- Apple Inc. / Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 22, 2026 · IPR2022-01002 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 1–9 and 12–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Paulraj and Heath under § 103.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“determining no challenged claim had been proved unpatentable by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Apple Inc. (collectively, “Petitioner”). Paper 41. Petitioner appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Papers 43, 44. On January 13, 2026, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded, on the basis that the Board erred by not considering certain alternative arguments presented in the Petitioner’s Reply (Paper 29), which were properly responsive to claim construction proposed in the Patent Owner Response and adopted by the Board.1 Paper 45. In its Reply, Petitioner alternatively argued that even under the Patent Owner’s claim construction relating to “the plurality of antennas,” the same prior art references nonetheless still rendered obvious the challenged claims. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing, despite having been given an opportunity to make and explain such a request. Paper 51. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. Having considered all of the arguments presented in Petitioner’s Reply, we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 and 12–20 of U.S. Patent No. 9,191,083 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’083 patent”) are unpatentable. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and at least two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems, or the equivalent.” Pet. 2–3 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 27–28). Petitioner additionally states that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner does not in its Response address the level of ordinary skill. Patent Owner’s expert witness, Dr. Cooklev, testifies that he “will apply the same definition of the level of skill of a POSITA [as Petitioner].” Ex. 2004 ¶ 19. Based on the evidence of record, we determine a person of ordinary skill would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and two years of experience related to the design or development of wireless communication systems. This is consistent with Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill, with the exception of Petitioner’s open-ended reference to “at least” two years of experience, because that would improperly encompass a level of experience only possessed by an expert. This articulation of the level of ordinary skill is also the same as what we determined in the Final Written decision issued on November 30, 2023. Paper 41, 6. C. slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends: “The plain meaning of the claims requires that the same ‘plurality of antennas’ be used for transmitting and receiving the plurality of signal streams.” PO Resp. 5, 9–12. Citing Dr. Cooklev’s testimony, Patent Owner contends that the ’083 patent’s Specification describes embodiments that use the same antennas for both transmitting and receiving data streams. PO Resp. 7–9 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 34–35). In the Final Written Decision, we determined: Although we do not understand the claims to require both transmission and reception “via all antennas” all of the time, we determine the claims require a set of antennas in which at least some of the antennas are for both transmitting and receiving. We disagree with Petitioner that two separate sets of antennas— one set of transmitting antennas and a separate, nonoverlapping set of receiving antennas—fall within the scope of the challenged claims. Paper 41, 13 (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit agreed with our claim construction. Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLC, U.S. Ct. App. Fed. Cir., slip op. 24-1419 (January 13, 2026) (2026 WL 91021) (Paper 45, 2–4). We continue to apply the same construction here that we adopted in the Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“legally sufficient motivation for modifying Paulraj, but only attempted to show that the modification “could” have been made by one of ordinary skill in the art which is not enough for a showing of obviousness. Sur-reply 8–9. We disagree with Patent Owner. Establishing that certain technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the effective filing date of the challenged patent constitutes sufficient motivation to make a modification in accordance with what was well-known in the art to one of ordinary skill, absent factors not present here. Indeed, “if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. That would be the situation where a technique was well-known to one of ordinary skill in the art, unless there is actual difficulty in making the application. The “improvement” here, although not articulated by Petitioner, is inherent with the technique, not requiring use of separate antennas for transmitting and receiving, i.e., eliminating the need for additional parts. Further, it is not necessary to show that a modification is the “best option,” because any “suitable option” would suffice. See Intel Corporation v. Qualcomm Incorporated, 21 F.4th 784, 800 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, Patent Owner does not assert that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had difficulty modifying Paulraj to use some of the same antennas both for transmitting and for receiving. Nor does Patent Owner dispute that it was well known to one of ordinary skill in the art to use the same antenna(s) for both transmitting and for receiving. We further note the following description in the Specification of the ’083 patent: “The typical CT/MD [cellular telephone/mobile device] has one transmitter and one receiver (T/R), with one antenna.” Ex. 1001, 1:47–48. That statement is fully consistent with Petitioner’s assertion that it was well-known to use the same antenna for transmitting and for receiving. For the foregoing reasons, notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary, we determine that Petitioner sufficiently has shown that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Paulraj such that some of the same antennas would be used both for transmitting and for receiving, according to limitations 1[b], 1[d], and 1[e].” slip op. at 36
Patent outcomesUS 9,191,083 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,191,083 - Deltran USA LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00885 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under Richardson-based obviousness grounds; the Yu and Paparrizos grounds do not establish unpatentability.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, “[a]s of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, . . . would have been a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience in design of battery charging systems.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–30). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art[.]” PO Resp. 16. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, because it is supported by the testimony of C. Arthur MacCarley and not disputed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“arguments relating to whether the prior findings are “necessary to the determination” or whether estoppel applies to arguments relating to Richardson being inoperative. See Pet. Reply 27. Nor does Petitioner respond to our inquiry about whether collateral estoppel maybe applied on a limitation by limitation basis. See Pet. Reply 27. At the hearing, however, Petitioner confirmed that resolution of the issue is not necessary to our final determination. JUDGE ROSS: Do we even need to decide the collateral estoppel issue? I mean, it seems to me that if your petition clearly made out your case for the combination of Richardson and Zhao, then we don't even need to reach that. MR. CHANDRA: That’s exactly right, Your Honor. That is our position, as well. We believe collateral estoppel applies, but you don't need to decide that issue in order to find these claims unpatentable. As I mentioned before, these are the same references. We have fairly sought out all of the portions of Richardson, we cited to specific portions. Not just relying on collateral estoppel, but the teachings of the reference itself. So, while this is an issue, we believe that collateral estoppel should apply. It does not have to apply in order to find the challenged claims unpatentable. Tr. 19:9–20. We are persuaded, as discussed in Section II.G., that Petitioner has shown where Richardson in combination with Zhao meets each limitation of the claims of the ’203 patent. Accordingly, we need not address whether Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that collateral estoppel applies here.” slip op. at 14
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredOther
“Our Practice Guide states, that “[o]nce a trial is instituted, the Board may decline to consider arguments set forth in a preliminary response unless they are raised in the patent owner response.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“Practice Guide”), 52 (Nov. 2019) (citing In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that a patent owner waives an issue presented in its preliminary response if it fails to renew the issue in its response after trial is instituted)).12 In addition, in our Scheduling Order, we stated that “Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.” Paper 9 at 10; see also Practice Guide, 94 (same). Patent Owner confirmed at the Oral Hearing its understanding that arguments raised in its Preliminary Response and not reasserted in its Patent Owner Response were not appropriate for consideration during trial. Tr. 4:10–6:17. Petitioner does not identify any particular argument raised in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response that is not present in the Patent Owner Response. But, in this Final Written Decision, we do not consider arguments made in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response and instead assess only those fairly presented in the Patent Owner Response.” slip op. at 15
Patent outcomesUS 11,667,203 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,667,203 - Deltran USA LLC / Adc Solutions Auto LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01219 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious over the Richardson-based grounds; the Yu and Paparrizos grounds do not establish unpatentability.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, “[a]s of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, . . . would have been a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience in design of battery charging systems.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–30). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art[.]” PO Resp. 16. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, because it is supported by the testimony of C. Arthur MacCarley and not disputed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner submits there are no formal claim constructions necessary in this proceeding[.]” Pet. 22. Patent Owner also “does not propose any terms need to be construed.” PO Resp. 15. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached
“arguments relating to whether the prior findings are “necessary to the determination” or whether estoppel applies to arguments relating to Richardson being inoperative. See Pet. Reply 27. Nor does Petitioner respond to our inquiry about whether collateral estoppel maybe applied on a limitation by limitation basis. See Pet. Reply 27. At the hearing, however, Petitioner confirmed that resolution of the issue is not necessary to our final determination. JUDGE ROSS: Do we even need to decide the collateral estoppel issue? I mean, it seems to me that if your petition clearly made out your case for the combination of Richardson and Zhao, then we don't even need to reach that. MR. CHANDRA: That’s exactly right, Your Honor. That is our position, as well. We believe collateral estoppel applies, but you don't need to decide that issue in order to find these claims unpatentable. As I mentioned before, these are the same references. We have fairly sought out all of the portions of Richardson, we cited to specific portions. Not just relying on collateral estoppel, but the teachings of the reference itself. So, while this is an issue, we believe that collateral estoppel should apply. It does not have to apply in order to find the challenged claims unpatentable. Tr. 19:9–20. We are persuaded, as discussed in Section II.G., that Petitioner has shown where Richardson in combination with Zhao meets each limitation of the claims of the ’203 patent. Accordingly, we need not address whether Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that collateral estoppel applies here.” slip op. at 14
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“With respect to Petitioner’s allegations that rest on AAPA, we determine Petitioner has failed to show that claims 2, 10, and 11 are unpatentable. Our rules require that a petition for inter partes review must base the asserted challenges on “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) and (4). And, a petitioner who relies on applicant admitted prior art as the basis, or part of the basis, of a ground, runs afoul of § 311. Qualcomm, 134 F.4th at 1365; see also USPTO Memorandum, Enforcement and Non-Waiver of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) and Permissible Uses of General Knowledge in Inter Partes Reviews (Jul. 21, 2025), available at www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/aapa_memo_final__signed.pdf. We acknowledge but reject Petitioner’s position that its combinations discussing AAPA do not “rely” on AAPA but rather rely on U.S. Patent No. 5,793,185 (“the ’185 patent”), described in the ’203 patent as prior art. Pet. Reply 26. A petition for inter partes review must identify, “in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (b)(4). Here, Petitioner’s contention that the Grounds 2 and 5 actually rely on the ’185 patent when discussing AAPA is inconsistent with the Petition. In particular, the Petition does not cite to or direct our attention to any specific details from the ’185 patent to support its challenges. See generally Pet. 54–57, 76–77. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2, 10, and 11 would have been unpatentable over the combination of Richardson, Zhao, and AAPA as well as over the combination of Yu, Paparrizos, and AAPA. Petitioner’s alternative allegations based on Epower-20/Epower-21 are considered below.” slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 11,667,203 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,667,203 - Geneoscopy, Inc. v. Exact Sciences CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01330 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 3, 4, and 12–19 are unpatentable as obvious under each asserted ground.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelOther
- Expert testimonyOther
- Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner
“embody claims of the ’746 patent, the product has features not covered by the ’746 patent’s claims, some of which are critical unclaimed elements according to Patent Owner. Accordingly, Cologuard is not coextensive with the challenged claims, and no nexus between the product and the challenged claims is shown on this record.” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable
“developed where the patient need not manipulate their fecal sample to portion it, but the law of obviousness does not require an option to be the best option to be obvious. For these reasons, bearing in mind that the ultimate burden here is always on Petitioner, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. We also reject Patent Owner’s argument that only impermissible” slip op. at 60
Patent outcomesUS 11,970,746 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,970,746 - Lenovo (United States), Inc. v. University Of RochesterSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 2, 2026 · IPR2024-01225 · APJ Thu A Dang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 3–7 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 8–12 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted grounds did not establish asynchronous operation between domains.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“specification is the ‘single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,’ . . . and ‘is, thus, the primary basis for construing the claims.’” Trs. of Columbia Univ. in City of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Although Patent Owner contends that the Specification disparages systems that impose significant restrictions on the possible choices of frequencies (PO Resp. 21), we find availing Petitioner’s contention that “[s]upport for Patent Owner’s construction is absent from the specification.” Pet. Reply 10. As Petitioner points out, Patent Owner’s claim construction “appears to be based on a single paragraph of the ’443 patent referring to preexisting ‘synchronization schemes [that] restrict the phase relationship and relative frequencies of the clocks.” Id. That is, the only reference by Patent Owner to the Specification is that the Specification states that “Some synchronization schemes restrict the . . . relative frequencies of the clocks, thereby eliminating the need for hardware arbitration [27]. Unfortunately, these schemes impose significant restrictions on the possible choices of frequences.” PO Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:32–36). We agree with Petitioner that such disclosure in the Specification “does not describe how these synchronization schemes ‘restrict the phase relationship and relative frequencies’ with any specificity.’” Pet. the Specification that some schemes impose restrictions on the possible choices of frequency is not a disparagement of any system that has limited choices of frequency or would preclude the claims from covering such prior art techniques. Instead, as Petitioner points out, the Specification of the ’443 patent states “[t]he preferred embodiment uses four domains […] so that domains may vary somewhat in size and still be covered by a single clock.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001, 5:57–59). As Dr. Baker testified in support of Petitioner’s contention, “the preferred embodiment of the ’443 patent relies on a single external master clock that distributes a signal to the local PLL of each domain.” See Ex. 1032 ¶ 9. Thus, although Patent Owner contends that clock signals generated based on a master clock cannot be interpreted to be generated independently of the clock signals generated for others of the plurality of domains (PO Resp. 49), we agree with Petitioner that such claim construction would “exclude[] the preferred embodiment of the ’443 patent,” which is disfavored. Pet. Reply 11. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that “changeable independently” of the other domains does not require that the separate clocks in the plurality of domains be globally-asynchronous.” slip op. at 12
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“As both parties recognize, (PO Resp. 5; Pet. Reply 12), “[actual] [r]eduction to practice in the United States requires that the invention be embodied in tangible form.” Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, actual reduction to practice requires a showing of the invention in a physical or tangible form that shows every element. not sufficient. See Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Here, Patent Owner does not provide any evidence showing every element of the claims in physical or tangible form, as required, but rather contends that the Specification refers to the Paper, wherein the Paper stated that simulation using a software, SimpleScalar, was performed. PO Resp. 16. We are persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that the SimpleScalar simulation was not an actual reduction to practice of the claimed invention. Pet. Reply 12. As Petitioner points out, claim 1, for example, is directed to a “microprocessor,” wherein “Patent Owner has presented no evidence and has not alleged that any physical microprocessor was ever produced or operated.” Id. at 13; see PO Resp. 15–17. And as Petitioner points out, “Patent Owner has produced no evidence of any physical prototype of the claimed microprocessor that could have validated the simulation.” Pet. Reply 13–14. We agree with Petitioner that, at most, such simulation “demonstrated feasibility for prototyping of a microprocessor,” but not a tangible form of the microprocessor itself as required for an actual reduction to practice. Id. at 14; see also Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 1, 67 (1991) (“The feasibility of the optical alignment system may have been proven by the optical mock-up, but the optical mock-up was not a reduction to practice of the proposed MHU–145/M trailer.”).” slip op. at 36
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed
“Here, we find that Petitioner has not met its burden to prove that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that “the functional units of Georgiou operate asynchronously since they have different clocks.” Pet. 74 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 211–219). Specifically, although Petitioner relies on Georgiou for teaching different clocks, Petitioner’s conclusory statement that such application would operate asynchronously requires gapfilling. Id. As Patent Owner points out, Georgiou discloses a clocking architecture in which “all domain clocks are derived from a shared master clock through predetermined rational dividers.” PO Resp. 49. Petitioner concedes during the oral hearing that, in systems such as Georgiou, each domain clock is set a fraction of a master clock, and thus, the various domain clocks are “possibly” synchronous with each other. Tr. 59:4–14 (JUDGE DANG: . . . would being fractions of the master, wouldn’t they be synchronized with each other? MR UHR: They may be, . . . the answer is possibly.”) Thus, we find Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have recognized that the functional units of Georgiou operate “asynchronously” lacks sufficient support in the record. We find the testimony of Dr. Baker insufficient to support Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 213, 215–219. In his declaration, Dr. Baker testified that he “provided several references . . . that explain operating domains asynchronous to one another while the domains operate synchronously.” Id. ¶¶ 215–219. However, although such references explain “globally asynchronous, local synchronous (GALS) systems” (id. ¶ 216), Dr. Baker does not explain why a POSITA “would have known that a functional unit of Georgiou also operates asynchronous with respect to at different frequencies.” Id. ¶ 217. Without evidentiary support, we are left with speculation and impermissible hindsight. See in Re Wagner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). We decline to engage in speculation. See, e.g., In re Vaidyanathan, 381 F. App’x 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Wallen, 565 F. App’x 867, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014), both citing In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Circ. 2001) ([T]he Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.”). In sum, based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s showing is insufficient. Thus, based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not persuasively shown that Georgiou teaches “operating the microprocessor such that each domain operates synchronously, while the domains operate asynchronously relative to one another,” as recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 28
- BurdenMixed
“of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that “the functional units of Georgiou operate asynchronously since they have different clocks.” Pet. 74 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 211–219). Specifically, although Petitioner relies on Georgiou for teaching different clocks, Petitioner’s conclusory statement that such application would operate asynchronously requires gapfilling. Id. As Patent Owner points out, Georgiou discloses a clocking architecture in which “all domain clocks are derived from a shared master clock through predetermined rational dividers.” PO Resp. 49. Petitioner concedes during the oral hearing that, in systems such as Georgiou, each domain clock is set a fraction of a master clock, and thus, the various domain clocks are “possibly” synchronous with each other. Tr. 59:4–14 (JUDGE DANG: . . . would being fractions of the master, wouldn’t they be synchronized with each other? MR UHR: They may be, . . . the answer is possibly.”) Thus, we find Petitioner’s contention that a POSITA would have recognized that the functional units of Georgiou operate “asynchronously” lacks sufficient support in the record. We find the testimony of Dr. Baker insufficient to support Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 53–56, 213, 215–219. In his declaration, Dr. Baker testified that he “provided several references . . . that explain operating domains asynchronous to one another while the domains operate synchronously.” Id. ¶¶ 215–219. However, although such references explain “globally asynchronous, local synchronous (GALS) systems” (id. ¶ 216), Dr. Baker does not explain why a POSITA “would have known that a functional unit of Georgiou also operates asynchronous with respect to at different frequencies.” Id. ¶ 217. Without evidentiary support, we are left with speculation and impermissible hindsight. See in Re Wagner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). We decline to engage in speculation. See, e.g., In re Vaidyanathan, 381 F. App’x 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Wallen, 565 F. App’x 867, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2014), both citing In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Circ. 2001) ([T]he Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.”). In sum, based on our review of the record, we find Petitioner’s showing is insufficient. Thus, based on the complete record presented, we determine that Petitioner has not persuasively shown that Georgiou teaches “operating the microprocessor such that each domain operates synchronously, while the domains operate asynchronously relative to one another,” as recited in claim 8.” slip op. at 28
Patent outcomesUS 7,089,443 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,089,443 - Allstate Insurance Company v. Atos, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 30, 2026 · IPR2021-01449 · APJ Jon M Jurgovan · IPR · Remand
Claims 3–5 are unpatentable; claims 1 and 2 are not shown unpatentable. Claims 3 and 4 are obvious over the applied grounds under the remand construction of “movement vector.”
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“was incorrect, vacated the Final Written Decision as to claims 3 and 4, and remanded the case to the Board to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” and decide the outcome for claims 3 and 4 in accordance with that meaning. Atos, LLC v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2025 WL 1482404, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 23, 2025); Paper 35 (“Federal Circuit Remand,” “Remand,” or “Fed. Cir. Remand”). Pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s instructions, the Board authorized the” slip op. at 3
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“considered individually and together, have well-understood, common meanings to ordinarily skilled artisans as of the invention date, reflected by the ’174 patent’s specification and other evidence of record noted above. Accordingly, we determine that the ordinary and customary meaning of “movement vector” is “a vector indicating movement of an object.” 3) “operation indicator” Petitioner” slip op. at 20
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Dr. Kanellakopoulos’s explanation that angular momentum is not inherent to an object, and its computation requires an arbitrary choice of a point of origin that has no physical meaning in the context of vehicle motion, also supports Patent Owner’s position. Id. ¶ 71 (citing Ex. 2004, 262). Accordingly, Patent Owner’s argument, that angular momentum cannot be used to detect a vehicle turning, is persuasive. Id. We also find persuasive, as Dr. Kanellakopoulos explains, that Petitioner’s argument regarding the figure on Kleppner 234 is based on misinterpretation of the vectors in that figure. Id. ¶ 67 (explaining that Kleppner 233–234 does not depict a gravity vector).” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Kleppner does not disclose a rotation vector, a person of ordinary skill would have used the knowledge of a rotation vector (because it is a term of art) alongside Kleppner’s teaching, to arrive at claim 1. See Pet. Reply 11. This argument does not satisfy Petitioner’s burden to provide articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the conclusion of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Petitioner does not explain which teaching of Kleppner a person of ordinary skill would have selected and combined with their knowledge of a rotation vector to yield the method of claim 1, or explain why a person of ordinary skill would have recognized based on Kleppner that estimating the angle between a rotation vector and gravity vector could be used to detect a vehicle turning. Nor does Petitioner respond to Patent Owner’s assertion that Kleppner provides no rationale for estimating an angle of alignment between a rotation vector and gravity vector as a way of detecting a vehicle turning. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 65.” slip op. at 35
Patent outcomesUS 9,846,174 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,846,174 - Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01083 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–3, 7, 9, 10, and 101 are unpatentable as obvious over Ahn, Chaudhri, and Hinckley.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art had knowledge that “linear menus are not easy to use on small devices, especially in mobile situations” because “[t]he limited screen space makes it difficult to display a large . . . linear menu while keeping items large enough to be easily selected” (Ex. 1028, 2) and that “[d]istance to and size of the target are important factors that give pie menus the advantage over traditional linear menus” (Ex. 2013, 2). See Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 31–33. Given that Hinckley explicitly describes using its radial menu in a mobile telephone, and given that a person of ordinary skill in the art had knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of Hinckley’s radial menu, we find Dr. Terveen’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Hinckley’s radial menu in Ahn’s mobile device more persuasive that Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony to the contrary, because Dr. Terveen’s testimony is consistent with the teachings of Hinckley and the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art, whereas Dr. Rosenberg does not reconcile his testimony with Hinckley’s express disclosure of displaying a radial menu on the touch screen of a mobile telephone. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 56, 63–67; 1023 ¶¶ 31–33; Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 71–79; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 43, 53, 56; Ex. 2009, 3; Ex. 2010, 2; Ex. 2013, 2. We find that a person of ordinary skill in the art had reason to conclude that implementing Hinckley’s radial menu in Ahn’s mobile device with limited screen space yields advantages such as distance to and size of the icons as well as associating a function with a direction that outweigh disadvantages such as having less icons than a linear menu. We find that combining the bezel gestures and associated bezel menu and radial menu of” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. We find that altering Ahn’s device by substituting Hinckley’s bezel gestures and associated bezel and radial menus for Ahn’s technique of displaying menus does no more than yield the predictable results of (a) conserving screen real estate, (b) distinguishing bezel gestures from normal gestures so that the bezel gestures do not interfere with normal gestures and vice versa, (c) providing a novice mode to help a user learn the expert way of accessing the functionality of the bezel and radial menus, and (d) providing a user user as taught by Hinckley. Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1, 40, 46, 77–80, 110; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 63–67.” slip op. at 27
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s contention that several of the icons shown in Ahn’s menus would not benefit from a radial menu because of their assigned locations and functions (PO Resp. 42–51) do not address the Petition’s contention that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Hinckley’s bezel menu with icon 1712 that includes radial menu icon 1714 in Ahn’s device. See Pet. 46–55. Even if some icons would not benefit from a radial menu, we agree with Petitioner that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that other icons would benefit, such as the icons that display sub-menus when selected, as shown by icon 830 in figure 8C and the answer options icon shown in figure 17 of Ahn as well as icon 1714 shown in figure 17 of Hinckley, and would have therefore provided such icons with a radial menu icon. See Reply 2 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418); see id. at 15–16 (quoting Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). With respect to the specific locations assigned to the bezel menu icons and the radial menu icons, we agree with Petitioner that a manner that improves efficiency and usability, such as locating the radial menu icon away from the end points of the bezel menu as taught by figure 17 of Hinckley.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,642,413 unpatentable§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,642,413 - Apple Inc. v. Smith Interface Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2024-01084 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 8–18, 22–30, and 34–39 are unpatentable as obvious over Shiplacoff and over Shiplacoff combined with Nan.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, human-computer interaction, or a comparable field and at least two years of professional experience in the design and development of graphical user interfaces (GUIs), human-computer interfaces, or equivalents thereof. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 22). Petitioner’s declarant, Loren Terveen, Ph.D., testifies that “[s]uch experience could be obtained through research and study in a graduate program or through comparable exposure through industry employment, and additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 22. Patent Owner agrees with this definition. PO Resp. 13 (citing Dec. 5). As Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill appears commensurate with the subject matter before us, we apply Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision. Also, the level of ordinary skill in the art can be evidenced by the references cited, and we find it commensurate with the cited references in this proceeding. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“according to the Phillips standard.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner contends that under the plain language of claim 1, the “one or more criteria” is satisfied when a “movement parameter” of “the second input” is detected to be “above a movement threshold.” PO Resp. 14. Patent Owner contends that under the plain language of claim 27, the “second one or more criteria” is satisfied when “a duration parameter” of the “second input” is detected to be “above a duration threshold.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner contends that the plain language of limitations [1j] and [1k] requires an operation capable of detecting a second input by a second contact that includes movement across a display in a direction, determining whether the second input meets or does not meet the recited criteria, and triggers performance of each of the corresponding display actions as appropriate. Id. at 15–19. Patent Owner 15. Id. at 21–23. Patent Owner contends that the plain language of limitations [27d]–[27f] recited in claim 27 require an operation that enables the device to detect a second input by a second contact that includes movement across the display in a direction, determine whether the second input meets or does not meet the two recited criteria, and trigger performance of each of the recited display actions as appropriate. Id. at 19– 20. Patent Owner contends that for “the second input” recited in limitations [1j] and [1k], “the second input” must be detected in the same operational context. Id. at 23–24. In particular, Patent Owner contends that limitations [1j] and [1k], and similar limitations recited in claims 15 and 27, “require a single, common contact event as the starting point of the claimed logic operations.” Id. at 24; see id. at 25–26. We do not need to determine whether Patent Owner’s proposed constructions are correct, because under either Petitioner’s or Patent Owner’s proposed constructions, we find that the prior art would have rendered all challenged claims obvious as discussed below in our patentability analysis.” slip op. at 6
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“at 418; see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Patent Owner’s contention and the supporting testimony of Dr. Madisetti does not address Shiplacoff’s teaching of using a gesture, such as Shiplacoff’s flick gesture, to return to launch screen. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen in finding that Shiplacoff’s disclosure that “returning to the launch screen . . . is performed by performing a gesture” (Ex. 1004 ¶ 99) such as a flicking gesture (Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 126, 129; Ex. 1023 ¶ 13) teaches using a flicking gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. See Pet. 16, 22–24; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–53, 59; Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Reply 7–10. Because Dr. Terveen’s testimony is consistent with and supported by the teachings of Shiplacoff as a whole (in contrast to that of Dr. Madisetti), we credit the testimony of Dr. Terveen in finding that using a gesture to return from home screen to launch screen as taught by Shiplacoff, where the gesture is a flick gesture as taught by Shiplacoff, yields the predictable result of using a flick gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“articulate why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Shiplacoff’s flicking gesture to switch from full screen mode to the launch screen. PO Resp. 47–49. Petitioner contends that Shiplacoff’s swipe up gesture teaches limitation [1j] by including a movement parameter above a movement threshold. Pet. 17–23. Petitioner contends that Shiplacoff teaches that a user can perform another gesture to return to the home screen. Id. at 23. Petitioner contends that when a gesture different from the swipe up gesture is used to return to the home screen, a person of ordinary skill would have used a flicking gesture because the flicking gesture has a different movement parameter than the swipe up gesture, namely, a movement parameter that does not meet the movement threshold. Pet. 23– 24 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 99–102, 167; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 60–61). We agree with Petitioner for the reasons given in the Petition and as discussed above. We reiterate that using a gesture to return from home screen to launch screen as taught by Shiplacoff, where the gesture is a flicking gesture as taught by Shiplacoff, yields the predictable result of using a flicking gesture to return from home screen to launch screen. Ex. 1023 ¶ 13; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 52–61; KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. We disagree with Patent Owner’s contention that Shiplacoff teaches away from using the flicking gesture to switch from full screen mode to the launch screen because, according to Patent Owner, Shiplacoff already uses the flick gesture to perform scrolling in full screen mode. PO Resp. 49–52 the same gesture in a given mode can be assigned to different functions depending on where, when, and how the gesture is input by the user, as discussed above. Reply 11–12 (discussing Shiplacoff’s teaching of associating the same tap gesture with different functions depending on where the tap occurs), 13–14 (discussing Duarte’s teaching of associating both a drag gesture and a scrolling gesture to the same mode). Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 16–19. We agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen, that based on the teachings of Shiplacoff (and, by incorporation, Duarte), a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that a flick started in area 102 or near an edge of screen 101 and continuing onto screen 101 would be distinguished from a flick entirely within screen 101 based on location, and would perform a different function. Ex. 1023 ¶¶ 18–19. We also agree with Petitioner and Dr. Terveen, that Duarte teaches associating a gesture with one function when a modifier key is not pressed, and associating the same gesture with a different function when the modifier key is pressed, such that a flick performed when the key is not pressed would perform one function such as scrolling and a flick performed when the key is pressed would perform another, such as changing the display mode. Reply 15 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 64; Ex. 1023 ¶ 20). We agree with Petitioner that Shiplacoff does not teach away from using a flicking gesture to change from full screen mode to home screen because it “does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.” Reply 10 (quoting Depuy Spine, 567 F.3d at1327).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 10,649,578 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,649,578 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00055 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s motion, entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner on claims 1–42 after statutory disclaimer, and terminated the proceeding.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Under the Rules, actions construed as a request for entry of adverse judgment include “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Here, Patent Owner has disclaimed, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.321, claims 1–42 of the ’407 patent, which constitute all challenged claims involved in this trial. See Ex. 2031. We thus construe the statutory disclaimer as a request for entry of adverse judgment. Having reviewed the statutory disclaimer, we determine that adverse judgment against Patent Owner with respect to claims 1–42 of the ’407 patent is appropriate.” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 9,486,407 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jan 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00054 · APJ John G New · IPR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s unopposed motion and entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner as to claims 1–16 after statutory disclaimer.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding. Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include … [d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(1). We find that good cause exists to grant Patent Owner’s unopposed request for adverse judgment and to terminate this proceeding. Consequently, we grant Patent Owner’s Motion to Terminate and Request for Adverse Judgment. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 11,246,828
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.