- Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 2, 2023 · IPR2022-00051 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 6 are unpatentable as obvious over Birrell and Schultz; the Board did not reach the Piepgras or Harbers and Schultz grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the priority date of the ’251 patent “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or the equivalent, and two or more years of experience with LED devices and/or related circuit design, or a related field.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 20–24). For purposes of this proceeding, “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of [a person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 14. Upon review of the parties’ arguments, the prior art of record, and the ’251 patent, we adopt Petitioner’s undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim[s] in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have had to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party contends that any terms of the ’251 patent require express construction, with each party relying on the plain and ordinary meaning of each claim term. PO Resp. 13–14; Pet. Reply 1. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we agree that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“In view of the foregoing, we determine that Birrell and Schultz, when viewed in light of the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, teach or suggest mounting “at least one LED circuit” “on a reflective substrate,” as recited in claim 1 of the ’251 patent.” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“sought to use a reflective coating in Birrell because “the use of a reflective substrate to provide mechanical support for an array of LEDs was well known in the art.” Pet. 29. Petitioner further contends that Schultz expressly discloses that reflective coatings are beneficial as they prevent light from an LED die being “unutilized due to absorption or scattering of the light.” Id. at 30 (quoting Ex. 1046 ¶ 48); Ex. 1046 ¶ 49 (Schultz explaining that “reflective surfaced materials” provide a “higher probability” that light reflected from the LEDs will reach the focusing element). Petitioner further contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have used a reflective substrate in Birrell in view of Birrell’s expressed desire for a uniform optical reflection to provide a uniform light source. Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 104; Ex. 1018, 6:6–18; Ex. 1022 ¶ 81; Ex. 1023, 16:16–45). Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in using a reflective substrate in Birrell because this would have entailed “the use of known components and mounting techniques to produce the predictable result of an LED circuit that benefited from properties of reflective base structures, as suggested by Schultz and the knowledge of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” Id. at 31.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS 10,492,251 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,492,251 - Tokyo Ohka Kogyo., Ltd. v. Fujifilm Electronic Materials U.S.A., Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 31, 2023 · PGR2022-00010 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable for lack of written description support under § 112(a); the Board did not reach either obviousness ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) “would have had a Bachelor degree in materials science, engineering, chemistry or similar technical discipline, and had at least two years of experience relating to the design and development of semiconductor manufacturing processes.” Pet. 14. Petitioner further submits that, “[a]lternatively, such a person may have had additional graduate education as a substitute for professional experience, or significant work experience as a substitute for formal education.” Id. Patent Owner states that, “[w]ithout taking a position on the correctness of this definition, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s POSA definition.” PO Resp. 11 (citing Pet. 14). 3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), revised 35 U.S.C. § 103 effective March 16, 2013. Petitioner contends, and Patent Owner does not contest, that “the earliest priority date claimed by the ’329 patent” is December 6, 2013. Pet. 13; PO Resp. 6. Because the undisputed earliest claimed priority date of the ’329 patent is after March 16, 2013, we apply the AIA versions of §§ 102 and 103. record, and is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected in the prior art in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We disagree. It is clear from the plain language of claim 1 that the claimed “cleaning composition” is a composition for cleaning that includes four named components and has a specified pH. Ex. 1001, 29:2–9. The ’329 patent specification unambiguously teaches that the cleaning composition is for removing residues from semiconductor substrates. Id. at 1:23–29, 2:10–12, 2:17–33, 15:52–55. Although the ’329 patent describes a cleaning composition that comprises a redox agent, a chelating agent, a metal corrosion inhibitor, an organic solvent, and water, we see no reason to construe the term “cleaning composition” itself to require these components. Claim 1 expressly recites expressly including or precluding a chelating agent or a metal corrosion inhibitor. Ex. 1001, 29:2–9. The Federal Circuit advises that the specification “is not a suitable substitute for, nor can it be used to rewrite, the chosen claim language. ‘Specifications teach. Claims claim.’” SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at 875 (quoting SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 n. 14 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)). The ’329 patent specification does teach a cleaning composition that includes a redox agent, a chelating agent, a metal corrosion inhibitor, an organic solvent, and water, but claim 1 is directed to a cleaning composition that expressly requires only a subset of those components. Patent Owner’s proposed construction would effectively rewrite the claim by adding unclaimed components, which we decline to do under the guise of claim construction. See id. (“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not a part of the claim.”).” slip op. at 9
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“that Petitioner establishes that the ’329 patent does not provide sufficient written description support for the challenged claims. Pet. 15–43; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 56–82. More specifically, we find that the ’329 patent does not reasonably convey to a POSA that the inventor was in possession of cleaning compositions that do not include a chelating agent or a metal corrosion inhibitor. There is no dispute, on this record, that the ’329 patent specification explicitly teaches that a redox agent, a chelating agent, a metal corrosion inhibitor, an organic solvent, and water are mandatory components of the cleaning composition described therein. PO Resp. 15 (Patent Owner agreeing with Petitioner that “[t]he ’329 patent’s disclosure is unambiguously explicit regarding mandatory components of the cleaning compositions described therein.” (citing Pet. 17; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 56–57) (emphasis omitted, alteration in original)); see Ex. 1001, 3:47–48, 3:62–64, 10:24–26, 10:66–11:2, 12:3–4; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 56–67. Claim 1, however, does not require that the cleaning composition include a chelating agent or a metal corrosion inhibitor. Ex. 1001, 29:2–9. Therefore, establishing proper written description support for claim 1 requires more than showing that the inventor was in possession of a cleaning composition that includes a redox agent, a chelating agent, a metal corrosion inhibitor, an organic solvent, and water; the ’329 patent must also show that the inventor was in possession of a cleaning composition that includes only a redox agent (hydroxylamine), an organic solvent (an alkylene glycol), water, and an alkanolamine. Id.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 10,927,329 unpatentableClaim construction§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,927,329 - Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 22, 2023 · PGR2022-00009 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · PGR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7–12, and 14–19 are unpatentable based on lack of written description, anticipation by Bruning, or obviousness over Bruning and Kabel.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“lighting device.” Accordingly, we determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art is “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with two years of relevant experience in the field of design and/or development of LEDs and circuits,” as Petitioner proposes and that “the field of design and/or development” would be “in the context of lighting devices” as Patent Owner proposes, in which “[a]n increase in experience could compensate for less education.” Id.; Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 46).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner
“theoretically fall under the “or greater” portion of the amended claim limitation “forward voltage of 6V or greater,” Applicant distinguished Colby on the basis that the 120V AC voltage from a wall outlet is not “the minimum voltage difference required between the anode and cathode of the LEDs in the claimed circuit to allow current to flow through the LEDs.” See Ex. 1023, 9 (emphasis added). Applicant’s argument specifically identifies the claim language at issue––“forward voltage of 6V or greater”––and specifically states that it is not disclosed because Colby does not disclose the minimum voltage and instead, discloses something else, something larger–– 120V AC voltage. Accordingly, we conclude that Applicant disclaimed any voltage that is more than “the minimum voltage difference required between the anode and cathode of the LEDs in the claimed circuit to allow current to flow through the LEDs” from the scope of “forward voltage.”” slip op. at 25
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
“4. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) With respect to the written description requirement, we are persuaded” slip op. at 32
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable
“Basis § Unpatentable Unpatentable Lack of written description, 3, 10, 17 112(a) 3, 10, 17 Lack of enablement 3, 10, 17 112(b) Indefiniteness 3, 10, 17 Lack of written description, 4, 11, 18 112(a) 4, 11, 18 Lack of enablement 4, 11, 18 112(b) indefiniteness 4, 11, 18” slip op. at 77
Patent outcomesUS 10,932,341 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,932,341 - Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · May 10, 2023 · IPR2021-01575 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Saito and Catalano, Saito and Wojnarowski, and those combinations with Johnson.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the priority date of the ’551 patent “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or the equivalent, and two or more years of experience with LED devices and/or related circuit design, or a related field.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 19–20). For purposes of this proceeding, “Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of a [person of ordinary skill in the art].” PO Resp. 9. Upon review of the parties’ arguments, the prior art of record, and the ’551 patent, adopt Petitioner’s undisputed level of ordinary skill in the art in this proceeding.” slip op. at 6
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In IPR2021-01367, which also is directed to the ’551 patent, the Board construed the term “driver” to mean “a program, circuitry, or device used to power other programs, circuits, or devices.” Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc., IPR2021-01367, Paper 8 at 11–14 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2023) (Institution Decision); see also IPR2021-01367, Paper 46 at 7 (Final Written Decision). Patent Owner believes that this construction is broader than that used by the ’551 patent, “but will nevertheless refer to this construction because it is helpful in resolving the disputes over the teachings of the prior art, because none of the prior art teaches or suggests a driver even under this broader construction.” PO Resp. 10–11. Patent Owner does not propose an alternative construction of the claim term. Id. Petitioner does not contest the adopted construction of “driver.” Pet. Reply 1. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons expressly set forth in IPR2021-01367, we construe “driver” to mean “a program, circuitry, or device used to power other programs, circuits, or devices.” No other claim terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 6
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportReference is prior artPriority date awardedDecided for petitioner
“connector” to describe the 3-pin connector of Catalano was potentially ambiguous. Based on the full trial record, we are persuaded that the citations provided in the Petition provide sufficient evidence that the ’495 Provisional provides written description support for claim 23 of Catalano.11 In response to Patent Owner’s argument that Catalano’s 3-pin connector 612 is connected to bulb base 616, and there is no evidence that such a connector is used in “a conventional incandescent bulb” (Sur-Reply 9), we find that regardless of the internal components connecting the “standard bulb base” to the LED circuit, the “standard bulb base” is a connector that can fit within “standard bulb sockets” and allow the device to replace a conventional incandescent bulb. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 5–7. Therefore, it is “a standard bulb power connector equivalent to the power connector of a” slip op. at 14
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Upon review of the record and the parties’ arguments as a whole, we agree with Petitioner that Saito discloses a driver, as that term is used in claim 1 of the ’551 patent. First, our construction of “driver” is broad, constituting any “program, circuitry, or device used to power other programs, circuits, or devices.” And, consistent with the structure of claim 1 of the ’551 patent, this construction does not require that the identified circuit or device actually generate power, only provide power to another device or circuit. switch that turns on or off a power source. Rather, the circuit of Saito monitors the voltage provided at both node A 107 and node B 715 and, depending on the reported voltages, switches between voltage sources to provide power to the LEDs. In this way, the voltage applied to the LED circuit is maintained within a range of roughly 16 and 30 Volts, and the LEDs are driven for a prolonged period of time by capacitors 106 and 107, which Saito explains “cut[s] down the consumption of electric current” and results in more efficient use of power. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 98–103. We find persuasive Dr. Baker’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have considered such a circuit to be a “driver,” as recited in claims 1 and 5 of the ’551 patent. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 94–95, 110–111.” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS 10,154,551 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,154,551 - Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 26, 2023 · IPR2021-01541 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 6–8, 11–13, 15–17, and 19 are unpatentable as obvious over the cited combinations of Dowling, Mueller, Okuno, Nortrup, Yan, and Martin.
RulingsFinal written decision- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“After considering the evidence and arguments of the parties, we determine that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1– 4, 6–8, 11–13, 15–17, and 19 are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Graham, 383 U.S. at 13, 17. Petitioner asserts that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with two years of relevant experience in the field of design and/or development of LEDs and circuits in the context of lighting control systems. An increase in experience could compensate for less education. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 22). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. PO Resp. 14. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’001 patent and prior art of record. We therefore adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Under the correct claim construction, Dowling discloses this limitation because Dowling discloses several examples of two-way switch 190 turning on or off LED circuits, independent of other LED circuits. For example, Dr. Neikirk persuasively testifies that Dowling’s color wash mode (selected by switch 190) discloses this limitation by referring to LEDs that “cycle . . . through the full color spectrum,” turning different colored LEDs on or off. Ex. 1033 ¶ 26 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 44, 103 (“If two LEDs were used . . . with circuitry to turn each color on or off, four colors could be produced.”) (emphasis added)). As another example, Dr. Neikirk persuasively testifies that switch 190 can be used to select a “static color mode to produce, for example, the color red, then only the red LED will be turned on and the remaining LEDs will be turned off.” Id. ¶ 28 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 103). Finally, Dr. Neikirk persuasively testifies that switch 190 can select a strobing mode to cause LEDs to “alternate[] green and red,” which a POSITA would have understood to cause “at least one color LED circuit to be turned on or off independent of other LED circuits.” Id. ¶ 29 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 47). Patent Owner does not rebut these assertions of Dr. Neikirk. See Sur- reply 7–10. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has established that Dowling discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 26
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“We begin our analysis with the claim language. Claim 1 requires a switch to “independently switch on or off at least one of the first LED circuit or the at least one additional LED circuit.” There is no express requirement in the claim that any switching occur independently “of other switches.” In effect, Patent Owner appears to imply that “independently” modifies only the word “switch.” Yet the plain reading of this phrase is that the word “independently” modifies the entire phrase that follows—“switch on or off at least one of the first LED circuit or the at least one additional LED circuit.” As such, the plain language of the claim encompasses switching one of the LED circuits on or off independently of another LED circuit. In other words, the switch can turn on or off either LED circuit by itself, without affecting the other LED circuit. Patent Owner even appears to have had the same understanding pre-institution, arguing that one of Dowling’s modes “is simultaneously controlling all the LEDs, not independently switching one LED circuit on or off.” Prelim. Resp. 19. The specification does not inform the meaning of this limitation because it does not include the word “independently”—this term only appears in the claims. And Patent Owner points us to no discussion of independent switching in the specification by another name. At most, Patent Owner refers to two separate claims and a few specification references that possibly mention two separate switches. Sur-reply 3–4. But Patent Owner’s references to claims 11 and 15 are unavailing, as even if claims 11 and 15 mention different switches, Patent Owner does not sufficiently explain how this compels the meaning it ascribes to “independently switch.” This is true even though claim 11 itself recites a similar “independently switch” limitation. Further, the specification’s mere mention of different switches is also insufficient to draw any conclusion about whether those switches are independently switched from one another. We therefore find no disavowal, lexicography, or any context that would counsel departing from the plain and ordinary meaning of this limitation. As such, we construe “a switch . . . configured to at least one of independently switch on or off at least one of the first LED circuit or the at least one additional LED circuit” in claims 1, 6, and 11 to encompass a switch that switches an LED circuit on or off independently of another LED circuit.” slip op. at 11
Patent outcomesUS 10,537,001 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,537,001 - Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 29, 2023 · IPR2021-01540 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 33, 34, 38, 39, and 43 are unpatentable as obvious over Teshima and SISE, or over Teshima, Butterworth, and SISE.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“[a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with two years of relevant experience in the field of design and/or development of LEDs and circuits in the context of lighting control and networking systems. An increase in experience could compensate for less education. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 34). Patent Owner states that it “adopts this definition of level of ordinary skill for purposes of this proceeding only.” PO Resp. 5. We are persuaded that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’842 patent and prior art of record. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that no other terms require construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“We find Petitioner’s arguments more persuasive. As a threshold matter, we disagree with Patent Owner that “coated” requires a “thin layer.” We note that Patent Owner did not construe “coated” in its Patent Owner Response, relying only on a single citation to its expert declaration for the proposition that “coated” refers to a “thin layer.” PO Resp. 27 (citing Ex. 2007 ¶ 80). There, Dr. Bretschneider merely cites a dictionary definition without analysis or discussion in support of his testimony that “[c]oating an LED is adding a thin layer or covering to something.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 79. When questioned about this, he testified, “I didn’t equate that [statement in the declaration] to an opinion equivalent to claim construction.” Ex. 1038, 132:2–14. Patent Owner also does not discuss the intrinsic record in support of its implicit claim construction position. Based on our review of the intrinsic record, we can find no special definition or disavowal associated with the term “coated.” We also find Patent Owner’s dictionary definition unhelpful, as the meaning of “thin” layer is unclear. See Ex. 2007 ¶ 79. Moreover, Leung refers to “coating an LED with a phosphor layer” and that “it is often difficult to control the phosphor layer’s geometry and thickness,” which undercuts Patent Owner’s position that a coated layer must be thin. See Ex. 1037 ¶ 8.” slip op. at 26
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that SISE is analogous art to the ’842 patent. The field of endeavor of the ’842 patent is LED lighting systems. The ’842 patent explains that “LED based lighting may be used for general lighting, specialty lighting, signs, and decoration such as for Christmas tree lighting.” Ex. 1001, 1:66–2:2; see also id. at code (54) (“AC Light Emitting Diode and AC LED Drive Methods and Apparatus”). This is a broad field of endeavor, and we discern no relevant distinction between LED lighting systems that are used to illuminate an area or object and those used to signal information, such as traffic signals. Further, Patent Owner’s arguments here are inconsistent with its arguments in a related proceeding, IPR2021-01369. There, Patent Owner argued that the field of endeavor in a continuation patent of the ’842 patent was “LED lighting systems.” Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc., IPR2021-01369, Paper 45 at 17 (PTAB Feb. 14, 2023). Here, Patent Owner contends that the ’842 patent’s field of endeavor is “LED lighting systems and specifically circuits for driving LED lighting systems.” PO Resp. 42. As both patents share a common specification and Patent Owner does not explain why it proposes a different field of endeavor, we determine that the field of endeavor here is also “LED lighting systems.”” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 10,091,842 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,091,842 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 15, 2023 · IPR2021-01346 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3–16 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over the seven combinations of prior art listed in the decision.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“These definitions are very similar, but we are persuaded that Patent Owner’s proposal is more consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’466 patent and prior art of record. Petitioner’s use of the term “and/or” is problematic because it makes experience with LED devices optional. In contrast, Patent Owner’s definition requires two or more years of experience with LED devices and related LED circuit design. We therefore adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill. Had we adopted Petitioner’s level of skill, however, the outcome here would not have changed.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither party proposes any claim constructions. Pet. 6; PO Resp. 8–9; Reply 1. We determine that no terms require construction. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner. Patent Owner indeed relies on an improper bodily incorporation argument. Petitioner does not propose bodily incorporating Siwinski and Srivastava together, but rather taking certain teachings from these references and applying them to Hack. Reply 11, 14. For example, Petitioner argues that a POSITA would have relied on Siwinski’s teachings “to configure Hack’s device to implement a circuit configured to detect touch via capacitive sensing.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 124). And Petitioner relies on Srivastava for the teaching that a POSITA would have configured Hack’s device with a lens doped with particles configured to receive and transmit light from a plurality of LEDs. Id. at 29– 30 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 126–32). Patent Owner’s argument that Srivastava’s shell is not combinable with Siwinski’s touch screen misdirects our attention to a combination that Petitioner did not propose, and is a bodily incorporation that fundamentally misapplies the law of obviousness. “The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). Regardless, Petitioner’s arguments are not conclusory. The Reply persuasively argues that “Srivastava’s express applicability to OLEDs and display backlights is consistent with Hack’s OLED backlight features.” Reply 11 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1052, 1:10–12, 5:29–38). We are further persuaded by Petitioner’s evidence supporting that “the use of a lens with LED backlight configurations was known,” which undercuts Mr. Credelle’s testimony that Srivastava’s lens would be incompatible with a touch screen backlight. Id. (citing, e.g., Ex. 1090 (depicting a lens over multiple OLED color elements), Fig. 13; Ex. 1098, code (57) (“display back lighting system” with an “entrance lens” and a “reflecting lens”); Ex. 1099, code (57) (“backlight assembly” with “a closely packed array of hemispherical or spherical lenses”)); see Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 96–97. And contrary to Mr. Credelle’s testimony that “[i]t would be illogical to form Srivastava’s shell over Siwinski’s touch screen because the shell would prevent touching the touch screen, which is the function of the touch screen,” Petitioner persuasively argues that “Srivastava explains that it was known that LEDs are used as a backlight in liquid crystal displays.” Reply 11. In other words, Petitioner’s reliance on Srivastava’s backlight teachings would not prevent a user from touching a screen (in front of the backlight) in the modified device. Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Hack, Siwinski, and Srivastava to achieve this limitation.” slip op. at 16
- Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for petitioner
“We start our analysis with the Sur-reply because it exposes several weaknesses in Patent Owner’s arguments. First, contrary to what the Sur-reply contends, the Patent Owner response did not argue that “Srivastava’s LED shell is incompatible with Hack’s touch screen because the hard shell would interfere with the functionality of the touchscreen.” Id. This is a new argument first made in the Sur-reply, and we do not consider it. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b). What Patent Owner actually argued in its Response was that “[a] POSITA would not combine Srivastava’s LED shell for a single LED with Hack’s flexible display.” PO Resp. 24. There is no mention of a “hard shell” interfering with the functionality of the touch screen in the Patent Owner Response. See id. At most, Patent Owner contends that the shell would “prevent touching the screen,” and that the “curvature of the shell” would be incompatible, not that any hardness of the shell would present a problem. Id. at 25–26 (quoting Ex. 2001 ¶ 97). Regardless, even if we consider this argument, it is inapposite because as the Reply correctly notes, “Srivastava explains that it was known that LEDs are used as a backlight in liquid crystal displays,” and we accordingly find that a backlight with a hard shell would not interfere with a user touching a display. See Reply 11 (citing Pet. 30–33; Ex. 1052, 1:10–12).” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 10,499,466 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,499,466 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 15, 2023 · IPR2021-01345 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 4, 9–11, 13, 17, 18, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Hack and Garcia, Hack, Garcia, and Cordelli, or Hack and Porter.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would mean someone who, at the time of the invention in February 2004, had at least a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, physics, or the equivalent, and two or more years of experience with LED devices and related LED circuit design. PO Resp. 7 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 41–48). Petitioner contends that there is little difference between these definitions and that Patent Owner does not tie any of its arguments to the minor differences. Reply 1–2. We agree. However, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the level of skill because we are persuaded that it is consistent with the problems and solutions in the ’252 patent and prior art of record, except that we delete the phrase “or more” to avoid including ambiguity in the definition of the level of skill. The outcome of this decision would not have changed had we adopted Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Because the intrinsic record7 does not assist us with interpreting the term “folded,” we turn to the extrinsic evidence, including Patent Owner’s proffered dictionary definitions and expert testimony. As mentioned above, Patent Owner supplied two dictionary definitions for “fold.” See Exs. 2006, 2007. But these definitions are from non-technical sources and are non-contemporaneous with the ’252 patent’s priority date, and are thus of limited relevance to our analysis. Reply 14 n.7. As for expert testimony, Patent Owner’s expert submits that “[a] POSITA would understand that folding a substrate requires bending the substrate so that one part of the substrate is in full contact with another part of the substrate.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 81. However, Patent Owner’s expert provides no evidence or explanation for this conclusory assertion, so we give it little weight. See id.; PO Resp. 18–19; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a). Further, as we will discuss in detail below, the prior art upon which 7 The parties do not address the prosecution history. Petitioner relies explicitly discloses a substrate that is flexible enough to be folded. See, e.g., Pet. 40; Ex. 1005 ¶ 76 (“[T]he display 106 could be thin and flexible enough to . . . fold into a housing 102[.]”). Thus, apart from explaining the errors in Patent Owner’s proposed construction, we determine that it is unnecessary for us to further analyze the proper scope of this term. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Because the intrinsic record7 does not assist us with interpreting the term “folded,” we turn to the extrinsic evidence, including Patent Owner’s proffered dictionary definitions and expert testimony. As mentioned above, Patent Owner supplied two dictionary definitions for “fold.” See Exs. 2006, 2007. But these definitions are from non-technical sources and are non-contemporaneous with the ’252 patent’s priority date, and are thus of limited relevance to our analysis. Reply 14 n.7. As for expert testimony, Patent Owner’s expert submits that “[a] POSITA would understand that folding a substrate requires bending the substrate so that one part of the substrate is in full contact with another part of the substrate.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 81. However, Patent Owner’s expert provides no evidence or explanation for this conclusory assertion, so we give it little weight. See id.; PO Resp. 18–19; 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“We agree with Petitioner that Garbuzov discloses stacked LEDs, with a coating on one of those LEDs, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, which we discuss in detail below. To briefly summarize, first, we agree with Petitioner (and Patent Owner does not dispute) that Figure 39 (above) of the ’252 patent depicts an OLED. Second, we agree that each of the sets of layers Petitioner identifies in Garbuzov as an OLED has a similar structure as the OLED in Figure 39 of the ’252 patent, and is therefore an OLED. See, e.g., Ex. 1089, 48:3–6. Third, we agree with Petitioner that the phosphor layer 114 is applied to one of Garbuzov’s OLEDs within the stacked set of OLEDs, as shown in Garbuzov Figure 2, and therefore, that Garbuzov discloses coating an LED with a phosphor. Finally, we agree with Petitioner that phosphor layer 114 produces a change in color because Garbuzov describes phosphor layer 114 as “red downconversion phosphor layer 114.” See Ex. 1016, 3:32–33.” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,492,252 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,492,252 - Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2023 · IPR2021-01347 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–17 and 21–25 are unpatentable: claims 6 and 24 are anticipated by Birrell; the remaining challenged claims are obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends there are “several problems” with Petitioner’s proposed definition. PO Resp. 11. In particular, Patent Owner contends the “and/or” qualifier and addition of “or a related field” could be read to allow an individual with no experience with LED devices to be a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. Upon review of the parties’ arguments, the prior art of record, and the ’298 patent, we agree with Patent Owner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had experience working with LEDs and/or LED circuit design. Thus, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of one of ordinary skill in the art. We note, however, that neither party asserts that the outcome of this case rests on resolving the small differences between the parties’ definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“C. Claim Construction In this proceeding, the claims of the ’298 patent are construed “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under that standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have had to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention in the context of the 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Neither party contends any terms of the ’298 patent require construction. Pet. 5–6; PO Resp. 12. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we agree that no terms require express construction. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
“By its express language, the claim term “wirelessly” is best understood as “without the use of a wire.” We are directed to no disclosure in the written description or prosecution history that would contradict this conclusion or otherwise shed light on the meaning of this claim term. There is no dispute that capacitive coupling does not use a wire or any other form of direct contact to transmit power. Thus, the plain meaning of “wirelessly” encompasses capacitive coupling. This conclusion is supported 6,336,031 states that “[c]onnectionless (i.e., wireless) transmission of analog and digital signals has previously been accomplished using . . . [c]apacitive coupling.” Ex. 1131, 1:10–18. Likewise, U.S. Patent No. 6,988,026 describes a “power receiving system which receive[s] power wirelessly (inductively, through radio frequency energy transfer and/or capacitively).” Ex. 1133, 113:64–114:2. Mr. Credelle’s counter-testimony is not persuasive because he does not explain in any detail why one of ordinary skill in the art would not understand a capacitive coupling that transfers power to be a wireless system. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 80.” slip op. at 50
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“KSR instructs that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Here, Petitioner proposes to substitute one known method of transmitting power for another (an inductor in place of two capacitors), according to known methods (Logan), and Patent Owner does not dispute that the combination would yield a predictable result of wirelessly providing power from one device to another. This suggests that the proposed combination would have been obvious. Id. point to a specific problem discussed in Birrell for which Logan’s method of using inductive coupling would be a solution. See In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The use of patents as references is not limited to what the patentees describe as their own inventions or to the problems with which they are concerned. They are part of the literature of the art, relevant for all they contain.”) (internal quotations omitted). What the Petition must demonstrate is that there was some reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to combine the elements in the manner proposed. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. The Petition provides multiple, persuasive reasons (discussed above) as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to use inductors, as disclosed in Logan, to wirelessly transmit power to a lighting device, such as that disclosed in Birrell.13 (d) Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, we find that Petitioner presents multiple, persuasive reasons as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to implement the wireless power transmission system of Logan in the lighting device of Birrell.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 10,966,298 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,966,298 - Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2023 · IPR2021-01300 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious under §103 over the asserted combinations of Oba and the additional references listed for each ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner provides a very similar definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, but removes the “and/or” qualifier for experience with LED devices, as well as the allowance for individuals to have experience in an unspecified “related field.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner contends these modifications are appropriate because Petitioner’s proposed definition would allow an individual with no experience with LEDs to be a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. art of record, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan as it is consistent with the disclosures of the ’697 patent and with the prior art of record. We note, however, that neither party asserts that any arguments in this proceeding rise or fall based on the definition that is adopted.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Neither party contends any terms of the ’697 patent require construction. And, upon review of the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we determine that no terms require construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)).” slip op. at 8
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Petitioner provides uncontroverted testimony from Dr. Baker, which we credit, that: (1) Oba’s laptop computer necessarily has a battery ground (Ex. 1002 ¶ 102); (2) it was known in the art, for example as disclosed in Hara, that a capacitor could be coupled between a battery ground and the circuit elements powered by the device in order to serve as a filter for noise (id. ¶¶ 103, 108; Ex. 1090 ¶ 3 (asserting that AC power is a known source of noise)); and (3) capacitively coupling Oba’s battery ground to the conductor connecting the battery poles and the circuit components of the laptop computer would “smooth delivered power,” thereby “facilitating a steady supply of power” (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 104–106). As argued by Patent Owner, Hara uses a capacitive coupling to battery ground in order to mitigate standing waves caused by the extended length of the conductors connecting the laptop battery to circuit components. PO Resp. 15. The capacitive-coupling to battery ground, however, need not be used in Oba to solve the same problem identified in Hara, and Dr. Baker persuasively explains why the system of Oba would benefit from a ¶¶ 103–104; Ex. 1090 ¶ 3–10 (asserting that AC power is a known source of noise). As such, Petitioner persuasively explains why one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to combine Oba and Hara to arrive at a battery ground that is capacitively coupled to the circuit components of the laptop computer. c)” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 11,019,697 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,019,697
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.