• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00342 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 6–11 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations did not teach guiding a vehicle to a fixed destination or calculating the claimed optimized path from stored destination data.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentOther

    “reserves consideration of discretionary issues to the Director. The relief Patent Owner requests is that the panel exercise discretion to terminate these proceedings based on actions taken in related district court proceedings as done in Hulu. Supp. PO Resp. 2. Because the basis for Patent Owner’s requested relief is discretionary, the panel lacks the authority to grant the request. In this regard, the present situation is different from that in Hulu and Sinclair Pharma Limited v. Hydrafacial LLC (IPR2025-00145, Paper 41, Squires, Feb. 12, 2026), cited by Patent Owner. In those cases, the 9 Available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Director_Institution_of _AIA_Trial_Proceedings.pdf (“Director Institution Memo”). Director ordered de-institution, not the panel. The Director has not made such a determination or delegated such authority to the panel in these proceedings. Indeed, as noted above, Patent Owner has already briefed, and the Director has previously ruled on, discretionary denial issues. Paper 10. Accordingly, we decline to vacate our Institution Decision and focus our analysis on the merits of the case as presented by the parties.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “[O]ne or more factors may predominate.” Id. Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related subject, and four years of work experience in image processing, automated vehicle control/navigation, or a related field.” Pet. 7. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’805 patent, and we adopt it here. See generally, PO Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’805 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Here, in our opinion, Patent Owner has shown that the Specification describes the potential destinations of a vehicle as limited to physically fixed, non-transient objects or features. PO Resp. 18–21. As an initial matter the ’805 patent is titled “Docking Assistant” and explains its purpose for guiding a “vehicle to a stop at a specific location.” Ex. 1001, codes (53), (57), Abstract. We acknowledge that claim 1 does not expressly recite that “at least one potential destination” is a fixed destination or location. See id. at 7:61– 63 (Claim 1 requiring “extracting from the acquired image data positional parameters of at least one potential destination relative to the motor vehicle;”). Yet, in the context of the relatively brief specification, there is no explanation, example, or embodiment which reasonably extends the meaning of “destination” or “potential destination” beyond a fixed location. The ’805 patent describes in the Abstract that [m]any day-to-day driving situations require that an operator of a motor vehicle guide the motor vehicle along a specific course and bring the vehicle to a stop at a specific location, for example in a parking bay or at a loading platform. Id. at code (57) Abstract. The Abstract explains in the next sentence that “[t]o assist a vehicle operator in such situations, a method and a suitable device for implementing this method, include detecting the potential target objects in the image data of an image sensor and identifying the potential target objects as potential destinations in a multi-stage exclusionary method.” Id. (emphasis added). Nowhere in this initial description of the invention, nor anywhere else that Petitioner points to, is there is expansion of the “specific location” or “potential destination” beyond a docking station or parking bay. Of course, the claim is not limited to these examples, as it would be inappropriate to read in such limitations from the Specification. See Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 771 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Acceleration again attempts to import structural limitations into claims lacking those limitations. . . . While the specifications discuss a broadcast channel overlaying a network, the claims at issue are not so limited.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Majumder, testifies to the contrary that “[r]ead as an engineer, the ‘805 patent’s present invention is framed around guiding a vehicle to fixed, physical destinations (exemplified by docking stations and similar structures) without fiducials or special markings.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 81. Considering Broggi, Dr. Majumder testifies further that “[a] moving object, such as a preceding car, is not a valid destination under the ‘805 Patent, because it is not a stationary location at which the host vehicle can be guided to stop. To treat such a vehicle as a ‘potential destination’ would lead to collision, not guidance.” Id. ¶ 86. As discussed in our claim construction, given a plain reading of claim 1 in light of the Specification, our understanding of the ’805 patent is consistent with Dr. Majumder’s testimony. We agree that Broggi is directed expressly to the platooning of moving vehicles, and not physically fixed destinations as the proper claim construction requires. Because Broggi does not disclose the use of physically fixed “potential destinations” as required, e.g., in limitations [1.2]–[1.3], and neither Huttenlocher nor Brady are relied upon to overcome this deficiency, Petitioner has not met its burden of persuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Broggi in view of Huttenlocher and Brady.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,336,805 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,336,805
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00221 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 over Dateki; claims 3 and 7 over Dateki and Mate; and claims 4 and 8 over Dateki and Chitrapu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “[w]ould have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the wireless communications systems that are pertinent to the ’889 patent. That person would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally, PO Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’889 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “do not recite, as Patent Owner interprets it, that the extracted power control information upon which the UE bases its transmission of a signal be “the same” power control information extracted from the control message. PO Resp. 25. Where the claim is clear on its face, we decline to inject “the same” into the construction, that is, words that are not actually in the claim. Yet considering the plain language of claim 1, we mostly agree with Patent Owner’s interpretation, namely that “a transmission power level based on the extracted power control information,” as required in limitation [1.6] includes power control information extracted from “the control message,” in limitation [1.5] having “power control bits for a plurality of UEs” as recited in limitation [1.4]. Ex. 1001, 10:2–19. We understand and interpret the concluding limitation in method-type claim 5 in the same manner as limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “do not recite, as Patent Owner interprets it, that the extracted power control information upon which the UE bases its transmission of a signal be “the same” power control information extracted from the control message. PO Resp. 25. Where the claim is clear on its face, we decline to inject “the same” into the construction, that is, words that are not actually in the claim. Yet considering the plain language of claim 1, we mostly agree with Patent Owner’s interpretation, namely that “a transmission power level based on the extracted power control information,” as required in limitation [1.6] includes power control information extracted from “the control message,” in limitation [1.5] having “power control bits for a plurality of UEs” as recited in limitation [1.4]. Ex. 1001, 10:2–19. We understand and interpret the concluding limitation in method-type claim 5 in the same manner as limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “where packet transmission is conducted, “the transmission power control information is transmitted via the HS-SCCH as second transmission power control information TPCC at a shorter periodic cycle.” PO Resp. 11 (quoting Ex. 1005, 13:11–13). But in context, after describing transmission of TPCC 1 on F-DPCH, Dateki says “[a]lso, in a case where packet transmission is conducted, the transmission power control information is transmitted via the HS-SCCH as second transmission power control information TPCC at a shorter periodic cycle.” Ex. 1005, 13:8–13 (emphasis added). We find it significant that the word “also” is used by Dateki, here, to describe the relationship of TPCC 1 and TPCC 2 as used together. If the intent was to transmit and use only TPCC 2 on HS-SCCH when data packets are transmitted on HS-PDCH, it would have made more sense to say “alternatively,” and otherwise make clear that only TPCC 2 is transmitted. But they did not. On the other hand, the inventors certainly understood how to explain when TPCC 2 is not transmitted. For example, Dateki makes clear that in certain embodiments TPCC 2 is unnecessary and “transmission power control may be effectively realized without including transmission power control information in the HS-SCCH.” Id. at 14:33–35. The same cannot be said for TPCC 1.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,664,889 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,664,889
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 1, 2026 · IPR2025-00222 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–11, 13, and 14 are unpatentable over Yu and Miyazaki; claims 15, 16, and 19 were not shown unpatentable over Matsushima.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art “at, and before, the earliest claimed priority date of the ’158 patent . . . would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2–3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” adding that “[l]ess experience may be sufficient with additional education, and likewise, less education may be sufficient with additional work experience.” Pet. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–18). Patent Owner does not offer a competing definition or dispute Petitioner's articulation. Based on the entire record, we adopt Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill for one of ordinary skill in the art because that characterization, we find, is consistent with the ’158 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “We determine that the claims require a per-channel determination of integration time—that is, an integration time arrived at for each sensor or channel individually—and cannot be satisfied by a single global value merely applied uniformly across the sensors. We do not, however, read the independent claims to require that the per-channel integration times differ from one another.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We adopt the definition clearly and unambiguously set forth in the specification, which was likewise adopted by the Court in the related litigation. See Pet. 7–8, 55; Pet. Reply 1–2 (district court construing the term to mean “the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene”). The specification states that the integrated photo-charge “is directly related to the time the image sensor collects and integrates signal from the scene,” and that “[t]his is known as integration time.” Ex. 1001, 4:4–7. Accordingly, the ’158 patent demonstrates that the inventors indisputably acted as a lexicographer for the term “integration time.”” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “We construe “during a frame” to mean the period during which data for a single frame of an image is captured. The limitation is satisfied where the per-channel integration time is effectuated during the frame; it does not require that the integration time be re-determined mid-frame, nor does it require actuation of a “charge integration switch.” The specification’s only use of the phrase confirms this reading: “each camera channel is controlled during a frame under an independent integration time.” Ex. 1001, 3:45–50. Consistent with that usage, the specification describes selecting an integration time for each channel and then integrating the photo-signal “within a single frame of data,” and describes placing the charge-integration switch in a state to allow charge to accumulate for the selected period and then transferring the accumulated charge upon completion of the integration period. Id. at 4:51–54, 11:3–18. We decline Patent Owner’s proposal to require in-frame actuation of a charge-integration switch, for the same reason we decline to import that structure into “integration time.” We also decline to read the phrase to require mid-frame re-determination of the integration time, because the patent’s own embodiment selects an integration time and then integrates charge during the frame under that selected time. Ex. 1001, 4:51–54, 11:3– 18. So construed, “during a frame” is not redundant of the independentclaim limitation: it adds that the per-channel control occurs within a single frame (intrascene), as distinct from adjustment from one frame to the next (interscene).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 9,232,158 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,232,158
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00220 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Wallen and Berggren because the combined teachings render the claimed subject matter obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “We agree that Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction is wholly unsupported by, and inconsistent with, the language of independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and the aims of the ’670 Patent Specification. See Ex. 1001, 2:3– 25, 9:32–10:5, 12:51–67, 18:54–19:6, 19:26–42, 20:12–26. Moreover, the cited extrinsic evidence––testimony by Patent Owner’s expert Dr. Lomp–– does not support Patent Owner’s proposed construction because it is internally inconsistent and also undermined by Dr. Lomp’s inconsistent deposition testimony. See Ex. 1036, 11:6–17, 12:9–12; Ex. 2010 ¶¶ 40, 48. Similarly, the extrinsic evidence cited by Petitioner (e.g., Exs. 1037, 1038, 2009) undermines Patent Owner’s position emphasizing the intended recipient devices of SIB1. In summary, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction because it is unsupported by the claim language, the ’670 Patent Specification, and the cited extrinsic evidence. with the ordinary and customary meaning which does not include limiting SIB1 to an ordinary legacy SIB and excluding MTC specific SIBs or SIBs intended for MTC devices. In addition, we need not construe explicitly any other claim term or phrase. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. 868 F.3d at 1017 (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “would have had a bachelor’s degree from an accredited program in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and at least two years of professional experience relating to wireless communication technology” and “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 15–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–21). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We find that “at least” in Petitioner’s formulation of the level of skill in the art is vague and open-ended. Otherwise, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’670 Patent Specification and the prior art of record. slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “filing date. As explained above, the burden of production shifted to Patent Owner to show that Wallen is not prior art because the ’670 Patent is entitled to the earlier January 20, 2012, filing date of foreign priority application GB1201000. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing a system information block 1, Patent Owner’s arguments do not substantively address how GB1201000 provides written description support for any other limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 43, 57. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in foreign priority application GB1201000, the burden of production did not shift back to Petitioner, and,” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “primary synchronization signal (PSS), a secondary synchronization signal (SSS), and a physical broadcast channel (PBCH) including a master information block (MIB).” See Pet. 41–42 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 70–75; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 76, 77, 83–84). Petitioner implicitly acknowledges that Wallen does not expressly disclose a physical broadcast channel (PBCH), but relies on Berggren for confirming that the LTE standard specifies that a PBCH carries the MIB. See Pet. 42–43 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 74; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 73–75). According to Petitioner, “a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to transmit Wallen’s MIB using a PBCH as taught by Berggren.” Pet. 43 (citing Pet. 33–38). In particular, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated for Wallen’s LTE system to utilize the LTE standard implementation details taught by Berggren,” and “it would have been predictable and beneficial for Wallen’s user equipment to receive the MIB in the [PBCH], as was standard in LTE.” Pet. 34 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 58), 37 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 63). According to Petitioner, “the combination is nothing more than ‘the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.’” Pet. 38 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). Based on the entire record developed during trial, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify Wallen’s broadcast MIB with Berggren’s teachings of using a PBCH for transmitting broadcast MIBs. See Pet. 33–38; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,206,670 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,206,670
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 23, 2026 · IPR2025-00219 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 11–22 were not shown unpatentable under any § 103 ground because the prior art did not teach or suggest receiving the claimed resource allocation and multi-level TPC command on one physical channel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references.]” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “The second and third asserted benefits—reduced complexity and reduced latency—rest on the declaration of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶ 64) rather than on any disclosure of Andersson or Khan. We accord that testimony little weight on this point because it asserts the benefits in conclusory terms without explaining why they would result from inserting a scheduling grant into Andersson’s undefined “other bits,” as distinct from Khan’s separate-slot design.” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 14. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’500 Patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner offers a proposed construction for the recited “single physical channel” found in limitation 11.2 and “an accumulation of TPC commands” found in independent claims 12 and 18. PO Resp. 9–17. Petitioner likewise addresses the scope of an accumulation of TPC commands, but Petitioner does not contest directly Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “single physical channel.” Pet. Reply 2–7. We determine, however, that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 9,706,500 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,706,500
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 22, 2026 · IPR2025-00217 · APJ Frederick C Laney · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–5, 10–15, and 20 not unpatentable under four §103 grounds because the petitioner did not establish the claimed enabled-accumulation indication or single-channel combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103, effective March 16, 2013. Because the application from which the ’153 patent issued claims priority to an application filed before this date, the pre-AIA version of § 103 applies. 2 US 6,334,047 B1, iss. Dec. 25, 2001 (Ex. 1009). 3 US 2001/0036238 A1, pub. Nov. 1, 2001 (Ex. 1010) 4 US 2004/0190485 A1, pub. Sept. 30, 2004 (Ex. 1005). 5 US 2004/0077370 A1, pub. Apr. 22, 2004 (Ex. 1008). 6 US 6,600,772 B1, iss. July 29, 2003 (Ex. 1004). 7 US 6,529,741 B1, iss. Mar. 4, 2003 (Ex. 1007). unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to the patent owner. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Moreover, a petitioner should not “place the burden on [the Board] to sift through information presented by the Petitioners, determine where each element [of the challenged claims] is found in [the cited references], and identify any differences between the claimed subject matter and the teachings of [the cited references].” Google Inc. v. EveryMD.com LLC, IPR2014-00347, Paper 9 at 25 (PTAB May 22, 2014).” slip op. at 5

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems.” Pet. 15. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’153 patent. Therefore, we adopt it as the ordinary level of skill of an artisan in the field of the patented technology for our analysis below.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “apparent agreement between the parties: “TPC command accumulation” refers to a process that collects and uses TPC commands from a network device to cumulatively affect transmission power. And having studied the intrinsic record of the ’153 patent, we are in accord. But, we decline to further limit the construction of “TPC command accumulation” in the manner proposed by either party––i.e., (1) each TPC command adjustment must be summed to cumulatively affect transmission power (as proposed by Petitioner) or (2) a TPC command value must be added to an integrator. Although both parties are able to point to disclosures in the ’153 Patent where the TPC command accumulation of an exemplary embodiment is described as using an integrator and/or summing each TPC command adjustment to cumulatively affect a UE’s transmission power (PO Resp. 16 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:15–29, 9:27–42; Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 35–42); Pet. Reply 4–5 (citing Ex. 1001, 3:39–43, 7:2–6, 7:8–22, 9:28–40)), neither party has demonstrated persuasively that the intrinsic record of the ’153 Patent demonstrates a clear intent to limit “TPC command accumulation” to those particular embodiments.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “A rationale supports obviousness only where the proffered benefit would flow from the specific modification proposed; a benefit that the prior art realizes in a different structural context does not, without more, establish that the same benefit would result from inserting one reference’s element into the other. On this record, the nexus between Khan’s benefits and Petitioner’s “other bits” modification is missing.” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 10,952,153 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,952,153
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00350 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 7–12 were held unpatentable over Wannamaker alone or with Avellan; claims 1–6 and 13 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not teach the claimed screen-capture sequence and assembly.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 17. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 19–20; PO Resp. 18. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 5

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Yet paragraph 122 of Mr. Lipoff’s declaration merely repeats the Petition’s argument almost verbatim. Compare Ex. 1007 ¶ 122, with Pet. 28. Mr. Lipoff does not add any citation to Avellan or any other source that supports his testimony. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 122. Nor does Mr. Lipoff offer any additional technical reasoning than what is stated in the Petition. Testimony may be entitled to little weight if it merely restates the petition’s unsupported, conclusory assertions without adding supporting evidence or technical reasoning. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9 at 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (precedential). That is the case here.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that claim 1 is not obvious over Avellan because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 21–23. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. PO Sur-reply 20. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 21–23; PO Sur-reply 20.” slip op. at 7

  Patent outcomesUS 10,524,002 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,524,002
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 29, 2026 · IPR2025-00349 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–21 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan did not disclose the claimed sequence of screen captures used to assemble a media stream.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not dispute the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 22. No express finding is necessary. The level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA does not change our analysis or conclusions.” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 14–15; PO Resp. 22. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding.” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “c. Analysis “A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We are persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan does not anticipate claim 1 because it does not assemble a media stream of multimedia items using the recited screen captures. See PO Resp. 26–29. We agree with Patent Owner that the plain language of the claim requires more than transmitting individual media items. Sur-reply 21. To the extent that Avellan captures images, those images do not meet the claimed requirements for a “temporal sequence of screen captures” in the independent claims, which must (1) be of the web page rendered by a browser, (2) “define all the content of the web page at a given time,” (3) “illustrate a dynamic change of at least a portion of the content over time” when two of them are compared, and (4) used to assemble “the at least one media stream.” Rather, the record better supports Patent Owner’s argument that Avellan transmits the multimedia items separate from any media stream assembled from screen captures. PO Resp. 26–29; Sur-reply 21.” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “All other challenged claims require the “generating” and “assembling” operations because they depend from claims 1, 12, or 17. Petitioner does not allege that the additional references—Durante, Ma, Suzuki, Wanamaker, Heikens, Matthews, or Wilsher—teach or suggest the “temporal sequence of screen captures” recited in claim 1. Rather, Petitioner’s reasoning in the challenges to the dependent claims pertaining to the screen captures mirror the rationale presented in the independent claim. See, e.g., Pet. 25 (arguing that Avellan’s screen captures correspond to the video content in the challenge to claim 2), 26–27 (arguing that Avellan obtains screen captures from a playback of a video on the webpage in the challenge to claim 4). Petitioner’s argument that Avellan teaches or suggests these operations in the grounds based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 depend on the reasoning and insufficiently supported characterizations of Avellan in the challenges based on 35 U.S.C. § 102, as discussed above. See Pet. 40–60. grounds based on anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or teaches or suggests these operations in the grounds based on obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that any challenged claim is unpatentable as anticipated by Avellan or obvious over any of the combinations of Avellan and the other cited references.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,123,074 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 10,123,074
• Stingray Group Inc. / Stingray Music USA, Inc. v. Edwin A. Hernandez-MondragonSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 28, 2026 · IPR2025-00351 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–9 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations; claims 10–26 were not shown unpatentable because Avellan does not teach limitations [10d]–[10f].

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “would have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree in computer science or a related field and at least 2 years of experience in multimedia processing or delivery using internet protocols.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68). The Petition further states that “a person with less formal education but more experience, or more formal education but less experience, could have also met the relevant standard for a POSITA.” Id. Patent Owner submits a similar definition and does not take issue with the Petition’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art of delivering multimedia content. Resp. 18. We determine that no express finding is necessary and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Any perceived difference in how each party characterizes a POSITA’s education, knowledge, and work experience does not change our analysis or conclusions. slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “Neither party has offered any claim construction arguments, relying on ordinary and customary meaning. Pet. 11; Resp. 18–19; Reply 5. We determine that construction of claim terms is not necessary to resolve the disputes raised by the parties in this proceeding. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element) › Inherent disclosureInherency not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence “must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill.” Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “‘Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578, 581 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). Reasonable inferences of a POSITA may suffice to establish inherent disclosure in a prior art reference such as Farber. See Eli Lilly v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute, 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–1075 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he dispositive question regarding anticipation is whether one skilled in the art would reasonably understand or infer from a prior art reference that every claim element is disclosed in that reference.”). Here, however, we find the Petition’s argument and evidence insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Farber inherently discloses limitation [1b].” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,140,441 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 11,140,441
• Assa Abloy AB / Assa Abloy Inc. et al. v. CPC Patent Technologies Pty, LtdNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 27, 2026 · IPR2022-01093 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Remand

  Claims 13 and 14 were not shown unpatentable because the evidence did not establish that the received card information defines the memory location for the biometric signature.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed our Original Decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. CPC Pat. Techs. Pty Ltd. v. ASSA Abloy AB, No. 2024-1492, 2025 WL 3134960, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 10, 2025), Paper 43. The Federal Circuit also noted that in light of the affirmance of our decision in another proceeding, IPR2022- 00600, challenging the same patent, the “errors the Board made in this appeal only extends to claims 3–18, which were not at issue in the other appeal.” Id. at *3 n 1. Therefore, in this proceeding, only challenged claims 13 and 14 remain. At the request of the parties, we permitted additional briefing addressing the issues on remand from the Federal Circuit. Paper 44. Petitioner filed an opening brief (Paper 51 (“Pet. Remand Br.”)), and Patent Owner filed an opening brief (Paper 52 (“PO Remand Br.”)). Both parties also filed responsive briefs. Paper 54 (“Pet. Responsive Br.”); Paper 55 (“PO Responsive Br.”). This is a Final Written Decision on Remand addressing the patentability of the remaining challenged claims 13 and 14. To prevail, Petitioner must prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.” slip op. at 3

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “offers nothing to suggest that its card information ‘tells you’ where to store the fingerprint data.” ASSA ABLOY AB, 2025 WL 3134960 at *3. Reversing our determinations as to Hsu, the Court found that the testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Lipoff, “merely confirms the associative link between the card information and the biometric data. Still missing is any non-conclusory testimony that Hsu’s card information determines the memory location of the biometric data.” Id. at 8. Therefore, on remand, a central question is whether Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Tsukamura cures this deficiency. Petitioner has not done so. In the Petition, Petitioner relies on Tsukamura for teaching a specific location for storing fingerprint data. See Pet. 75 (stating that “Tsukamura’s index number specifies the physical memory location in the memory”). Petitioner argues that “[t]hus, Tsukamura discloses defining, dependent upon the “index number N index,” a memory location for storing a biometric signature (e.g., a fingerprint template), i.e., ‘a memory location is specified by the card information.’” Id. at 75–76 (citing Ex. 1006 ¶ 215). In support, Petitioner’s declarant, Mr. Lipoff, testifies that “[i]f the Tsukamura implementation were used for Sanford-Hsu database, each user/account number would specify a different entry (index number) in the database.” Ex. 1006 ¶ 394. Tsukamura’s index number N index does not teach or suggest much more than Hsu’s using “an account number or employee number, to access a stored there during an enrollment procedure.” Compare Ex. 1004, code (57), with Ex. 1005, 4:7–11. That is, both references arguably teach defining, i.e., setting or establishing, a certain location in a database for biometric data. For example, as described above, Tsukamura’s fingerprint template Temp is stored in flash ROM 35 at a defined index number N index in the database. Id. 4:7–11, 50–54. However, neither Petitioner, nor Mr. Lipoff, persuasively explain how or why Tsukamura’s fingerprint template Temp, stored at index number N index, is commensurate with “means for defining, dependent upon the received card information, a memory location in a local memory external to the card” as recited in claim limitation 13[C]. Ex. 1001, 14:3–5 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Tsukamura’s index number N index does not teach or suggest much more than Hsu’s using “an account number or employee number, to access a stored there during an enrollment procedure.” Compare Ex. 1004, code (57), with Ex. 1005, 4:7–11. That is, both references arguably teach defining, i.e., setting or establishing, a certain location in a database for biometric data. For example, as described above, Tsukamura’s fingerprint template Temp is stored in flash ROM 35 at a defined index number N index in the database. Id. 4:7–11, 50–54. However, neither Petitioner, nor Mr. Lipoff, persuasively explain how or why Tsukamura’s fingerprint template Temp, stored at index number N index, is commensurate with “means for defining, dependent upon the received card information, a memory location in a local memory external to the card” as recited in claim limitation 13[C]. Ex. 1001, 14:3–5 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Tsukamura’s index number specifies the physical memory location in the memory. Thus, Tsukamura discloses defining, dependent upon the “index number N index,” a memory location for storing a biometric signature (e.g., a fingerprint template), i.e., the memory location is specified by the index number, under the Second Construction. In my opinion, if the Tsukamura implementation were used for Sanford-Hsu database, each user/account number would specify a different entry (index number) in the database. Ex. 1006 ¶ 394. This is consistent with our understanding of Tsukamura, and we can agree that Tsukamura teaches defining—that is, setting or establishing—a location for storing the biometric signature at “index number N index.” See Ex. 1005, 4:7–11. However, considering the Federal Circuit’s decision, we determine such an associative link does not sufficiently explain how one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood Tsukamura’s IC” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 8,620,039 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,620,039

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.