- PTAB · Nov 7, 2025 · IPR2025-00913 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–30 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–25, 27–28, and 30 are obvious over Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)). A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). Obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17– 18 (1966). A party who petitions the Board for a determination of obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated to invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). We assess Petitioner’s evidence and argument according to the above- referenced obviousness standard. We determine that the Petition satisfies the reasonable likelihood of prevailing standard under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We begin our analysis with a discussion of the Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref references. slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us that reflects the knowledge and experience of a POSITA. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the Petition’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the description in the ’034 patent, the prior art of record, and the testimony of both experts.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner relies on the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms consistent with the Phillips standard. Pet. 12–13 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). The Petition addresses the construction of “peer-to-peer architecture” recited in independent claims 1 and 30 of the ’034 patent, a limitation we need not construe to decide the institution question. Id. at 13; Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner contends that “no claim construction is required” to address the Petition’s asserted deficiencies. Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner also contends, however, that the Petition relies on a “novel claim construction” of limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1]—“second [third] hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores”—to support Petitioner’s obviousness argument. Id. at 11–12.8 Patent Owner challenges the Petition’s reliance on “single core processors on different chips,” such as the Power3 single-core processors of the Symmetric Multi- Processor (“SMP”) configuration disclosed in the RS6000 reference, as a disclosure of limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1]. Id. Patent Owner contends that such single-core processors on different chips do not satisfy limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1] because the ’034 patent “claims only multicore processors.” Prelim. Resp. 5 (citing Ex. 1001, 7:15–27). Petitioner responds in part as follows: To the extent PO is implicitly arguing that RS6000’s “four, eight, twelve, or sixteen 375 MHz 630FP 64-bit processors” do not teach the recited “cores,” Patent Owner’s argument excludes embodiments described in the ’034 patent’s specification. The ’034 patent describes “[p]rocessor cores [as] generally independent microprocessors.” Ex.1001, 5:14–15. Patent Owner’s attempt to exclude RS6000 from the scope of the claims 8 Pursuant to the Board’s Order on Related Matter Updates (Paper 14), the parties filed the September 26, 2025 Claim Construction Order entered in the co-pending District Court litigation in this proceeding. Ex. 1085. The District Court Claim Construction Order did not construe the claim phrase “hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores.” Id. patent where the processor has independent microprocessors. Patent Owner’s attempt to distinguish RS6000’s Symmetric MultiProcessor as a “configuration” (Paper 8, 24) also fails because a “Symmetric MultiProcessor configuration” is no different than the ’034 patent’s description of a configuration of independent microprocessors. Id. Paper 9, 30.9 It is apparent there is a dispute over the plain meaning of Limitations [1.4.1] and [1.5.1], “a second [third] hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores,” recited in the independent claims.10 The parties are ordered to propose and support a particularized plain meaning or other construction of Limitations [1.4.1], [1.5.1], and [30.1.2] in their briefs. The parties are ordered to analyze the relevant claim language and cite to the specification and prosecution history in support of their claim construction, where applicable, with particular attention to the description of a hardware processor with a plurality of processing cores in the ’034 patent. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:11–37, 7:14–36, 9:50–10:3.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artInstituted
“Motivation to Combine and Analogous Art The Petition offers several motivations to combine Menon, Trefethen, RS6000, and POEref in the manner claimed in the ’034 patent with a reasonable expectation of success, which we find sufficient on the present record. The Petition first asserts that Menon and Trefethen are analogous prior art because they pertain to the same “field of cluster computing” as the ’034 patent and “are reasonably pertinent to the problem of the ’034 patent, namely, executing a single program on multiple nodes.” Pet. 22 (citing Ex.1001, 1:14–15; Ex.1003, ¶¶ 65–69; Ex. 1005, 2; Ex. 1006, Abstract). The Petition points out that Menon expressly cites and builds on the MultiMATLAB system taught by Trefethen. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 71; Ex. 1005, 1–2). The Petition also contends that: Accordingly, Menon and Trefethen together represent a combination of prior art elements according to known methods (executing MATLAB code on a multiprocessor system) to yield the predictable result discussed in both papers: the MultiMATLAB system executing MATLAB in parallel to perform mathematical calculations. Id. at 22–23 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 70; Ex.1005, Abstract; Ex. 1006, 2–7). The Petition further contends that a POSITA would have found it predictable to combine Trefethen with Menon with a reasonable expectation of success” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,570,034 - Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 5, 2025 · IPR2025-00895 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–20 and all asserted challenges after finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim would be unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had at least [a bachelor’s degree in] electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field, along with two years of experience designing or developing wireless networks. Additional education might substitute for some of the experience, and additional substantial experience might substitute for some of the educational background. . . . A POSITA would also have familiarity with the 3GPP LTE standards, and would have understood how to search through the available Technical Specifications for implementing RAN technologies. Pet. 21–22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 50–53). Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage, with a proposed modification to insert “a bachelor’s degree in” to Petitioner’s statement. Prelim. Resp. 12–13; id. at 12, n.1. We have inserted this proposed modification in brackets in the above block quotation. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal, as modified by Patent Owner, is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’113 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s skill definition at this stage.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“The parties do not propose any claim constructions. See Pet. 11–12; Prelim. Resp. 8. As no terms are in dispute, we determine that no terms require construction at this stage.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“IV. CONCLUSION At this stage of the proceeding, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges as to at least one challenged claim. At this preliminary stage, we have not made a final determination as to the patentability of the challenged claims or any underlying factual and legal issues. V. ORDER It is, therefore, ORDERED that, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’113 patent is instituted with respect to all challenges of unpatentability set forth in the Petition; and FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(c) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial commencing on the entry date of this Decision.” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“measurement value, as Jover teaches.” Id. (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 39–40; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). Among other reasons, Petitioner contends that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine “to improve the accuracy and reliability of the beam failure determination.” Id. at 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). Petitioner further contends that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success because “it would have been straightforward for a POSITA to implement Jover’s triggering condition in Xia’s method.” Id. at 38 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 115–30). After considering Patent Owner’s arguments, which we address below, we agree with Petitioner at this stage that the combination of Xia and Jover renders obvious limitation [1e]. Patent Owner first argues that Jover “does not cure the deficiencies of Xia because Jover’s threshold condition for an increase in BER is not used for triggering a transmission of the first and second radio signal.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Just like Xia, Patent Owner contends, Jover discloses no “causality between the threshold being exceeded and transmitting the first and second radio signal.” Id. at 21. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s showing at this stage because Petitioner relies on Xia, not Jover, for the claimed “triggering the transmission,” or “causality,” as Patent Owner calls it. See Pet. 36–38. That is, Petitioner relies on Jover for the triggering condition and on Xia for the actual triggering. See id. Patent Owner’s argument attacking the references individually is unpersuasive. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of refences.”). Patent Owner next contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined Xia and Jover “since Jover is directed to the opposite objective of the ’113 Patent or Xia.” Prelim. Resp. 21. That is, Patent Owner asserts, Jover teaches away from the disclosed methods. Id. at 22. Patent Owner explains, “Jover provides no attempt to improve the beam strength, but rather ignores it through beam sweeping or nullif[ies] it, in contrast to the purpose of the ’113 Patent.” Id. at 22–23. At this stage, Patent Owner’s argument is insufficient to undermine” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,568,113 - Apple Inc. v. Ferid AllaniInstitutedPTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00857 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–27 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability for claims 21 and 23–26.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review may not be authorized by statute “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Upon consideration of the record before us, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of claims 1– 27 of the ’058 patent. Accordingly, we institute the requested inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“A [person of ordinary skill in the art] at the time of the ’058 Patent would have had bachelor’s degree in computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field, with two to three years of experience with web-based information systems. Additional education or experience might substitute for the above requirements. Dec., ¶¶37-39. Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–39). Patent Owner contends that: A [person of ordinary skill in the art] at that time would be a person with a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a closely related discipline and two years of relevant professional experience in software engineering or a 2 US Patent No. 6,119,155 issued Sept. 12, 2000 (Ex. 1004). 3 US Patent No. 6,037,934 issued Mar. 14, 2000 (Ex. 1005). 4 US Patent No. 6,353,839 B1 filed Apr. 30, 1998, issued Mar. 5, 2002 (Ex. 1006). 5 US Patent No. 6,493,702 B1 filed May 5, 1999, issued Dec. 10, 2002 (Ex. 1008). 6 US Patent No. 6,138,158 issued Oct. 24, 2000 (Ex. 1007). similar field. Alternatively, someone with an advanced degree and less professional experience or less education and more professional experience would also qualify as a [person of ordinary skill in the art]. Prelim. Resp. 11. Given that Patent Owner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill substantially overlaps with Petitioner’s definition, and given that Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that the plain meaning of “beforehand locally stored” requires the claimed selection pages to be present on the local device before a user conducts a preliminary search. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that a user could download and store selection pages to the local device, such downloading and storing must occur before the user locally performs a preliminary search in order for the selection pages to be “beforehand locally stored” within the scope of claims 1 and 27. We construe the terms “said selection pages being beforehand locally stored” recited in claim 1 and “said selection pages being . . . beforehand locally stored” recited in claim 27 as requiring the selection pages to be locally stored before a user locally performs a preliminary search.” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner. Rossman discloses times when accessing a web page over the network is unavoidable. Col. 8; see Pet. 21. Himmel teaches that using a bookmark to directly access a desired page is quicker than navigating through intermediate pages to get to the desired page. See Pet. 22–23, 25. Patent Owner does not address Rossman’s disclosure that a request to a network web page may be unavoidable, and does not address Himmel’s disclosure of making a direct request to the desired web page to save time and conserve network resources when accessing the desired web page. On this record, we agree with Petitioner that adding Himmel’s bookmarks to Rossmann’s cards provides the benefit of directly accessing a particular web function, thus reducing network traffic and data usage as compared to navigating multiple web pages to arrive at the particular web function.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,943,058 - Apple Inc. v. Apex Beam Technologies LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00898 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–20 on all asserted challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 6, 11, and 16 would have been obvious over Kim and Chen.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’271 patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review with respect to all challenged claims and challenges asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 10, 16, 29–32). Patent Owner uses Petitioner’s proposed level of skill in the art at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 6. We are persuaded, on the present record, that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’271 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill at this stage.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties do not propose any explicit claim constructions. See Pet. 4–6; Prelim. Resp. 6. As no terms are in dispute, we do not construe any terms. Petitioner discusses constructions proposed by Patent Owner in the Samsung IPR, but Patent Owner does not rely on those constructions here. Pet. 4–6 (citing IPR2023-00747, Paper 14 at 11–13). We therefore do not address them at this stage.” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“discloses the claimed “proportional sequence.” Prelim. Resp. 9. First, Patent Owner contends that “indexes of antenna port groups with RSRP measurement values higher than a certain threshold are not a sequence of ratios,” but rather, just an identification of antenna port groups. Id. (emphasis added). We disagree, on this record. The flaw in this reasoning is that the claim does not require the first proportional sequence to be a sequence of ratios. Rather, the claimed “first proportional sequence” merely “corresponds to . . . ratios.” Thus, Patent Owner’s argument that the indexes “are not a sequence of ratios” is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Petitioner persuades us, at this stage, that the indexes correspond to ratios (e.g., RSRP_n/max(RSRP_i)). See Pet. 32–33.” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,951,271 - Kohler Co. v. Delta Faucet Co.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 1, 2025 · IPR2024-00700 · APJ Jane E Inglese · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 3–8 and 10–24 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted references failed to establish limitations including the claimed light pipe features.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook) qualifies as a POSITA under this definition, and, therefore, is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the areas of expertise prescribed by the definition. As indicated above, Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA does not require education in the field of optics and professional experience designing or analyzing optical apparatus, unlike Patent Owner’s definition. We are aware, however, that Patent Owner’s witness (Dr. Klopp) has more extensive experience with optical systems and methods than Petitioner’s witness (Mr. Cook). Compare Ex 1003 ¶¶ 8–14, Ex. 2005, 39:21–59:17, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 3–20, Ex. 2004, 1–2, Ex. 1015, 10:22–13:25. Although Mr. Cook possesses excellent credentials in the field of mechanical engineering, his experience in the design and analysis of optical systems and methods is sparse and insubstantial compared to that of Dr. Klopp. Id. Due to this difference in experience levels, in instances where the witnesses express differing views on factual issues related to optical systems and methods, we will accord more weight to Dr. Klopp’s testimony than to Mr. Cook’s.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“through the light transmission portion and bottom output face 313 of light conductor 38, which teaches transmitting light in parallel with the longitudinal axis of the housing. Tseng does not disclose or teach that light is emitted through the side surface of annular protrusion 383 in a direction perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the housing. Ex. 1004 ¶ 97. Petitioner’s assertions that this would be the case consist solely of conclusory statements, supported only by citations to Mr. Cook’s declaration. Mr. Cook, however, simply repeats Petitioner’s conclusory statements, without providing sound technical reasoning supported by objective evidence to explain and support his opinions. Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101– 102, 105, 195–198, 202. We, therefore, accord little weight to Mr. Cook’s opinion on this particular matter because it “merely repeats, verbatim, the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support,” and “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning [in] support.” Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). Furthermore, Mr. Cook’s opinion conflicts with that of Patent Owner’s witness, Dr. Klopp, who opines that a “POSITA would understand from Tseng’s third embodiment that light from the LED would bypass the annular protrusion 383 of outer cliff 381, while transmitting downwardly toward the output face 313.” Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 174–175, 190–194, with Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 101–102, 105. As discussed above, Mr. Cook is qualified to opine from the perspective of a POSITA on technical matters included within the expertise of a person meeting Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA, which do not include optics and optical apparatus. We, therefore, credit Dr. Klopp’s opinion over that of Mr. Cook on this particular factual issue of how it is directly related to optical systems and methods about which Mr. Cook possesses limited relevant experience. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 6–15 (experience in communication systems and electronics); Ex. 2005, 55:16–58:19 (design experience with electronics that use indicator lights or fiber-optic communications; no professional experience with light pipes, diffusers, or plumbing fixtures). Dr. Klopp possesses substantial research and professional experience with optical methods, fiber optic light pipes, light guides, diffusers, prisms, and analysis of faucets, spray heads, and plumbing fixtures. See Ex. 2003 ¶¶ 6–10 Supra 8 (discussing weight accorded to conflicting witness testimony); see also Resp. 2–3 (arguing that “Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Cook, is a mechanical engineer with substantial professional experience in electronics for high-voltage power systems and communications, but he has limited experience with the claimed subject matter.”).” slip op. at 34
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“would be used to construe the claim[s] in a civil action [held] under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, claim terms generally are given their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the invention when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner asserts that the claim terms do not require construction and should be afforded their plain and ordinary meaning. Pet. 13. Patent Owner contends that it applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms. Resp. 7. Taking into consideration the information presented, we determine that none of the claim terms requires express construction for purposes of resolving the dispute before us.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenMixed
“perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of Tseng’s housing (internal 33 and external 34 sleeves). “In an inter partes review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to the patentee.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017 (en banc (quoting Magnum Oil)).” slip op. at 40
Patent outcomesUS 10,393,363 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,393,363 - Ceva Santé Animale S.A. / Egg-Chick Automated Technologies S.A.S et al. v. Targan, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2024-00595 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted §103 grounds; Petitioner did not show claims 16–18 unpatentable because the angled-conveyor combination lacked a supported rationale.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There is uncontested evidence in the record before us, including the ’124 patent, the Gershman, Pierre, Yavnai, Tao, and Goodwin references, and the background and qualifications of both sides expert witnesses that reflect the knowledge and experience of a POSITA, including knowledge of systems for assessing and transporting poultry in an industrial setting. Patent Owner’s proposed skill level overlaps with Petitioner’s proposed skill level, and any differences would not alter the outcome of this proceeding. Therefore, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed skill level with two modifications. A POSITA also could have a Bachelor of Science degree in Animal Science or similar discipline, and a POSITA would be familiar with techniques for assessing and transporting poultry in an industrial setting, such as visual and/or anatomical characteristics of a chick.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“Therefore, we find that Applicant distinguished Tao from “an unrestrained chick” because in Tao’s automated system a chick is restrained—the chick is held in place—by a retainer unit on a moving platform, whereas in Applicant’s claimed system a chick is not held in place on a moving platform. We further conclude that Applicant’s reason for distinguishing the claimed invention over Tao informs the claim construction even if the “prosecution history statements do not rise to the level of unmistakable disavowal . . . .” Personalized Media, 952 F.3d at 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In view of the ’124 patent claims, specification, and prosecution history, we determine “an unrestrained chick” is a chick not held in place on the moving platform and free to open its wings.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“For the reasons given below, we find the Petition has established that Gershman discloses and teaches “a moving platform to support an unrestrained chick of a particular breed” by a preponderance of the evidence.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“to determine a characteristic [of the chick] . . . [that] manifests in one of two or more possible states, e.g., sex (male vs. female), health (healthy vs. unhealthy), genetic mutation (present vs. not present).” Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1004, 3). The recitation of a generic “database of images” does not distinguish limitation [1.4] from the asserted combination of Gershman-Pierre, particularly in view of Pierre’s disclosure of “a computerized processing process is implemented in order to compare the captured images to reference images,” as asserted in the Petition. Ex. 1004, 3 (emphasis added); see Pet. 23–24 (citing Ex. 1003, 2–5; Ex. 1004, 3, 5). Thus, we find that storage of Pierre’s reference images of male and female wing feathers in a database used for comparison in Gershman’s computerized digital chick image processing system would have been obvious to a POSITA and satisfies limitation [1.4].19 We agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious and well within the skill level of a POSITA—someone with a Bachelor of Science degree in agricultural, industrial, or electrical engineering and two years of experience in industrial poultry sexing and/or image processing (Resp. 20)—to store reference images as taught by Pierre in a “computerized processing” database. The rationale argued by Petitioner, to organize the collection of reference images for comparison to determine whether the characteristic of interest was present, finds direct support in Gershman and Pierre. Both references disclose comparing digital images of a chick’s wing feathers to reference data (Gershman) or reference images (Pierre) of male and female chick wing patterns. Pet. 23–24; Reply 12–13. Storing digital reference images in a database for comparison to captured digital images is, moreover, a basic and straightforward task in any computerized image processing” slip op. at 44
Patent outcomesUS 10,806,124 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,806,124 - Google LLC v. Brodti Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Jul 24, 2025 · IPR2025-00472 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10, and 19 are obvious over Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). We may not institute an inter partes review “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Considering the subject matter of the ’898 patent, the background technical field, the prior art, and Petitioner’s proposed and unopposed definition of the skilled artisan (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 9–12), we apply the level of skill set forth above.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“Petitioner submits that all terms in the Challenged Claims should be given their plain and ordinary meaning in this proceeding, and that no specific construction of any claim term is required to resolve this case. Pet. 6 (“Petitioner does not believe express claim construction is necessary to resolve this Petition.”). Patent Owner has not submitted a preliminary response, and thus does not propose any terms for construction at this stage. In determining that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of establishing unpatentability of at least one Challenged Claim, we need not and do not construe expressly any claim terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner argues the skilled artisan would have had various rational reasons for combining the teachings of these four references, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. See, e.g., Pet. 18–21 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas and Laidlaw and expectation of success in doing so), 33–37 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas and Mayadas and expectation of success in doing so), 44–45 (discussing reasons to combine Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error and expectation of success in doing so). Based on the record before us, we find Petitioner sufficiently shows that the combination of Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error would have taught or at least fairly suggested to the skilled artisan the limitations of claim 1.4 Thus, for the reasons stated in the Petition (Pet. 8–51), we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing that independent claim 1 would have been unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Nicholas, Laidlaw, Mayadas, and Error.” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,416,898 - Apple Inc. v. DH International Ltd.InstitutedPTAB · Jun 25, 2025 · IPR2025-00172 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 10–12, and 19 are obvious over Suga and Gorsuch.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim in the ’294 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’294 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention of the ’294 Patent (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or in a similar discipline with at least two years of experience with wireless communication devices and networks. More education can substitute for practical experience and vice versa. Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 34). Patent Owner states that it “agrees with Petitioner on the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 8 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 26–29).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Both parties rely on the language of claim 1 and the ’294 patent specification to support their respective constructions, and they emphasize that a user’s selective triggering of the control device does not issue different activation commands or control which data conveyance operation is used. Claim 1 recites an “invariable activation command” as a command that is “issued when said control device is selectively triggered by the user.” selectively trigger a control device “via one of a button, a keypad, a tactile screen, and a biometric parameter detector,” e.g., by entering a PIN that is authenticated, in order for an invariable activation command to be issued. Id. at 8:43–50, 10:26–29, 19:3–5. The claimed function of an invariable activation command is to “initiate[]” either a “first data conveyance operation” or a “second data conveyance operation” depending on whether “said switching element is in said first state” or “in said second state.” As explained above, the state of the switching element depends on whether or not an “activation cue” has been received by a “cue receiver.” The ’294 patent specification confirms the operation. Id. at 10:26–36, 15:14–28. The parties joust over the proper terminology for characterizing an “invariable” activation command, but they appear to agree on how the claimed cell phone and method work. The ’294 patent specification makes clear that the activation command is “invariable” in the sense that whenever a user selectively triggers the control device on the cell phone, for example by pressing a button on a keypad, the same command is issued to initiate a data conveyance operation regardless of the “state” of the “switching element” (i.e., in a “first state” or “second state”). The user cannot select or issue different activation commands. The selection of which of the two possible data conveyance operations will be initiated by selectively triggering the control device depends not on the activation command—it is always the same—but on whether the switching element has received an activation cue (“first state”) or not (“second state”). The ’294 patent neatly summarizes that “[t]he same invariable activation command will thus be issued upon [the] control device being triggered, and it is the state of [the]” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The ’294 patent claims and specification make clear that the switching element switches between a “first state” and a “second state” depending on whether or not an activation cue is received. Ex. 1001, 9:28–41, 14:53–59. The state of the switch, in turn, “allow[s] data to be conveyed according to alternate data conveyance operations.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the claim limitation is recited as a “data conveyance switching element,” not a “data switch,” because the switching element allows the device to switch between alternate operations for conveying data from the cellular phone to an external data exchange device. Id. Patent Owner’s proposed construction “conflicts with the express disclosure of the ’294 Patent.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (The “specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’”) (citation omitted). On the present record, we determine that no further construction of claim terms is necessary to determine whether to institute a trial in this case. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. &” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,022,294 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Beth Z Shaw · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–26 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv Order 6. That is the case here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor strongly weighs against exercising the authority to deny institution. Id. Under the second Fintiv factor, the proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision weighs against exercising our authority to deny institution because there is no trial date scheduled. Id. at 9; see Ex. 1031, 3. slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute an inter partes review, we must determine “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). The Board, however, has discretion to deny a petition even when a petitioner meets that threshold. Id.; see, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) (“[T]he agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion.”). For the reasons that follow, we grant institution of inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). Petitioner further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition (see Prelim. Resp. 13–14), but states that a POSITA “would understand that . . . the subject of the patent is a software-based solution to broadcasting multimedia streams, and the skillset and expertise in hardware-based systems would not make one knowledgeable about software-based systems.” Prelim. Resp. 13–14. We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). The difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions based on the present record. Should Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition during trial, we encourage Patent Owner to explain how a software-focused definition would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision.” slip op. at 10
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“Claim 1 does not limit the “caching unit” in any way. With this in mind, we preliminarily agree that Farber discloses the subject matter of limitation 1a sufficiently to meet Petitioner’s burden on institution. b.” slip op. at 14
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 11,140,441 - PTAB · Jun 13, 2025 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–13 for all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“After Patent Owner made these arguments, though, the district court in the Florida Litigation (1) stayed all deadlines indefinitely and (2) said that the October trial will not go forward as scheduled. Ex. 1028, 3. “A district court stay of the litigation pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv Order 6. That is the case here. Thus, the first Fintiv factor strongly weighs against exercising the authority to deny institution. Id.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Conclusion At this stage and on this record, it is reasonably likely that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Avellan. The Petition’s merits are compelling because Petitioner’s challenge plainly leads to a conclusion that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelOther
“B. Merits 1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to the Petition, Here, a Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art (“POSITA”) at the time of the claimed invention would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols. . . . A person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could also meet the standard. Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 68–69). Patent Owner provides a different definition: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the inventions in the ‘002 Patent would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science or a related field, and at least two years of experience working in the field of software systems used in generating and broadcasting multimedia streams. An individual with less technical education but more experience, or vice versa, could also qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 59) (emphasis added). Patent Owner argues that the definition must include experience in software systems because the invention is a software-based solution. Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 2006 ¶ 60). At this stage, our decision would be the same under either definition. Should Patent Owner dispute Petitioner’s definition during trial, we encourage Patent Owner to explain how a software-focused definition would affect any obviousness analysis in our final written decision.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Instituted
“There is no dispute that (1) Avellan’s user initiates the request and eventually receives the stream and (2) gateway server 134 receives a request for a media stream for playback on a broadcast channel. See id. at 32–39; Pet. 22. The issue here is whether claim 1 requires that the recited “content provider” originates the request. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 does not require this. Prelim. Reply 7. Apart from being received from the content provider, claim 1 does not limit the request’s origin in any way. Rather, claim 1 only requires that the request is received from the content provider. Ex. 1001, 14:51–54. Claim 1 recites “comprising” in the preamble of the method (id. at 14:50), which is a encompasses user-originated requests that are received from other entities. With this understanding of the claim, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that Avellan discloses limitation 1a through its communication path from network 150 to user computers 1041–104n via gateway platforms 1301–130n. Pet. 22. That is, Avellan’s gateway platform 134 receives a request for at least one media stream, and claim 1 does not exclude user-originated requests. See id. We agree that the content can be video from CNN, BBC, ESPN, or other live-streaming television feeds. Id. at 24 (citing Ex. 1003, 8:18–21). Thus, at this stage and on this record, we agree with Petitioner that Avellan discloses limitation 1a. See id. at 22. ii. Remaining Limitations Apart from the arguments discussed above, Patent Owner does not present arguments specifically directed to the other limitations of claim 1. See Prelim. Resp. We determine that Petitioner’s arguments made in connection with those limitations are sufficient at this stage and on this record. Pet. 24–32. We agree with Petitioner that Avellan teaches obtaining content from the networks 150 and 152, as recited in 1b; rendering a webpage by a browser at gateway 134, as recited in 1c; generating the screen captures at gateway 134, as recited in 1d; and assembling and providing the media stream when gateway server 134 compresses the image or video format and sends it to the browser 106, as recited in 1e and 1f. Id. at 24–29. Petitioner has provided a sufficient rationale at this stage why a method with the subject matter recited in lg and 1h would have been obvious. Id. at 29– 32. Conclusion At this stage and on this record, it is reasonably likely that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Avellan. The Petition’s merits are compelling because Petitioner’s challenge plainly leads to a conclusion that claim 1 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 12
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,524,002
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.