- Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01228 · APJ Kimberly Mcgraw · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment on the disclaimed challenged claims, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
NonePatents in suitUS 11,656,422 - Commscope Technologies LLC v. Belden Canada UlcAdverse judgmentPTAB · Sep 8, 2025 · IPR2024-01227 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s withdrawal of its motion to amend and entered adverse judgment after it disclaimed challenged claims 1–5 and 8–13, terminating the IPR.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“Under our rules, a party may request adverse judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding, including by disclaiming all claims involved in a trial. 37 C.F.R. §42.73(b). Because Patent Owner’s request to withdraw its Motion to Amend has been granted and Patent Owner has disclaimed all Challenged Claims such that no claims remain in the trial, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate by Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 3
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted
“In view of the facts presented, including that no decision as to the patentability of the proposed substitute claims has yet been made and Petitioner does not oppose the withdrawal, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Amend.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,435,542 - Disney Media & Entertainment Distribution LLC v. Digital Media Technology Holdings, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Aug 25, 2025 · IPR2024-00736 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4–7, and 9 are unpatentable as obvious over Garfinkle and Kosten; claim 11 is unpatentable as obvious over Garfinkle, Kosten, and Allen.
RulingsFinal written decision- ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedPetitioner expert discountedGranted
“Our reviewing court has held that if a declarant fails to qualify as a person of ordinary skill in the art, then that person’s testimony regarding the knowledge or motivations of one of ordinary skill in the art is irrelevant as a matter of law. Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. International Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1377–78 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art. Without that skill, the witness’ opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.”). Mr. Daniels’ declaration consists of an analysis of the cited prior art in comparison to the challenged claims and a discussion of whether there would have been a 2 The motion does not seek to exclude the declaration of the named inventor of the ’725 patent, Nick Stiliadis. See Ex. 2109 (Stiliadis Declaration). motivation to combine the prior art. Ex. 2121 ¶¶ 4–20. Mr. Tulchin’s declaration addresses claim construction issues. Ex. 2131 ¶¶ 5–35. Each declarant, therefore, addresses issues that must be considered from the vantage point of a POSITA at the time of the invention, meaning a person with the level of ordinary skill defined in Section II.E.1 above. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (claim construction); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (obviousness). If Mr. Daniels and Mr. Tulchin do not qualify as POSITAs, as Petitioner alleges, then their opinion testimony is inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 (Testimony by Expert Witnesses). We find that there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that Mr. Daniels qualifies as a POSITA in relation to the ’725 patent. Mr. Daniels has an undergraduate degree in engineering physics in addition to a law degree. Ex. 2121 ¶ 2. His declaration, however, does not establish that he also has “one year of experience related to marketing and distribution of multimedia material over a computer network, or the equivalent.” See Section II.E.1 above. Mr. Daniels characterizes his non-legal work experience as follows: The rest of my professional career has been spent working in my own companies in the research, development and prototyping/commercialization of a number of different technologies, principally including fishing rod technology, digital video file transport, storage and processing, LED-based light-emitting tapes, drone control systems, wearable medical related electronic devices and breath-based diagnostic devices. Ex. 2121 ¶ 3; see also Ex. 1023, 99 (Daniels Deposition) (describing work on “a suite of interactive television innovations,” including “the first working pause button”). None of the projects identified appears to relate to “marketing and distribution of multimedia material over a computer network.” Patent Owner argues that Mr. Daniels “was involved (at the time of the filing of the application which matured into the ’725 patent) in making inventions, that dealt with interactive television, video pause buttons and video file provision over the Internet.” Sur-Reply Br. 6. However, neither Mr. Daniels’ declaration nor his deposition testimony assert that he ever worked on “video file provision over the Internet,” let alone that he did so for one year or more. See Ex. 2121 ¶ 3; Ex. 1023, 98–100. We find that the evidence in the record is not sufficient for us to conclude that Mr. Daniels qualifies as one of ordinary skill in the art. We further find a lack of evidence establishing that Mr. Tulchin qualifies” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the following definition of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art: “a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field plus one year of experience related to marketing and distribution of multimedia material over a computer network, or the equivalent.” Dec. 9. Patent Owner’s proposed definition differs from the Board’s only in that it adds a Bachelor of Science in engineering physics to the list of degrees that one of ordinary skill in the art might possess. See id. We view engineering physics as being related to the fields of electrical engineering, computer engineering, and computer science. Accordingly, following a review of the full record, we view Patent Owner’s proposed definition in its Response as consistent with the ’725 patent and the asserted prior art, and we apply it in our analysis below.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaning
“When interpreting the meaning of a claim, “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Patent Owner has, briefly, proposed six claim terms for construction: exhibition; exhibitor; broadcast exhibitor; distribution; marketing; and storing. PO Resp. 10. The Petition states that “[t]o resolve the grounds presented herein, Petitioner does not believe that any term requires explicit construction.” Pet. 12. We see no reason why “exhibition” and “exhibitor” should be understood as having a meaning as narrow as Patent Owner proposes. “Exhibition” and “exhibitor” encompass more than just a showing by “one in the exhibition business” because the specification of the ’725 patent identifies certain “exhibitors” that are not “in the exhibition business”: e.g., a high school, libraries, and other non-profit organizations. Ex. 1001, 12:38–41 (“schools, libraries, and other non-profit organizations”), Fig. 1 (“high school”). The plain and ordinary meaning of “exhibitors” is at least broad enough to encompass the types of exhibitors identified in the specification: movie theaters, television stations, satellite television operators, cable television operators, and non-profit organizations such as high schools. Ex. 1001, 4:20–22, Fig. 1. We further determine that some of these exhibitor types, including at least satellite and cable television operators, are “broadcast exhibitors.” Moreover, we find that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “distribution” is not so narrow as to be limited to “the business of marketing films and providing copies to venues,” as Patent Owner proposes. See PO Resp. 10 (emphasis added). The claimed invention is a “method of marketing and distributing multimedia,” which is not limited to films. We agree with Petitioner that the term is at least broad enough to encompass distribution of any type of multimedia to any type of exhibitor contemplated in the specification. See Ex. 1001, 1:20–25 (multimedia types); Reply Br. 6. Similarly, the plain and ordinary meanings of “marketing” and “storing” are not limited to Patent Owner’s specific examples: interesting individuals in seeing a film and saving to non-volatile storage, respectively. See PO Resp. 10; Tr. at 57:3–7. The invention is directed to marketing and distributing multimedia, not just films, Ex. 1001, 16:21, and while the Specification refers to storing multimedia on “hard drives,” id. at 4:35–37, 4:44–52, there is nothing in the Specification, claims, or prosecution history that would limit storage only to hard drives or other non-volatile storage. The intrinsic evidence suggests that the proper construction of each” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Garfinkle’s video distribution system to implement Kosten’s distribution method to achieve the improvements described therein, such as: access to a large number of video products and advertising materials available at a centralized location (Ex-1007, 54; Ex-1005, 1:42–49, 1:54–2:12), improved advertising capabilities (Ex-1007, 54; Ex-1005, 1:42–49, 1:54–2:12), and improved distribution processes resulting in lower shipping and handling costs and labor intensity, improved security against piracy, wider and more flexible distribution capabilities, cost reductions for movie theaters, increased control over time and locations of exhibitions by studios and distributors, an ability to scale up or down distribution based on success in theaters, and an ability to track and monitor sales and marketing data (Ex-1007, 52, 54). Pet. 14 (citing Dystar Textilfarben v. C.H. Patrick, 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (A motivation to combine exists when the “improvement” results in a product or process that is “stronger, cheaper, cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient.”)). Petitioner further asserts that such a person would have had a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the objective of efficient content distribution through the proposed combination of Garfinkle and Kosten with no change in their respective functions because: (1) both are “from the same field and address the same well-known issues”; and (2) both references purport to achieve this objective in similar and predictable ways, “such as using the well-known teachings of digitizing content, correlating multimedia and associated advertising materials, and connecting multiple user sites to the central station through a public communications system.” Id. at 13, 16–17 (internal citations omitted) (citing Ex. 1005, 2:58–3:5, 3:32–49, 4:37–39; Ex. 1007, 54); Ex. 1002 ¶ 68. Patent Owner contends that there would have been no motivation to combine Kosten and Garfinkle because each represents a “complete solution[] to different file transport modes, Kosten involving simple file transmission to a theater and billboards, and Garfinkle involving file transmission to a [video-on-demand] user. Neither has a problem which is addressed by the other.” PO Resp. 33. Petitioner argues, however, and we agree, that “(1) a known technique can provide motivation to combine and (2) a known technique does not need to improve upon the primary reference—it just must be a ‘suitable option.’” Reply Br. 21 (citing Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023)). Thus, it does not matter that Kosten and Garfinkle each represent a complete and functional solution to digitally transporting media files. If the references in the combination address a known problem, such as issues with multimedia distribution, see Pet. 13–14, and the proposed combination is a suitable solution, then there would have been a motivation to combine the two references. Moreover, Petitioner persuasively argues that by combining Kosten and Garfinkle, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to achieve benefits such as lower shipping and handling costs, improved security against piracy, wider and more flexible distribution capabilities, an ability to more easily scale distribution up or down as needed, among other benefits. Pet. 14. We find that these benefits would have provided a sufficient motivation to combine Garfinkle’s technical implementation of a distribution process for large multimedia files with Kosten’s proposed business application, “beaming” films directly to theaters via satellite. Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.” slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 7,574,725 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,574,725 - Microsoft Corporation v. Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 23, 2025 · IPR2024-00306 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held all challenged claims of the ’933 and ’054 patents unpatentable as obvious over Ahya and McKillop, with ’933 claims 20, 21, 42, and 43 also relying on Aholainen.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, computer engineering, or a closely related field, and one to three devices that used common wireless communications protocols such as Bluetooth and 802.11/Wi-Fi. More education, e.g., a Master’s or Ph.D., would compensate for less work experience and vice versa. 305 Pet. 13–14; accord 306 Pet. 14. Patent Owner “has adopted Microsoft’s definition for this proceeding.” 305 PO Resp. 6; accord 306 PO Resp. 6. Neither party argues that a particular level of ordinary skill in the art makes a difference in the outcome of the issues presented in these proceedings. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find to be consistent with the record evidence, particularly because it specifies having one to three years of experience working with wireless devices that use Bluetooth and 802.11.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We conclude that for the purposes of this Decision, we need not determine whether the claim term “detecting” encompasses “soliciting” detectable responses from other devices, as Patent Owner proposes, Sur- Reply 3, or whether Petitioner is correct that “solicitation and detection are distinct acts, and thus using Bluetooth for solicitation is not using Bluetooth for detection.” Reply 5. As discussed in Section IV above, “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803). Here, it is not necessary to construe the term “detecting” to determine that no presumption of nexus exists because, for the reasons discussed below, we find that AirDrop is not coextensive with the challenged claims under either party’s interpretation of the term.” slip op. at 38
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“device uses significantly less power than if a high speed seek was used.” Ex. 1005 ¶ 43. However, once a connection between two devices is established, Petitioner persuasively argues that “[a] POSITA would have been motivated to implement devices based on these teachings to switch from Bluetooth to Wi-Fi to transfer content, as taught by McKillop, because Ex. 1003 ¶ 70. Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have reasonably expected to succeed in implementing these features because they would have required only minor software code that was well within the skill of a POSITA, as evidenced by these features’ ubiquity in the prior art.” Pet. 19–20; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38–45 (ubiquity in the prior art), 72 (only “minor software code” required). Petitioner also persuasively argues that one of ordinary skill “would have been further motivated to implement the Ahya+McKillop wireless devices to prompt users to accept or deny incoming file transfers, as described by numerous background references[,]” and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Pet. 22; see Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 46– 51 (background references), 78–81 (motivation), 83 (only “minor software code” required to implement combination). We find that on the full record Petitioner has sufficiently established that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have been motivated to combine Ahya and McKillop. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).” slip op. at 18
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“Here, the evidence demonstrates that AirDrop includes significant unclaimed features that are likely to have been major contributors to any commercial success or industry praise that Apple’s AirDrop-equipped devices have enjoyed. This is true even if the analysis is limited to the AirDrop feature itself, rather than to the entire Apple device. See Sur- Reply 10–11 (“Patent Owner is not claiming the commercial success of the iPhone to show a presumptive nexus. “). Petitioner identifies three major features of AirDrop that are not part of the claimed invention: (1) device visibility controls implemented using iCloud services-based authentication; (2) security, including encryption; and (3) tight integration within the Apple ecosystem. Reply 8; Ex. 1086 ¶ 15. We find that the evidence of these features is sufficient to rebut Patent Owner’s claim that it is entitled to a presumption of nexus.” slip op. at 39
Patent outcomesUS 9,173,054 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,173,054 - Inductev, Inc. v. Witricity CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · May 20, 2025 · IPR2024-00105 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 and 16 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103(a) over the stated Fells-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had . . . a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, microelectronics, or equivalent, and . . . two to three years of industry or research experience,” and “a higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39–44). Patent Owner “does not disagree with Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art,” but “does not believe that resolution of the Petition depends on the precise definition of the level of ordinary skill.” PO Resp. 12. Petitioner’s proposed articulation is supported by testimonial evidence and appears consistent with the types of problems and solutions in the ’184 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–2:53. As it is uncontested, we adopt it for this decision.” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner
“The parties agree that the terms of the contested claims should be given their ordinary and customary meaning, but neither party argues that we should construe any claim terms explicitly. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62– 63); PO Resp. 12. We agree with the parties that, for this decision, we do not need to construe any of the terms explicitly. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). However, the meaning of certain terms are contested, including most notably “magnetic field sensor,” and we discuss those terms below in the context of the prior art.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notNot reached
“Petitioner argues that, to the extent the preamble is limiting, Fells discloses the recited wireless energy transfer system, and that the system includes facilities to detect FOD. Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 191, Fig. 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–71, 96–101). Patent Owner does not specifically contest Petitioner’s arguments. See PO Resp. We agree with Petitioner’s argument that Fells discloses the preamble; thus, we need not decide whether the preamble is limiting. See Ex. 1005 ¶ 191, Fig. 2.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that the ordinary and customary meaning of “magnetic field sensor” refers to a device that measures only external magnetic fields. There is nothing in the claim language to suggest such a limitation: the plain language simply refers to a “magnetic field sensor,” without regard to how the sensor works or where it senses magnetic fields from. Ex. 1001, 12:16. In fact, the claim does not explicitly require sensing anything at all using the magnetic field sensor, merely reciting a “foreign object debris detection system” comprising the sensor and that the “foreign object debris detection system is configured to verify” the presence of FOD. The very general nature of how the magnetic field sensor is recited, without any explicit recitation of how its output may be used, undermines Patent Owner’s overly restrictive interpretation. Although the ’184 patent specification includes examples of measuring external magnetic fields to detect FOD, Patent Owner has not pointed to anything in the specification indicating an intent to restrict the term “magnetic field sensor” to only those sensors that measure external magnetic fields. Nor is there intrinsic evidence that an “eddy-current sensor” would not also be a magnetic field sensor, given that it senses magnetic fields. Indeed, as Petitioner persuasively argues, an eddy-current sensor still measures external magnetic fields—albeit magnetic fields generated within FOD through interaction with a powered sensor. Pet. 6–7; Ex. 1037 ¶¶ 14– 16, 25–29.” slip op. at 17
Patent outcomesUS 10,027,184 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,027,184 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. KP Innovations 2, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · May 12, 2025 · IPR2025-00101 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of review of claims 18–21, finding no reasonable likelihood on three grounds and declining institution in view of the limited potential reach of the remaining ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Regarding the alleged anticipation by Okaya, Petitioner has not adequately shown that Okaya discloses that the audio and video outputs of carousel 10 connect to a communication network without the intervening use of a computer or video conferencing system to which the carousel is connected. Okaya specifically describes that “the multimedia carousel 10 includes several input and output terminals for integrating with a multimedia computer or video conferencing system.” Ex. 1006, 3:1–4. The specific scenario described in Okaya, in column 3, lines 43 to 61, also has carousel 10 connected to a notebook PC. Thus, Petitioner’s arguments based on carousel 10 itself as the device of limitation [18a] is inadequate. See also” slip op. at 13
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“For reasons discussed below, we find Petitioner’s reasoning to be insufficient for one of ordinary skill in the art to add two cameras to Nagasawa’s case body 1, one on each side of case body 1. Petitioner does not adequately address the issue of sufficient spacing on Nagasawa’s case body 1, which includes two back-to-back mounted displays 4 and 8 (Figure 1A), to include two additional cameras, one facing inward and the other facing outward, particularly as one side of case body 1 is used for gaming (Fig. 1B, Ex. 1007, 3:53–65). In Nagasawa’s fifth embodiment, which includes a camera for video conferencing, the camera is placed in the hinge connecting case bodies 1 and 2, and not within case body 1. That is an indication that there is not enough room in Nagasawa’s case body 1 to incorporate a camera, much less two cameras as Petitioner has proposed to meet limitations [18c] and [18d]. Nagasawa’s Figure 12B is reproduced below: Figure 12B is a front view of a fifth embodiment of Nagasawa’s foldable phone in the unfolded position. Ex. 1007, 3:24–26. Nagasawa describes: “Video conference display may be provided where the photo sticker 51 is to be affixed in order to provide folding portable apparatus equipped with a small-sized TV camera 53 at the hinge.” Id. at 7:36–39. Nagasawa’s design already dictates where a camera would be mounted, and omits discussion of any other locations of that camera, much less a placement of it on the phone case body. Id.” slip op. at 23
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“Additionally, Dr. Theogarajan testifies: “A person using [Nagasawa’s] pocket game would cover any camera placed on the outer surface of the first case body. Any camera placed in such a position would be abused with dirt and oil from a game player’s hand.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 145. We credit the testimony. It further undermines Petitioner’s proposed addition of two cameras to Nagasawa’s case body 1. Also, Nagasawa’s fifth embodiment already includes a video conferencing camera facing the user, mounted in the hinge connecting case bodies 1 and 2. In light of that teaching, there is little reason to add a camera to the inward facing side of Nagasawa’s case body 1.” slip op. at 24
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner asserts: “[T]he Board need not construe any term because the prior art invalidates the claims under any plausible construction.” Pet. 12. Petitioner has not proposed an express construction for any claim term. Patent Owner asserts that “[t]he term ‘receive and transmit information’ [in claim 18] means real-time or near real-time audio and visual information.” Prelim. Resp. 15–16. Patent Owner further argues that “Petitioner accepts Patent Owner’s construction because the construction is a plausible construction, and Petitioner stated that they believe their art invalidates the claims under any plausible constructions.” Id. at 16. For purposes of this Decision, however, we need not decide whether to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction. C.” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,499,168 - Intel Corporation v. Interdigital, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 1, 2025 · IPR2024-01441 · APJ Lisa A Murray · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all four grounds for claims 1–8 under § 325(d), finding the art or arguments previously presented and no material Examiner error shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 325(d). The Board uses a two-part framework for evaluating arguments under Section 325(d): (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Both Petitioner and Patent Owner argue that the Board can determine whether to grant or deny institution without construing any claim terms. Pet. 16; Prelim. Resp. 17. They represent, however, that the construction of the term “sparse de-noising filter” is contested in the co-pending investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 at the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”). Pet. 13; see Prelim. Resp. 6–8. In that litigation, four constructions were proposed for that term: ITC Complainants’ proposal, ITC” slip op. at 6
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,674,556 - PTAB · Mar 28, 2025 · IPR2024-01505 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–8, 15, 17, and 19–25 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of proving obviousness over Rusert and Zheng.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2024); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024). An inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.§ 314(a). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Upon consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record before us, we conclude Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in establishing unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’833 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all challenged claims of the ’833 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter “POSITA”) “would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a comparable field of study such as physics, and (2) approximately two to three years of practical experience with video encoding/decoding.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 37–39). Patent Owner states that it “has applied Petitioner’s POSITA for the sake of this Response.” Prelim. Resp. 33. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art. It is supported by the testimony of Dr. Creusere and not disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“That specific claim language of association indicates a relationship between “the block” and the first spatial motion vector prediction candidate, that is more than how every single prediction candidate broadly may be regarded in general as related to the current block being processed, the block for which a motion vector prediction list is being generated. The modifier “associated with the first spatial motion vector prediction candidate” clearly modifies “the block” at issue here and cannot be discarded or ignored. Further, if “the block” refers to the block recited in limitation [1a], i.e., the current block being processed, then the modifying phrase “associated with the first spatial motion vector prediction candidate” would be superfluous and have no meaning, because “the block,” without the modifying phrase, would already derive its antecedent basis from “a block of pixels” recited in limitation [1a]. We decline to adopt a construction that reads out “associated with the first spatial motion vector prediction candidate.” Construing the claim according to what the claim language actually states, without excluding any part of the claim language recited, is more appropriate.” slip op. at 18
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,571,833 - Deltran USA LLC v. The Noco CompanyInstitutedPTAB · Mar 19, 2025 · IPR2024-01219 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–11 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless the Director determines . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“of the litigation pending resolution of this proceeding,” was not entirely accurate as of the time of the filing of Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response.12 Id. at. 19. The district court granted a stay in the parallel litigation on December 18, 2024—5 days before the Preliminary Response was due. Ex. 3001 (“Order”). According to the district court, “On balance, . . . staying [the parallel litigation] promotes judicial efficiency and is not unduly burdensome or prejudicial to NOCO.” Id. at 7.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has not demonstrated sufficiently that collateral estoppel should apply here as to the “USB port.” Prelim. Resp. 13–14. But, Petitioner does not appear to be requesting collateral estoppel with respect to the “USB port.” Instead, Petitioner argues there is no dispute that the claim limitations 1[PRE], 1(A), 1(D)–1(G) were fully litigated in IPR2020-00944—identifying each limitation of claim except those with a “USB port.” Pet. 35, 37, 42, 43, 46, 48. Petitioner also appears to argue collateral estoppel precludes Patent Owner from disputing “the Board’s findings regarding the prior art and printed publication status of Epower-20 and Epower-21.” Id. at 30. In its Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not dispute that the above-identified limitations (i.e., limitations 1[PRE], 1(A), 1(D)–1(G)) were fully litigated nor does Patent Owner dispute that Epower-20 and Epower-21 are prior art printed publications. See generally Prelim. Resp. Because Patent Owner’s arguments, at this stage of the proceeding, do not implicate collateral estoppel, we need not address whether Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that collateral estoppel applies here. The parties are encouraged to further develop this issue over the course of trial including, such as, questions such as whether estoppel should be applied on a limitation by limitation basis, claim by claim basis, or otherwise.” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, “[a]s of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, . . . would have been a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience in design of battery charging systems.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–30). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art[.]” Prelim. Resp. 22. In light of the record before us, and for purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on our review of the ’203 patent and the prior art of record, we determine that the definition offered by Petitioner comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand the ’203 patent and the prior art. We will make any final determination pertaining to the level of ordinary skill in the art, however, on the full trial record.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,667,203 - Lenovo (United States) Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Feb 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01226 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Lenovo had not shown a reasonable likelihood of proving any challenged claim unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“identifies and refers to a valid region of the integrated circuit memory device as having a three-dimensional boundary delimited by phase ranges in command/address signals, data signals, and sampling signals. Nowhere does the ’835 patent specification indicate a valid region of the integrated circuit device as a whole can be represented by values for less than three parameters x, y, and z, all together, e.g., the command signals, the data signals, and the sampling signals. Also, the ’835 patent describes that the purpose of determining the boundaries of a valid region is to configure an optimal operating point for the integrated circuit device. Ex. 1001, 5:48–51. We have also considered other language in the claims. Each of independent claims 1 and 7 requires adjustment of the phase of all three command signals, data signals, and sampling signals, to determine the “valid operation range.” Ex. 1001, 6:56–7:4, 7:18–34. Each of independent claims 12, 20, and 23 requires adjustment of the phase of all three command signals, data signals, and sampling signals, to determine the “valid operating range.” Ex. 1001, 7:46–60, 8:28–44, 8:62–10:4. Based on the foregoing, the specification informs us that “valid operation range” is a three-dimensional range. We recognize that the specification does not expressly exclude a two-dimensional range or multiple two-dimensional ranges from being a “valid operation range” of the integrated circuit device. However, that is why we construe the claims to determine what, if anything, may be required despite a lack of express recitation in the claims.” slip op. at 17
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Citing testimony from Dr. Baker, Petitioner asserts a person of ordinary skill in the art (hereinafter “POSITA”) “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or the equivalent, and two to three years of experience designing high speed computer memory devices.” Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 31–35). Patent Owner’s expert, Mr. Lee, testifies: “I agree with Petitioner that [Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill] would be the minimum qualifications for a POSITA.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 35. On this record, we adopt Petitioner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill in the art, i.e., that a POSITA “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or the equivalent, and two to three years of experience designing high speed computer memory devices.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 34. The stated level is supported by the testimony of Dr. Baker and not disputed by Patent Owner. Further, it appears consistent with what is reflected by the content of the applied prior art. Cf. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the applied prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill). C.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Petitioner still has not made a sufficient showing for limitation [1.4.a]. That is because Petitioner has, at best, identified only two 2-parameter valid operation ranges, i.e., an operation range involving just command and sampling signals, and an operation range involving data and sampling signals. Pet. 29–34. This does not satisfy “valid operation range” as we have construed above in Section III.C. Specifically, we determined that “valid operation range” is a three-dimensional range including a boundary for each of three underlying parameters which, for example, may be the phases of the command signals, the data signals, and the sampling signals. Nowhere has Petitioner identified or explained how Johnson discloses a valid operation range that is a function of three parameters together, e.g., the respective phases of command signals, data signals, and sampling signals. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner’s reasoning for adjusting the phase of clock signals DCLK, which Petitioner regards as sampling signals, to synchronize with the phase of data signals on the DQ data bus is unpersuasive, because Johnson, as Petitioner has recognized, already adjusts the phase of data signals on the DQ data bus to synchronize with clock signals DCLK. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 136; Ex. 1004, 4:55–59, 6:46–48, 7:25–31, 7:36–42). The proposed adjustment is redundant and serves little, if any purpose. Petitioner has not proposed to stop adjusting the data signals relative to DCLK. Nor has Petitioner articulated a reason to do the adjustment in both directions, i.e., adjusting the data signals relative to the sampling signals and adjusting the sampling signals relative to the data signals. We have also determined above, in discussing limitation [1.3], that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Johnson’s CCLK signal is a sampling signal. Further, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 24) that neither delay 55 nor delay lock loop 41 in Johnson’s Figure 4 is used for systematic calibration of any signal or in a signal calibration process. We find that the mere presence of a delay element in a signal path does not reasonably suggest systematic calibration. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentable
“Petitioner still has not made a sufficient showing for limitation [1.4.a]. That is because Petitioner has, at best, identified only two 2-parameter valid operation ranges, i.e., an operation range involving just command and sampling signals, and an operation range involving data and sampling signals. Pet. 29–34. This does not satisfy “valid operation range” as we have construed above in Section III.C. Specifically, we determined that “valid operation range” is a three-dimensional range including a boundary for each of three underlying parameters which, for example, may be the phases of the command signals, the data signals, and the sampling signals. Nowhere has Petitioner identified or explained how Johnson discloses a valid operation range that is a function of three parameters together, e.g., the respective phases of command signals, data signals, and sampling signals. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner’s reasoning for adjusting the phase of clock signals DCLK, which Petitioner regards as sampling signals, to synchronize with the phase of data signals on the DQ data bus is unpersuasive, because Johnson, as Petitioner has recognized, already adjusts the phase of data signals on the DQ data bus to synchronize with clock signals DCLK. Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 136; Ex. 1004, 4:55–59, 6:46–48, 7:25–31, 7:36–42). The proposed adjustment is redundant and serves little, if any purpose. Petitioner has not proposed to stop adjusting the data signals relative to DCLK. Nor has Petitioner articulated a reason to do the adjustment in both directions, i.e., adjusting the data signals relative to the sampling signals and adjusting the sampling signals relative to the data signals. We have also determined above, in discussing limitation [1.3], that Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that Johnson’s CCLK signal is a sampling signal. Further, we agree with Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. 24) that neither delay 55 nor delay lock loop 41 in Johnson’s Figure 4 is used for systematic calibration of any signal or in a signal calibration process. We find that the mere presence of a delay element in a signal path does not reasonably suggest systematic calibration. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,646,835
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.