• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting And Ledvance LLC / Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting, Elong International USA Inc., And Xiamen Longstar Lighting Co. Ltd v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2026 · IPR2024-01357 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held all challenged original claims unpatentable as obvious and granted the contingent motion to amend for substitute claims 30 and 32–49; substitute claim 31 was denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “E. Credibility of Dr. Doolittle Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Doolittle’s testimony because, “[o]n cross examination, Prof. Doolittle repeatedly contradicted himself, dodged questions, and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions.” PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner raises two major complaints about Dr. Doolittle. First, Patent Owner argues that he took inconsistent positions by asserting in these IPR proceedings that the claims were entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning, while in the parallel district court proceeding, asserting that certain claim terms were indefinite. Id. at 26–28. Second, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Doolittle “repeatedly dodged questions and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions,” and that “[d]uring cross examination Patent Owner was forced to object to Prof. Doolittle’s nonresponsive answers no less than eighteen times.” Id. at 28. We strongly disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Doolittle’s testimony. We have reviewed the entirety of both of Dr. Doolittle’s depositions. We are impressed with his forthrightness, candor, and good humor in the face of Patent Owner’s counsel’s aggressive questioning. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we find that his testimony was well-reasoned, forthright, honest, and entitled to significant weight. Dr. Doolittle explained the different claim construction positions We also strongly disagree that Dr. Doolittle’s answers were nonresponsive or “evasive” as Patent Owner argues. Patent Owner’s numerous attempts to “strike” portions of his testimony belie Dr. Doolittle’s efforts to honestly and in good faith respond to Patent Owner’s counsel’s questions. Ex. 2025, 22:10–23:15, 25:9–26:14, 30:14–22, 40:3-9, 58:12–59:1, 60:18–61:13, 65:1–10, 83:15–84:16, 92:15–95:20, 96:18–99:9, 102:22–106:16, 135:3–136:22. An answer is not “non-responsive” simply because it does not conform to the conclusion you want or undermines the logic underlying your questioning. Dr. Doolittle explained his answers and addressed the issues Patent Owner asked about. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to give Dr. Doolittle’s testimony no weight. Instead, we assess Dr. Doolittle’s testimony on a case-by-case basis as discussed below.” slip op. at 21

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 10

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successUnpatentableMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Basin-2005, Shimizu, and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 with a reasonable expectation of success. 4. Summary We have reviewed Petitioner’s contentions regarding claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 (Pet. 19–53), and find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 teach the limitations of those claims, and that there would have been a motivation to combine the references in the manner suggested with a reasonable considerations does not outweigh the strong showing of obviousness. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–3, 6, 9, 10, 16–21, and 25 would have been obvious over Basin-2007 and Basin-2005.” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerations › NexusObjective indicia no nexusDecided for petitioner

    “1. Nexus In order for secondary considerations to be awarded “substantial” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
• Savant Technologies LLC D/B/A GE Lighting / Ledvance LLC et al. v. Feit Electric Company, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 28, 2026 · IPR2024-01357 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16–21, 25, 26, and 29 are unpatentable; substitute claims 30–49 were not reached.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art We consider the asserted ground of unpatentability in view of the” slip op. at 10

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “E. Credibility of Dr. Doolittle Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Doolittle’s testimony because, “[o]n cross examination, Prof. Doolittle repeatedly contradicted himself, dodged questions, and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions.” PO Resp. 25. Patent Owner raises two major complaints about Dr. Doolittle. First, Patent Owner argues that he took inconsistent positions by asserting in these IPR proceedings that the claims were entitled to their plain and ordinary meaning, while in the parallel district court proceeding, asserting that certain claim terms were indefinite. Id. at 26–28. Second, Patent Owner argues that Dr. Doolittle “repeatedly dodged questions and tried to shoehorn new and nonresponsive opinions into his answers to Patent Owner’s questions,” and that “[d]uring cross examination Patent Owner was forced to object to Prof. Doolittle’s nonresponsive answers no less than eighteen times.” Id. at 28. We strongly disagree with Patent Owner’s characterization of Dr. Doolittle’s testimony. We have reviewed the entirety of both of Dr. Doolittle’s depositions. We are impressed with his forthrightness, candor, and good humor in the face of Patent Owner’s counsel’s aggressive questioning. Contrary to Patent Owner’s assertions, we find that his testimony was well-reasoned, forthright, honest, and entitled to significant weight. Dr. Doolittle explained the different claim construction positions We also strongly disagree that Dr. Doolittle’s answers were nonresponsive or “evasive” as Patent Owner argues. Patent Owner’s numerous attempts to “strike” portions of his testimony belie Dr. Doolittle’s efforts to honestly and in good faith respond to Patent Owner’s counsel’s questions. Ex. 2025, 22:10–23:15, 25:9–26:14, 30:14–22, 40:3-9, 58:12–59:1, 60:18–61:13, 65:1–10, 83:15–84:16, 92:15–95:20, 96:18–99:9, 102:22–106:16, 135:3–136:22. An answer is not “non-responsive” simply because it does not conform to the conclusion you want or undermines the logic underlying your questioning. Dr. Doolittle explained his answers and addressed the issues Patent Owner asked about. Accordingly, we decline Patent Owner’s invitation to give Dr. Doolittle’s testimony no weight. Instead, we assess Dr. Doolittle’s testimony on a case-by-case basis as discussed below.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “lower wavelength might offer, there were other drawbacks that a person of ordinary skill would have to balance. But “a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indeed, Petitioner has shown several references—including, Basin-2005, Shimizu, and Stokes—that made this tradeoff. Moreover, “[o]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success. . . . [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We find that the prior art of record demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have such an expectation in making the combination of Basin-2007 and Basin-2005. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there would have been motivation to combine Basin-2007 and Basin-2005 with a reasonable expectation of success.” slip op. at 41

  • Obviousness (§103) › Objective indicia / secondary considerationsDecided for petitioner

    “7. Summary As discussed above, we find that Patent Owner has failed to show a” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 8,604,678 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,604,678
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. Ziklag IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2026 · IPR2026-00047 · APJ Hung H Bui · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 9–14, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Yurt and Logan; the Board denied Petitioner’s motion to strike.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, we are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s “proposed level of skill” is appropriate in this proceeding for reasons discussed below.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “McCulloh’s qualifications are grounded upon Patent Owner’s “proposed level of skill” (which we rejected) that is “higher than Petitioner’s proposed level” (which we adopted for this proceeding) and focus on their level of skill in the late 1990s timeframe (time of the invention), but there is no time requirement on when an expert acquired the requisite level of skill in the art. Osseo Imaging, LLC v. Planmeca USA Inc., 116 F. 4th 1335, 1340–1341 (declining to add a timing requirement to the minimum qualifications necessary to offer expert testimony from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art). “An expert need not have acquired that skill level prior to the time of the invention to be able to testify from the vantage point of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, an expert can acquire the necessary skill level later and develop an understanding of what a person of ordinary skill knew at the time of the invention. In practice, the fact that the expert was not a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention may well be used during cross examination to undermine the credibility of the expert.” Id. Under Petitioner’s proposed level of skill (which we adopted), Dr. McCulloh is indeed qualified to testify in this proceeding because he has a Ph.D. in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University and extensive experience, including “hands-on deployment and academic research in distributed systems operating under real-world constraints” (Ex. 2009, Ex. 2010). See Ex. 2010 (CV) (BSIE, MS Comp. Sci, PhD Comp. Sci, Lieutenant 1994-1999, 10th Mountain Division (“led the army’s first tactical deployment of a distributed computing system”)); Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 6–10. Although Dr. McCulloh’s declaration does not include any searching or analysis of patent literature including Yurt or Logan as part of his analysis of the “background” state of the art, as correctly recognized by Petitioner (Pet. Reply 7–8 (citing Ex. 1017, 74:18–75:14; Ex. 2009 ¶ 3)), we are persuaded that Dr. McCulloh is qualified to address Dr. Lippman’s portrayal of the architecture disclosed in the ’128 patent, as advanced by Patent Owner. Ex. 2009, ¶¶ 3, 5–34; Ex. 2010. Dr. McCulloh does not provide testimony to refute Petitioner’s obviousness analysis based on Yurt and Logan. See Ex. 2009. Mr. Johnson is only offered to refute Petitioner’s obviousness analysis based on Yurt and Logan. Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 3, 18, 29. Under Petitioner’s proposed level of skill (which we adopted), Mr. Johnson, who is a co-inventor of the ’128 patent, is qualified to testify in this proceeding, especially, when his declaration states that (1) he is a POSITA “with more than 30 years of experience building technology-driven media and contentdistribution systems” and (2) he “was actively involved in the development and deployment of digital music and video distribution technologies” since the mid-1990’s, including “real-time and near-real-time electronic delivery of media content.” Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 9–10, 14, 16. Certainly, “[t]he inventor himself may qualify as an expert and testify what his claims would mean in the relevant art.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1995).” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningNo construction needed

    “Plain Meaning of “Substantially Real Time” Instead, the plain meaning of “substantially real time” is readily apparent and understood by a person of skill (POSITA) in the art in the context of data distribution or transmission of the ’128 patent as referring to an acceptable time delay (i.e., “a fraction of real time”) between distribution center 18 and user device 12, via network 14, shown in Figures 1–2 of the ’128 patent and, as such, is consistent with the ‘128 patent’s specification and Dr. Lippman’s Declaration (Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 79, 126). Because the plain meaning of “substantially real time” as understood by a POSITA is readily apparent, there is no reason for the Board to consider Patent Owner’s clarification of “substantially real time” based solely on extrinsic evidence, i.e., counsel argument, Mr. Johnson’s declaration (Ex. 2007, ¶¶ 27, 29–30, 33, 39; Ex. 1018, 38:13–39:20) and Dr. McCulloh’s declaration (Ex. 2009, ¶ 19). For example, Patent Owner, relying upon Mr. Johnson’s testimony, clarifies the term “substantially real time” requires either (1) “playback while transmission is ongoing” (PO Resp. 30), or (2) “[a] coordinated system behavior in response to a user’s request” “in which a user request triggers coordinated operations, including locating content across distributed systems, routing that content, and initiating playback while transmission is ongoing” (PO Sur-Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:67–3:2, 6:23–35)). However, Patent Owner’s shifting position regarding “substantially real time” is not commensurate with the plain reading of the term. Based on the plain meaning of “substantially real time,” we are persuaded by Petitioner that Yurt explicitly discloses transmitting data at least in “real time,” preferably “less than real time” or “a fraction of real time” for playback. Pet. Reply 9 (citing Ex.1005, code (57), 1:66–2:4, 4:68– 5:3 (teaching distributing “digital audio” in “less than real time” and in “a fraction of real time,” where the receiving system may “decompress in real time the requested material as it is distributed by transmission system 100”)).” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “teaches or renders obvious all limitations of claim 1, Petitioner also provides sufficient motivation or reasoning with a rational underpinning to combine Yurt and Logan. Specifically, Petitioner, relying on Dr. Lippman’s declaration (Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 62–73), asserts “a POSITA would have been motivated to combine Yurt with Logan for several reasons, discussed further below. Combining Logan’s usage log teachings with Yurt’s improved audio file accessibility (e.g., via popularity) to track additional user request information would have been obvious, beneficial, and predictable.” Pet. 19 (citing Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 62–72). According to Petitioner, because “Logan teaches implementation details for tracking user/usage data for billing purposes and adapting preferences ‘based on actual usage,’” “[a] POSITA would have thus been motivated to combine Yurt’s teachings (e.g., tracking information about requested items like item popularity) with Logan’s teachings (e.g., storing user data and usage information in response to user requests).” Id. at 19–20. “This would have been merely the use of a known technique (Logan’s tracking of user and usage data in response to user requests) to improve a similar method in the same way (Yurt’s tracking of information about user-requested items).” Id. at 20 (citing Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 67– 68). According to Petitioner, [T]he combination is straightforward: use Logan’s known technique for recording user data with Yurt’s existing item database teachings. See Ex. 1005, 12:28–57, 10:66–11:4; Ex. 1006, 5:33–42, 6:27–35, 8:49–58; Pet. 19–23. Since Yurt already teaches using its item database to track item popularity and request information, no modification to Yurt’s architecture is necessary. Logan merely confirms when and how to store the user information. Pet. 19–21. A POSITA would have found the combination obvious for all the reasons Dr. Lippman provided. See, e.g., Ex.1003, ¶¶ 71–72.” slip op. at 58

  Patent outcomesUS 6,182,128 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,182,128
• Apple Inc. / Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. Ziklag IP LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 26, 2026 · IPR2025-00700 · APJ Hung H Bui · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6, 9–14, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over Yurt and Logan; Petitioner’s motion to strike is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the record before us, we are unpersuaded that Patent Owner’s “proposed level of skill” is appropriate in this proceeding for reasons discussed below.” slip op. at 13

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Under Petitioner’s proposed level of skill (which we adopted), Dr. McCulloh is indeed qualified to testify in this proceeding because he has a Ph.D. in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University and extensive experience, including “hands-on deployment and academic research in distributed systems operating under real-world constraints” (Ex. 2009, Ex. 2010). See Ex. 2010 (CV) (BSIE, MS Comp. Sci, PhD Comp. Sci, Lieutenant 1994-1999, 10th Mountain Division (“led the army’s first tactical deployment of a distributed computing system”)); Ex. 2009 ¶¶ 6–10. Although Dr. McCulloh’s declaration does not include any searching or analysis of patent literature including Yurt or Logan as part of his analysis of the “background” state of the art, as correctly recognized by Petitioner (Pet. Reply 7–8 (citing Ex. 1017, 74:18–75:14; Ex. 2009 ¶ 3)), we are persuaded that Dr. McCulloh is qualified to address Dr. Lippman’s portrayal of the architecture disclosed in the ’128 patent, as advanced by Patent Owner. Ex. 2009, ¶¶ 3, 5–34; Ex. 2010. Dr. McCulloh does not provide testimony to refute Petitioner’s obviousness analysis based on Yurt and Logan. See Ex. 2009. Mr. Johnson is only offered to refute Petitioner’s obviousness analysis based on Yurt and Logan. Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 3, 18, 29. Under Petitioner’s proposed level of skill (which we adopted), Mr. Johnson, who is a co-inventor of the ’128 patent, is qualified to testify in this proceeding, especially, when his declaration states that (1) he is a POSITA “with more than 30 years of experience building technology-driven media and contentdistribution systems” and (2) he “was actively involved in the development and deployment of digital music and video distribution technologies” since the mid-1990’s, including “real-time and near-real-time electronic delivery of media content.” Ex. 2007 ¶¶ 9–10, 14, 16. Certainly, “[t]he inventor himself may qualify as an expert and testify what his claims would mean in the relevant art.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The fact that Johnson is a co-inventor is not in and of itself sufficient to discredit his testimony. “That an expert may have a bias or self-interest towards a party on whose behalf he or she is offering testimony, without more, generally does not require disqualifying the expert so long as the expert appears to be providing an objective analysis. Bias goes to the weight of the testimony, not necessarily its admissibility.” Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F. 3d 1286, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, the Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert testimony. Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Board was well within its discretion to give more credibility to [one expert over another] unless no” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the record before us, we determine that neither Patent Owner’s proposed clarification nor an express construction of “substantially real time” is necessary for our proceeding. Plain Meaning of “Substantially Real Time” Instead, the plain meaning of “substantially real time” is readily apparent and understood by a person of skill (POSITA) in the art in the context of data distribution or transmission of the ’128 patent as referring to an acceptable time delay (i.e., “a fraction of real time”) between distribution center 18 and user device 12, via network 14, shown in Figures 1–2 of the ’128 patent and, as such, is consistent with the ‘128 patent’s specification and Dr. Lippman’s Declaration (Ex. 1003, ¶¶ 79, 126). Because the plain meaning of “substantially real time” as understood by a POSITA is readily apparent, there is no reason for the Board to consider Patent Owner’s clarification of “substantially real time” based solely on extrinsic evidence, i.e., counsel argument, Mr. Johnson’s declaration (Ex. 2007, ¶¶ 27, 29–30, 33, 39; Ex. 1018, 38:13–39:20) and Dr. McCulloh’s declaration (Ex. 2009, ¶ 19). For example, Patent Owner, relying upon Mr. Johnson’s testimony, clarifies the term “substantially real time” requires either (1) “playback while transmission is ongoing” (PO Resp. 30), or (2) “[a] coordinated system behavior in response to a user’s request” “in which a user request triggers coordinated operations, including locating content across distributed systems, routing that content, and initiating playback while transmission is ongoing” (PO Sur-Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:67–3:2, 6:23–35)). However, Patent Owner’s shifting position regarding “substantially real time” is not commensurate with the plain reading of the term.” slip op. at 36

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Conclusion as to Claim 1 Petitioner has shown that (1) Yurt and Logan teach or suggest all the limitation of claim 1 and (2) reasons sufficiently existed with a rational underpinning to support the combination of Yurt and Logan.” slip op. at 63

  Patent outcomesUS 6,182,128 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,182,128
• Anthony Inc. v. Controltec, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 25, 2026 · IPR2025-00559 · APJ Barry L Grossman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable as obvious over the five asserted grounds based on Carter, Beatenbough, King, Gatling, and Kotani.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We find unpersuasive Mr. Pollock’s testimony that we limit the level of ordinary skill to “refrigerated display cases” because defining the level of skill as an engineer with experience “working with refrigerated display cases” does not relate to the technology disclosed and claimed in the ’181 patent, which is controlling condensation and conserving energy. E.g., Ex. 1001, 2:17–21 (“The invention is proactive in preventing condensation temperature at frame and door surfaces is reached. Power is then cycled off at a set point above dew point to save energy.” (emphases added)). An electrical engineer with a bachelor’s degree and 2 years of experience focused on lighting systems for refrigerated display cases would have “experience working with refrigerated display cases,” and thus meet Patent Owner’s proposed level of skill. Such a person, however, would not be experienced in controlling condensation, dew point sensor positioning, and condensation algorithm design, which is the focus of the disclosed and claimed invention, and which Mr. Pollock states “materially affect performance, energy use, and reliability” in controlling condensation in a refrigerated display case. Ex. 2014 ¶ 11. We also note that Mr. Pollock’s qualifications are a “B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, cum laude, from Drexel University (1998), with focus on thermal and mechanical systems, thermodynamics, and HVAC&R (Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning & Refrigeration).” Ex. 2014 ¶ 3. Accordingly, based on the prior art, the sophistication of the disclosed technology in the ’181 patent, finding Mr. Pollock’s testimony on this issue too general, and crediting Dr. Henze’s testimony with substantial probative weight, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill. We modify it to state that more academic training will offset less experience, and more experience will offset less academic training, as did Dr. Henze (Ex. 1003 ¶ 31). Thus, in this proceeding a person of ordinary skill would have a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, or a comparable field and at least three to five years of professional experience working with heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and refrigeration” slip op. at 16

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “The fundamental role of expert testimony is that “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact [here, the Board] to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a). The testimony must be “based on sufficient facts or data” (id. at 702(b)); must be “the product of reliable principles and methods” (id. at 702(c)); and must reflect “a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case” (id. at 702(d)). We determine, based on the record before us, that Dr. Henze’s Declaration testimony meets these requirements. He provides, as required, the facts and data to support his testimony. Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the Code of Federal Regulations require him to do so. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Expert testimony that “merely repeats, verbatim, the conclusory assertion for which it is offered to support,” or that “does not cite to any additional supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support” the testimony is entitled to little weight. Xerox Corp. v. Bytemark, Inc., IPR2022-00624, Paper 9, 15 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2022) (Precedential) (emphasis added).” slip op. at 31

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Here, whether the preamble is or is not limiting is not argued by Petitioner. Moreover, whether the preamble is or is not limiting is not necessary to resolve this controversy because it would not affect the outcome of this case. 2. “Adapted for” Patent Owner asserts that the term “adapted for” in independent claims 1 and 8 has its “plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 14. Patent Owner does not, however, provide us with a specific identification of what is the “plain and ordinary” meaning. Petitioner does not address a specific construction for this term. Thus, it is not in controversy and we need not specifically construe this term. slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“References within the statutory terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102 qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination only when analogous to the claimed invention.” (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992))). The Federal Circuit has laid out two separate tests to determine whether a reference is analogous art to the claimed invention, i.e., whether one of ordinary skill in the art would even look to the teachings of that reference. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). These two tests are: “(1) whether the art is from the same field of [the inventor’s] endeavor” and “(2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” Id.; see also Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, 80 F.4th 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Importantly, ‘the scope of any field of endeavor will vary with the factual description of each invention.’ Unlike the reasonable-pertinence test, the field-of-endeavor test does not look to the problem that the patent purports to address. It is enough that the prior art reference falls within the relevant field of endeavor of the patent-in-suit.”) (citations omitted); Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“To determine if art is analogous, we look to ‘the purposes of both the invention and the prior art.’ If a reference disclosure and the claimed invention have a same purpose, the reference” slip op. at 42

  Patent outcomesUS 7,207,181 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,207,181
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 20, 2026 · IPR2025-00343 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6 and 8–13 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not establish a reason to combine Bucknell’s multiplexing techniques with Eckert.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “Patent Owner does not expressly dispute Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. On this record, Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is not disputed and is consistent with our review and understanding of the technology and descriptions in the ’138 patent and the asserted prior art references. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For purposes of this Decision, we rely on Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 12

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “1. a subset of radio bearers Petitioner points out that in IPR2022-01127 the Board “preliminarily determined that a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” means “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.” Pet 12 (citing Ex. 1019, 18–19). Petitioner explains that, in the present proceeding, it has applied “the prior art in accordance with that construction; however, in view of the asserted grounds, no claim term requires express construction to find the Challenged Claims unpatentable.” Id. (citing Nidec 868 F.3d 1017). Patent Owner neither disputes the prior construction of “a subset of radio bearers,” nor offers additional constructions. See generally PO Resp. To the extent necessary, and in accordance with our prior determination, we construe “a subset of the plurality of radio bearers” to mean “less than all of the plurality of radio bearers.”” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “bears pointing out that the specification of the ’138 patent appears to explain what “a single allocation” means: If there are multiple QoS requirements within a single 3GPP PDP context, a single physical allocation of radio resources may be made to the UE. In this manner, a single PDP context implies a single CCTrCh. This single physical allocation of radio resources provided to a UE is shared amongst a number of services, in proportion to their respective QoS requirements, for example in proportion to the signalled weight values (Stier). Ex. 1001, 9:36–43 (emphasis added). Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Ding, explains that the “abbreviation CCTrCh was understood in the art to refer to a transport channel known as the Coded Composite Transport Channel.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 88. Dr. Ding testifies that Eckert teaches selecting data for uplink within a determined TTI and scheduling the uplink transmission on a transport channel, E-DCH, where scheduling of the E-DCH in a UE is controlled by a base station. Eckert, [0012] (“[A] new dedicated transport channel called Enhanced Dedicated Channel (E-DCH) has been introduced for this purpose. The fundamental characteristics of this new transport channel include . . . scheduling controlled by the base station, also called NodeB in UMTS…” Id. ¶ 90. In addition to Eckert disclosing a single transport channel E-DCH, Petitioner argues that Eckert discloses using a “finite quantum of physical resources” where “[t]he ’138 patent disclosure parallels Eckert, with both the E-DCH and CCTrCH transport channels relating to a UMTS uplink, employing spreading codes in code division multiple access (CDMA), and Reply 6 (citing Ex. 1005, ¶¶ 3, 8, 15, 23; Ex. 1071 ¶¶ 17–20; Ex. 1011 ¶¶ 6, 51). We do not need to specifically interpret this claim phrase because there is no actual dispute as to the meaning of the claim language itself and because, ultimately, the construction of this phrase plays no part in our Decision.” slip op. at 15

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “D. Ground 1: Claims 1–4 and 8–11 – Alleged Obviousness over Eckert in view of Bucknell and Lohr-1 On the complete record now before us, Petitioner has not established a preponderance of evidence that claims 1–4 and 8–11 would have been obvious over Eckert, Bucknell, and Lohr-1. For the reasons explained below we determine that Petitioner has failed to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Eckert in view of Bucknell in the manner claimed. We focus our analysis below on claim 1, and more specifically on those limitations for which the combination of Eckert and Bucknell is asserted. 1. Limitations [1.0]–[1.2] and the combination of Eckert and Bucknell The combination of Eckert and Bucknell is essential to each of Petitioner’s asserted grounds in this proceeding. Pet. 13. At the outset, we address this issue because our determination that Petitioner has failed to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Eckert and Bucknell is dispositive as to all grounds.” slip op. at 20

  Patent outcomesUS 10,292,138 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,292,138
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, and 30 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, 32, and 33 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

    “We decline Patent Owner’s invitation to construe “during a frame” of “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame” by importing the extraneous limitations “at some point between the beginning and the end of the exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” As pointed out by Petitioner, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unsupported by the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Specification because Specification does not disclose an exposure interval nor suggest “during a frame” is limited to an exposure interval. Patent Owner and its expert Dr. Saber cite only extrinsic evidence (Exs. 2006, 2009) to support its argument that claim 22 should be limited to an “exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” See PO Resp. 16–17; Ex. 2020 ¶ 64. Similarly, Patent Owner relies only on extrinsic evidence (e.g., Ex. 2011, 1; Ex. 2022, 1; Ex. 2020 ¶ 66) to limit “during” to “at some point between the beginning and the end.” See id. at 18. When considered in the context of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification which do not limit “during a frame” to an exposure interval, we find that we cannot rely on Patent Owner’s citations to extrinsic evidence to yield a reliable construction for “during a frame.” As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not provide an explicit construction for “during a frame” to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the merits of the patentability challenges. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. We apply the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame.” To the extent that an explicit identification of the ordinary and customary meaning may aid the understanding of our analysis, consistent with the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification, we find that the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame” is “during the period of time that data for an image frame is acquired.” See Ex. 1001, code (57), 20:6–24, 25:23–35.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing deficiencies of written description support the ’854 Provisional Application provides written description support for all of the limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Specifically, Patent Owner does not address written description support in the ’854 Provisional Application for “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame”––limitation [22.3]––the heart of the parties’ claim construction disputes addressed above in Section II.A. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–27. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in the ’854 Provisional Application. As a result, the burden of production does not shift back to Petitioner, and, therefore, the ’180 Patent is not entitled to the benefit of the August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not present arguments that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Matsushima to acquire data for images 62A and 62B at the argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).10 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, 30, and 33 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu under § 103; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, and 32 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”).” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “We do not agree with Petitioner’s arguments based on retrieval of data from CCD 18A and CCD 18B. Although Matsushima’s CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B are driven synchronously by timing generator 28 (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 27), Matsushima discloses that “accumulated signal charges are retrieved by CCD drive pulses applied by CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B, and are sequentially output from CCD 18A and CCD 18B as voltage signals (analog image signals) corresponding to each signal charge” (see Ex. 1007 ¶ 23) (emphasis added). In other words, regardless of whether CCD drive circuits 20A and 20B are driven synchronously by timing generator 28, Matsushima discloses that voltage signals corresponding to the accumulated 8 Petitioner’s citation erroneously includes ¶¶ 34–36 of Exhibit 1069. CCD 18A and CCD 18B sequentially––not output at the same time or simultaneously.” slip op. at 30

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).9 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id. Petitioner clarifies that the Petition does not argue inherency. See Pet.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 21, 2026 · IPR2025-00342 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 6–11 were not shown unpatentable because the cited combinations did not teach guiding a vehicle to a fixed destination or calculating the claimed optimized path from stored destination data.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Adverse judgmentOther

    “reserves consideration of discretionary issues to the Director. The relief Patent Owner requests is that the panel exercise discretion to terminate these proceedings based on actions taken in related district court proceedings as done in Hulu. Supp. PO Resp. 2. Because the basis for Patent Owner’s requested relief is discretionary, the panel lacks the authority to grant the request. In this regard, the present situation is different from that in Hulu and Sinclair Pharma Limited v. Hydrafacial LLC (IPR2025-00145, Paper 41, Squires, Feb. 12, 2026), cited by Patent Owner. In those cases, the 9 Available at: https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Director_Institution_of _AIA_Trial_Proceedings.pdf (“Director Institution Memo”). Director ordered de-institution, not the panel. The Director has not made such a determination or delegated such authority to the panel in these proceedings. Indeed, as noted above, Patent Owner has already briefed, and the Director has previously ruled on, discretionary denial issues. Paper 10. Accordingly, we decline to vacate our Institution Decision and focus our analysis on the merits of the case as presented by the parties.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We consider the asserted grounds of unpatentability in view of the understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art. In assessing the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “[O]ne or more factors may predominate.” Id. Petitioner asserts that ordinarily skilled artisans “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related subject, and four years of work experience in image processing, automated vehicle control/navigation, or a related field.” Pet. 7. Petitioner’s proposed definition, which Patent Owner does not dispute, appears reasonable and consistent with the asserted prior art and the ’805 patent, and we adopt it here. See generally, PO Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’805 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Here, in our opinion, Patent Owner has shown that the Specification describes the potential destinations of a vehicle as limited to physically fixed, non-transient objects or features. PO Resp. 18–21. As an initial matter the ’805 patent is titled “Docking Assistant” and explains its purpose for guiding a “vehicle to a stop at a specific location.” Ex. 1001, codes (53), (57), Abstract. We acknowledge that claim 1 does not expressly recite that “at least one potential destination” is a fixed destination or location. See id. at 7:61– 63 (Claim 1 requiring “extracting from the acquired image data positional parameters of at least one potential destination relative to the motor vehicle;”). Yet, in the context of the relatively brief specification, there is no explanation, example, or embodiment which reasonably extends the meaning of “destination” or “potential destination” beyond a fixed location. The ’805 patent describes in the Abstract that [m]any day-to-day driving situations require that an operator of a motor vehicle guide the motor vehicle along a specific course and bring the vehicle to a stop at a specific location, for example in a parking bay or at a loading platform. Id. at code (57) Abstract. The Abstract explains in the next sentence that “[t]o assist a vehicle operator in such situations, a method and a suitable device for implementing this method, include detecting the potential target objects in the image data of an image sensor and identifying the potential target objects as potential destinations in a multi-stage exclusionary method.” Id. (emphasis added). Nowhere in this initial description of the invention, nor anywhere else that Petitioner points to, is there is expansion of the “specific location” or “potential destination” beyond a docking station or parking bay. Of course, the claim is not limited to these examples, as it would be inappropriate to read in such limitations from the Specification. See Acceleration Bay, LLC v. Activision Blizzard Inc., 908 F.3d 765, 771 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Acceleration again attempts to import structural limitations into claims lacking those limitations. . . . While the specifications discuss a broadcast channel overlaying a network, the claims at issue are not so limited.”).” slip op. at 14

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Majumder, testifies to the contrary that “[r]ead as an engineer, the ‘805 patent’s present invention is framed around guiding a vehicle to fixed, physical destinations (exemplified by docking stations and similar structures) without fiducials or special markings.” Ex. 2010 ¶ 81. Considering Broggi, Dr. Majumder testifies further that “[a] moving object, such as a preceding car, is not a valid destination under the ‘805 Patent, because it is not a stationary location at which the host vehicle can be guided to stop. To treat such a vehicle as a ‘potential destination’ would lead to collision, not guidance.” Id. ¶ 86. As discussed in our claim construction, given a plain reading of claim 1 in light of the Specification, our understanding of the ’805 patent is consistent with Dr. Majumder’s testimony. We agree that Broggi is directed expressly to the platooning of moving vehicles, and not physically fixed destinations as the proper claim construction requires. Because Broggi does not disclose the use of physically fixed “potential destinations” as required, e.g., in limitations [1.2]–[1.3], and neither Huttenlocher nor Brady are relied upon to overcome this deficiency, Petitioner has not met its burden of persuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Broggi in view of Huttenlocher and Brady.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 7,336,805 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Markman · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,336,805
• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 6, 2026 · IPR2025-00221 · APJ Scott A Daniels · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–8 are unpatentable as obvious: claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 over Dateki; claims 3 and 7 over Dateki and Mate; and claims 4 and 8 over Dateki and Chitrapu.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “[w]ould have been someone knowledgeable and familiar with the wireless communications systems that are pertinent to the ’889 patent. That person would have a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of wireless communication systems or design of similar communication systems. Pet. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 25). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s contention as to the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally, PO Resp. Based on this record, and because there is no dispute, we adopt Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which is consistent with the ’889 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art, itself, can reflect appropriate level of ordinary skill in art).” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “do not recite, as Patent Owner interprets it, that the extracted power control information upon which the UE bases its transmission of a signal be “the same” power control information extracted from the control message. PO Resp. 25. Where the claim is clear on its face, we decline to inject “the same” into the construction, that is, words that are not actually in the claim. Yet considering the plain language of claim 1, we mostly agree with Patent Owner’s interpretation, namely that “a transmission power level based on the extracted power control information,” as required in limitation [1.6] includes power control information extracted from “the control message,” in limitation [1.5] having “power control bits for a plurality of UEs” as recited in limitation [1.4]. Ex. 1001, 10:2–19. We understand and interpret the concluding limitation in method-type claim 5 in the same manner as limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “do not recite, as Patent Owner interprets it, that the extracted power control information upon which the UE bases its transmission of a signal be “the same” power control information extracted from the control message. PO Resp. 25. Where the claim is clear on its face, we decline to inject “the same” into the construction, that is, words that are not actually in the claim. Yet considering the plain language of claim 1, we mostly agree with Patent Owner’s interpretation, namely that “a transmission power level based on the extracted power control information,” as required in limitation [1.6] includes power control information extracted from “the control message,” in limitation [1.5] having “power control bits for a plurality of UEs” as recited in limitation [1.4]. Ex. 1001, 10:2–19. We understand and interpret the concluding limitation in method-type claim 5 in the same manner as limitation [1.6].” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “where packet transmission is conducted, “the transmission power control information is transmitted via the HS-SCCH as second transmission power control information TPCC at a shorter periodic cycle.” PO Resp. 11 (quoting Ex. 1005, 13:11–13). But in context, after describing transmission of TPCC 1 on F-DPCH, Dateki says “[a]lso, in a case where packet transmission is conducted, the transmission power control information is transmitted via the HS-SCCH as second transmission power control information TPCC at a shorter periodic cycle.” Ex. 1005, 13:8–13 (emphasis added). We find it significant that the word “also” is used by Dateki, here, to describe the relationship of TPCC 1 and TPCC 2 as used together. If the intent was to transmit and use only TPCC 2 on HS-SCCH when data packets are transmitted on HS-PDCH, it would have made more sense to say “alternatively,” and otherwise make clear that only TPCC 2 is transmitted. But they did not. On the other hand, the inventors certainly understood how to explain when TPCC 2 is not transmitted. For example, Dateki makes clear that in certain embodiments TPCC 2 is unnecessary and “transmission power control may be effectively realized without including transmission power control information in the HS-SCCH.” Id. at 14:33–35. The same cannot be said for TPCC 1.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 11,664,889 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,664,889

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.