- Charter Communications, Inc. / Altice USA, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-01231 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable under §103; claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations do not teach or justify the claimed server-side command conversion.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’251 patent would have had: (1) the equivalent of a four-year, B.S. degree from an accredited institution in computer science, computer engineering or an equivalent field; (2) approximately two years of professional experience with Internet-based video delivery systems; and (3) working proficiency with network architecture, including Internet-hosted server-client systems, and with computer programming. PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Wicker, testifies that the parties’ definitions are only “slightly different,” and that if Dr. Wicker were to adopt Petitioner’s definition, that would not change any of his opinions. Ex. 2025 ¶ 24. Because the parties’ definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art only “slightly differ,” we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’251 patent and the asserted prior art. Regardless of which definition is applied, our analysis and decision would not change.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Both parties propose construing the claim term “media player” because it was construed in a related inter partes review proceeding as well as in a district court case. Pet. 19; PO Resp. 21. According to Patent Owner, construing “media player” to mean “software for playing media” would be consistent with the construction applied in both related proceedings. PO Resp. 21. Petitioner agrees, noting that the term “media player” “‘refers to software and not to a hardware device.’” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1164, 13). player” used by both parties, and we need not engage in any further claim construction because there are no claim construction disputes that bear on the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Alleged Obviousness of Claims 1–26 in View of Danciu and Mahajan or” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position. To the contrary, we find Dr. Wicker’s testimony to be credible because it is supported by the disclosures in both Mahajan and Danciu. Specifically, we agree with Dr. Wicker, who testified that Mahajan does not describe an abstraction layer as ever being on “a server in the network.” See Ex.1197, 18:21–24. We also find Dr. Wicker’s testimony credible when he explained that even if Mahajan’s abstraction layer were implemented on a server in a network as posited by Petitioner, it still would not result in the claim mapping proposed by Petitioner. See Ex. 2025 ¶ 45 (Dr. Wicker: “[T]he two abstraction modules work together to create a ‘collaboration media abstraction layer 130.’”) (citing Ex. 1114 ¶ 22; Ex. 2027, 39:6–40:12, 44:10–19 (Mr. Lett reading from and agreeing with paragraph 45 of Dr. Wicker’s Declaration)).” slip op. at 25
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,356,251 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,356,251 - Charter Communications, Inc. / Altice USA, Inc. v. Touchstream Technologies, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 12, 2025 · IPR2024-00322 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 22–26 are unpatentable under § 103; claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations do not teach or justify the claimed server-side command conversion.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’251 patent would have had: (1) the equivalent of a four-year, B.S. degree from an accredited institution in computer science, computer engineering or an equivalent field; (2) approximately two years of professional experience with Internet-based video delivery systems; and (3) working proficiency with network architecture, including Internet-hosted server-client systems, and with computer programming. PO Resp. 21 (citing Ex. 2025 ¶¶ 24–25). Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Wicker, testifies that the parties’ definitions are only “slightly different,” and that if Dr. Wicker were to adopt Petitioner’s definition, that would not change any of his opinions. Ex. 2025 ¶ 24. Because the parties’ definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art only “slightly differ,” we accept the assessment offered by Petitioner, which appears consistent with the ’251 patent and the asserted prior art. Regardless of which definition is applied, our analysis and decision would not change.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Both parties propose construing the claim term “media player” because it was construed in a related inter partes review proceeding as well as in a district court case. Pet. 19; PO Resp. 21. According to Patent Owner, construing “media player” to mean “software for playing media” would be consistent with the construction applied in both related proceedings. PO Resp. 21. Petitioner agrees, noting that the term “media player” “‘refers to software and not to a hardware device.’” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1164, 13). player” used by both parties, and we need not engage in any further claim construction because there are no claim construction disputes that bear on the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D. Alleged Obviousness of Claims 1–26 in View of Danciu and Mahajan or” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundMotivation foundMixed
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position.” slip op. at 25
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedMixed
“Mr. Lett testifies that Mahajan “allows for its server media abstraction module to be located in a processing device that may not typically be labeled a ‘server,’ such as remote control 14 of Danciu.” Ex. 1198 ¶ 9 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶ 162; Ex. 1114 ¶ 17). Yet, both Petitioner and Mr. Lett fail to explain how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would take the distributed nature allowed by Mahajan and completely flip its teachings to put a client or remote device process on a server device. Mr. Lett further fails to explain how or why one would want to move Mahajan’s abstraction layer in the first place. Although Mahajan teaches that its system can operate in a distributed environment, based on the explicit disclosure of Mahajan and its examples, we do not understand “distributed” to mean that (i) the server processes can occur on client devices and (ii) that client processes can occur on server devices. See Ex. 1114 ¶¶ 51, 58, 60, 61, 76, 77. Rather, we understand “distributed computing environments” to encompass “an environment where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are linked through a communications network” because that is what is taught in Mahajan. Id. ¶ 58. Our understanding is supported by the testimony of Mr. Lett. See Ex. 1198 ¶ 8 (reciting the explicit disclosure in Mahajan). It is clear, based on the plain reading of Mahajan, that the distributed environment indicates that server 202 and client 204 could be located in different locations, but would be linked through a communications network where user-command 230 flows from client 204 to server 202. See Ex. 1114 ¶ 35, Fig. 2. At no point does Mahajan teach or even suggest that user-commands 230 would flow from server 202 to client 204 as proposed by Petitioner. Additionally, we find insufficient reason in the record to explain Petitioner’s argument appears to be based completely on hindsight bias created in view of the challenged claims. Therefore, we find little credibility in Mr. Lett’s testimony regarding the change or in Petitioner’s position. To the contrary, we find Dr. Wicker’s testimony to be credible because it is supported by the disclosures in both Mahajan and Danciu. Specifically, we agree with Dr. Wicker, who testified that Mahajan does not describe an abstraction layer as ever being on “a server in the network.” See Ex.1197, 18:21–24. We also find Dr. Wicker’s testimony credible when he explained that even if Mahajan’s abstraction layer were implemented on a server in a network as posited by Petitioner, it still would not result in the claim mapping proposed by Petitioner. See Ex. 2025 ¶ 45 (Dr. Wicker: “[T]he two abstraction modules work together to create a ‘collaboration media abstraction layer 130.’”) (citing Ex. 1114 ¶ 22; Ex. 2027, 39:6–40:12, 44:10–19 (Mr. Lett reading from and agreeing with paragraph 45 of Dr. Wicker’s Declaration)).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 8,356,251 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 8,356,251 - Silicon Motion Inc. v. K.Mizra, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01241 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–2 and 4–15 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claims 1 and 2, 4–7, and 9–15 are obvious over Johnson or Stubbs.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). For the reasons provided below, and based on the present record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition. B.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a related field, and 2-3 years of experience in memory system design,” or, alternatively, “a Master’s degree in one of those fields and 1-2 years of relevant experience.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 26–29). Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, but it reserves the right to do so in the event that trial is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 7. There being no present dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation for purposes of this decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “that no construction is necessary for any terms for the purposes of this Petition as the challenged claims are invalid under any reasonable construction.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner states that “the Board need not construe any claim term in a particular manner to arrive at the conclusion that the Petition is substantively deficient.” Prelim. Resp. 7. 5 At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner has not presented objective evidence of non-obviousness. In view of the parties’ positions, we determine that we need not expressly construe any terms for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“to combine Johnson and Moss is inadequate. See Prelim. Resp. 20–24. We tend to agree. In the “Motivation to Combine Johnson and Moss” section, the Petition first asserts that “Johnson and Moss are in the same field of endeavor,” which is insufficient without more to provide a motivation. See, e.g., Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 82 F.4th 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The Petition then asserts that “[t]o provide enhanced flexibility, [one of ordinary skill in the art] in possession of Johnson would look to Moss to incorporate a plurality of delay elements to the data strobe signal.” Pet. 22. This is not persuasive because (a) Petitioner argues that Johnson already provides a plurality of delay elements, (b) Petitioner fails to explain where or how additional delay elements from Moss would be added to Johnson, and (c) Petitioner fails to explain how or why the modification would “provide enhanced flexibility,” or even what “enhanced flexibility” might mean in 9 “a first sampling circuit to sample the first delayed data signal based on the strobe signal” 10 “a second sampling circuit to sample the second delayed data signal based on the received strobe signal” this context. Petitioner also argues that “Moss further discloses that the size of the data path – i.e. the number of data pins in each data path – is a design choice well within the knowledge and ability of a POSITA, and expressly recites examples of 4, 8, and 16-bit wide data paths.” Pet. 23. We agree that varying the width of the data path would have been within level of ordinary skill and would have depended on the particular application, but the Petition fails to explain how or why that would have made it obvious to incorporate various elements of Moss into Johnson.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,111,608 - Silicon Motion Inc. v. K.Mizra LLC.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 5, 2025 · IPR2024-01240 · APJ Michelle N Wormmeester · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–19 based on all asserted challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Meaney and Meaney-Greeff obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons that follow, we institute an inter partes review as to all the challenged claims of the ’466 patent based on all the challenges presented.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or a related field as well as at least two years of academic or industry experience in design and implementation of high-speed digital communication systems.” Pet. 13. Petitioner further asserts that “[a]n individual with an advanced degree in a relevant field, such as computer or electrical engineering, would require less experience in the design and implementation of high-speed digital communication systems, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner “does not contest Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, but it reserves the right to do so if trial is instituted.” Prelim. Resp. 7. There being no present dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s formulation for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). That standard involves construing claims in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claims as would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. See id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner contends that “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to incorporate the termination circuitry disclosed in Greeff with the system of Meaney to achieve enhanced system performance and reliability.” Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1002, app. A at 82). As support, Petitioner asserts that “Greeff’s termination circuitry ensures proper signal integrity and reduces reflections in high-speed data transmission systems.” Id. (citing Ex. 1006, 1:28–31, 4:10–12, 8:3–5; Ex. 1002, app. A at 82). Petitioner further asserts that “Meaney’s calibration techniques, when applied to the termination resistance and transistor drive strength of Greeff, would ensure that these parameters remain optimal throughout system operation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, app. A at 82); see also id. at 54 (“A POSITA would have found it obvious to apply Meaney’s calibration process to Greeff’s termination circuitry in order to optimize the termination resistance and drive strength of the termination circuitry.”). Petitioner adds that “[a] POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Meaney and Greeff.” Id. at 54. According to Petitioner, “[t]he integration of Greeff’s termination circuitry into Meaney’s system would have been straightforward and cost-effective,” any “required modifications are minimal, and the results of the combination are predictable, given the complementary nature of the technologies.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, app. A at 82). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s analysis for this limitation. See Prelim. Resp. Based on Petitioner’s argument and evidence, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that its proposed combination of Meaney and Greeff teaches or suggests the recited “circuitry” of limitation 17a. We also are persuaded that Petitioner’s proffered reasoning for modifying Meaney’s system to include Greeff’s termination circuitry, namely, to ensure proper signal integrity and reduce reflections, is sufficient to support institution. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”).” slip op. at 26
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 9,160,466 - PTAB · Mar 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01253 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–12, 14–21, 23–25, 27–29, and 31–33 based on a reasonable likelihood of obviousness over Eldering-I and Eldering-II.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and the grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“The CTPG states that “the Board recognizes that there may be circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary, including, for example, when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation.” CTPG 59. Patent Owner does not “clearly proffer any necessary stipulations” as the CTPG stresses. See id. at 61 (“If stating that issues are not material or in dispute, the patent owner should clearly proffer any necessary stipulations. For example, the patent owner may seek to avoid additional petitions by proffering a stipulation that certain claim limitations are not disputed or that certain references qualify as prior art.”).” slip op. at 7
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“The Director has broad authority to exercise discretion to deny a petition under § 314. However, Patent Owner does not assert that Petitioner is a real party in interest with United Patents or allege that Petitioner is in a special relationship with Unified Patents based on its membership status, with respect to the EPR. See Paper 11, 5; Ex. 2013, 8–12 (different IPR finding no special relationship between Hulu and Unified Patents); Fintiv, Paper 11 at 13–14 (“If a petitioner is unrelated to a defendant in an earlier court proceeding, the Board has weighed this fact against exercising discretion to deny institution under NHK.”). In addition, the EPR involves only independent claims 1, 10, 19, and 27 and a different combination of prior art. See Ex. 2009, 1, 6 (relying on Wu, Rosenberg, and Angel, or Wu Rosenberg, Eldering, and Engel). In general, “a person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 311. Accordingly, we determine that the circumstances outlined do not tilt toward exercising discretion on this record to deny the Petition.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Petitioner is correct. As summarized above, Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor exercising discretion to deny the Petition so there is no need to address whether the merits are compelling. See Volvo Penta, Paper 15 at 4–5 (“On remand, if the Board determines that Fintiv factors 1–5 favor exercise of discretion to deny institution, the Board shall consider whether the record prior to institution demonstrates that the merits are compelling” (emphasis added)). In addition, as determined below, Petitioner shows that there is a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits with respect to at least one challenged claim. Therefore, Fintiv factor 6 favors not exercising discretion to deny institution. Based on the foregoing discussion, a holistic review of the record favors not exercising discretion to deny institution. Accordingly, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314 based on Fintiv.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,463,768 - PTAB · Mar 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01252 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 5–12, 14–21, 23–25, 27–29, and 31–33 on the asserted obviousness ground over Wu and Doherty.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to the challenged claims and the grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Petitioner is correct. As summarized above, Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor exercising discretion to deny the Petition so there is no need to address whether the merits are compelling. See Volvo Penta, Paper 15 at 4–5 (“On remand, if the Board determines that Fintiv factors 1–5 favor exercise of discretion to deny institution, the Board shall consider whether the record prior to institution demonstrates that the merits are compelling” (emphasis added)). In addition, as determined below, Petitioner shows that there is a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits with respect to at least one challenged claim. Therefore, Fintiv factor 6 favors not exercising discretion to deny institution. Based on the foregoing discussion, a holistic review of the record favors not exercising discretion to deny institution. Accordingly, we decline to exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314 based on Fintiv.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Wu and Doherty are not cumulative to Knepper. As Petitioner argues, the Petition relies on Wu’s teachings regarding a digital recording/play back system allowing users to fast forward through or skip over advertisements during playback and Doherty’s teachings regarding rescheduling advertisements and other items of information (e.g., media content) in response to user input—neither set of teachings is present in Knepper. Reply 2.” slip op. at 45
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionOther
“construction for “intersplicer” as “software that selects advertising content and controls insertion and conveyance of advertising content in media content.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1001, code (57), 7:45–55, 15:4–18). The specification implies that the intersplicer is “application software” that may include an “‘intersplicer’ module.” Ex. 1001, 7:45–58. The module “select[s] . . . the ads to be shown” and controls the insertion and conveyance of ads and the application software “automatically edits the selected advertisements into the presentation stream.” See Pet. 5 (quoting Ex. 1001, 7:45–55; citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 23); see also Ex. 1001, code (57) (“The intersplicer combines the media files with the ad files by providing control signals to the media player, causing the media player to present the ad files with the selected media files.”). Patent Owner does not propose a construction for “intersplicer” at this stage in this proceeding. See generally Prelim. Resp.7 The preliminary record supports Petitioner’s proposed construction of an “intersplicer” for purposes of this Institution Decision.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,463,768 - PTAB · Feb 13, 2025 · IPR2024-01262 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–26 on all petition challenges and granted Altice USA’s motion to join IPR2024-00322, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The patentability challenges in the Comcast IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). IPR2024-00322, Paper 13, 36.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Under the present circumstances, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in IPR2024- 00322. Nonetheless, we lay out the following restrictions in order to ensure minimal impact on the trial schedule, cost, discovery, and potential briefing. Specifically, we limit Petitioner Altice USA, Inc.’s participation in the joined proceeding, such that (1) Comcast Communications, LLC alone is responsible for all petitioner filings in the joined proceeding until such time that it is no longer an entity in the joined proceeding, and (2) Altice USA, Inc. is bound by all filings by Comcast Communications, LLC in the joined proceeding, except for (a) filings regarding termination or settlement and (b) filings where Altice USA, Inc. receives permission to file an independent paper. Altice USA, Inc. must obtain prior Board authorization to file any paper or to take any action on its own in the joined proceeding, so long as Comcast Communications, LLC remains as a non-terminated petitioner in the joined proceeding. This arrangement promotes the just and efficient administration of the ongoing trial in IPR2024-00322 and protects the interests of Comcast Communications, LLC as original petitioner in IPR2024-00322, and of Patent Owner. For the foregoing reasons, and with the limitations discussed above, Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder is granted.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 8,356,251 - PTAB · Feb 4, 2025 · IPR2024-01231 · APJ Georgianna W Braden · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–26 on all petition grounds and granted Charter’s motion to join IPR2024-00322, subject to participation limits.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The patentability challenges in the Comcast IPR met the “reasonable likelihood” standard of § 314(a). IPR2024-00322, Paper 13, 36.” slip op. at 4
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“not be impacted if it were to join that proceeding because “[t]he grounds in the instant Petition—and evidence upon which they rely—are identical to the grounds in the Comcast IPR, which the Board instituted.” Mot. 1, 5. Furthermore, Petitioner agrees that, if joined as a party to the Comcast IPR, it will act as “understudy” and will not assume an active role unless Comcast terminates its involvement after joinder. Mot. 1, 7–8. Under the present circumstances, we agree with Petitioner that joinder is appropriate and will not unduly impact the ongoing trial in IPR2024- 00322. Nonetheless, we lay out the following restrictions in order to ensure minimal impact on the trial schedule, cost, discovery, and potential briefing. Specifically, we limit Petitioner Charter Communications, Inc.’s participation in the joined proceeding, such that (1) Comcast Communications, LLC alone is responsible for all petitioner filings in the joined proceeding until such time that it is no longer an entity in the joined proceeding, and (2) Charter Communications, Inc. is bound by all filings by Comcast Communications, LLC in the joined proceeding, except for (a) filings regarding termination or settlement and (b) filings where Charter Communications, Inc. receives permission to file an independent paper. Charter Communications, Inc. must obtain prior Board authorization to file any paper or to take any action on its own in the joined proceeding, so long as Comcast Communications, LLC remains as a non-terminated petitioner in the joined proceeding. This arrangement promotes the just and efficient administration of the ongoing trial in IPR2024-00322 and protects the interests of Comcast Communications, LLC as original petitioner in IPR2024-00322, and of Patent Owner.” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 8,356,251 - Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC v. Yechezkal Evan SperoSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 16, 2025 · IPR2023-01027 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 37–70 are unpatentable: claims 37–41, 47, 50–56, 58–59, 60–62, 64–65, and 70 as anticipated by Alden; the remaining challenged claims as obvious over Alden and the listed combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“alleged invention “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, automotive engineering, optical engineering, applied physics, computer science, or similar disciplines, along with two years of experience working with intelligent vehicle systems, automotive control systems, or lighting control systems” and that more education could compensate for less experience and vice versa. See Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 33). 3 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 01/70538 A2 (Exhibit 1010). 4 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 01/01038 (Exhibit 1006). 5 U.S. Patent No. 4,970,628 (Exhibit 1007). 6 U.S. Patent No. 6,144,158 (Exhibit 1008). 7 U.S Patent No. 6,049,749 (Exhibit 1009). 8 PCT Patent App. Pub. No. WO 02/04247 A1 (Exhibit 1011). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed skill level for a person of ordinary skill in the art” (PO Resp. 4), and, as we generally agree that it is consistent with the subject matter disclosed in the ’503 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this decision. B.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Claim Construction We construe claims using the standard that would be applied in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b), giving terms their ordinary and customary meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the specification and prosecution history. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). The Petition asserts that all claim terms should be given their “ordinary and customary meaning.” See Pet. 8. Patent Owner also proposes that the claim terms be given their ordinary meaning, and identifies the “ordinary meaning” for the terms “identify,” “turn,” and “curve,” which we discuss in our analysis below. We otherwise find that that no express claim construction is necessary. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
Patent outcomesUS 10,894,503 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,894,503 - Apple Inc. v. Theta IP, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Nov 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00816 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–7, 9–13, 16, 23, 25, 26, 28, and 29 over Behbahani, Leete, and Tan because claim 23 showed a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review, under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4. An inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2020) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). The reasonable likelihood standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading,” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). For the reasons provided below and based on the record before us, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticDenied
“We determine that the first General Plastic factor does not favor exercising discretion to deny institution of inter partes review. This is Petitioner’s first petition challenging the ’330 patent. Pet. 73. Patent Owner argues that “Apple’s use of prior petitions as a roadmap ‘implicitly create[s] such a relationship’” as set forth in Valve. Prelim. Resp. 54. According to Patent Owner, “Apple’s admitted attempt to improve over issues ‘that have plagued prior invalidity challenges’ ties its interests to the prior Petitioner’s aims.” Id. Under the circumstances in this case, we disagree with Patent Owner’s arguments. There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has any significant relationship with Lenovo or Samsung—for example, that Petitioner is a co-defendant with either of them or was accused of infringing the ’330 patent based on the same product. See Valve at 9–10. That Petitioner apparently may have reviewed and considered strategies undertaken by prior petitioners on similar issues does not, in and of itself, create a significant relationship with any of the prior petitioners. For these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“That Behbahani and Tan appeared in an initialed IDS is sufficient to satisfy the first Advanced Bionics prong. See Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 7–8 (“Previously presented art includes art made of record by the Examiner, and art provided to the Office by an applicant, such as on an Information Disclosure Statement (IDS), in the prosecution history of the challenged patent”). Leete was not previously presented to the Office, but we need not decide whether the reference to Leete in Behbahani (see Section II.F.1 below) or Petitioner’s obviousness arguments concerning Behbahani and Leete suffice to satisfy the first Advanced Bionics prong for purposes of this Decision. As discussed below, even if we assume that the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework is satisfied, Petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims in the second part of the framework.” slip op. at 22
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner thus proposes a Master’s degree with two years of experience, while Patent Owner proposes a Bachelor’s degree with five years of experience. Given that both parties also indicate that more education could substitute for less experience and vice versa, we do not see a material difference in the proposals, and thus adopt Patent Owner’s version for the purposes of this Decision. If the parties believe that the choice of one proposal over the other would make a difference in the patentability analysis, they may address that during trial.” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,010,330
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.