• Microchip Technology Inc. v. HD Silicon Solutions LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 7, 2022 · IPR2021-00752 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7 and 9–17 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable because the petitioner did not sufficiently explain why a skilled artisan would combine Trivedi and Yang.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Pet. 5. Patent Owner does not dispute this level of skill. See generally PO Resp. Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the prior art presented. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We accordingly adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which is supported by Dr. Lee’s testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 32.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “d) “the first film and the second film are deposited insitu.” First, we observe the meaning of “in-situ” is not dispositive. Patent Owner contends the term means deposited in the same chamber, or in chambers that are connected through a central chamber. PO Resp. 36 (citing Ex. 2009 ¶ 50). Dr. Lee agrees. Ex. 2010, 89:13–23; see also Tr. 20:8–12 concerned, I don’t think the parties are that far apart in our understanding in that as long as, you know, the reference is disclosing the ability for a wafer to be processed in the same chamber, that would satisfy in-situ.”).” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “disclosure is inapplicable to local interconnect fabrication. PO Resp. 34–36. Patent Owner has not argued that Joo is non-analogous art, nor has Patent Owner addressed either test for non-analogous art. See generally PO Resp. Specifically, Patent Owner has not addressed whether Joo is within the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention or whether Joo is otherwise reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Patent Owner contends that gate electrodes are different from local interconnects. See PO Resp. 7–11, 33–36. In any event, we agree with Petitioner that Joo is in the same field of endeavor as the ’033 patent. In the Background, the ’033 patent states that present invention relates to “integrated circuits, and more particularly to integrated circuit fabrication processes and structures.” Ex. 1001, 1:5–8. Similarly, Joo is directed to “the field of semiconductor manufacturing and more specifically to a method and apparatus for the selective oxidation of a composite silicon/metal film.” Ex. 1005, 1:5–10. Moreover, Joo states that its described processes and “composite film need not necessarily be used to form a gate-electrode but can be used to form other device features such as but not limited to capacitor electrodes and interconnects.” Ex. 1005, 5:41–” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “After consideration of the contentions and the evidence of record, we find that Petitioner has shown that the combination of Trivedi and Joo teaches each recitation of claim 3. Also, we are persuaded that Petitioner has offered articulated reasoning with a rational underpinning as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Trivedi and Joo in the manner recited in claim 3. Based on the complete record now before us, we determine that Petitioner has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 3 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combined teachings of Trivedi and Joo.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 6,774,033 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,774,033
• Apple Inc. v. Masimo CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 23, 2022 · IPR2020-01539 · APJ Amanda F Wieker · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12 and 14–28 are unpatentable under § 103; claim 13 was not shown unpatentable under the Aizawa, Inokawa, Ohsaki, Mendelson-2006, and Bergey ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “Accordingly, we do not agree that Ohsaki’s disclosed advantages” slip op. at 57

  • BurdenFwd mixedMixed

    “and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner has met its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that challenged claims 1–12 and 14–28 of the ’554 patent are unpatentable. However, Petitioner has not met its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that challenged claim 13 is unpatentable.” slip op. at 2

  Patent outcomesUS 10,588,554 mixed
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,588,554
• Glux Visual Effects Tech (Shenzhen) Co. / Leyard Optoelectronic Co. et al. v. Ultravision Technologies, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 17, 2021 · IPR2020-01052 · APJ Denise M Pothier · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 10–13, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over Kalua in view of ordinary skill; claims 4–6, 14–16, and 21–26 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “G. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts: A person of ordinary skill in the art (i.e., a skilled artisan, or “POSITA”) at the time of the ‘791 patent’s alleged invention would have: (i) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or physics, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field, and (ii) at least two years of experience in the design and/or implementation of LED panels . . . Additional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education. Pet. 17–18 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 41–44). Patent Owner does not set forth an ordinary artisan’s skill level. See generally Resp. Mr. Credelle, Patent Owner’s expert, states that he do[es] not disagree with Mr. Flasck’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, which he lists as (i) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or physics, or undergraduate training in an equivalent field, and (ii) at least two years of experience in the design and/or implementation of LED panels. Ex. 2002 ¶ 33. Mr. Credelle further states, similar to Petitioner, “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, and significant work experience could substitute for formal education.” Id. In the Institution Decision, we preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble not limitingOther

    “modification kit for converting an existing signage mounting structure to an electronic sign.” Ex. 1001, 87:11–12, 88:1–2, 88:51–52. Petitioner asserts the “preamble is limiting” because the phrase provides antecedent basis for (1) “the existing signage mounting structure” recited in the body of claims 1, 4, and 21 or (2) “the existing signage structure” recited in body of claim 12. Pet. 19. Petitioner further asserts that the preamble breathes, life, and meaning into claims 1, 12, and 21, namely the retrofitting of an existing nonelectric sign into a digital sign. Id. at 19–20 (citing Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Ex. 1001, 1:38–41, 1:45–46, 1:52–54, 18:48–52, 23:1–6, 24:1–11, Fig. 3). For these reasons, Petitioner asserts the preamble “should be construed to require ‘a self-contained retrofit kit for on-site use to convert an existing static non-electronic sign into an electronic sign.’” Id. at 19; see id. at 21.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “and further limit either claims 1 or 12. Ex. 1001, 87:63–67, 88:17–18, 88:46–50. We have reviewed the record. Based on the evidence and argument presented, Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Kalua in view of Ordinary Skill teach and suggest each limitation in claims 10, 11, 13, 19, and 20, and has articulated sufficient reasoning, with rational underpinning, that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined Kalua with Ordinary Skill in the manner Petitioner proposes. Pet. 63 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 2, 7, 13, 42, 54; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 241–244). Patent Owner does not separately challenge Petitioner’s ground for claims 10, 11, 13, 19, and 20. See generally Resp. Accordingly, having considered each of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine Petitioner provides by a preponderance of the evidence and articulates sufficient reasoning to support its challenge of claims 10, 11, 13, 19, and 20 as unpatentable over Kalua in view of the knowledge and level of ordinary skill in the art as evidenced by Watchfire. (c) Conclusion – Claims 1, 10–13, 19, and 20 Having considered each of the parties’ arguments and evidence, we determine Petitioner has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kalua in view of the knowledge and level of ordinary skill in the art as evidenced by Watchfire teach or suggest claims 1, 10–13, 19, and 20.” slip op. at 84

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “suggest claims 4, 5, 10, and 11. Pet. 41–43 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 145–153; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 55–56, 75, 78, code (57), Figs. 1A, 1C, 1E (annotated)). Claims 4, 5, 10, and 11 ultimately depend from claim 1 (Ex. 1001, 87:31–37, 87:63– 67) and, therefore, include element [1e] as discussed above. Also, the discussion of claims 4, 5, 10, and 11 in the Petition do not further address the “plurality of power routing systems” limitation (i.e., element [1e]). See Pet. 41–43. Accordingly, Petitioner’s analyses of these claims suffers from the same problems we discussed above when addressing claim 1.” slip op. at 46

  Patent outcomesUS 9,047,791 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,047,791
• Cook Group Incorporated / Cook Medical LLC v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 28, 2018 · IPR2017-00440 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–7, 10–16, 18, and 20 are unpatentable; claims 5 and 8 are not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 21, 30, and 38 are unpatentable as obvious over Sackier and Kirsch.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyOther

    “3. Dr. Nicosia’s Declaration in support of its Opposition to Patent” slip op. at 7

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “B. “clip” The Parties now agree that “clip,” as the term is generally understood,” slip op. at 14

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed

    “as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We conclude that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing this element to be present in Sackier because Petitioner combines features from distinct embodiments in Sackier without establishing persuasively that those embodiments are so directly related to each other such that one of ordinary skill in the art, looking at the reference as a whole, would recognize a disclosure of the invention as claimed. Accordingly, although a very close call, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate anticipation of claims 1, 12, and 20 by Sackier for this reason.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 9,271,731 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,271,731
• Shenzhen Kean Silicone Product Co., Ltd. v. Pkoh Nyc, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 3, 2018 · IPR2017-01327 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–7, 10–13, 20–22, 24, 26, 28–32, and 35–38 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 14 was not shown unpatentable over Cho.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Goldman, proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the bottle/container field as of the time of the filing of the application that became the ’036 patent “would have a bachelor’s degree (or equivalent) in mechanical engineering and at least one or two years’ experience developing container technology.” Ex. 1014 ¶ 4. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal, and based on the final record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “The Specification of the ’036 patent describes “[t]he elastomeric material is . . . of an appropriate durometer, such as 40 Shore A, to make the squeeze bulb 200 substantially deformable yet resilient,” and the elastomeric material is preferably silicone. Ex. 1001, 2:54–63. Only the claimed wall portion of the receptacle is claimed to be “resiliently deformable.” Id. at 5:9–10. Nothing in the claim, however, precludes or requires any other portion of the receptacle (comprised of elastomeric material) from also being resiliently deformable. Id. at 4:47–48. Notably, the receptacle is claimed to be “flexible and resilient.” Id. Although the “flexible and resilient” receptacle and its wall being “resiliently deformable” are not necessarily identical, this distinction appears to be minor considering the written description of the ’036 patent. Based on the foregoing, we give each of these claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a person or ordinary skill in the art. The surrounding claim language for each claim limitation focuses the scope of these terms such that any interpretation we could provide would not be as helpful in understanding the terms as the surrounding claim language. We determine that no terms require express construction for the purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “6 In our decision, we give little weight to Petitioner’s evidence of “scores of popular baby bottles currently on the market,” because the design of these new bottles does not indicate the state of the art at the time the ’036 patent was filed. Further, Petitioner has failed to provide any corroborating testimony related to these new bottles—recent advertisements do not convince us of what a person of skill in the art would have considered at the time of filing. See Pet. Reply 11 (emphasis added) (citing Exs. 1022, 1023, 1024). We likewise give little weight to Petitioner’s uncorroborated article (Ex. 1026) from Wikipedia concerning “Baby bottle.” The record before us does not establish the origin and scientific basis for this evidence, and thus, we weigh Mr. Goldman’s testimony (Ex. 1021 ¶ 13) based on this evidence in a similar manner. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,763 (“Affidavits expressing an opinion of an expert must disclose the underlying facts or data.”). This sentence, standing alone, supports Mr. Fletcher’s conclusion that “an elastomeric, flexible silicone” could be used in the body of Cho’s bottle. See Ex. 1014 ¶ 30. Further, we find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments, supported by the testimony of Mr. Fletcher, that “silicone is primarily known for its elastic properties, and has been widely used in medical applications, including implants and storage containers, due to its chemical inertness, high heat resistance, flexibility and resistance for at least 60 years.” Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶ 34). Petitioner also supports its argument as to the suitability of silicone in consumer products, including in baby bottles, with a 1991 New York Times article that explains the elastomeric properties of silicone. Pet. 12; Ex. 1018, 2 (describing “rubbery silicone”), id. at 3 (“When baby gets a bottle these days, the nipple is a rubbery version of silicone.”). The fact that silicone could also possess other properties, or hardness, does not dissuade us from the determination that Cho, as a whole, teaches using a soft, resilient silicone in the body of the bottle.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “At the outset, Mueller is analogous art and Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary flip the analysis from focusing on the problem faced by the inventor of the ’036 patent to the “specific problem(s) found in Cho’s baby bottle.” First, Cho and Mueller are in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention—dispensing containers—as admitted by Patent Owner. See PO Resp. 36. We need not address the second portion of the analogous art test, which focuses on whether the prior art “is reasonably pertinent to the problem with which the inventor was concerned.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We do note, however, that the parties have both misapplied this second portion of the analysis. This analysis is focused on the problem faced by the inventor of the ’036 patent, not necessarily the problems addressed in the prior art references. Because neither party sufficiently addresses the problems faced by the inventor of the ’036 patent, and because Mueller and Cho are in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention, we need not address the second portion of the analogous art test.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 7,959,036 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,959,036
• Cook Group Incorporated / Cook Medical LLC v. Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 15, 2018 · IPR2017-00135 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3–5, and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Kimura (claims 1, 3–5) and Kimura with Sackier (claim 10); claims 7, 11–15, and 17 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the filing of the application that became the ’371 patent would have possessed the knowledge and skill of an engineer or similar professional with at least an undergraduate degree in engineering, or a physician having experience with designing medical devices. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶ 11). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 15

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “The issue we have with Patent Owner’s contentions, as pointed out by Petitioner, is that Patent Owner does not establish persuasively how its claims require the “reversible open/close” feature and the “tactile feel features.” See Pet. Reply 27–29. Even presuming that these features did indeed drive tremendous commercial success and industry praise for the commercial products, Patent Owner does not adequately explain in its analysis how the claims of the challenged patent require these particular features that drive commercial success. Patent Owner seems to suggest that a break section in the control wire will fracture and that this feature in the commercial product relates to the tactile feel. PO Resp. 57 (citing Ex. 2029 ¶¶ 91–93) (“After the yoke has disengaged, if the handle spool is moved further proximally, a break section in the control wire will fracture, leaving the ball within the yoke and uncoupling the control wire from the distal components of the device.”). This “break section in the control wire” is not, however, claimed or covered in claim 1, the claim that purportedly embodies the commercial product. The claims alleged to cover the product do not specifically require any “tactile feel feature.”3 Likewise, while the claims may allow for an opening and closing of the clip assembly, there is no requirement in these claims that the clip assembly, as “demanded” by physicians, repeatedly open and close. Thus, both of the drivers of commercial success and industry praise are not commensurate in scope with the claims of the patented invention. See Ex. 1046 ¶¶ 23–29 (explaining how features are not claimed).” slip op. at 16

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “district court proceeding, Petitioner contends that “coupled to the sheath” means “slideable inside the sheath” and “the sheath confines the bushing.” Pet. 9. Petitioner provides no additional support. The district court tentatively rejected this broad interpretation. See Ex. 2003, 27–28 (“[T]he Court recommends that ‘coupled to the sheath’ be construed as ‘linked together, connected, or joined, but not slidable inside the sheath.’”). Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s proposed construction of “coupled to the sheath” is “unreasonably broad,” but provides little citation to the intrinsic record before us. Prelim. Resp. 13–14. Instead, Patent Owner notes that the plain and ordinary meaning of coupled is “linked together, connected, or joined,” citing to an unrelated Federal Circuit decision as well as the related district court determination. Id. at 14; Ex. 2003, 28. In our proceeding, Petitioner has not provided persuasive evidence or argument to support its claim interpretation by merely pointing to what Patent Owner purportedly argued in district court. Based on the final record before us, “coupled to the sheath” means “linked together, connected, or joined” to the sheath. Our construction is consistent with the district court’s analysis and reflects the common understanding of the term “coupled” in the mechanical arts to require more than simply abutting or contacting. See generally Ex Parte Paul Robert Homrich, Appeal 2014-005786, 2016 WL 3541285, at *3 (PTAB, June 27, 2016) (“When used in mechanical systems, the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘coupled’ means to link together or connect,” and coupled requires more than contact or abut.).” slip op. at 10

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that Adams discloses “a bushing extending between a proximal end coupled to the sheath,” (Ex. 1027, 17:4–5) as required by claim 1 of the ’371 patent. Based on the final record, Petitioner’s contention that retainer 110 [bushing] is slidable inside the sheath, or confined by the sheath, does not establish persuasively that the proximal end of the bushing is coupled to the sheath as required by claim 1. The claimed coupling must be “proximal coupling” and Petitioner can only point to distal coupling via distal tabs 118, 119 (Pet. Supp. Reply 6) – this is not “proximal” coupling. Further, for the bushing and the sheath to be coupled requires them to be “linked together, connected, or joined” in some manner and Petitioner has not established any such connection for proximal coupling. Petitioner also has failed to establish a persuasive reason for linking or connecting retainer 110 and sheath 112 – indeed, doing so would negatively impact the ability of retainer 110 to freely slide out of sheath 112. See Prelim. Resp. 27. Adams suggest that when control wire 108 is actuated and the clip is locked into the lock sleeve, retainer release 109 pulls retainer 110 back, disengaging retainer tabs 118, 119 from the two retainer holes as depicted in Figure 4.” Ex. 1023, 7:26–44 Finally, we note that our decision would not change if we adopted the district court’s claim interpretation. The district court adopted a claim construction of “a bushing extending between a proximal end coupled to the sheath” as “linked together, connected, or joined, but not slidable inside the sheath.” Ex. 2003, 28 (emphasis added). Should the district court’s interpretation be the correct one, Patent Owner’s position is much stronger whereas Petitioner’s theory is based on slidable movement. See Pet. 9 (arguing for “slideable inside the sheath” and “the sheath confines the bushing”); Pet. Supp. Reply 6. Having now considered the evidence in the complete record established during trial, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been anticipated by Adams. Petitioner has not established persuasively that Adams discloses “a bushing extending between a proximal end coupled to the sheath.” For this reason, Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Adams anticipates claim 1.” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,974,371 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,974,371
• Google LLC v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 12, 2018 · IPR2016-01535 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 12–14 and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Xu and Peterson; unpatentability was not shown for claims 15, 16, and 19.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “We first examine the claim as a whole with a focus on the disputed language. The claim language itself requires “computing real time traffic jam identification.” Ex. 1001, 23:10 (emphasis added). By qualifying the claimed traffic jam as being determined in real time, and by also by using “sample vehicles to measure time delays,” a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that traffic jams are more immediate, e.g., real time, than the regular, statistical, congestion described in the ’783 patent. See Ex. 2002 ¶ 7 (“[C]laim 12 further goes on to recite the computation of ‘traffic jams,’ by using ‘sample vehicles to measure time delays,’ which a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand must therefore be distinct from regular, statistical, congestion.”). The claim also requires “collecting GPS data and computing individual statistical travel time estimates (regular times) for predetermined roads.” Ex. 1001, 23:3–6; Tr. 27:16–29:17 (discussing the relevance of this limitation). Reading the claim as a whole suggests that a “traffic jam” must be a sudden unpredictable change of traffic on a segment as compared to these regular times. See Ex. 2002 ¶ 7.” slip op. at 14

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). In that regard, Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Braasch, testifies that:” slip op. at 18

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on the final record, Petitioner has not provided sufficient arguments or credible evidence establishing how TravTek teaches the traffic jam limitation. Specifically, Petitioner has not persuasively shown how TravTek teaches the use of measured time delays of sample vehicles for computing a real time traffic jam. As explained above, we construed the term “traffic jam” to mean “a sudden unpredictable change of traffic in a segment as compared to regular times, i.e., individual statistical travel time estimates,” and thus the claimed “measuring time delays” must also be in relation to regular times. Claim 12 also requires that traffic jam identification is determined “by utilizing the sample vehicles for measuring time delays.” Petitioner has not directed us to record evidence sufficient to show that TravTek teaches these limitations.” slip op. at 24

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “First, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Xu only uses information from third party, or other external, sources to identify current traffic conditions. Patent Owner’s argument narrowly focuses on one example described in Xu, and fails to consider Xu as a whole, from the perspective of an ordinarily skilled artisan. A prior art reference must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not limited to the particular example it is describing. EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Furthermore, in an obviousness analysis, we must consider the combination of references, as a whole, in light of the general knowledge of an ordinarily skilled artisan. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). One stated objective of Xu is to create “a method for collecting dynamic traffic data using equipment installed in vehicles” as opposed to just relying on the prior art “methods for collecting traffic data” such as “sensing systems” that “are installed along highways,” using “[v]ideo cameras” or “pulsed laser range image technology.” Ex. 1006, 3:23–48. Given that a purpose of Xu was to use dynamic traffic data obtained from GPS receivers installed in vehicles, Xu, as a whole, provides a basis for using that same dynamic traffic data for determination of real time traffic conditions as testified by Dr. Braasch. Id.; see also id. at 2:63–67, 4:17–22; Ex. 1026 ¶ 36. For example, Xu explains how current traffic conditions may impact traffic forecasts and “the [TSC] receives a plurality of traffic data indicating that the link is experiencing an unusual congestion, by comparing the current traffic status with the normal traffic condition.” Id. at 12:66–13:6 (emphasis added); Ex. 1026 ¶ 36. Based on the final record, Petitioner establishes that the “plurality of traffic data” would include dynamic vehicle position data and that “time delays” are determined by comparing the current traffic status as determined by vehicle position with the normal traffic condition. Ex. 1006, 13:2–5 (“comparing the current traffic status with the normal traffic condition”); see also Pet. 68; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 145–46; Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 32–40. Indeed, as Dr. Braasch testifies, vehicle position data would be a source of real time traffic conditions indicative of unusual congestion. See Ex. 1026 ¶ 36; Ex. 1006, 12:66–13:6; Tr. 33:7–34:8 (citing Ex. 1006, 12:54–65). We are also persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Xu’s “communication system ‘forwards road traffic data reported from all vehicles 20 . . . to the traffic service center’ and that this data is used to provide ‘an optimum travel route based on real-time traffic conditions.’” Pet. Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1006, 7:37–52; 8:26–36; 12:66–13:6). Also persuasive is the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Kurzhanskiy that “one of the plurality of traffic data that could be being [sic] used to detect unusual congestion is vehicle probe position data.” Pet. Reply 17 (quoting Ex. 1024, 82:19–83:7) (also agreeing “that Xu discloses that vehicle position data is a form of traffic data that the system collects”). For these reasons, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that Xu fails to disclose the traffic jam limitation.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 6,480,783 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,480,783
• Genband US LLC / Genband Management Services Corp. v. Metaswitch Networks Ltd.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 15, 2016 · IPR2015-01457 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 2–5, 8, 9, 15–18, and 22–24 are unpatentable as obvious over Ejzak and Cisco or Intel; claim 10 was not shown unpatentable over either combination.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “First, the above-reproduced figure does not appear in the Specification of the ’640 patent. Rather, it is a creation of the Patent Owner. The figure creates the impression that a “part” necessarily is a “device.” Patent Owner, however, does not provide adequate support for such a narrow reading of 14 “part.” Although a “device” is a “part” of a telecommunications network, that does not mean a “part” has to be a “device.” Even Dr. Akl, Patent Owner’s expert, testified only that a “device” is a “part” of a telecommunications network and not that a “part” of a telecommunications network has to be a “device.” Ex. 2006 ¶ 56. Second, the figure also creates the impression that neither a domain nor a region would identify a device. But Patent Owner does not provide adequate support for such a narrow reading of “domain” and “region.” In that regard, Dr. Akl, Patent Owner’s expert, testifies only that a “device” is neither a “domain” nor a “region,” not that a “domain” or a “region” would not or could not identify a “device.” Id. By assuming that a “part” of a telecommunications system has to be a “device,” and by assuming that neither “domain” nor “region” would identify one or more devices, Patent Owner sees an alleged contradiction in allowing media connectivity setting to be as we have construed it, and the phrase that immediately follows the claim term—“identifying one or more other devices.” Because of that alleged contradiction, Patent Owner contends that “at least one media connectivity setting identifying one or more other devices” should be construed as “information identifying one or more parts of a telecommunication network, distinct from either a domain or a region of the telecommunication network.”” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Claim 10 recites, among other limitations, an additional requirement of determining from said bypass mode data that said media gateway “must” be bypassed in said media path. That is in contrast with the language of claim 9, which also depends from claim 8, and which recites, among other limitations, the additional requirement of determining from said bypass mode data that said media gateway “may” be bypassed in said media path. Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner proposes an express construction for the word “must.” In the circumstances here, the plain and ordinary meaning of “must” in the English language applies. There is no indication that one with ordinary skill in the art would understand the word as conveying something different. The Specification of the ’640 patent does not set forth a special definition of “must.” Also, consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of “must,” the Specification of the ’640 patent distinguishes between “must” and “may”: It may be determined from the retrieved bypass mode data that the media gateway may be bypassed in the media path, in which case preceding device connectivity data is included in the outbound communication setup request message. It may be determined from the retrieved bypass mode data that the media gateway must be bypassed in the media path, in which case preceding device connectivity data is included in the outbound communication session setup request message. Ex. 1101, 12:35–42 (emphasis added). 34 We determine that “must,” when applied to an action, such as bypassing a media gateway as recited in claim 10, eliminates not taking that action as a possibility and precludes the not taking of that action. In that regard, the different language used between claims 9 and 10 further supports the distinction between the absolute nature of “must” as used in claim 10 and the permissive nature of “may” as used in claim 9. In that regard, as is noted by Patent Owner, Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Bress, agrees that the permissive nature of “may” does not meet the absolute requirement of “must.” PO Resp. 43 (citing Ex. 2004, 123:7–124:5).” slip op. at 34

  • Skill levelDecided for patent owner

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts: As of the priority date of the ’640 Patent of March 22, 2011, a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have been someone with a Bachelor’s Degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related scientific field, and at least two years of work or research experience in the telecommunications industry, which could include telecommunications device design, telecommunications software development, or related areas. Alternatively, a POSITA in the relevant timeframe would have been someone with an advanced degree, such as a Master’s Degree, in electrical engineering, computer science, or a related scientific field, focusing on telecommunications technology. Alternatively, a POSITA in the relevant timeframe could have been someone lacking formal technical education but having experience in the 18 telecommunications industry that would be equivalent to such education. See Ex. 1004 at ¶ 128. Pet. 19–20. Patent Owner does not explicitly take a position on the level of ordinary skill in the art. We determine that no express finding on a specific corresponding level of technical education and experience is necessary, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). C.” slip op. at 18

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “49 media gateways. In that connection, we credit the testimony of Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Bress, over the testimony of Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Akl, in part because Mr. Bress discusses and explains more of the disclosure of Ejzak. Patent Owner’s argument that it is possible to obtain the media connectivity setting of the ensuing device by requesting the ensuing device for such information (PO Resp. 38) is ineffective with respect to claim 4, which does not specify from where the information is retrieved. Retrieving information from the ensuing device nonetheless still is retrieving. With respect to claim 5 which requires retrieving the information from within the given media gateway, not the ensuing device, we have determined that Petitioner has not stablished that Ejzak necessarily discloses retrieving such information from within the storage of the given gateway. Patent Owner’s argument that the claim limitation of “retrieving ensuing device connectivity data for an ensuing device” would not have been regard by one with ordinary skill in the art as an obvious variant of Ejzak’s determining the IP realm for the next segment of the media path is not supported by sufficient reasoning and explanation directed to Ejzak’s disclosure of provisioning IP realms of media gateways as identified and explained by Petitioner. Between the testimony of respective expert witnesses of Petitioner and Patent Owner, we credit the testimony of Mr. Bress, Petitioner’s witness, over that of Mr. Akl, Patent Owner’s witness. Mr. Bress’s testimony, in our view, is more thorough, whereas Mr. Aky’s testimony, in our view, focuses more on what a prior art 50 disclosure literally states without enough explanation as to the understanding by one with ordinary skill in the art of the teachings associated with that language.” slip op. at 49

  Patent outcomesUS 8,687,640 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 8,687,640

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.