• Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00371 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of Takagi, Cornette, Suehiro, GMW14400, Laurent, and Vaissiere.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 15). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’227 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “1. superficial layer The only independent claim at issue, claim 1, recites a “Superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:6. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’227 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Extrinsic evidence (dictionaries, experts)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the extrinsic sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions). Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’227 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. Claim 1 indicates that the intermetallic layer has a “mean composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:1–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry—consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Ex. 1001, 2:47–50. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’227 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Rabbe’s testimony. Dr. Rabbe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’227 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:60–64 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating … which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076 ¶ 166; Ex ¶ 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s construction of “intermetallic” for this proceeding does not fully account for the ’227 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently mean compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “Because IHS was a company that created an online database with the purpose of providing (selling) standards including General Motors standards to the public, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known to look to this database and would have been able to find GMW14400. Patent Owner presents no evidence to the contrary. Because a preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner, we determine Petitioner establishes GMW14400 is qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,326,227 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,326,227
• Posco Co., Ltd. v. ArcelormittalAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 16, 2026 · IPR2025-00370 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 are unpatentable as obvious under § 103 over the asserted combinations of prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) “would have had an undergraduate degree in materials science, manufacturing engineering, mechanical engineering, or equivalent knowledge, training, or experience, with two years of experience working in metallurgy.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 13–16). Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA for this proceeding. PO Resp. 8. Because the parties agree and because Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable and consistent with the ’602 patent specification and the prior art, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner

    “1. superficial layer All independent claims at issue, claims 1, 21, and 24, recite a “superficial layer.” Ex. 1001, 15:11, 16:60, 17:21. Patent Owner argues that, based on plain and ordinary meaning, the term “superficial layer” refers to a “surface layer” or “top layer.” PO Resp. 8–9. Petitioner does not dispute this construction. See Pet. Reply 21–22 (arguing that the relevant layer of the Suehiro reference is a superficial layer because it is outermost and present at the surface). Because the parties are in agreement and because that agreement is consistent with plain language, claim language, and the ’602 specification, we construe “superficial layer” as referring to a surface layer or top layer.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “defined stoichiometry” (Ex. 2037, 527) but the word may also be a “generic term for phases . . . which may have a narrow or extended compositional stability range” (id.). The first glossary meaning is consistent with Patent Owner’s position. The second, broader, glossary meaning is consistent with Petitioner’s position. Some of the sources before us support the broad definition, and some support the narrow definition. See PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (arguing that Dr. Miles admitted that various treatises distinguish intermetallic compounds from alloys and solid solutions) Thus, neither Dr. Miles or Dr. Raabe is “wrong scientifically” in how they use the term “intermetallic” in this proceeding. Id. at 2 (noting that Dr. Miles agreed that Dr. Raabe’s construction is not wrong scientifically). As explained below, however, only one of these meanings is appropriate here. To decide which possible meaning applies to the ’602 patent, we focus on the patent claims and specification. The claims indicate that the intermetallic layer has a “mean iron composition” (emphasis added). Ex. 1001, 15:6–10. This indicates, albeit weakly, that the iron composition across the layer may vary rather than having ordered stoichiometry— consistent with Petitioner’s position. The specification also indicates that “intermetallic alloying” is a possibility—again, consistent with Petitioner’s position. Id. at 2:50–54. Meanwhile, nothing in the ’602 specification explicitly (or implicitly) suggests that “intermetallic layer” must be limited to elements atomically joined with defined stoichiometry in an ordered crystal structure. We also find that Dr. Miles’s testimony regarding the meaning of “intermetallic” is more credible than Dr. Raabe’s testimony. Dr. Raabe, in deposition, stated that Figure 2 of the challenged patent “does not show a layer that meets [his] construction of intermetallic.” Ex. 1078, 129:21–24. The ’602 patent, however, states that Figure 2 includes an “Al-rich Intermetallic layer.” Ex. 1001, Fig. 2, 3:57–61 (“FIG 2. Illustrates a coating . . . which does not correspond to the invention. This succession of layers (interdiffusion layer and intermetallic layer) yields inferior results in resistance spot welding.”). Also, Dr. Raabe previously referred to a layer of Takagi as having “intermetallic phase layering and structure.” Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1076, 166; Ex. 1075, 17) (emphasis omitted). Thus, Dr. Raabe’s definition of “intermetallic” does not fully account for the ’602 patent usage of the word “intermetallic” and does not fully account for Dr. Raabe’s prior usage of the word “intermetallic.” Patent Owner argues that Petitioner’s construction “erases the meaningful distinction” between the claimed layers. PO Resp. 11. Patent Owner further argues that Petitioner’s construction renders the word “intermetallic” superfluous because allowing the intermetallic layer to be “merely a multi-element alloy erases the meaningful distinction among these layers.” Id. We disagree. The word intermetallic serves to require that the layer be composed of two or more metals or a metal and a metalloid. The word intermetallic also serves as a label to differentiate each of the four claimed layers. For example, in claim 1, the word “intermetallic” is used much like the words “interdiffusion” and “intermediate” to give each of the four layers (each having differently defined mean iron compositions) different labels.” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “have had reason to combine teachings of Takagi and Cornette with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 11–20 (citing, e.g., Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 28– 42; Ex. 1016 ¶ 35; Ex. 1014, 9; Ex. 1025, 5:17–20; Ex. 1026, 7; Ex. 1034 ¶ 13). In particular, Petitioner argues that Takagi discloses a pre-coating thickness of 10–20 µm but does not explicitly disclose a post hot-stamping coating thickness corresponding to the pre-coating thickness. Pet. 11. Cornette teaches that the hot-stamping thickness causes coating expansion from 25 µm to about 40 µm, an increase of 60%. Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner and Dr. Miles reason that, when hot stamping Takagi’s product, the thickness would be 32 µm. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 32); see also Pet. Reply 20–21. Thus, Patent Owner argues that Cornette evidences Takagi’s finally coating thickness without requiring modification of Takagi. Petitioner further argues that Takagi and Cornette teach that post hot- stamping thickness could be varied and optimized as a result effective variable. Id. at 12–13; see also Pet. Reply 17–18. Cornette teaches, for example, that “[t]he average [pre-coating] layer thickness showing the best compromise between corrosion protection and weldability is 25 µm” and links this pre-coating thickness to a final thickness of “about 40 µm at the steel surface.” Ex. 1014, 9. Petitioner also argues that it would have been obvious to fill in other details of Takagi including, for example, selecting USIBOR 1500 steel, based on the teachings of Cornette. Pet. 14. Patent Owner argues that there is no reason to combine Takagi with the teachings of Cornette. PO Resp. 26. Patent Owner makes seven related arguments. Patent Owner first argues that the Petitioner’s position is speculative and lacks basis. Id. at 26–27. We disagree. Cornette evidences a final coating thickness for Takagi, and the references also suggest that final coating thickness is result effective. Second, Patent Owner argues that there would have been no incentive to seek a motivation to seek a thicker coating post-hot stamping. Id. at 28– 35. This argument does not undermine Petitioner’s position that Takagi, by itself, would have reached a thicker coating after stamping as evidenced by Cornette. Pet. 11–12. Petitioner takes the position, with evidence, that practice of Takagi alone would reach the recited thickness. No motivation to modify Takagi is required under this position.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,961,602 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,961,602
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00115 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 10, 11, 14, 17, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28–30, 32, 33, and 35 are unpatentable; claim 15 is not shown unpatentable, based on the four asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were in public use prior to the claimed inventions, are not prior art that can form the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 80

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “‘electronics for power and control’”). According to Mr. Crosby, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have understood based on the disclosure of this setup that these speed and motor parameters were monitored by a sensor providing feedback to the controller.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 725. Mr. Crosby identifies no support for this opinion, which we give little weight to. The mere fact that Bourque’s pump used software to control speed and motor parameters does not show that Bourque used “one or more sensors” to provide feedback signals to the external control unit. Indeed, Petitioner fails to identify any evidence that Bourque used any “sensor” to monitor “speed and motor parameters.” Mr. Crosby also states that “[e]ach of the ‘ultrasonic flow probe’ and the ‘solid-state catheter-type pressure transducer’ described in [Bourque] is a ‘sensor’ as recited in Claim 33 that provides feedback signals to the external control unit (e.g., ‘electronics for power and control’ and ‘data acquisition’).” Id. ¶¶ 581, 726. Mr. Crosby’s opinion is again unsupported by the evidence, because, as explained above, there is no teaching in Bourque that either the “ultrasonic flow probe” or the “pressure transducers” used in the “in vitro characterization” studies were part of the heart assist pump device. Based on our review and consideration of Petitioner’s arguments and evidence directed to claim 11, we find that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the asserted combination of Bourque and Wampler teaches or suggests each of the limitations of dependent claim 11. We reach the same conclusion for the same reasons with regard to claim 33.” slip op. at 48

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, a second magnetic device “positioned” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 11,674,517 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,674,517
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00096 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10, 12, and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over Schima and Akamatsu; claim 5 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Fed. R. Evid. 702 serves “a ‘gatekeeping role,’ the objective of which is to ensure that expert testimony admitted into evidence is both reliable and relevant.” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008). There is no question that the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby is relevant to the asserted motivation to combine and reliable, only whether it becomes “not relevant” or “unreliable,” in light of limited scope upon which grounds of unpatentability may be based under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b), because the testimony is based on, or supported by, knowledge of physical devices and publications discussing physical devices. Patent Owner directs us to no support for the notion that an expert’s testimony in an inter partes review must be limited to only the prior art relied upon as grounds for unpatentability and may not take into account any knowledge of, or publications concerning, other “physical devices” that would have been known to a person of ordinary skill at the relevant time. See generally Mot.25 In sum, we find that Patent Owner has 25 Patent Owner improperly asserts for the first time in its Reply in support of the Motion that “Petitioner in this case is improperly relying on non-prior art evidence.” Mot. Reply 3. This argument was not made in the Motion, and Patent Owner fails to identify what “non-prior art evidence” it seeks to exclude. We recognize that Petitioner appears to raise the argument that “non-prior art evidence” may be relied upon by an expert, but Petitioner also fails to identify what evidence it is referring to and that argument was not responsive to any issue Patent Owner raised in the Motion. See Mot. Resp. 5. To the extent the Parties intend “non-prior art evidence” to refer to the testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby, we view the issue as pertaining to the weight afforded that testimony, in light of the supporting evidence relied upon, rather than one of admissibility. for the exclusion of evidence in this proceeding and deny the Motion.” slip op. at 83

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “D. Claim Construction In this proceeding we construe claims using the same claim” slip op. at 20

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “5. Rationale in Support of Asserted Combination Petitioner shows, and there is no dispute, that Bourque and Wampler” slip op. at 48

  Patent outcomesUS 11,351,356 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,351,356
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SANo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00116 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–5, 7, 10, 16–24, 26, and 28 not unpatentable under any of the four § 103 grounds because the petition failed to prove required limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that the ’077 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’077 patent is consistent with the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, which we adopt. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We further find that our determinations in this Decision would be the same if we were to instead adopt the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that “axially adjacent” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis.” PO Resp. 5–6; see also Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 73–79 (Mr. Leschinsky addressing the claim term “axially adjacent” and explaining that a person of ordinary skill would have understood it to mean that the “first magnetic device and the rotor are ‘adjacent’ to one another, i.e., disposed next to one another, as measured along the central axis about which the rotor spins”). Patent Owner’s construction also is supported by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Crosby, who agrees that “adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis,” could be “one meaning,” along with “many other meanings.” Ex. 2014,8 19:13–20:11. In sum, consistent with our Institution Decision, we conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of “axially adjacent” is “at a position adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis.” See Dec. on Inst. 12.” slip op. at 14

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Second, for the reasons below, we determine that we do not need to construe any other claim terms to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner. As we discuss above, we find “axially adjacent” to mean “adjacent to one another as measured along a central arguments that rest on Petitioner’s assertion that in the Parallel Litigation, Patent Owner “asserts that a magnetic element sealed within a rotor is . . . ‘axially adjacent.’” Id. at 20–21, n.6 (citing Ex. 1019, 5–7). In particular, we find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that Wampler teaches that magnetic pieces 88 (“a first magnetic device”) “are inserted [‘axially adjacent’] in…the impeller.” Id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 80, Fig. 13; Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). We also find unavailing Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler’s Figure 13 and Mr. Crosby’s cited testimony that “the ‘impeller’ and ‘magnetic pieces’ are axially adjacent—situated next to each other on the same axis.” Id. at 21–22 (annotating Ex. 1008, Fig. 13; citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 174–176). Petitioner does not sufficiently explain this argument, but appears to conflate being adjacent along a central axis with about an axis. Id. We also find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that under Patent Owner’s construction, Wampler also teaches this limitation, because Patent Owner “concedes that ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have positioning that is next to one another, perhaps touching or sharing a common side, when measured along the axis.’” Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing PO Resp. 14). Petitioner mischaracterizes Patent Owner’s arguments and ignores Patent Owner’s showing that “axially adjacent” components are “distinct from components that are aligned with one another such that they overlap or occupy the same portion of an axis upon which they are positioned.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 78). For the preceding reasons, Petitioner fails to show by a” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 11,754,077 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,754,077
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SASome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 10, 2026 · IPR2025-00114 · APJ Annette R Reimers · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14–16, 18, and 19 are unpatentable under §103; claim 20 was not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyDenied

    “IV. PATENT OWNER’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner seeks to exclude portions of Dr. Wieselthaler’s Declaration (Exhibit 1041), portions of Mr. Crosby’s Reply Declaration (Exhibit 1042), portions of the deposition transcript of Dr. Wieselthaler (Exhibit 2028), and the exhibits “upon which that testimony is based” (Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050). Mot. 1. According to Patent Owner, the Motion was made “to preserve objections previously made in the record.” Id. (citations omitted). Patent Owner did not timely move to strike any of the evidence at issue as being outside the scope of reply evidence. Patent Owner asserts that because an inter partes review must be based on prior art consisting of patents or printed publications (citing 35 U.S.C. § 311(b)), the testimony of Mr. Crosby and Dr. Wieselthaler concerning “various physical devices allegedly known” to a person of ordinary skill in the art is inadmissible, along with all of the exhibits (consisting of printed materials such a journal abstracts, press releases, and papers) related to those physical devices. Id. at 3–4; see also Mot. Reply 1–4 (arguing that “devices that Petitioner’s witnesses assert were the basis of an inter partes review”). According to Patent Owner, Dr. Wieselthaler was unable to “link two of these physical devices to the printed prior art asserted in this [inter partes review], but those attempts fell apart during his cross examination.” Id. at 4. Patent Owner further reasons that because the evidence “cannot be the basis” of an inter partes review, it “has no tendency to make any fact of consequence in this trial more or less probable,” “is irrelevant and not admissible,” “presents substantial danger of confusing the issues, causing undue delay, and wasting time in this trial,” and “are not ‘based on sufficient facts[,] the product of reliable principles and methods[, or] ‘a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” Id. at 7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401–403, 702) (modification in original). With regard to Exhibits 1015, 1038, 1044, 1046, 1049, and 1050, Petitioner argues, and we agree, that Patent Owner identifies no plausible legal theory for their inadmissibility based on the contention that they discuss physical devices. See Mot. Resp. 3. We also agree with Petitioner that the exhibits are not “the basis for any ground” asserted in this proceeding, and may be properly relied upon by Dr. Wieselthaler and Mr. Crosby as support for their rebuttal testimony directed to Patent Owner’s arguments disputing Petitioner’s asserted motivation to combine the prior art relied upon in the instituted grounds. See id. at 3–4. In regard to the disputed testimony of Dr. Wieselthaler and” slip op. at 77

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed board ownOther

    “1. “magneto coupling” Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “a second magnetic device . . . positioned to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Ex. 1001, 5:34–37. Claim 11 recites, in relevant part, “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor so as to magnetically drive rotation of the magnetically driven rotor relative to the one or more walls via a magneto coupling with the first magnetic device.” Id. at 6:42–48. Petitioner argues that “magneto coupling” means “a transfer of torque from one rotating permanent magnetic component to another rotating permanent magnetic component via a magnetic field.” Pet. 8–9 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 68–87). According to Petitioner, this construction is consistent with the ’879 patent, which describes “a coupling between two rotating ‘bar magnets’—a drive wheel rotates one bar magnet which causes another bar magnet (connected to a rotor) to rotate.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–55 (analyzing Ex. 1001, 2:28–52, 4:44–64, Fig. 2)). Patent Owner argues that “magneto coupling” should be afforded “its plain and ordinary meaning, which would encompass a magnetic coupling through both rotating magnets and the use of a rotating magnetic Owner directs us to the testimony of Mr. Leschinsky, who explains that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the ’879 patent to use “magneto coupling” to generally describe “a way to couple the rotor to a drive element while sealing the two from one another and avoiding use of a direct mechanical coupling.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 67. According to Patent Owner, “Petitioner provides no recognizable basis for limiting the plain meaning of magnetic coupling to one type of magnet and excluding another type of magnet.” PO Resp. 6–7 (citing Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc., v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989–992 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner does not provide a sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’879 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 13 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 7; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)).” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableUnpatentable

    “reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claims 1 and 11, as well as by claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14– 16, and 18–20, which depend from either claim 1 or claim 11. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes [that] ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 11,572,879 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,572,879
• Rocket Media, LLC D/B/A Launch Labs v. Fullthrottle Technologies, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00148 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Doughty and Van Boucq, and over Doughty, Van Boucq, and Maginnis.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art in June 2021 would have had “(1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or an equivalent field plus at least one year of experience working on computer networking, or (2) at least 3 years of experience working on computer networking, even without a formal degree.” Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 44–47). Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proffered definition. PO Resp. 23. Petitioner’s proposed definition appears to be consistent with the disclosure of the ’947 patent, and we adopt it for purposes of this Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the prior art itself may “reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We determine that no terms require express construction to resolve the parties’ disputes in this case, but address certain claim construction arguments made by the parties in the analysis below. See id.; Inst. Dec. 11 (determining that “no express claim construction is necessary for any claim terms”); PO Resp. 23 (agreeing that “no express constructions are necessary to resolve this IPR”). slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Petitioner has shown that the combination of Doughty and Van Boucq accounts for these limitations. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments that claim 1 somehow excludes, what Patent Owner calls, the “Unique Identifier/Tracker Embodiment.” See PO Resp. 27, 31. Beginning with the language of the claims, the claims are silent as to where the “location data” recited in limitation 1[c] is stored. See Tr. 21:7– 16 (Patent Owner agreeing that “the stored location data does not actually have a required location at all” in the claim, and need not be stored in a database). Nor does Patent Owner direct us to any claim language that would specifically exclude “location data” stored on the user’s device. See Sur-reply 2–3. “The patentee is free to choose a broad term and expect to obtain the full scope of its plain and ordinary meaning unless the patentee clearly redefines the term (lexicography) or disavows claim scope (claim disavowal).” Aortic Innovations LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 159 F.4th 1, 8 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Patent Owner directs us to statements in the Specification, stating “[f]or example, the computing device may access a database or other storage location that maintains a mapping of unique identifier to a browser session, a user computing device, and/or location data.” Ex. 1001, 9:52–55; see also id. at 39:26–30 (same), 43:55– 59 (same). But none of those passages amounts to lexicography or disavowal of claim scope. Indeed, when read in their full context, these passages support a broad reading, not a narrow reading, of the claims. The full passage of the Specification states: The computing device may determine, at 406, whether there is a unique identifier that is associated with the user (e.g., the user computing device, the browser, and/or the browser session) stored on the computing device. For example, the script may inform the computing device that there is no unique identifier for the user computing device. The computing device may determine that there is no unique identifier associated with the user computing device when there is no location data stored for the user computing device. For example, the computing device may access a database or other storage location that maintains a mapping of unique identifier to a browser session, a user computing device, and/or location data. Additionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine whether there is a unique identifier for associated with the user based on presence of a location tracker (e.g., cookie) installed in the browser application on the user computing device. Ex. 1001, 9:43–59. The passage above is full of language that indicates that the patentee did not intend to limit the claims to a single embodiment. Indeed, the specific portion of the passage cited by Patent Owner begins with “[f]or example” and further states “[a]dditionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine whether there is a unique identifier for associated with the user based on presence of a location tracker (e.g., cookie) installed in the browser application on the user computing device.” Id. at 9:52–59 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Specification states “[a]dditionally or alternatively, the computing device may determine the location data using the tracker installed in the browser application on the user computing device.” Id. at 10:2–5. The Specification also explains that the tracker may “maintain data related to the user and/or user computing device.” Id. at 12:62–63. Based on these disclosures, we find that the Specification supports a reading where the location data are stored in the user computing” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find persuasive Petitioner’s reasoning that a POSITA would have been motivated to modify Doughty, based on Doughty’s own teachings regarding cookies and similar files, and would have recognized that the techniques of Van Boucq would have offered an efficient and commonly used way to determine whether the user already has been assigned a unique identifier. See Ex. 1007 ¶ 153. Patent Owner’s arguments about the precise contents of Van Boucq’s connection cookie attack Van Boucq individually and ignore the combination and modifications that Petitioner proposes. In the combination, Petitioner proposes incorporating the unique identifier from Doughty into Van Boucq’s connection cookie. See Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1008, 16:59–17:33; Ex. 1007 ¶ 153). As for Patent Owner’s contention that “[n]othing in the record suggests that Van Boucq’s connection cookie could contain any information about either Doughty’s table 105 Profile ID or Doughty’s hashed email address,” PO Resp. 33, as Dr. Gottesman testifies, “[a] cookie is a small piece of data (text file).” Ex. 2012 ¶ 55. We fail to see why a skilled artisan at the time of the invention would have any difficulty incorporating Doughty’s alphanumeric unique identifier into a text file. See Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 153, 166. Thus, we find that Petitioner has shown a motivation to combine Doughty and Van Boucq for these limitations.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,556,947 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,556,947
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SAAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 8, 2026 · IPR2025-00112 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 10, 11, 14, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Schima and Akamatsu; the other asserted grounds were not established.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Petitioner contends a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering; knowledge and experience in human circulatory system anatomy and physiology; and at least five years’ experience designing and developing implantable medical devices.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 18).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “sufficient basis for limiting the plain meaning of “magneto coupling.” That the ’357 patent describes embodiments using bar magnets does not serve to require the use of permanent magnets for the recited “magneto coupling.” See Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those embodiments.”)). Moreover, the claim language here is not so limited. 11 Patent Owner notes that Petitioner’s grounds of unpatentability based on Wampler and Bourque depend on the disclosure only of electromagnetic drives in each reference, implying that “Petitioner does not believe its own proposed narrower construction.” PO Resp. 6; see also Pet. 8 (Petitioner alleging that in the Parallel Proceeding Patent Owner “conflates ‘magneto coupling’ . . . with a stator drive using a stationary electromagnet, instead of a rotating magnet, to rotate the rotor magnet,” and asserting that as the basis for Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler and Bourque as teaching a “magneto coupling” in this proceeding (citing Ex. 1019, 9–11; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 84–87)). distinguished “magneto coupling” drives from drives using stators. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1011, 1 (explaining that the rotating field is generated by rotating magnets in a magnetic coupling pump and by electric stator windings in a stator pump)). Petitioner does not explain how this cited reference evidences that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood “magneto coupling” requires rotating permanent magnets. At most, this reference teaches an example device that provides “magneto coupling.” See Ex. 1011, 1. In sum, we agree with Patent Owner that “magneto coupling,” consistent with our Institution Decision, encompasses generating a rotating field either by rotating magnets or by an electromagnet / stator. See Inst. Dec. 22” slip op. at 22

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “ignores the readily apparent fact that the lower arrow is placed in a location that misrepresents the minimum distance between the magnetically driven rotor and the second magnetic device to suggest that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor,” as required by claim 1. Petitioner purports to justify this misrepresentation by asserting that “the vast majority of the impeller 74 is spaced significantly farther apart from the stators 90 and 94 than the magnetic pieces 88 are positioned from the stators 90 and 94.” Id. at 33–34. Claim 1 does not recite any feature based on the “vast majority” of a component and it is readily apparent from Petitioner’s own annotated version of Figure 11a that the distance from both the “motor magnets [88]” and “impeller 74” to the “circular electromagnetic stator[s] [90 and 94]” is the same. We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner has provided a “misleading Figure with two red arrows denoting measurement distances to illustrate its incorrect view that the second magnetic device is farther from the magnetically driven rotor than from the first magnetic device.” PO Resp. 13–15 (providing an annotated version of Wampler’s Figure 11a with an orange arrow showing that in Wampler the distances from the second magnetic device to both the rotor and the first magnetic device are the same). Accordingly, Petitioner fails to show that Wampler teaches “the second magnetic device positioned axially closer to the first magnetic device than to the magnetically driven rotor.”” slip op. at 29

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “To orient the pump in the least obtrusive position (i.e., in the human configuration, as in Figure 3), it was decided that the rotational axis of the pump’s rotor should be perpendicular to the body’s long axis. That resulted in a sharp bend in the flow before it enters the impeller. To minimize the losses in this transition, the flow is slightly accelerated through this elbow. that this type of elbow [i.e., the elbow used with Bourque’s centrifugal pump] was unnecessary,” applying Wampler to Bourque would have improved “blood flow.” Pet. 73 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 418–419; Ex. 1007, 402; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–76). As explained above, Wampler does not teach that “this type of elbow” was unnecessary. Bourque uses a centrifugal pump with an additional elbow specifically so that the centrifugal pump may be oriented “in the least obtrusive position.” Ex. 1007, 402. Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to support Petitioner’s assertion that eliminating the elbow from Bourque would improve “blood flow.” Mr. Crosby’s declaration provides no additional explanation or support to show how “blood flow” would have been improved. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 419. Nor does Mr. Crosby address the fact that Bourque expressly states that “flow is slightly accelerated” through the elbow to “minimize losses in this transition.” Ex. 1007, 402. Eliminating the elbow from Bourque, as Petitioner and Mr. Crosby propose, would mean the pump could no longer be placed in “the least obtrusive position” according to Bourque and there is no persuasive evidence that such a modification would improve blood flow.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 11,351,357 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,351,357
• Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SAAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 4, 2026 · IPR2025-00113 · APJ James A Tartal · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 17 are unpatentable under §103 over Schima and Akamatsu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “reasons discussed above. See supra Section III.D.3. Accordingly, because Petitioner’s contentions are premised on an unsupported claim construction that we reject, Petitioner fails to show how Wampler teaches or suggests “a magnetically driven rotor . . . axially adjacent to a first magnet device,” as required by claim 1, as well as by claims 2–5, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 17, which depend from claim 1. In its Reply, Petitioner suggests that “[u]nder [Patent Owner’s] construction from the [Patent Owner Response], Wampler also teaches or suggests this limitation,” because Patent Owner “concedes that ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have positioning that is next to one another, perhaps touching or sharing a common side, when measured along the axis.’” Pet. Reply 11 (citing PO Resp. 17). Petitioner mischaracterizes Patent Owner’s arguments and ignores Patent Owner’s showing that “axially adjacent” components are “distinct from components that are aligned with one another such that they overlap or occupy the same portion of an axis” slip op. at 32

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “endeavor of the ’415 patent (i.e., “[a] method and device to assist the performance of a heart with at least one pump that is formed as a rotary pump and driven via magneto coupling”). See Ex. 1001, code (57); Ex. 1005 code (57); Ex. 1006, 1. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Schima and Akamatsu are analogous art to the ’415 patent.” slip op. at 71

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “endeavor of the ’415 patent (i.e., “[a] method and device to assist the performance of a heart with at least one pump that is formed as a rotary pump and driven via magneto coupling”). See Ex. 1001, code (57); Ex. 1005 code (57); Ex. 1006, 1. Accordingly, we determine that Petitioner has sufficiently shown that Schima and Akamatsu are analogous art to the ’415 patent.” slip op. at 71

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “not identified a persuasive basis under any of the Federal Rules of Evidence for the exclusion of evidence in this proceeding and deny the Motion.” slip op. at 78

  Patent outcomesUS 11,376,415 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,376,415
• Western Digital Technologies, Inc. v. Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 29, 2026 · IPR2024-01493 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 3, 5, 7–11, 14, and 15 are unpatentable as obvious; claims 2, 4, 6, 12, and 13 were not shown unpatentable because the references did not establish entirely crystallized CoFeB layers.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the definition Petitioner proposes for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’167 patent. Dec. on Inst. 6. Namely, we found that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and at least one year of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent,” or “a Master’s degree in electrical engineering, physics, materials science, or a related field, and four years of experience in the research, design, and/or development of magnetic/spintronic devices, or the equivalent.” Id. (citing Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1024 ¶ 25)). We also found that “[l]ess work experience may be compensated by a higher level of relevant education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner does not address Petitioner’s definition, nor provide its own. See generally PO Resp. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’167 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner

    “Here, neither party sets forth any term for claim construction. Pet. 17; see generally PO Resp. Thus, for purposes of this Decision, we afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”)).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “In addition, we agree with Petitioner and find that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have been motivated to replace either or both of Bowen’s electrodes with CoFeB to increase TMR and lower Hf [(coupling field)] and Hc [(coercivity)].” Pet. 24, 27; Ex. 1055,30 2270 (“[I]t is natural to replace both the free and pinned layers to CoFeB to further increase the TMR value.”); Ex. 105631 ¶¶ 67–68 (“[B]oth the ferromagnetic layers 5, 7 are made of an FeCoB”32 for “improvement of the TMR ratio.”); Ex. 1024 ¶¶ 129, 132. We credit Dr. Bokor’s cited testimony as it is consistent with the cited evidence. Moreover, as Petitioner explains, “[r]esearchers were . . . interested in optimizing MTJs to improve MRAM performance,” and “[h]igher TMRs long promised improved performance for MRAM.” Pet. 6 30 Dexin Wang et al., 70% TMR at room temperature for SDT sandwich junctions with CoFeB as free and reference layers, 40 IEEE Trans. Magn. 2269–71 (July 2004). 31 US 2004/0136232 A1, published July 15, 2004, to Hosomi. 32 We find persuasive Dr. Bokor’s testimony that “a skilled artisan [would have] understood that CoFeB and FeCoB refer to the same alloy.” Ex. 1024 ¶ 121. 36–44) (emphasis omitted). In addition, we agree with Petitioner that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to use Parkin’s CoFeB layer in place of Bowen’s electrodes to increase TMR” in light of Parkin’s explicit teachings. Pet. 27; Ex. 1024 ¶ 133. In particular, Parkin explicitly teaches that “very high TMR values are unexpectedly found for MTJs with highly textured (100) MgO tunnel barriers but with nominally amorphous storage layers.” Ex. 1062, 18:49–51. Notably, Parkin provides that “[t]he TMR of the device of F[igure] 3A is nearly two times higher than the highest TMR ever reported in prior art devices using conventional alumina tunnel barriers.” Id. at 18:63–65; Pet. 27. And as we discuss above, Parkin teaches that Figure 3A’s MTJ may be inverted, such that the storage layer is formed beneath the tunnel barrier. Ex. 1062, 17:7–10. In addition, we agree that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in modifying Bowen in the manner Petitioner proposes, as forming electrodes with CoFeB alloys was known. Pet. 28. As Petitioner argues, “forming electrodes with CoFeB alloys in MTJs was known and had been successfully done,” and thus we are persuaded that “one of skill would have found it to be a straightforward, predictable, and desirable improvement to TMR, Hf, and Hc in Bowen’s” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find unavailing Patent Owner’s arguments that Bowen teaches a “radically different manufacturing process[] from the claimed invention,” and that Bowen “went to heroic lengths to provide a crystalline (001) bottom electrode that provides a template for epitaxially growing a crystalline MgO(001) layer.” PO Resp. 2 (emphasis omitted). Patent Owner describes in detail Bowen’s specific manufacturing process, including the specific structure of the MTJ manufactured, and argues the claimed invention differs. PO Resp. 30–33. These arguments are inapposite. Petitioner cites the specific teachings Petitioner relies on from Bowen, rather than adopting the entirety of Bowen’s process or MTJ. See, e.g., Pet. 21–36 (citing the portions of Bowen—that in combination with Parkin—teach claim 1). Petitioner is not “compelled to adopt every single aspect of [Bowen’s] teaching without the exercise of independent judgment.” Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984). We also find unavailing Patent Owner’s argument that Bowen and Parkin each teach away from Petitioner’s combination because Parkin used boron to avoid crystalline electrodes whereas Bowen tried to achieve perfect crystalline electrodes. PO Resp. 4. As we discuss above, one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to replace Bowen’s electrodes with CoFeB to increase TMR. And Patent Owner does not identify in either reference a specific teaching that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise 35 M. Jimbo et al., Thermal stability of spin valves using amorphous CoFeB, 165 J. Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 308–11 (1997) (“Jimbo”). combination. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 10,680,167 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,680,167

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.