• Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. William Beaumont HospitalNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 4, 2017 · IPR2016-00170 · APJ Kalyan K Deshpande · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 and 20–31 were not held unpatentable because the strong evidence of industry praise and long-felt need, with supporting evidence of commercial success and copying, outweighed the obviousness showing.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Balter, Petitioner’s expert, proffers that a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, with respect to and at the time of the’765 Patent, would have the following qualifications: “a medical physicist with a Ph.D. (or similar advanced degree) in physics, medical physics, or a related field, and two or more years of experience in radiation oncology physics and image processing/computer programming related to radiation oncology applications.” Ex. 1102 ¶ 13. Dr. Hashemi, Patent Owner’s expert, essentially agrees, with the only major differences to the above being that an M.S. is acceptable in lieu of a Ph.D., and that three years of experience is preferred. Ex. 2080 ¶ 17. Nominally, we accept Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art based on Dr. Balter more complete explanation. We note, however, that neither party has explained substantively any significance that the difference in the proffered levels of ordinary skill in the art would have in the obviousness analysis. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966); Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he level of skill in the art is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior art and the claimed invention.”); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.”). To that end, we note that the prior art itself often reflects an appropriate skill level. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) does not applyNot shown unpatentable

    “In our Decision on Institution, we were not persuaded that the terms “computer” (claim 1), “controller” (claim 7), “structure” (claim 20), and “support table” (claim 26) fail to recite sufficiently definite structure, and, therefore, we declined to construe these terms as means-plus-function limitations in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Dec. 10‒12. Neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner provide any more argument or evidence to disturb our interpretation of these terms. See PO Resp. 12. Accordingly, we do not construe these terms as means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (The Board may not change a claim interpretation from the institution decision where neither party anticipated that “already-interpreted terms were actually moving targets.”).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We begin first with the claim language, and note that “three- dimensional information” appears facially to be co-extensive with any information relevant to three-dimensions. We discern that “length, width, 6 In evaluating the assertions set forth in the Declaration of James Balter Ph.D. in Support of Petitioner’ Reply (Ex. 1500), we considered Patent Owner’s Motion for Observations on the Cross-Examination of Dr. James Balter (Paper 48) and Petitioner’s Response to Patent Owner’s Motion for Observations on Cross-Examination (Paper 56). 7 In the Decision on Institution, we preliminarily agreed with Petitioner’s proposed construction of “three-dimensional information.” Dec. 9–10. and depth” are just such information. We have considered Patent Owner’s above-cited portions of the ’765 patent, but are unpersuaded that those portions narrow “three-dimensional information” with sufficient “reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” such that one of ordinary skill would have understood “three-dimensional information” as co-extensive with Patent Owner’s proffered construction. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For example, column 2, lines 44‒56 certainly disclose that “volume” is desirable, but does not provide any equivalence between “threedimensional information” and “volume.” Indeed, column 2, lines 55–56 disclose “provide information regarding the location of soft-tissue target volumes,” indicating that “information” is a subset of “volume.” In another example, column 3, lines 41–56, mentions “three-dimensional (3-D) images,” which we agree would appear to require “volumetric data;” however, the claim limitation at issue is the broader term “three-dimensional information.” In a further example, column 9, line 54‒64, clearly refers to “volumetric data,” but does not indicate its relation to “three-dimensional information.” In yet another example, column 16, lines 23–25 and 38–42, do not recite “three-dimensional information,” instead disclosing “3-D structure” and “3-D nature” in relation generally to “volumetric data,” but, again, not in a manner sufficient to indicate a particular relationship. Finally, in regards to assertions set forth in the Declaration of Dr. Hashemi, we discern some merit in his assertion that when reading the claim limitation “three-dimensional information” in conjunction with another claim limitation “cone-beam computed tomography,” “a CBCT image is a volumetric image that provides the location, shape, and spatial orientation of the target volume in all directions, not just its length, width, and depth.” Ex. 2080 ¶ 85. Furthermore, the claim limitation does not preclude an image having more information than “three-dimensional information concerning said object” (such as length, width, and depth), “based on a plurality of two-dimensional projection images.” Under Patent Owner’s construction, however, the image would be required to have such information. We are unpersuaded that such information is required under a proper construction of “three-dimensional information” for the reasons set forth supra. We construe “three-dimensional information” as “information” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We are unpersuaded for several reasons. Primarily, we are unpersuaded because a fundamental assumption made by Patent Owner is that the patient must remain unrestrained. Patent Owner makes this assumption based on the assertion that “the primary goal of the Adler/Depp systems is to permit a patient to be relatively unrestrained during the radiotherapy procedure.” PO Resp. 33. We have reviewed Patent Owner’s supporting evidence, and are unpersuaded that the evidence supports Patent Owner’s assertion that “the primary goal of the Adler/Depp systems is to permit a patient to be relatively unrestrained during the radiotherapy procedure.” For example, Patent Owner cites to certain paragraphs of Dr. Hashemi’s Declaration, which in turn cite to certain portions of Depp. Ex. 2080 ¶¶ 117, 133, 136 (citing Ex. 1104, 11:66–12:23, Fig. 9). We have reviewed those portions of Depp, and find that while they do disclose that target location and treatment periods are on the order of seconds, they do not mention anything about “the primary goal of the Adler/Depp systems is to permit a patient to be relatively unrestrained during the radiotherapy procedure.”11 Accordingly, absent such an evidentiary foundation, we do not find credible Dr. Hashemi’s assertions concerning this matter. Even without explicit analysis by Patent Owner, we logically understand the connection between longer image acquisition and processing times, and the higher likelihood of interim patient movement. Absent the aforementioned “primary goal,” however, we are unclear as to why the converse of that goal would not be correct, i.e., that one of ordinary skill would have resolved the timing consideration by restraining the patient. Indeed, in opposition, Petitioner asserts, and we agree, that “POSA would understand that in the majority of radiotherapy treatment settings, patients are in fact restrained to some degree.” Pet. Reply 7‒8 (citing Ex. 1500 ¶¶ 33–35; Ex. 2080 ¶¶ 54–55; Ex. 1502, 142:23–143:19). In particular, we are persuaded by the consistency of Dr. Balter’s and Dr. Hashemi’s testimony that molds were used in 2000 to minimize unwanted patient motion during treatment. Ex. 1500 ¶ 35; Ex. 2080 ¶ 55.” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 7,471,765 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,471,765
• Captioncall, L.L.C. / Sorenson Communications, Inc. v. Ultratec, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 11, 2017 · IPR2015-01889 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–74 are unpatentable as obvious over Liebermann, Engelke ’405, Mukherji, and Engelke ’482; substitute claims 75–81 are denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “specificity and the explanation of the facts on which based his conclusion, credible. Furthermore, we have reviewed the challenged patent and prior art of record in this proceeding (Exs. 1001, 1004–1008) and find that evidence consistent with Mr. Occhiogrosso’s opinion. Accordingly, we adopt Mr. Occhiogrosso’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of the following analysis.” slip op. at 25

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “specificity and the explanation of the facts on which based his conclusion, credible. Furthermore, we have reviewed the challenged patent and prior art of record in this proceeding (Exs. 1001, 1004–1008) and find that evidence consistent with Mr. Occhiogrosso’s opinion. Accordingly, we adopt Mr. Occhiogrosso’s characterization of the level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of the following analysis.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for patent owner

    “(iv) Conclusion: Nexus For these reasons, we conclude that Patent Owner has proffered” slip op. at 72

  Patent outcomesUS 9,131,045 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,131,045
• Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc. v. Novadaq Technologies, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 8, 2017 · IPR2015-01847 · APJ Daniel N Fishman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–17 are unpatentable: all are obvious over Yabe; claims 10, 12, and 14 are also anticipated by Krauter.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for patent owner

    “1. Level of Ordinary Skill Mr. Gunday testified, In my opinion, a person having ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the alleged invention is a person with a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or other similar degree, and two ([2]) to three (3) years of work experience relating to medical endoscopic imaging. Such a person would have had an understanding of, or experience in, designing, implementing, and using endoscopic imaging systems, including light sources and endoscopic video and image processing. Ex. 1011 ¶ 76. Mr. Jaggi agrees with Mr. Gunday’s opinion in this regard, adding only that degrees in “Electrical engineering or Engineering Physics” would each qualify as Mr. Gunday’s “other similar degree.” Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 53–54. We agree with and adopt the view of the parties regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 22

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Initially, we note bodily incorporation of the features of the embodiments is not the test of obviousness; rather, the test lies in what is taught or suggested to the ordinarily skilled artisan by the proposed combination of embodiments of Yabe. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Furthermore, “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. Yabe discloses multiple embodiments and expressly discloses interchangeability of rotary (“surface-sequential-type”) filters as disclosed in Yabe’s second embodiment (Figure 2) and mosaic (“built-in”) filters as disclosed in Yabe’s first and third embodiments (Figures 1a and 10). Ex. 1007, 18:17–21. Yabe’s express disclosures outweigh the unsupported assertions of Patent Owner’s expert regarding the complexity of constructing the proposed combination of embodiments. “Combining two embodiments disclosed adjacent to each other in a prior art patent does not require a leap of inventiveness.” Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Therefore, we are persuaded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the embodiments of Yabe, as proposed by Petitioner, “because it would serve the same purpose as the existing rotary filter/CCD arrangement and lead to predictable results.” See Pet. 20; see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.” slip op. at 28

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “We are disinclined to adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction of this phrase, as recited in claim 1, to require mathematical manipulation. Claim 1 recites “calculates” in a self-defining manner, specifically reciting calculating the image signals “by minimizing the contribution from signals produced by the image sensor in response to red illumination light.” Thus, claim 1 is clear on its face that the calculation to be performed is by minimizing the contribution from red light. Therefore, our analysis shifts to determining the meaning of “minimizing” as recited in claim 1. The ’151 patent discloses a variety of embodiments for “minimizing” the contribution of red light.5 For example, in support of the Patent Owner’s 5 Additionally we observe that “minimizing” appears only once in the ’151 patent—in claim 1 (and, thereby, also in its dependent claims 2–9). construction, the ’151 patent does disclose exemplary embodiments that minimize red light contribution utilizing mathematical manipulations including, for example, CMYG filter computations that are “considered to be well known to those of ordinary skill in the art” (Ex. 1001, 4:66–7:59) and averaging blue and green signals to “compute” a cyan signal (id. at 4:21–24). The ’151 patent, however, also specifically recites, Because the passbands of the red mosaic filters do not significantly overlap with the pass bands of the other filters for a short wavelength imaging mode, the contribution of the image signals due to red illumination light can be reduced or largely eliminated by not assigning the image signals produced by image sensor pixels that are sensitive to red light to their corresponding display pixels. Id. at 4:5–12 (emphasis added). The ’151 patent further states “a short wave-length image (or the color components of such an image) can be computed from a subset of image sensor signals (i.e. excluding the signal data from red light).” Id. at 8:29–32 (emphasis added). Thus, the ’151 patent also encompasses the contribution of red light in the image being” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Although the ’151 patent does not address “analog” or “digital” in reference to “memory,” we agree with Patent Owner, based primarily on the cross-examination testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Gunday, that the ordinarily skilled artisan at the time of the ’151 patent filing would have understood “memory,” in the context of the ’151 patent, to be referring to digital memory rather than analog buffers. The signals stored in Krauter’s analog buffers are transitory, analog signals propagating from circuits that calculate a value, through the analog buffer, to an analog input of a display monitor. We are persuaded that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have considered such analog buffers to be a memory in the context of the ’151 patent. Thus, we determine “memory,” as recited in claim 1, means any digital memory capable of storing image signals that minimize the contribution of red light.” slip op. at 17

  Patent outcomesUS 7,420,151 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,420,151
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 8, 2017 · IPR2015-01637 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 30, 31, 37–41, and 45–57 are unpatentable as obvious over Iwata and Stephan, with claim 53 additionally relying on Capps.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1202 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “Prior to our Institution Decision, Petitioner proposed constructions for “contact-sensitive transducer . . . which produces an output signal.” Pet. 10– 12. Patent Owner did not propose any express constructions or challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. 2–27. In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction. Inst. Dec. 6. In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 29. We determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “We find Petitioner’s argument persuasive. The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a reference may be bodily incorporated into another reference to produce the claimed subject matter; rather, it is what the combination of references makes obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.”). Furthermore, an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). In this case, we determine that a skilled artisan, using ordinary creativity, would not be dissuaded from combining Iwata and Stephan even if Stephan’s scroll regions have fixed locations.” slip op. at 27

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 19

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2017 · IPR2015-01646 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 58–69 are unpatentable as obvious over Iwata and Stephan; Petitioner’s motion to exclude is dismissed in part and denied in part.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1204 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “We determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “As discussed above, Petitioner asserts four reasons supporting why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to make the proposed modification. See supra Section III.D.3.a.iv. After considering all evidence and arguments, we determine that Petitioner has provided a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason or motivation to combine Iwata and Stephan in the manner provided. We also determine that Petitioner has provided analysis explaining how the combination would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the claim limitations. See supra Section III.D.3.a. c) Conclusion In view of the above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 58 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as directed to subject matter that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of Iwata and Stephan.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2017 · IPR2015-01761 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 16–26, 29, and 33–36 are unpatentable as obvious over Palatsi and Moore.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “’931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1207 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedMixed

    “Second, and more importantly, we credit Dr. Wolfe’s testimony that the express disclosure of Moore would have conveyed enabling or disabling the touch strips and, which in combination with Palatsi’s processor, would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art “a second mode wherein the controller is unresponsive to contact with one of the banks of touch strip” (Ex. 1207 ¶ 180). Dr. Wolfe’s testimony relies on an express disclosure of Moore (switching touch strip banks) and explains how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that teaching. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). We accord Mr. Ward’s testimony less weight than Dr. Wolfe’s testimony because Dr. Wolfe’s testimony better comports with the express description of Moore of switching between banks of touch strips. In re Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”). Dr. Wolfe’s testimony also addresses what the combined teachings of Palatsi and Moore would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art (see Ex. 1207 ¶ 180), whereas Mr. Ward’s testimony unduly focuses on Moore’s isolated disclosures (see, e.g., Ex. 2057 ¶ 78 (“Again, I” slip op. at 31

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Prior to our Institution Decision, Petitioner proposed constructions for “contact-sensitive transducer . . . which produces an output signal” and “graphical object(s).” Pet. 11–13. Patent Owner did not propose any express constructions or challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction. See generally PO Resp.; Paper 6 (Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response). In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction. Inst. Dec. 6. In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 23. We determine that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction for this Final Written Decision. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “3. Analysis We agree with Petitioner’s analysis described above and adopt it as our own. We, therefore, determine that the combination of Palatsi and Moore as set forth by Petitioner would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art all the limitations recited by independent claim 16. Our inquiry continues because “[a] patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Rather, “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does.” Apple, 839 F.3d at 1058 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“[T]here must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 1, 2017 · IPR2015-01641 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 16–26, 29, and 33–36 are unpatentable: claims 16–17 and 18–26, 29 as obvious, and claims 33–36 as anticipated or, alternatively, obvious over Iwata.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1203 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 29. We determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “As discussed above, Petitioner asserts four reasons supporting why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to make the proposed modification. See supra Section III.D.3.a.iv. After considering all evidence and arguments, we determine that Petitioner has provided a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason or motivation to combine Iwata and Stephan in the manner provided. We also determine that Petitioner has provided analysis explaining how the combination would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the claim limitations. See supra Section III.D.3.a.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
• TCL Corporation / TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. et al. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM EricssonAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 25, 2017 · IPR2015-01602 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12 and 15 are unpatentable under § 103 over Iwata and Stephan (claims 1, 2, and 15), and Iwata, Stephan, and Capps (claims 3–12).

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Petitioner’s second point. Mr. Ward actually opines that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would probably have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer engineering, at least 2–3 years of hands-on experience working with hand held contact-sensitive user interface devices, and direct knowledge of the types of user interfaces used in mobile phones and handheld devices in 1997.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 22. In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Ward indicates he “considered the ‘931 patent, the types of problems encountered in the art of handheld radio telephone devices and handheld devices, the prior art solutions to those problems, and the educational level of workers active in the field.” Id. In contrast, Dr. Wolfe does not explain the basis for his opinion. 1201 ¶ 58. We determine that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Mr. Ward is consistent with the challenged patent and the asserted prior art, and we therefore adopt this definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art for the purposes of the analysis below. Our analysis would not differ, however, if we adopted Dr. Wolfe’s definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDenied

    “given its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). There is a presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Furthermore, only those terms that are in controversy need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Prior to our Institution Decision, Petitioner proposed constructions for “contact-sensitive transducer . . . which produces an output signal” and “graphical object(s).” Pet. 10–13. Patent Owner did not propose any express constructions or challenge Petitioner’s proposed construction. See generally Prelim. Resp. 2–15. In the Institution Decision, we determined that no claim term required express construction. Inst. Dec. 6. In its Response, Patent Owner indicates that it “generally agrees that the constructions proposed by [Petitioner] are in keeping with how a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have understood those terms.” PO Resp. 29. Accordingly, we determine, for purpose of this Final Written Decision, that no term in the challenged claims requires express construction. See, e.g., Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “As discussed above, Petitioner asserts four reasons supporting why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to make the proposed modification. See supra Section III.D.3.a.v. After considering all evidence and arguments, we determine that Petitioner has provided a persuasive articulated reason with rational underpinning to support its contention that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason or motivation to combine Iwata and Stephan in the manner provided. We also determine that Petitioner has provided analysis explaining how the combination would have conveyed to one of ordinary skill in the art the claim limitations. See supra Section III.D.3.a. c) Conclusion In view of the above, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 1 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as directed to subject matter that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of Iwata and Stephan.” slip op. at 30

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “The only support provided for asserting that 10 millimeters is “a standard assumption for finger size in the art of touch screen devices” is the testimony of Mr. Ward. Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 79). Mr. Ward’s testimony, however, merely repeats this statement from the Patent Owner Response without providing any supporting evidence or reasoning. Ex. 2004 ¶ 79. Accordingly, we give this testimony little weight. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little to no weight.”). Rather, we agree with Petitioner that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion that, when combining Iwata and Stephan in the manner proposed, a skilled artisan “would have modified Iwata to necessarily have a scroll region width of 3.3 millimeters.” See Reply 28–29 (emphasis added).” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS RE43,931 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
• Repro-Med Systems, Inc. v. Emed Technologies CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 12, 2017 · IPR2015-01920 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 and 10 are unpatentable on the stated anticipation and obviousness grounds; claim 9 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Claim Construction In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent, such as the ’476 patent, are given their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016) (concluding that 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) “represents a reasonable exercise of the rulemaking authority that Congress delegated to the Patent Office”). Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be 5 The Decision on Institution considered 27 separate grounds. See Dec. on Inst. 6–8. understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Also, we are careful not to read a particular embodiment appearing in the written description into the claim if the claim language is broader than the embodiment. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[L]imitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.” (citation omitted)). 1. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art RMS’s expert, Dr. Kazmer, contends that the level of ordinary skill of the ’476 patent is “a degreed Chemical, Mechanical, or Plastics engineer with three years of experience directly related to plastics product design and injection molding” or, alternatively, “a non-degreed practitioner with ten years of experience directly related to plastics product design and injection molding.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 21. EMED counters that the level of ordinary skill is “a degreed BioMedical, Chemical, Mechanical, or Plastics engineer with 3-5 years [of] experience designing medical products including medical products with a sharps protection device or alternatively a professional with 5-7 years [of] experience designing medical products, including medical products with a sharps protection device.” PO Resp. 6 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 22).6 At oral argument, EMED clarified that the “experience designing medical products 6 In his Declaration supporting EMED’s Motion to Amend, Mr. Stoker provides a different level of ordinary skill in the art— “a degreed BioMedical, Chemical, Mechanical, or Plastics engineer with five years of experience directly related to needle product design, particularly concentrating on the safety aspects of needle design” or, alternatively, “a non-degreed practitioner with ten years of experience directly related to the safety aspects of needle design.” Ex. 2007 ¶ 44. including medical products with a sharps protection device” merely required some of the experience in product design must concern sharps. See Tr. 36:13–6 (“[O]ne of skill in the art necessarily wouldn’t need three to five years specifically working in sharps technology, but they would have to have at least some experience.”).” slip op. at 8

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “support its contention that an artisan of ordinary skill would understand the claim limitation “the wings in the open position are spaced apart from each other to expose the medical needle to allow placement of the medical needle into a treatment site and delivery of a medicinal fluid” to require the wings to be folded back to permit inserting the needle. See PO Resp. 31 (citing Ex. 2003, Decl. of Ron Stoker, ¶ 78). Mr. Stoker merely provides the same statement as that appearing in the Patent Owner Response—“[o]ne of skill in the art would understand permitting placement to mean that the wings could be folded back to permit insertion of the needle”—without providing any basis for his opinion. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 78. Accordingly, we give little weight to this testimony. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“[T]he Board is entitled to weigh the declarations and conclude that the lack of factual corroboration warrants discounting the opinions expressed in the declarations.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”).” slip op. at 18

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “for the term “and are configured for”—“a pair of wings being selectively positionable from a first position to a second position, the first position for placing the medical [ ] needle into a patient and delivering a medicinal fluid to a second position.” PO Reply 9–10 (citing its Motion to Amend at 11– 14). The Motion to Amend, however, refers to the disclosure that serves as the basis for this “construction” as support for the amendment, not as the meaning of the term. Also, this construction conflicts with how EMED evaluates the claim limitation with respect to the prior art. Accordingly, we address EMED’s implicit construction and this post hoc construction, below.” slip op. at 74

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, grantedMotion to exclude, deniedMixed

    “that Mr. Stoker has a sufficient educational foundation and sufficient experience in sharps protection to help the Board understand the evidence or make factual findings in this proceeding. Further, to the extent that RMS identifies specific deficiencies in the methods and principles supporting Mr. Stoker’s opinions, we find that such matters go to the probative weight of his testimony, as opposed to its admissibility. We note that the policy considerations for excluding expert testimony, such as those implemented by the gatekeeping framework established by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), are less compelling in bench proceedings such as inter partes reviews than in jury trials because, unlike a lay jury, the Board by statutory definition has competent scientific ability (35 U.S.C. § 6) and has significant experience in evaluating expert testimony. Accordingly, the danger of prejudice in this proceeding is considerably lower than in a conventional district court trial.” slip op. at 86

  Patent outcomesUS 8,961,476 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,961,476
• Inline Packaging, LLC v. Graphic Packaging International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 10, 2017 · IPR2015-01609 · APJ Michael W Kim · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–53 are held unpatentable: claims 1–4, 6–24, 26–29, and 31–33 as obvious over Kato and Clough; other claims under the stated § 103 grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedOther

    “Patent Owner cites to the Declaration of Dr. Floros to support many of its assertions set forth above, in particular, that Kato does not provide any indication that it would have been modified to include the microwave energy interactive material of Clough. See Ex. 2007, 28–38, 40–44. Dr. Floros’ testimony is unpersuasive for the same reasons as set forth above, and need not be repeated here.” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner proffers that a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, with respect to and at the time of the ’078 patent, would have been a packaging professional with at least an undergraduate degree in packaging science (or related field) or comparable training/experience and would have had at least three (3) years of professional experience in the design of packaging materials for consumer products that are made from paperboard. Pet. 5. Patent Owner did not offer a skill level in the Patent Owner Response.4 Based on our review of the overall record, including the ’078 patent, we concur with the Petitioners’ assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art and apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “wherein the cut in the first end panel is substantially T-shaped” Dependent claims 4, 24, 36, and 49 each recite “wherein the cut [in] the first end panel is substantially T-shaped.” Dependent claims 30 and 43 recite substantially the same, with “slit” instead of “cut.” In the Patent Owner Preliminary Response, the Patent Owner asserted that the aforementioned claim limitation should be construed as “having a shape that closely resembles the capital letter ‘T’.” Prelim. Resp. 6–7 (citing Ex. 1001, 17:8–11). In the Decision on Institution, we agreed, although we clarified that we do not discern that the proposed construction provides any additional substantive clarity relative to the plain language. Dec. 7–8. After the Decision on Institution, while Patent Owner and Petitioner disagree with the application of the aforementioned claim construction, as set forth below, neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner has expressed disagreement with the construction itself. After considering anew the basis for our previous construction, we see no need for modification. slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “one of ordinary skill would not have modified Kato, which meets need (1), to include the microwave energy interactive material of Clough, so as to also meet need (2), because Kato is only directed to a container for holding an already-prepared (i.e., ready-to-eat) food item, and does not mention anything about a microwave browning and crisping package. PO Resp. 35– 36 (citing Exs. 1003, 2001, 2007). While Patent Owner’s assertions will be assessed in more detail below, fundamentally, Patent Owner’s assertions are misplaced as Clough, and not Kato, is cited for being directed to a microwave browning and crisping package. Pet. 14–16 (citing Exs. 1003, 1008). We agree with Petitioner that one skilled in the art would have recognized that Kato’s paperboard sleeve would have been used to microwave food therein and, thus, that one skilled in the art would have had ample reason to modify and improve Kato’s paperboard sleeve to brown and crisp food using Clough’s known technique of adding microwave interactive material to a sleeve to realize the advantages set forth in Clough. Pet. 14–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 106–114, 116–120; Ex. 1008). Primarily, Patent Owner’s assertions are flawed because they are almost uniformly directed to Kato alone. Essentially, Patent Owner is asserting that one of ordinary skill, when reading Kato, would discern that Kato is a perfect product for its stated purpose, that the stated purpose can never change or be added to, and, thus, that one of ordinary skill would never look outside the narrow confines of Kato for any modifications, no matter what improvements and advantages such modifications may bring. Such assertions are contrary to almost every doctrine of obviousness under KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). For example, KSR states “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR at 421. Patent Owner’s inflexible approach to Kato is more akin to that of an automaton, than to one of ordinary creativity. Furthermore, KSR explains explicitly that the ordinary artisan recognizes “that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” KSR at 420 (emphasis added). No one disputes that Kato’s primary stated purpose aligns with need (1), i.e., a container for holding an already-prepared (i.e., ready-to-eat) food item. We are unpersuaded, however, that this primary stated purpose of Kato should be held in such high esteem so as to exclude all other purposes known in the art, such as need (2), especially when KSR counsels that “uses beyond their primary purposes” must be considered. To that end, the record is replete with evidence concerning the advantages of modifying a paperboard sleeve, including that of Kato, with the microwave energy interactive material of Clough in order to brown and crisp food, so as to meet need (2). See, e.g., Ex. 1008, 1:48–68, 2:1–3, 18– 31, 3:10–19, 63–68, 4:1–9, 28–37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 116–120. Patent Owner would have us believe that such a purpose is irreconcilably in conflict with Kato’s stated purpose. We disagree. As a matter of logic, Kato must be made of some type of material, and we are persuaded that Clough provides sufficient objective evidentiary support for the notion that one of ordinary skill would have had reason to include in the paperboard sleeve of Kato the microwave energy interactive material of Clough in order to brown and crisp food.” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 8,872,078 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,872,078

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.