 based on the asserted combinations of Izumi, Cosper, Rossi, Ibuki, and Aldrich.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi’s module to include multiple sensors in accordance with Cosper’s teachings. Pet. 15. Petitioner argues that the sensors would monitor the moving element and generate a control signal in accordance with Izumi. Id. at 15–16. Petitioner further argues that Izumi’s controller would have been implemented using a microprocessor and memory as Cosper suggests. Id. at 16. Petitioner argues three reasons why a person having ordinary skill in the art would have combined Izumi with Cosper’s teachings. Id. at 16–19. First, Petitioner argues that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have looked to Cosper as a way to further Izumi’s objective of having a sensor that detects the and controls the movement of the moving element. Id. at 16–17. Second, Petitioner argues that the combination of Izumi and Cosper would have enhanced reliability of the feedback sensors by capturing “data specific to different operating parameters.” Id. at 17–18. Third, combining the references’ teachings would “facilitat[e] implementation of software instructions” by using a microprocessor and memory. Id. at 18–19. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s rationale to combine the references’ teachings. Based on our review and consideration of the record, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Izumi and Cosper in the manner Petitioner argues (“the Izumi-Cosper combination”).” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,093,767 - Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems Inc., D/B/A/ RevelhmiAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00697 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5 are unpatentable under § 103 based on the combinations of prior art listed in the decision.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. PO Resp. 2–3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention and states that “Patent Owner does not believe that any of the arguments herein would change if the Board were to adopt Petitioner’s definition for the level of ordinary skill rather than Patent Owner’s.” Id. at 3. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). Our reasoning herein would be the same under Patent Owner’s similar proposal.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for petitioner
“Claim 1, Preamble. Both parties agree that the preamble of claim 1 is limiting. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 6. We agree that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. We also note that the parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“Because neither party asserts that construction of “driving component” or “control component” is necessary to resolve the issues before us, we decline to expressly construe these claim terms. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For clarity, because Petitioner argues that plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate and because Patent Owner does not dispute that construction, we adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of these claim terms when comparing the challenged claims to the prior art. Other claim terms. It is unnecessary for us to expressly construe other claim terms for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Our reviewing court has stated that “[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotes omitted). While these two criteria are helpful in many instances, we must not lose sight of the key question at hand: what is “prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)? References that are “too remote to be treated as ‘prior art’” are excluded from the obviousness analysis. In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 741, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The non-analogous art test provides helpful insight on the underlying question of what is “prior art” within the meaning of the statute; we should not, however, be blind to the reality of the circumstances of the case before us. In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA (1979). Nor should we adhere to rigid and mandatory formulas that overly limit the inquiry. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 8,093,767 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,093,767 - PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00847 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–11 because Petitioners showed a reasonable likelihood of proving at least one challenged claim unpatentable across the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioners meet the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–11 of the ’847 patent based upon Petitioners’ asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, chemistry, materials science, or a related field and three years of work experience in semiconductor manufacturing, such as, for example, in integrated circuit device (or transistor) design and/or manufacturing,” and “[a]dditional relevant education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience or training could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 38). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’847 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner does not propose any claim constructions, except to explain that the claim 7 limitation “the spacer further comprises an offset spacer, positioned between the gate and the spacer,” is “satisfied if one layer (an ‘offset spacer’) of the claimed ‘spacer’ lies between another layer of the ‘spacer’ and the gate.” Pet. 11. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions or offer any claim constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because resolution of Petitioner’s proposed construction is unnecessary to our analyses for purposes of this decision, we do not address the proposal here. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We do not discern a need to construe any other claim language at this juncture because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC, 912 F.3d at 1375.” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“a. Claim 1 Petitioner contends that claim 1 is anticipated by Lan or, alternatively, obvious in view of Lan. Pet. 18–26. Petitioner explains how Lan teaches or suggests each recitation of claim 1, and Petitioner’s position is supported by adequate evidence for institution. Id. (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 100–125). Petitioner, for example, persuasively compares the structure of Figure 12 of Lan to each limitation of claim 1. Id. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contentions except to argue that Lan (and the Petition’s other asserted references) “Do Not Mention, Describe, or Concern ‘Raised Epitaxial Layers.’” Prelim. Resp. 22–24. Patent Owner does not persuasively undermine Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,745,847 - Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2024-00806 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–8, 15–17, and 20 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 14 and 19 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed paramagnetic flux paths in Wakuda lacked adequate support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 33. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” PO Resp. 3. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’830 patent specification.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that independent claims 1, 19, and 20 include means plus function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.8 Pet. 3–7; PO Resp. 6–14. An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. In particular, the parties agree that the “driving component” and “control component” requirements of independent claims 1, 19, and 20 are means plus function limitations. Pet. 3–7; PO Resp. 6–14. Construing a means plus function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 involves two steps: 1) identifying the claimed function and 2) identifying in the specification the corresponding structure that performs the claimed function. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Therefore, the specification clearly links the function of “control[ing] supply of power from the power supply to . . . cause the moveable component to oscillate at a frequency . . . specified by one or more stored values” at least to portions of steps 706 and 708 of the flow diagram algorithm of Figure 7A, as described above. Thus, the control component requires a microprocessor and memory with algorithmic structure including a timing algorithm or similar coding for creating a control output signal that flips to control the direction of current flow through a coil (e.g., coil 514, Fig. 5, coil 626, Fig. 6), where the coil is structure that corresponds to the recited “driving component,” as noted above.11 We adopt the District Court’s conclusion in the Apple litigation that the “control component” structure itself does not require an H-bridge switch, but only requires that the processor generates the “d” inputs to the switch; and further that the structure does not require does not require computing initial default values as specified in step 702 of Figure 7A (i.e., values not specified by a user). Ex. 3001, 30–33, 35. This is in accord with settled law 11 “Rather than using a formal timer mechanism, certain implementations may simply employ counted loops or other simple programming techniques for periodically carrying out tasks.” Ex. 1001, 7:17–20. that limits the structure to that necessary to perform the claimed function. 12 By the same token, we modify the District Court’s construction to the extent it would require, based on such steps as 706, 710, and 716, a specific order of the steps of generating the “p” and “d” values. The claims only require the control component to control the power supply to cause oscillation at a specified frequency and amplitude, but do not require the frequency value to be generated before the amplitude value, or vice versa.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“to include the ability disclosed in Ramsay to allow a user to customize and store parameters associated with haptic effects, such as creating “haptic track files” that specify variations in the amplitude and frequency of the effect over time to achieve a desired effect. Pet. 46–47 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 15, 25– 28, 37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 192–193). Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the desire to expand the functionalities of haptic devices to allow end users to create and customize haptic effects, to provide a fuller haptic experience, and to be able to store haptic effects to save processing power compared to real-time generated effects. Id. at 47–49 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 14–15, 30, 47, 53–57; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 194–196). Petitioner argues that this making combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that both references deal with linear actuators, both disclose storing frequency and amplitude values, and the combination involves routine knowledge of software techniques. Id. at 49–50 (citing Ex. 1004, 2:3–9; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 17, 26–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 197–198). Petitioner further argues that it would have been obvious to use the H-bridge switch of Rossi as part of the Gregorio actuator drive circuit 16 in the asserted Gregorio-Ramsay combination to periodically switch the polarity of drive signals to electric coil 28 of Gregorio, and thus oscillate magnet 27, under the control of a signal from processor 12 of Gregorio. Pet. 56 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 211). Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated because Gregorio does not disclose implementation details and therefore one of ordinary skill would have looked toward teachings like Rossi to fill in those details, and that an H-bridge switch was a well-known example circuit for implementing a change in “current flow direction/polarity” for “push” and “pull” actions in a system, and was a simple, cost-effective, and reliable circuit design. Id. at 56–58 (citing Ex. 1020, Abstr., Figs. 4, 6, 1:65–3:54; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 212–217). Petitioner argues that making this combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that it involved known techniques through routine circuit design considerations and software instructions for generating the control signal. Id. at 58 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 218). Petitioner further argues that it would have been obvious to modify the Gregorio-Ramsay-Rossi combination, using the control algorithm disclosed in Aldrich, to replace the monitoring technique of Gregorio with that of Aldrich to maintain a resonance frequency by incrementing or decrementing the drive frequency. Pet. 58–59 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:22–28, 4:42–48; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 219). Petitioner’s expert provides implementation details of Aldrich, including that the Aldrich hill-climb technique would use a Boolean value to indicate whether the frequency was being increased, with local variables set to default values, and use integer values when processing sensor signals. Id. at 59–60 (citing Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 220–222). Petitioner argues that these modifications would have been motivated to improve the Gregorio system using the Aldrich feedback algorithm for targeting a resonant frequency, given that the Gregorio approach had shortcomings that required a monitoring period with reduced haptic feedback, receiving weak EMF signals. Id. at 61–62 (citing Ex. 2004, 3:65–5:55, 5:63–65; Ex. 1021, 1–3; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 223–227). Petitioner argues that making this combination would have had a reasonable expectation of success given that it involved known techniques for improvement to yield predictable results, readily implemented via software executed by the microprocessor. Id. at 62–63 (citing Ex. 2004, 2:44–50; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶ 229). Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s arguments regarding the” slip op. at 27
Patent outcomesUS 9,941,830 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,941,830
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.