• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. / Cisco Systems, Inc. et al. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2022-01199 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1, 24, and 25 unpatentable as obvious over Buruganahalli; the copying evidence did not outweigh the strong obviousness showing.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Scope on Remand On remand, the panel here will not address issues outside the scope of the Federal Circuit’s mandate. See Hayward Indus., Inc. v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa, Inc., 814 F. App’x 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board is bound by the terms of a mandate issued by an appellate court. Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 121 F.3d 726, 1997 WL 413329, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ‘Unless remanded by [an appellate] court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are precluded from further adjudication.’ Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”). The sole issue on remand is whether “the evidence of copying” is sufficient to overcome the obviousness ground of unpatentability over Buruganahalli. Centripetal Networks, 19–20. We restate portions of the former Final Written Decision, as an aid to the reader, but substantially incorporate the analysis of the prior Decision below. C.” slip op. at 4

  • Director reviewDirector review, deniedDenied

    “not object to a new panel of APJs hearing this case if remanded.” Id. at 20. As such, Patent Owner requested Director Review (Paper 74), asking that the Director “de-institute,” based on an abuse of discretion. The Director (Paper 75) denied the request and directed the Board to assign a new panel on remand (see Papers 76, 77). B.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in The Art We adopt the level of ordinary skill in the art adopted in the prior Decision. See Decision 25. F.” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “This argument is unpersuasive because Buruganahalli uses rules/policies to filter encrypted packets by correlating them with handshaking packets that have unencrypted data, in the same way that is done in the ‘856 Patent. The only “filtering step” in the patent that “use[s] rules to filter encrypted packets without decryption” (PO Resp. 20) is the hello message approach used, for example, at steps 19 and 23 (see id.), which is clearly disclosed in Buruganahalli.7 As explained above, the ‘856 Patent does not describe applying rules to encrypted packets. Instead, it describes (a) filtering encrypted packets by correlating them with unencrypted data in other packets and (b) by decrypting the packets and applying the rules that are recited in the claims to unencrypted data. As also explained above, the amendment added the rules of step 22, which are applied to decrypted data, to a claim that was drafted to cover filtering of encrypted packets. However, among the criteria used in the filtering performed at step 22 is a “uniform resource identifier (URI),” which, we conclude, covers Buruganahalli’s “domain name.” Thus, despite the error made during prosecution, the claims that issued cover Buruganahalli’s method of determining that a session should be filtered based on a domain name in unencrypted handshake data.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 9,917,856 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,917,856
• Palo Alto Networks, Inc. / Cisco Systems, Inc. et al. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2022-00182 · APJ Kevin F Turner · IPR · Remand

  On remand, claims 1, 24, and 25 are unpatentable under § 103 over Buruganahalli; the evidence of copying does not outweigh the strong obviousness showing.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “Scope on Remand On remand, the panel here will not address issues outside the scope of the Federal Circuit’s mandate. See Hayward Indus., Inc. v. Pentair Water Pool & Spa, Inc., 814 F. App’x 592, 597 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board is bound by the terms of a mandate issued by an appellate court. Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 121 F.3d 726, 1997 WL 413329, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ‘Unless remanded by [an appellate] court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are precluded from further adjudication.’ Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).”). The sole issue on remand is whether “the evidence of copying” is sufficient to overcome the obviousness ground of unpatentability over Buruganahalli. Centripetal Networks, 19–20. We restate portions of the former Final Written Decision, as an aid to the reader, but substantially incorporate the analysis of the prior Decision below. C.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › CopyingObjective indicia outweighedNot shown unpatentable

    “given to the Eastern District of Virginia court’s opinion because it was later vacated. The district court considered all of the Read factors (applying Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-827 (Fed. Cir. 1992)), of which only the first factor is directed to deliberate copying, although factors 2 and 9 bear indirectly on the issue of copying. The district court determined that “[t]he fact that Cisco released products with Centripetal’s functionality within a year of these meetings goes beyond mere coincidence. Therefore, the fact that Cisco’s system mirrors the functionality of the Centripetal patents is compelling evidence that damages should be enhanced for copying.” Ex. 1027, 157. Without more, it is difficult to evaluate the processes that the district court employed to reach its determination. As the Federal Circuit instructed, we need “not [] go searching throughout the entire litigation record to find the evidence of copying, but [we have] an obligation to consider the specific evidence that was put before” us. Centripetal Networks, 19. We continue to determine that the vacated finding of the district court should be provided little weight, especially in view of the strong case of obviousness discussed above. Examination of Aaron Striegel We also do not find the Aaron Striegel’s testimony to be particularly persuasive. The testimony provides statements such as “I found evidence that it could be plausible,” “[s]o we can see the timeline is very plausible,” and “I found it very plausible that indeed that this technology could have made its way into these respective accused products.” Ex. 1029, 31:12–32:3. This testimony suggests the possibility of copying but does not demonstrate actual evidence of copying. At most, this testimony indicates that further consideration of the underlying evidence is warranted, but does little to support an ultimate finding of copying. Again, even taking this testimony as evidence of copying, it still must stand up against the strong case of obviousness discussed above.” slip op. at 40

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “The District Court did not provide an element-by-element analysis of how the claims of the ‘856 Patent cover this description. See Ex. 1027, 41. However, from the description, we understand the Court to have concluded that the system receives rules, identifies a set of packets as part of a flow using the NetFlow logs, “determines” that encrypted packets in the flow match known malicious signatures based on unencrypted data in other packets (e.g., data in the SNI), and then filters the flow based in a URI (e.g., that from the SNI), routing it to the null interface. The Court does not describe how the system “determines” that encrypted packets match known malicious signatures based on information in unencrypted packets, but we assume that is done as in the ‘856 Patent, by correlation, i.e., an encrypted packet is “determined” to match a threat indicator if it is in the same flow as a packet with unencrypted information that matches the threat indicator.10 With that understanding, we conclude that the allegedly infringing system operates, as least at the level described in the court’s decision, in the same way Buruganahalli’s system operates, filtering encrypted packets due to their presence in a flow that includes packets with unencrypted data, such as in a handshaking packet. It follows that Patent Owner is unable to establish a nexus, because “[w]here the offered secondary consideration actually results from something other than what is both claimed and novel in the claim, there is no nexus to the merits of the claimed invention.” Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1330” slip op. at 38

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › Long-felt need / failure of othersDecided for petitioner

    “need and industry recognition for the technology claimed in the ‘856 Patent because it describes the problem of detecting threats in encrypted traffic as ‘unsolvable.’” PO Resp. 68 (citing Ex. 1027, 64). Given that this is a press release by a company announcing that company’s new commercial product, however, we 8 The concurrence reevaluates Patent Owner’s evidence of industry praise and nexus, but we deem such considerations outside the remit of the Federal Circuit’s remand. are reluctant to give the “unsolvable” characterization much weight, as it may amount to puffery. But beyond that, it appears that the problem identified as “unsolvable” in the press release––“detect[ing] known attack signatures even in encrypted traffic”––had, in fact, already been solved in Buruganahalli, using the very same hello message, flow correlation, and man-in-the-middle techniques described in the ‘856 Patent. We thus cannot say that the press release identifies a long-felt need that was actually unsolved. See ZUP, 896 F.3d at 1374 (explaining that “[w]here the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention are . . . minimal . . . it cannot be said that any long-felt need was unsolved”) (quoting Geo. M. Martin Co. v. All. Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1304–05 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (first alteration in original)).” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 9,917,856 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 9,917,856
• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00160 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10–13, 15–18, and 20–31 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed Toge-Kumar combination did not establish the claimed remote internet site hosted on a server.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner filed a Response. Paper 23 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply. Paper 27 (“Reply”). Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply. Paper 35 (“Sur-reply”). Additionally, during trial, Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name a real party in interest (namely, Petitioner’s corporate parent, Resmed Inc.). Paper 37. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 38. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 39. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 44.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability. C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level). D. Summary of the Asserted Prior Art” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “summarized above, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have implemented Toge’s physician-side computer as a web server using a “localhost” architecture as proposed by Petitioner because such a configuration cannot communicate with external devices over the public internet, a deficiency that directly contradicts Petitioner’s stated motivations for the combination of permitting broad data access. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Chatterjee, expressly acknowledged in his Reply Declaration that when a client and server reside on the same machine, the communications between them do not traverse the internet. Ex. 1069 ¶ 8. Specifically, Dr. Chatterjee cited the Microsoft Computer Dictionary’s definition of “localhost” as “[t]he name that is used to represent the same computer on which a TCP/IP message originates,” noting that “[a]n IP packet sent to localhost has the IP address 127.0.0.1 and does not actually go out to the Internet.” Id. (citing Ex. 1070, 316). Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed configuration of placing both the client and web server on Toge’s physician-side computer would create a closed loop of communication that does not reach the broader network. Id. As noted by Patent Owner, “[i]f ‘the physician-side computer and the web server are on one machine,’ the local web server would not communicate with other devices via the Internet.” Sur-Reply, 3–4 (comparing Ex. 1069 ¶ 19 with id. at ¶ 8). Thus, the consequence of Petitioner’s proposed Toge-Kumar configuration is that other devices in the system, such as the PAP device that generates the treatment data and any remote client devices that might need to access that data, would be unable to send data to or retrieve data from the localhost web server. Patent Owner persuasively argues, supported by evidence of record, that under Petitioner’s proposed configuration, “the PAP device could not send data thereto nor could other clients receive data therefrom, as only the local client browser can exchange data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 8); see Ex. 2003, 4 (one-tier architecture “is not suitable for a web application” because “it can only access data available in a single computer or server” and therefore “is not suitable for a web application.”); Ex. 2022, 3 (Unlike more advanced multi-tier systems, a one-tier architecture “cannot transmit information from one client machine to another.”); Ex. 2020, 4 (While “the client process and server process can be on the same computer,” this architecture “is rarely used today” precisely because it cannot “take advantage of the distributed computing environment.”).” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 11,786,680 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,786,680
• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 4, 2026 · IPR2025-00158 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 were not shown unpatentable because Orbach did not disclose a single computer or processor performing all claimed remote analysis, output, and display functions.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “After considering all of the arguments and evidence presented on the full trial record, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–6, 8–17, 19, and 20 are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Ciulla and Orbach. We find that the deficiencies in Petitioner’s arguments regarding claim limitations [1.d], [1.f], and [1.g] are dispositive and we address the parties’ arguments concerning those limitations below.” slip op. at 24

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Pet. 8. Patent Owner agrees to apply Petitioner’s proposed definition of POSITA. PO Resp. 4. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “the Board need not construe any terms. Pet. 9. Patent Owner agrees. PO Resp. 4. We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). Nevertheless, in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability below, we discuss the scope of certain claim terms, e.g., “the computer” and “the processor.” C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, to show obviousness, Petitioner must show in Orbach that either (a) remote server 140’s output to viewing station 150 constitutes “display” within the meaning of the claim, or (b) viewing station 150 receives data “over cell towers” notwithstanding the intervening server. We determine that Petitioner has failed to do so on this record. Our analysis follows.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 11,690,512 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,690,512
• Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00159 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–9, 11–14, and 16 were not shown unpatentable under either § 103 ground because Petitioner did not establish the proposed remote internet site modification.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for patent ownerDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name a real party in interest (namely, Petitioner’s corporate parent, Resmed Inc.). Paper 37. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 38. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 39. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 44.” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.8 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. The parties agree that a person of ordinary skill in the art (sometimes referred to herein as a POSITA) would have had: at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, biomedical engineering, or a similar technical field, with at least two years of relevant product design experience working with diagnostic sensor systems and network data systems, such as networked PAP machines. Additional experience could substitute for less education, and additional education could likewise substitute for less experience. Pet. 12–13 (citing Ex. 1003 (Kirkness Decl.) ¶¶ 44–46); PO Resp. 7–8. Because the proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record, we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We find it unnecessary to construe any claim term to resolve the issues in this case. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “its burden of explaining why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have implemented a remote internet site in Toge’s system in the specific fashion Petitioner asserts (i.e., using the physician-side computer as a web server). As Patent Owner aptly states, the operative question is not merely whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Toge’s system to include a remote internet site, but whether the artisan would have modified Toge’s system to include a remote internet site “on a physician’s client computer” in accordance with the specific implementation argued by Petitioner. Sur-reply 2. On this critical question, Petitioner’s arguments are thin. Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Kirkness states that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood that one common way to access data transmitted over the internet, like the data from Toge’s wireless PAP device, is via a remote internet site.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 214. This assertion is reasonable. Indeed, prior art of record, such as Kumar, illustrates use of a central server that hosts a browser-based engine that can be accessed through web pages. See, e.g., Ex. 1008 (Kumar) Fig. 1A, ¶¶ 67, 72, 79, Pet. 10. Petitioner, however, elected to argue a specific implementation, namely that the skilled artisan would have modified Toge’s physician-side computer to operate as a web server. See, e.g., Pet. 15; Ex. 1005 (Chatterjee Decl.) ¶ 146; Reply 4. We find that this implementation is unsupported on this record. Petitioner has not pointed us to any disclosure in Toge, Burton, or Kumar (or any other prior art reference of record) that teaches or suggests “that a doctor’s computer should act a web server hosting sensitive patient data.” PO Resp. 9 (emphasis added). And critically, the Petition is silent as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have selected this implementation in particular. See, e.g., Pet. 49.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,375,921 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,375,921
• Apple Inc. v. DH International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00172 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Suga and Gorsuch; the Board denied Patent Owner’s motion to exclude.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “Patent Owner also asserts prejudice for “not knowing” which Suga Exhibit “the Petitioner and Petitioner’s expert is relying on (see Exhibit 1021 and 1022),” without further explanation. Mot. Reply 6. Exhibit 1022 is a dictionary definition of “node.” How this relates to Patent Owner’s argument of prejudice is not explained. Id. at 5–6. The Board perceives no difficulty following Petitioner’s arguments and evidence, which cite Suga Exhibit 1005, including the testimony of Dr. Buehrer regarding the English language translation of Suga, which is identical in Exhibits 1005 and 1017. Patent Owner, moreover, opted not to depose Dr. Buehrer, did not file a deposition transcript of Dr. Buehrer in this proceeding, and does not allege any difference or substantive deficiency in the English language translation in Suga Exhibits 1005 and 1017, which are identical. We fail to see any prejudice to Patent Owner.” slip op. at 84

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “d. Conclusion for Claim 1 For the reasons given above, we determine the Petition establishes by” slip op. at 60

  Patent outcomesUS 9,022,294 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,022,294
• Apple Inc. v. Varia Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01364 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–39 are unpatentable under § 103 over Willgert and Mooney; claims 3–9, 15–19, 22–28, and 34–38 are also unpatentable over Willgert, Mooney, Holloway, and Pitroda.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on a review of the record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with its inclusion of a Computer Science background, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ‘984 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, our Decision would not be altered if Petitioner’s definition applied.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “d) Analysis Re Construing “Voice Call Signals” We conclude that it is unnecessary to define “voice call signal.” Patent Owner’s construction would read into the term additional limitations that are for the most part already set forth in the claims: “a switchable mobile communications device capable of . . . voice call communication” (claims 1, 13, 21, 32); “output . . . a voice call signal for transmission . . . over a wireless network” (claims 13, 21, 32); “wherein the mobile communication device is a selected one of a wireless mobile phone and a personal digital assistant equipped with communication capability” (claims 12, 20, 31, 39). Thus the claims require a mobile communications device that is capable of communicating a voice call signal, but do not restrict the voice call signal to only be communicated by a mobile communications device. Likewise, claims 13, 21, and 32 (but not claim 1) require the voice call signal to be transmitted over a wireless network, but do not restrict transmission to only a wireless network, and do not restrict the wireless network to “a network of a wireless network service provider,” as Patent Owner would require.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed board ownDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “construction for the RFID transponder signal or data terms — it is sufficient for purposes here to conclude that the claims encompass Petitioner’s “functional emulation” articulation. See Reply 11–12. That is, the purpose of the frequent references to “emulated,” “emulation,” or the like in the ‘984 patent is to emphasize the fact that the mobile communications device of the claims has a dual role: to provide voice call communications, and to transmit RFID transponder data. In the latter role, transmitted RFID transponder data appears to an RFID reader to have been transmitted from an ordinary RFID transponder. But there is no need to rewrite the claims to restore the emulation terms, given that, as we discuss further below, Patent Owner deliberately removed those terms during prosecution. The functional emulation implicit in the ‘984 specification and claims” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “the fact that Willgert teaches that integrating its communications unit into a mobile telephone designed for Bluetooth communication was a “highly user-friendly application,” and that it was well known practice to use a Bluetooth headset wirelessly communicating with the phone to enable hands-free phone calls, as specifically taught by Mooney. Pet. 12–14 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 7, 39, 46–48; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner further argues that Bluetooth headsets were widely available, that incorporating the headset involved known methods yielding predictable results, and that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably expected to succeed in combining the teachings of Willgert and Mooney. Id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 10; Ex. 1005, ¶ 8; Ex. 1017, 1, 3; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77–79). Patent Owner does not specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Willgert and Mooney. See generally PO Resp. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Willgert and Mooney as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 8,127,984 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,127,984
• Apple Inc. v. Varia Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01363 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–32 are unpatentable under § 103 over Willgert and Mooney, or Willgert, Mooney, Holloway, and Pitroda, as applicable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner “disputes the narrow range of educational experiences in the Petition’s POSITA definition, but does not otherwise dispute the remaining portion of the definition.” PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art: [W]ould have been someone “with at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, with a background in radio frequency communications and software development, as well as approximately two years of experience working with or researching radio frequency communication systems. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” PO Resp. 13–14 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 34).7 Based on a review of the record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with its inclusion of a Computer Science background, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’947 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, our Decision would not be altered if Petitioner’s definition applied.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Not reached

    “d) Analysis Re Construing “Voice Call Signals” We conclude that it is unnecessary to define “voice call signal.” Patent Owner’s construction would read into the term additional limitations that are for the most part already set forth in the claims: “the voice call signal is output over a wireless network” (claims 1 ); “outputting the voice call signal over a wireless network” (claim 9); “output a voice call signal for transmission over a wireless network” (claim 16); transmit voice call signals . . . over a wireless network” (claim 26); “wherein the mobile communication device is one of a wireless mobile phone and a personal digital assistant equipped with communication capability” (claims 8, 15, 25, 32). Thus the claims require the voice call signal to be transmitted over a wireless network, but do not restrict transmission to only a wireless network, and do not restrict the wireless network to “a network of a wireless network service provider,” as Patent Owner would require. We also agree that there is nothing in the ’984 prosecution history that supports Patent Owner’s assertion that the Examiner found that the Bluetooth signal of Cooper was not a voice call signal. Cooper was distinguished because: The term “transceiver,” however, is well understood by those of ordinary skill in the art. One of ordinary skill in the art would not reasonably interpret a “transceiver” so broadly as to incorporate an entire mobile device’s circuitry, and in particular to be read on by two separate transmitters, as Cooper teaches. Ex. 1008, 40. On the other hand, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “This functional emulation solution is served regardless of how the specific RFID transceiver is implemented — the ’947 specification specifically provides for both software and hardware implementations. Id. at 2:24–28 (“Embodiments of the present invention includes . . . certain hardware and/or software embodied therein for the practice of the emulated RFID method”), 3:35–36 (“mobile communication device 102 is equipped with hardware and/or software elements”), 3:52–54 (“substantial portions of the hardware and/or software elements employed to provide a RFID”), 5:16 (“A Hardware/Software Implementation”). There is no reason why one version of the hardware used to emulate the RFID function could not be RFID transponder circuitry. The issue is not whether an RFID transponder can emulate itself, but rather whether RFID transponder circuitry incorporated into a mobile communications device can be used to allow the mobile communications device to emulate a separate RFID transponder. For example, rather than requiring the person described in the Background of the ’947 patent to carry both a mobile phone and a “key with remote control for gaining access to his/her vehicle,” they need only carry the mobile communications device of the claims. The statement in the ’947 patent that “the present invention is related to an emulated radio frequency data input method” (Ex. 1001, 1:22–24), and the other references to emulation, are consistent with a conclusion that the claims encompass the “functional emulation” option as described above. However, there is no basis for adding the negative limitation proposed by Patent Owner (“without the use of a physical RFID transponder”). Omega Engineering, 334 F.3d at 1333 (rejecting a construction because “neither the plain text of the claims, the specification, nor the file wrapper justifies the imposition of this negative limitation”). See also BillJCo, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2023-2189, 2023-2190, 2025 WL 1417957, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2025): Our court has “identified claim constructions that exclude a particular element as including a ‘negative limitation’ and held that such exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 F. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Moreover, the prosecution history of the ’984 grandfather patent is not” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the fact that Willgert teaches that integrating its communications unit into a mobile telephone designed for Bluetooth communication was a “highly user- friendly application,” and that it was well known practice to use a Bluetooth headset wirelessly communicating with the phone to enable hands-free phone calls, as specifically taught by Mooney. Pet. 16–18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 30, 32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 7, 39, 48; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 62–65). Petitioner further argues that Bluetooth headsets were a well-known concept and widely available, that incorporating the headset involved known methods yielding predictable results, and that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably expected to succeed in combining the teachings of Willgert and Mooney. Id. at 19–21 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 10, 30; Ex. 1005, ¶ 8; Ex. 1016; Ex. 1017, 1, 3; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–68). Patent Owner does not specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Willgert and Mooney. See generally PO Resp. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Willgert and Mooney as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 9,405,947 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,405,947
• Apple Inc. v. Varia Holdings LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 27, 2026 · IPR2024-01362 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–19 are unpatentable under § 103 over Willgert and Mooney, or over Willgert, Mooney, Holloway, and Pitroda for claims 3–6, 10, 11, and 13–17.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner “disputes the narrow range of educational experiences in the Petition’s POSITA definition, but does not otherwise dispute the remaining portion of the definition.” PO Resp. 12. Patent Owner contends that person of ordinary skill in the art: [W]ould have been someone “with at least a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, or a related field, with a background in radio frequency communications and software development, as well as approximately two years of experience working with or researching radio frequency communication systems. Lack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2004 ¶ 34).7 Based on a review of the record, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art, with its inclusion of a Computer Science background, because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’974 patent specification. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, our Decision would not be altered if Petitioner’s definition applied.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s description of the characteristics and operation of a wireless mobile phone, which are not in dispute. Also, the Specification’s description of wireless mobile phones is relied on by Patent Owner in its arguments regarding the construction of “voice call signal,” as discussed below. Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that it is unnecessary to construe the term, “wireless mobile phone.” Reply 4. We agree. The term “wireless mobile phone” is only used in dependent claim 19 (not in independent claim 12, as Patent Owner alleges), and the principal reference relied on by Petitioner (Willgert) explicitly discloses the use of a mobile telephone. Ex. 1001, 12:2; Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 30–32. For these reasons, and because our analysis of the issues set forth below is not dependent on Patent Owner’s proposed construction, it is unnecessary to adopt Patent Owner’s construction or otherwise construe the term “wireless mobile phone.”” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “to an emulated radio frequency data input method” (Ex. 1001, 1:20–21), and the other references to emulation, are consistent with a conclusion that the claims encompass the “functional emulation” option as described above. However, there is no basis for adding the negative limitation proposed by Patent Owner (“without the use of a physical RFID transponder”). Omega Engineering, 334 F.3d at 1333 (rejecting a construction because “neither the plain text of the claims, the specification, nor the file wrapper justifies the imposition of this negative limitation”). See also BillJCo, LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2023-2189, 2023-2190, 2025 WL 1417957, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 16, 2025): Our court has “identified claim constructions that exclude a particular element as including a ‘negative limitation’ and held that such exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 F. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Patent Owner’s argument that the claim language, “[a] transceiver . . . configured to output . . . RFID transponder [signals or data],” only makes sense “if the transceiver is not itself an RFID transponder” (Sur-Reply 10) is not persuasive. Examination of the complete version of the passage that Patent Owner only paraphrases — “[a] transceiver configured to output voice call signals in the first state and to output RFID transponder signals in the second state” — shows that the transceiver is capable of both voice call and RFID functions, and thus there is no inconsistency in allowing the RFID function to be performed by RFID transponder circuitry incorporated into the transceiver.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner argues that this combination would have been motivated by the fact that Willgert teaches that integrating its communications unit into a mobile telephone designed for Bluetooth communication was a “highly user-friendly application,” and that it was well known practice to use a Bluetooth headset wirelessly communicating with the phone to enable hands-free phone calls, as specifically taught by Mooney. Pet. 14–17 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 8, 30–32; Ex. 1005, Fig. 3, ¶¶ 7, 39, 46–48; Ex. 1021; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 72–76). Petitioner further argues that Bluetooth headsets were widely available, that incorporating the headset involved known methods yielding predictable results, and that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably expected to succeed in combining the teachings of Willgert and Mooney. Id. at 17–19 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 10; Ex. 1005, ¶ 8; Ex. 1017, 1, 3; Ex. 1021, 2; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 77–79). Patent Owner does not specifically address the issue of motivation to combine Willgert and Mooney. See generally PO Resp. We find, based on the record, that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Willgert and Mooney as proffered by Petitioner with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 8,381,974 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,381,974
• Biofrontera Inc. / Biofrontera Bioscience GmbH et al. v. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 23, 2026 · IPR2024-01312 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 16, 17, and 19–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Lundahl and Larsen; Ground 2 was conceded, and the motion to exclude was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has not provided a valid justification for requiring a POSITA to have both an engineering degree and a medical degree. Prelim. Resp. 22. We agree, insofar as Petitioner has not clearly set out any particular explanation or evidence in support of its dual-degree requirement. In all other respects, we note that the parties’ proposed definitions are largely similar. Because we determine that Patent Owner’s proposed definition is reasonable and consistent with the ’028 patent and the cited art, we adopt Patent Owner’s definition. In any event, our Decision does not turn on this level of skill determination. B.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “device “[f]or the treatment of large-area tissues,” such as the backs of human patients, wherein several applicators 13 are “flexibly connected to each other through hinges.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 72). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have been motivated “to incorporate Larsen’s solution of connecting light applicators by hinges, to allow for adjustability of Lundahl’s device to provide the desired irradiance and irradiance uniformity to all target areas during PDT.” Id. (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 127). According to Petitioner, a “POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success in combining Lundahl with Larsen, because both references describe similar illuminators for using light to treat conditions on a patient’s skin.” Id. at 31 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 128). Petitioner’s proposed modification of Lundahl also involves using LEDs as a light source instead of Lundahl’s fluorescent tubes. Id. According to Petitioner, a POSITA would have been motivated to make this change because: (1) LEDs had a lower cost and a longer lifetime than fluorescent tubes; (2) fluorescent tubes were known to have inconsistent light output within the tube itself; and (3) “the use of LEDs would be more practical to reduce spacing between light sources and the edges of the panels, as opposed to the bulky metal couplings at the end of fluorescent tubes, to reduce optical dead space across the light surface.” Id. (citing Ex. 1014, 4:41–42, 6:31–42; Ex. 1015 ¶ 129). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have had a reasonable expectation of success with this modification because Lundahl and Larsen “describe similar illuminators and the conversion from fluorescent tubes to LEDs was a routine practice prior to 2015.” Id. at 32 (citing Ex. 1015 ¶ 131). Patent Owner does not meaningfully dispute the Petitioner’s proposed reasons to combine Lundahl and Larsen. See generally PO Resp. To the extent Patent Owner argues that a POSITA would not have been motivated to make the combination because it would negatively affecting uniform illumination (PO Resp. 24), the motivating benefit here—using adjustable LED panels instead of monolith fluorescent tubes—outweighs the alleged disadvantages for the many reasons given by Petitioner, including greater adjustability and improved LED performance. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[t]he fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify.”); Reply 14. We are persuaded that a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Lundahl and Larsen for the reasons advanced by Petitioner.” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s reasoning (i.e., that it would have been obvious to try placing the hinges on the inner side surfaces) is unsupported and conclusory. PO Reps. 53–54. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner fails to identify a single prior art reference showing hinged structures on inner side surfaces. Id. This argument ignores that Larsen expressly identifies hinges on at least bottom side surfaces, and Petitioner merely proposes modifying their location from the bottom sides to inner sides. We find credible Dr. Grove’s testimony that relocating hinges would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. Dr. Jokerst testifies that a POSITA would have been discouraged from placing hinges between Larsen’s adjustable applicators, because the hinges would create gaps that interfere with uniform illumination as well as the panels’ wiring, and create issues with the use and alignment of the panels. Ex. 2050 ¶ 175. However, a system with discrete panels connected by hinges (like in Larsen) will already have wiring, use and alignment technical challenges, regardless of the location of the hinges— the expected consequence of connecting multiple movable electronic panels. Moreover, the ’028 patent acknowledges in its discussion of conventional illuminators that placing hinges between panels was already known. Ex. 1001, 2:7–15. With respect to Dr. Jokerst’s opinion that the hinges would create gaps negatively affecting uniform illumination, we are persuaded that it would have been within the skill of a POSITA to locate the hinges on the inside surfaces “in a nearly flush arrangement,” such that the gaps would be minimized. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. We also credit Dr. Grove’s supplemental testimony on this issue, directly refuting Dr. Jokerst’s testimony regarding gaps and uniform illumination (and therefore within the proper scope of reply, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument otherwise (Mot. 9). See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–20 (explaining LED light divergence and that the physical space caused by hinges “is easily addressed” to maintain uniform illumination).9 We further point out that the ’028 patent also suggests that gaps do” slip op. at 24

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Dr. Jokerst testifies that a POSITA would have been discouraged from placing hinges between Larsen’s adjustable applicators, because the hinges would create gaps that interfere with uniform illumination as well as the panels’ wiring, and create issues with the use and alignment of the panels. Ex. 2050 ¶ 175. However, a system with discrete panels connected by hinges (like in Larsen) will already have wiring, use and alignment technical challenges, regardless of the location of the hinges— the expected consequence of connecting multiple movable electronic panels. Moreover, the ’028 patent acknowledges in its discussion of conventional illuminators that placing hinges between panels was already known. Ex. 1001, 2:7–15. With respect to Dr. Jokerst’s opinion that the hinges would create gaps negatively affecting uniform illumination, we are persuaded that it would have been within the skill of a POSITA to locate the hinges on the inside surfaces “in a nearly flush arrangement,” such that the gaps would be minimized. Id.; Ex. 1015 ¶ 155. We also credit Dr. Grove’s supplemental testimony on this issue, directly refuting Dr. Jokerst’s testimony regarding gaps and uniform illumination (and therefore within the proper scope of reply, contrary to Patent Owner’s argument otherwise (Mot. 9). See Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 17–20 (explaining LED light divergence and that the physical space caused by hinges “is easily addressed” to maintain uniform illumination).9” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,697,028 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,697,028

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.