• Therabody, Inc. v. Hyperice IP Subco, LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 20, 2026 · PGR2024-00053 · APJ Alyssa A Finamore · PGR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not prove claims 34–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 unpatentable under § 112(a), § 112(b), or any asserted § 103 ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “The parties’ proffered definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art differ in the details of the experience a POSITA would possess. Petitioner’s definition requires experience with rotating or reciprocating mechanisms, whereas Patent Owner’s definition requires experience with devices for human use and interaction. These differences, however, do not affect our analysis of the issues in this case. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition of level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “During oral argument, Petitioner confirmed it would not object to the Board adopting the construction that Petitioner proposes in the district court litigation. JUDGE MARSCHALL: I think the Petitioner wouldn’t object if we adopted the construction that Petitioner proposed in the district court, especially the “designed to” construction, correct? MR. BERG: No. We wouldn’t object to that. And we think that our Petition is on all fours with that construction. Tr. 81:12–16. As Petitioner does not object to adopting its construction from the district court litigation, we construe claim element 34[e] in accordance with Petitioner’s construction from the district court litigation.” slip op. at 10

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “The invention, a reciprocating massage device, is in a predictable field, namely the electro-mechanical arts. Also, there is no evidence that the recited quick release connector is complex, even considering Patent Owner’s alleged understanding of it. Rather, Dr. Pratt testifies that a POSITA would be able to recognize a quick release connector for a particular application. According to Dr. Pratt, A person of ordinary skill in the art would consider a number of factors, depending on the context and specific application of the connector, to determine whether a connector provides a “quick release.” Such factors could include whether the connector is designed to manually and easily connect and disconnect two objects, and whether tools are necessary to do so. Other factors to be considered may be based on the specific application or operating environment. Ex. 1002 ¶ 58. Given the predictability of the electro-mechanical arts and lack of complexity of the recited quick release connector, a low level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement. See RAI Strategic Holdings, Inc. v. Philip Morris Prods. S.A., 92 F.4th 1085, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“Given the predictability of electro-mechanical inventions such as the one at issue here, and the lack of complexity of the particular claim limitation at issue—i.e., reciting the length of a heating member—‘a lower level of detail is required to satisfy the written description requirement than for unpredictable arts.’” (quoting Hologic, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 884 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). In view of the low level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the Specification’s example of a quick release connector configured to secure the massaging head as the piston reciprocates fails to provide sufficient written description support for the “quick release connector . . . configured to secure a first massaging head while the piston reciprocates a predetermined stroke length at the first speed” recited in claim element 34[e]. 4. Conclusion for Written Description For the reasons set forth above in sections II.C.1–3, Petitioner has not persuaded us that any aspect of claim element 34[e] lacks written description support. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 34, as well as any of claims 35–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 depending therefrom, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).” slip op. at 18

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable

    “Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the Specification provides guidance as to what amount of deviation from a perfect cylinder is still “substantially cylindrical.” The Specification describes that quick-connect system 600 includes two magnets with opposite poles facing each other: magnet 606 in the distal end of piston 602 and magnet 624 located in cylindrical pocket 622 of massaging head 620. Ex. 1001, 6:57–67, Figs. 6, 6A. The Specification further describes that “when the shaft 621 of massaging head 620 is slid into opening in bore 608, the magnets 606 and 624 are attracted to one another and magnetically hold massaging head 620 firmly in place.” Id. at 6:67–7:3. In view of the description of quick-connect system 600, the Specification sets forth a standard for ascertaining whether the pocket is “substantially cylindrical.” To wit, the pocket is “substantially cylindrical” when the pocket receives a magnet therein so that the magnets can magnetically hold the massaging head firmly in place. Furthermore, Dr. Pratt testifies that “[m]agnetic connectors comprise a magnet on at least one of the two objects to be joined. These types of connectors are ubiquitous even today for driving threaded fasteners.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 55. Dr. Pratt also testifies that a POSITA would understand how to take into account certain variances, like runout. Ex. 2033, 25:3–17. Dr. Pratt’s testimony shows that magnetic connectors are well known and that a POSITA would be able to determine whether the pocket was “substantially cylindrical” for a secure connection of the massaging head. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has not persuaded us that the claim term “substantially cylindrical” recited in independent claim 34 fails to inform, with reasonable certainty, the shape of the pocket. Petitioner has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that independent claim 34, as well as claims 35–38, 40, 41, 43–46, and 58–60 depending therefrom, are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,857,482 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,857,482
• CMS Cepcor Ltd. / CMS Cepcor Americas LLC v. Sandvik Intellectual Property ABNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 16, 2026 · IPR2024-01381 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–14 were not shown unpatentable because Polinski and Piepho do not teach the claimed tapered region extending from the shaft’s second end, and Petitioner did not establish adequate motivation to combine.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) relating to the ’090 patent would have had “a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a related field, and at least 2 years of experience with industrial equipment design and development.” Pet. 3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 29). Petitioner further contends that one of ordinary skill “may also have a combination of more formal education and less work experience or a combination of less/different formal education and more work experience.” Id. In the Patent Owner Response, Patent Owner states that it “does not object to the defined level of skill in the art.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Pet. 3). appears consistent with the problems addressed in the ’090 patent and the prior art.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “challenge, the crux of the parties’ dispute revolves around the limitation in claim 1 of “an axial region of the shaft body extending from the second end and being tapered relative to a longitudinal axis of the shaft.” We agree with for the tapered axial region and that starting point would be the extremity of the shaft not an undefined point in the “end region.” Because Patent Owner proposes a construction of “end” that would have general application to all claim terms including the first end of the shaft, the second end of the shaft, and the sleeve end, and that construction has no bearing on the issues we address below, we do not reach Patent Owner’s proposed general construction of “end” by itself. We determine that no other claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 17

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “As discussed above in our claim construction analysis, apart from the issue of the general construction of “end,” we determine that this limitation uppermost extremity of the shaft. Because neither Polinski nor Piepho disclose a tapered axial region starting at the uppermost extremity of the shaft, we find that Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Polinksi and Piepho discloses this limitation.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundDecided for patent owner

    “This paragraph discusses “accurate alignment” in connection with joint 21, not tapered end 25. Ex. 1018, 3:23–35. The paragraph subsequently states that both joint 21 and end 25 are tapered but that shaft end 25 may alternatively be cylindrical. Id. We also find nothing in this paragraph supporting Petitioner’s assertion that alignment “is notoriously more difficult with purely cylindrical shafting” (Pet. 16–17). In order to support its position, Petitioner improperly conflates separate statements in this paragraph of Piepho, i.e., joint 21 provides accurate alignment, joint 21 is tapered, and end 25 is tapered. Petitioner makes an unsupported logical leap that the result of these three statements is that tapered end 25 provides accurate alignment. However, Petitioner fails to reconcile this argument with the final sentence in this paragraph that shaft end 25 may also be cylindrical as shown in Figure 4. Figure 4 “is an external view of another embodiment of” Piepho’s shaft. Ex. 1018, 2:49–50. In Figure 4, joint 21 has the same tapered configuration as shown in Figure 3 but end 25 is not tapered. Based on our review of Piepho’s Figures 3 and 4, we find that Piepho’s reference to “accurate alignment” refers to joint 21 and not to tapered end 25 as Petitioner alleges. Because Mr. Smith’s testimony (Ex. 1002, 59) essentially parrots the Petition on this point and is inconsistent with our finding, his testimony is entitled to little, if any, weight. For the foregoing reasons, we find that Petitioner has not established that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to would teach this claim limitation.8 Because Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Polinski and Piepho teaches limitation 1b or an adequate motivation to combine, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 is obvious over Polinski, Piepho, and Harless.” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,014,090 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,014,090
• Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Smart Optics, Inc.Adverse judgment
  PTAB · Mar 31, 2026 · IPR2025-00216 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Adverse judgment

  The Board granted the Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment after disclaimer of claims 1–20.

  RulingsAdverse judgment

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted

    “Our Rules provide that “[a] party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” and that “[a]ctions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: . . . [c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2). Such is the case here. Thus, we grant Patent Owner’s unopposed Request for Adverse Judgment.” slip op. at 2

  None
  Patents in suitUS 11,487,138
• CMS Cepcor Ltd. / CMS Cepcor Americas LLC v. Sandvik Intellectual Property ABOther
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2026 · IPR2024-01380 · APJ Arthur M Peslak · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board cancelled original claims 1–10 and granted substitute claims 11–19 because Petitioner did not prove claim 11 obvious over Torrence and Piepho.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • 112 supportGranted

    “relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “[T]he hallmark of written description is disclosure.” Id. “[T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Id. “In order to satisfy the written description requirement, the disclosure as originally filed does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue.” Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Ind. Co., Ltd. v/ Int’l Trade Com’n, 535 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “[T]he level of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (citing Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). “This inquiry . . . is a question of fact.” Id. (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Further, inventions in the mechanical and electrical-based arts usually involve predictable factors and can be more predictable than other fields, such as chemistry and biology. See In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (CCPA 1970);” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of ordinary skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person presumed to have known the relevant art at the time of the invention. In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we may consider certain factors, including: “(1) the educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.” Best Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “D. Claim Construction We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary for purposes of this Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “[c]ombin[e] the tapered region of Piepho with the shaft of Torrence, the tapered region would extend from an uppermost extremity of the shaft.” RMTA Opp. 9. But, Petitioner concedes that neither reference discloses a tapered region extending from the uppermost extremity. Petitioner argues that Torrence’s shaft is straight (Amended RMTA Sur-reply 9) and that “[t]he tapered region of Piepho does not extend to the extreme end of the shaft.” RMTA Opp. 11 (emphasis added). Because neither Torrence nor Piepho discloses a shaft with a tapered region that “extends from an uppermost extremity of the shaft,” we find that the combination of Torrence and Piepho does not teach limitation 11[a]. We now analyze whether Petitioner provides reasoning with a rational underpinning why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Torrence with Piepho to extend Torrence’s taper from the upper extremity of its shaft. slip op. at 22

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,827,568
• Nxtgen Toys, LLC v. Zipstring, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 20, 2026 · IPR2024-01213 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 12, and 15–17 are unpatentable; substitute claim 27 is allowed, while substitute claims 21–26 and 28 are denied as obvious.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention “was typically a person with a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, aerospace engineering, physics, or other science or 6 Patent Owner does not rely on any objective indicia of nonobviousness in this proceeding. engineering based degree that [was] familiar with general principles of mechanics and aerodynamics with at least two years of experience in product design and development in the field of toys or other amusement type devices.” Pet. 32 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 2–6, 22–26). Patent Owner states that it submitted the following proposal for a POSITA in the related district court litigation: “[a POSITA] would have had at least a B.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace Engineering, Industrial Design, Product Design, or similar field, with at least two years industry experience in one of these fields, and such POSITA would have been familiar with general principles of mechanics, fluid mechanics and aerodynamics.” PO Resp. 4–5. We note that the parties’ proposals overlap considerably, and neither party argues the inadequacy of the other party’s proposal or that any patentability issue in this case turns on the resolution of this issue. We find Petitioner’s definition consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’774 patent and prior art of record, and adopt it as our own. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). We would arrive at the same findings and conclusions in this Decision if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Id. at 1312–13. Only terms in controversy need be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Petitioner contends that no “term requires construction to resolve the invalidity grounds presented in this Petition since the prior art renders claims 1–4, 12, and 15–17 unpatentable under any reasonable interpretation of the claims.” Pet. 7. Patent Owner argues that it “does not believe express claim constructions are necessary during this proceeding because the claims can readily be given their ordinary and customary meaning in the context of the patent at the time it was filed.” PO Resp. 5. Based on the parties’ positions and our view of the record, we need not expressly construe any claim limitations to resolve the issues in this Decision. To the extent that any implicit claim construction issues relate to the issues raised by the parties, we address them in the context of the parties’ patentability arguments below.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentableUnpatentable

    “string, and that adding Scorch’s slot removes this arguably inconvenient process by allowing insertion and removal of a string without removing and reinstalling any aspects of the housing. See Pet 85–86 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 174–175; Ex. 1007, 3:30–3:53, 6:03; Ex. 1008, 3:46–4:45); Pet. Reply 18–20 (citing in part Ex. 2002 ¶ 187 (Dr. Janét’s testimony that Wagner’s removal and reinstallation of a cover “may be viewed as an inconvenient process”)). Making insertion and removal of the string easier and quicker provides a notable advantage over Wagner’s existing device. See id. Scorch itself supports this argument and the related expert testimony because it discusses insertion and removal of strings and stated that the slot allows a user to “swap them out really quick.” Ex. 1007, 3:30–53. Petitioner also persuasively argues that a POSITA would know how to add the slot while maintaining the proper operation of the device, such as allowing insertion and removal of the string and avoiding inadvertent exiting of the string from the device. See Pet. 86–87 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 175–176; Ex. 1007, 4:00–30, Ex. 1008, 2:49–52); Pet. Reply 19, 21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 174–176). We find Petitioner’s arguments and reasoning in support of adding Scorch’s slot to Wagner’s housing straightforward and persuasive. Patent Owner’s arguments against the combination do not directly refute Petitioner’s reasoning or cast doubt on Scorch’s statement that its slot enables “quick” insertion and removal of a string—quicker than Wagner’s method that requires removal and replacement of a cover on its housing. See PO Resp. 16–22; PO Sur-reply 14–20; Ex. 2002 ¶ 187 (acknowledging inconvenience of Wagner’s existing process for insertion and removal of a string). Patent Owner suggests that Petitioner’s proposed combination fails to take into consideration certain drawbacks such as the risk of inadvertent string exit from the housing or slot, but Petitioner expressly addresses such concerns in the Petition. See PO Resp. 18 (stating that Scorch’s slotted funnel may allow the string to “shoot out the slot” and that Scorch addresses this by adding “a bent wire” to “prevent the string from coming out the side”); PO Sur-reply 16–17; Pet. 86–87 (arguing that Wagner’s flanges would help to trap the string in place, but if not, Scorch’s additional structures could be used to restring the string and “to further reduce the risk of a string inadvertently exiting” the device). We agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would understand how to incorporate Scorch’s slot without causing inadvertent removal of the string—using structures already present in Wagner and Scorch—and the need to add such unclaimed structurers does not teach away from the combination as Patent Owner suggests. See Pet. 86–87; PO Resp. 22. We also agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would understand how to make minor modifications, if necessary, to allow insertion and removal of the string around Wagner’s flanges. See Pet. Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 174–176).” slip op. at 26

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner

    “refute Petitioner’s reasoning or cast doubt on Scorch’s statement that its slot enables “quick” insertion and removal of a string—quicker than Wagner’s method that requires removal and replacement of a cover on its housing. See PO Resp. 16–22; PO Sur-reply 14–20; Ex. 2002 ¶ 187 (acknowledging inconvenience of Wagner’s existing process for insertion and removal of a string). Patent Owner suggests that Petitioner’s proposed combination fails to take into consideration certain drawbacks such as the risk of inadvertent string exit from the housing or slot, but Petitioner expressly addresses such concerns in the Petition. See PO Resp. 18 (stating that Scorch’s slotted funnel may allow the string to “shoot out the slot” and that Scorch addresses this by adding “a bent wire” to “prevent the string from coming out the side”); PO Sur-reply 16–17; Pet. 86–87 (arguing that Wagner’s flanges would help to trap the string in place, but if not, Scorch’s additional structures could be used to restring the string and “to further reduce the risk of a string inadvertently exiting” the device). We agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would understand how to incorporate Scorch’s slot without causing inadvertent removal of the string—using structures already present in Wagner and Scorch—and the need to add such unclaimed structurers does not teach away from the combination as Patent Owner suggests. See Pet. 86–87; PO Resp. 22. We also agree with Petitioner that a POSITA would understand how to make minor modifications, if necessary, to allow insertion and removal of the string around Wagner’s flanges. See Pet. Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 174–176). At best, Patent Owner’s arguments on this issue establish potential drawbacks in Petitioner’s proposed combination, but drawbacks alone do not defeat Petitioner’s obviousness rationale that includes readily apparent benefits. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit . . . should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another.”); Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine “). In addition, even if Patent Owner were correct that Wagner’s existing design works as well as Petitioner’s proposed combination, given all of the tradeoffs involved, that would not fatally undermine Petitioner’s showing. In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (obviousness does not require that the proposed combination “is the preferred, or most desirable, combination”). On this record, Petitioner’s (and Scorch’s) stated advantages that are achieved when adding Scorch’s slot to Wagner’s housing adequately support Petitioner’s motivation to combine rationale.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 11,674,774 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,674,774
• Alpinestars S.P.A. / Alipinestars USA Inc. v. Dainese S.P.A.Rehearing denied
  PTAB · Feb 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00750 · APJ Benjamin D M Wood · IPR · Rehearing

  The Board denied rehearing, leaving institution denied because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on claims 1–22 under the challenged obviousness grounds.

  RulingsRehearing decision

  • RehearingRehearing, deniedDenied

    “Petitioner misstates the Decision’s reasoning. As is clear from the previous discussion, we determined that Petitioner’s articulated reasons for combining EP’536 with CN’180 lacked a rational underpinning, not because “EP’536 does not relate to ‘air bags,’” but because the means by which EP’536’s device inflates differs fundamentally from that of CN’180’s device. Dec. 17–18. Petitioner did not acknowledge this critical difference in the Petition, and continues not to do so in its Rehearing Request.” slip op. at 5

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “EP’536 with CN’180 lacked a rational underpinning because EP’536’s inflation mechanism differs fundamentally from CN’180’s inflation mechanism. Dec. 17–18. As we stated, whereas CN’180’s fall-protection belt uses an airbag that requires an external source of pressurized air to inflate, EP’536’s garment does not need an external inflation device because “the gas generating agent 18 in each envelope automatically generates gas and inflates the envelopes in response to rising temperatures.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 15; Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 5, 19). This difference reflects the fundamentally different purposes of the two devices: CN’180’s device is designed to provide “fall protection” to, e.g., “elderly people,” (Ex. 1005 ¶ 1, 3), whereas EP’536’s device provides “adaptive thermal insulation” for, e.g., garments worn by fire fighters. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 1–3, 250. Because of the different means by which EP’536’s and CN’180’s devices inflate and the different purposes for doing so, we were not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references as Petitioner proposed. Dec. 18. We further noted that the modification would not have improved the reusability of EP’536’s device “by having only one mechanism to recharge,” because EP’536’s “gas generating agent does not need any ‘mechanism to recharge.’” Dec. 18. Instead, we noted EP’536’s teaching that its gas generating agent “automatically recombines or condenses in response to a temperature decrease to return the envelopes, and therefore the garment, to its original thickness, at which point the gas generating agent is ready for subsequent reactivation.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 139–141). Finally, we determined that replacing EP’536’s envelopes with CN’180’s airbag “would have made EP’536’s invention unsuitable for its intended purpose: providing a protective garment with ‘adaptive thermal insulation.’” Dec. 19. We stated that “Petitioner does not suggest, and we have found nothing in the record to establish, that CN’180’s airbag would provide this feature.” Id. at 20.” slip op. at 3

  • Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “rationales for combining EP’536 and CN’180. Reh’g Req. 6–7. First, Petitioner asserts that we “improperly rejected Petitioner’s ‘simple substitution’ evidence in view of [the Board’s] incorrect conclusion that EP’536 does not disclose an ‘external source of inflation [EP’536’s dosing aids].’” Id. at 6 (citing Dec. 18–19). This argument is unpersuasive at least because, as we discussed above, EP’536’s dosing aids do not constitute an external source of inflation. Petitioner further argues that we incorrectly evaluated its “obvious to try” rationale because, contrary to our analysis, Petitioner did in fact identify a problem to be solved by its “finite number of solutions”: “simplify[ing] the design and reduc[ing] the number of required inflation mechanisms.” Id. at 6–7. The Petition’s entire “obvious to try” discussion is as follows: [A] POSITA would have found it obvious to try a one-piece airbag 10 with strip-shaped inflation units 12 in the EP’536- CN’180 airbag system because it would have been a selection from a finite number of identified predictable solutions (i.e., using one chamber with connected individual inflation units 12 versus multiple individual envelopes 20). 5 Petitioner also argues that dosing aids are “needed in order to make the disclosed device reusable.” Reh’g Req. 5–6. This is incorrect, as EP’536 conveys that the reusability of the device is a result of the gas generating agent condensing or recombining when temperatures fall. Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 139– 141. Even if it were true, however, it is unclear how it would support Petitioner’s argument. Pet. 16. As is evident, Petitioner did not identify a design need, market pressure, or other problem that would have been addressed by its identified “solutions,” and therefore we were not persuaded by this rationale. Dec. 19. Petitioner’s attempt to cure this deficiency in its Rehearing Request is tardy. We cannot misapprehend or overlook an assertion that Petitioner fails to make in the Petition. It is also insufficient. Petitioner does not provide any evidence of a known design need or market pressure to “simplify [EP’536’s] design” or reduce the number of “required inflation mechanism” it uses.” slip op. at 7

  § 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 12,012,065
• Netflix, Inc. v. Avago Technologies International Sales Pte. LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 21, 2026 · IPR2021-01343 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Remand

  Claims 6, 8, 11, and 17 are unpatentable as obvious over the combined teachings of Cooper and Baldwin.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandOther

    “The Federal Circuit vacated the Board’s determination as to claims 6, 8, 11, and 17 and remanded to the Board to address Petitioner’s motivationto-combine arguments for Cooper and Baldwin in view of the Board’s finding that Cooper does not teach limitation 1[d], and to address whether Cooper teaches the additional limitations of claims 6, 8, 11, and 17. See Fed. Cir. Dec. 10. The Federal Circuit faulted the Board’s conclusion as failing to provide substantive analysis of Petitioner’s motivation to combine arguments. See id. at 8. In particular, the court explained that Petitioner provided a detailed explanation of why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Cooper’s receiver teachings with Baldwin’s teachings of providing alternative streams with staggered access points and selecting the stream with the next available access point. See id. at 8–9. The court highlighted Petitioner’s following arguments: (1) a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art according to known methods to yield predictable results; (2) combining the prior art would have been a simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable results; and (3) the combination represents a choice from a finite number of identified predictable solutions with a reasonable expectation of success. See id. at 9. Accordingly, the issues before us are whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the teachings of Cooper and Baldwin and whether Cooper teaches the additional limitations of dependent claims 6, 8, 11, and 17. See Fed. Cir. Dec. 8–10. To provide the full context for the issues before us, we first address each of the limitations of independent claims 1 and 12, and Petitioner’s reasons for combining the teachings of Cooper and Baldwin, followed by an analysis of the limitations of dependent claims 6, 8, 11, and 17.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art As previously set forth in the Final Written Decision, we determine a person of ordinary skill would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical 3 U.S. Patent No. 7,810,124 B2, issued Oct. 5, 2010 (Ex. 1004). 4 U.S. Patent No. 7,603,689 B2, issued Oct. 13, 2009 (Ex. 1005). engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a similar field and two years of experience in digital video signal processing or digital video streaming, which is consistent with the parties’ arguments, the ’014 patent, and the prior art of record. See Final Dec. 5.” slip op. at 5

  • BurdenUnpatentable

    “Based on the entire record, including the Final Written Decision, and Federal Circuit Decision, and after having considered Petitioner’s citations to Cooper, Baldwin, and Mr. Wechselberger’s testimony (Ex. 1003), we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Cooper and Baldwin by substituting Baldwin’s teachings of providing alternative streams with staggered access points and selecting the stream with the next available access point in place of Cooper’s teaching of identifying which alternative stream is readily available or not time-delayed to yield predictable results with the benefit of allowing a more objective-effective identification of the next available stream. See Pet. 18–23; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–58; Ex. 1004, 2:58–62, 4:15–38, 5:5–23, 5:39–62, 6:5–49, 7:8–22, 17:23–45, 18:17–31, 18:57–19:3, 19:19–23, 19:41–45, 23:56–64, 24:10–19; Ex.1005, 1:25–41, 2:5–15, 6:31–35, 6:55–61, 7:40–47, 9:24–28, 10:18–24, 12:42–44; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. e) [1e] “processing, by the receiver, the identified video information stream” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the entire record, including the Final Written Decision, and Federal Circuit Decision, and after having considered Petitioner’s citations to Cooper, Baldwin, and Mr. Wechselberger’s testimony (Ex. 1003), we are persuaded Petitioner sets forth sufficient articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the conclusion that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to combine the teachings of Cooper and Baldwin by substituting Baldwin’s teachings of providing alternative streams with staggered access points and selecting the stream with the next available access point in place of Cooper’s teaching of identifying which alternative stream is readily available or not time-delayed to yield predictable results with the benefit of allowing a more objective-effective identification of the next available stream. See Pet. 18–23; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 54–58; Ex. 1004, 2:58–62, 4:15–38, 5:5–23, 5:39–62, 6:5–49, 7:8–22, 17:23–45, 18:17–31, 18:57–19:3, 19:19–23, 19:41–45, 23:56–64, 24:10–19; Ex.1005, 1:25–41, 2:5–15, 6:31–35, 6:55–61, 7:40–47, 9:24–28, 10:18–24, 12:42–44; KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. e) [1e] “processing, by the receiver, the identified video information stream” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 8,646,014 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,646,014
• Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Smart Optics, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 30, 2025 · IPR2024-01072 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–26 are unpatentable as obvious over the listed prior-art combinations; the Board also denied Patent Owner’s motion to strike.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In our Decision on Institution, we adopted the definition Petitioner proposes for one having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of the ’960 patent. Dec. on Inst. 10. Namely, we found that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in mechanical or manufacturing engineering; mechatronics; electrical engineering plus coursework in mechanical engineering, manufacturing engineering, or mechatronics; or a similar technical degree,” and “at least 2 years of experience designing eyewear and/or consumer electronics,” and that “[w]ork experience could substitute for formal education and additional formal education could substitute for work experience.” Id. (citing Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 28)) (alteration in original). Patent Owner proposes a different definition for one of ordinary skill in the art, but does not specifically address any deficiencies in Petitioner’s proposed definition. PO Resp. 6. Because Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art is consistent with the ’960 patent and the asserted prior art, we maintain it for purposes of this Final Written Decision. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579; In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Our analysis herein, however, does not turn on which of the parties’ definitions we adopt.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededPlain and ordinary meaningOther

    “Here, neither party sets forth any term for claim construction. Pet. 11; PO Resp. 5–6; Pet. Reply 1–2. We determine that we do not need to construe any term to resolve the disputes between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”). We afford the claim terms their plain and ordinary meaning.” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “A reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103 when it is analogous to the claimed invention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). Below we focus on the first of these tests. “We determine the field of endeavor ‘by reference to explanations of the invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.’” Netflix, Inc. v. DIVX, LLC, 80 F.4th 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325)). We agree with Petitioner and find that the ’960 patent is in the field of eyewear and consumer electronics. Pet. 13. The ’960 patent discloses that its “subject matter is directed to electronic eyewear modules and systems to be worn by a wearer, whereby an electronic eyewear system with a docking station can be easily joined with a plurality of electronic application modules.” Ex. 1001, 1:66–2:4; Pet. 9. We also agree with Petitioner that the ’960 patent acknowledges “a need for a single pair of fashionable eyewear capable of . . . utilizing one or more of a multitude of different application devices while the wearer is wearing the eyewear.” Ex. 1001, 1:59–62; Pet. Reply 13. Patent Owner argues that “[t]he ’960 [p]atent pertains to the field of wearable embedded electronics, namely ‘commercial eyewear comprising electronics.’” PO Resp. 24 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:24–25). We view the parties’ descriptions of the field of the ’960 patent to be substantively the same.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We also find persuasive Petitioner’s argument and Dr. Feland’s testimony that Jannard’s “application module for eyewear is one such suitable device in which to incorporate Rosenblatt’s key or its functionality.” Pet. 47 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 156). This argument and testimony are consistent with Rosenblatt’s teaching of a wide variety of suitable devices. Compare id. and Ex. 1003 ¶ 156, with Ex. 1007 ¶ 7. Moreover, as Petitioner argues, Rosenblatt teaches that its “key . . . may include a clip or other connecting mechanism for attaching [the] key . . . to an object that the user typically carries,” such as “a user’s wallet, cellular telephone, personal media device (e.g., an iPod), wired headset, wireless headset, watch, bag, belt, article of clothing, or any other suitable object.” Ex. 1007 ¶ 43 (emphasis added). We find persuasive Dr. Feland’s testimony that Jannard’s eyewear system is a carried object like a wired or wireless headset in the context of Rosenblatt’s teaching. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 156; Ex. 1007 ¶ 43. We also find persuasive Dr. Feland’s testimony that incorporating Rosenblatt’s key or its functionality into Jannard’s application module “desirably ‘provid[es] functional fashion having device operation capabilities,’ which is consistent with Rosenblatt recommendations.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 156 (quoting Ex. 1007 ¶ 58) (alteration in original); Ex. 1007 ¶ 58 (“[T]he key may be integrated with operation capabilities.”). We also find persuasive Petitioner’s argument and Dr. Feland’s testimony that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to incorporate Rosenblatt’s key or its functionality in Jannard’s application module to achieve the benefits disclosed in Rosenblatt, including controlling host devices responsive to wireless communication with Jannard’s application module. Pet. 47; Ex. 1003 ¶ 156. We view this as using a known technique (Rosenblatt’s teaching of incorporating a key or its functionality into an electronic device) to improve a similar device (Jannard’s eyewear and application module with wireless communication for functions) in the same way. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”); see also Pet. 48; Ex. 1003 ¶ 157.” slip op. at 14

  Patent outcomesUS 10,598,960 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,598,960
• Luxottica Of America Inc. v. E-Vision Optics, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 23, 2025 · IPR2024-01030 · APJ Richard H Marschall · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20, 22–31, and 33–37 are unpatentable; claims 21 and 32 were not shown unpatentable, principally because the proposed combinations failed to establish motivation to combine or the required airtight seal.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “We find that the proposals from the parties substantially overlap, such that it remains unclear whether any substantive difference exists. Notably, neither party argues that the minor differences in the proposals lead to a different outcome on any issues in this proceeding. Based on our review of the proposals, we apply Patent Owner’s proposal because it is consistent with the problems and solutions disclosed in the ’483 patent and prior art of record. See, e.g., GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579 (approving the determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art by appeal to the references of record). The outcome of the issues addressed in this Decision would not change if we applied Petitioner’s proposal.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “hermetically sealed” module does not encompass waterproof modules that are not airtight. First, as Petitioner admits, as a general matter, “[s]omething that is hermetically sealed is sealed so as to be airtight.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 103; Ex. 1010, 269); PO Sur-reply 16. Petitioner later tries to argue that the specification puts a different spin on this meaning, but still acknowledges that “[o]utside the context of the ’483 patent, a hermetic seal is sometimes equated with an airtight seal.” See Pet. Post-hearing 2–3 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 103; Ex. 1010, 269). Based on our review of the record, the “ordinary meaning” of “hermetically sealed” means “airtight,” and, as noted above, “airtight” is not the same thing as “waterproof.” Second, the claims support Patent Owner’s position by including dependent claims that separately claim a “hermetically sealed” module (claims 13 and 32) and a “waterproof” module (claims 15 and 34), strongly suggesting that the terms have a different scope to avoid rendering some claims redundant. See Ex. 1001, 11: 65–66, 12:3–4, 12:52–53, 12:55–56. Petitioner argues in its Post-hearing brief that claims requiring waterproof modules are “a narrower species” of hermetic seal, but fails to explain how hermetic, airtight, and waterproof seals would not fall within the scope of both claims using its approach. Pet. Post-hearing Reply 2. Petitioner’s earlier argument in its Reply also seems to cut against this position by asserting that the specification “treats hermitically sealing as conventional and equivalent to waterproofing,” with different dependent claims directed to two allegedly “equivalent” terms making little sense. Pet. Reply 14 (emphasis added). The most natural reading of the claim language suggests that “hermetically sealed” means airtight, and does not encompass modules that are waterproof but not airtight. Third, while the specification does not define “hermetically sealed” and uses “waterproof” and “hermetically sealed” in similar contexts, it does not suggest that “hermetically sealed” does not require an airtight seal consistent with its ordinary meaning. See Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:47–53, 9:15–18, 10:47–50). Instead, the specification states that hermetic seals prevent water from contacting electronics, which remains consistent with Patent Owner’s position because airtight hermetic seals are also waterproof. See Ex. 1001, 6:47–53, 9:15–18. The specification also states that “[t]he module preferably houses any of the aforementioned electrical components in a substantially water-proof and wear resistant/moisture resistant environment and is preferably hermetically sealed.” Id. at 10:47–50 (emphasis added). This passage supports Patent Owner’s position by suggesting that the preferable “hermetically sealed” module goes beyond mere water resistance. See PO Sur-reply 16–17. slip op. at 16

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “2. Petitioner’s Anticipation Arguments and Evidence Petitioner argues that Howell-596 discloses every limitation of claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18, and points to specific portions of Howell-596 and expert testimony to support its arguments. See Pet. 10–20 (citing Ex. 1002; Ex. 1003). We have reviewed the evidence and arguments of record and find that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the limitations in claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18 are disclosed by Howell-596 for the reasons set forth in the Petition, which we adopt as our own. See id.11 Accordingly, we find that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Howell-596 anticipates claims 1, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 18.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Based on these undisputed points and the parties’ arguments, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner fails to establish that a POSITA would have been motivated to locate Howell-596’s module housing 1700, which contains its UV detection system 1500, behind a user’s ear. Petitioner never squarely addresses the fact that placing Howell-596’s UV detection system behind a user’s ear would negatively impact its performance. Pet. 31–33; Pet. Reply 17–22. As a result, even if we accept Petitioner’s arguments and evidence as to the various advantages when placing electronics behind a user’s ear, it fails to establish a motivation to combine that requires placing Howell-596’s module housing 1700, and therefore its UV detection system, behind a user’s ear. Petitioner never acknowledges the readily apparent disadvantages of placing a UV detection system behind the ear, where it may not work at all. See Pet. 31–33. Nor does Petitioner argue that, in its combination, adjustments would be made to ensure accurate operation of Howell-596’s UV detection system. See id. Similarly, Petitioner notes that both Howell-596 and Howell-833 disclose UV sensors behind the ear of a user, but those teachings do not establish that placing Howell-596’s module behind the ear would ensure proper operation of its UV detection system housed within that module. See Pet. Reply 17–22. Instead, even though Howell-596 discloses a sensor behind the ear of a user, it maintains the UV detection system in a module toward the front of the temple, away from the ear. See id. at 18–19; PO Surreply 21–22; Ex. 1003 ¶ 205 (describing UV detection system 2102), Fig. 21 (showing UV detection system 2102 toward the front of the temple). Moreover, Petitioner’s reliance on the sensor placed behind the ear of the user in Howell-596 lacks weight because that sensor merely indicates that the device “is being worn by a user,” which serves a very different purpose than Howell-596’s UV detection system, which seeks to monitor a user’s exposure to UV radiation, a central purpose of Howell-596’s eyewear. See Ex. 1003 ¶ 205, code (57). Howell-833 also employs a UV sensor behind the ear, but Petitioner does not establish that it operates any differently than the “being worn” sensor in Howell-596, and therefore does not establish that Howell-596’s UV detection system would still work for its intended purposes in Petitioner’s proposed combination. See Pet. Reply 19–20.” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,708,483 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,708,483
• Freightcar America, Inc. v. National Steel Car LimitedInstituted
  PTAB · Dec 16, 2025 · IPR2025-01046 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted IPR on claims 2–15, finding a reasonable likelihood that the 1946 Cyclopedia, Lindström, and Wong render at least claim 2 obvious; claim 1 was disclaimed.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner responds that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is incorrect, “because design or analysis experience with other industrial wheeled vehicles would not necessarily be applicable to the art of the ’892 Patent.” Prelim. Resp. 12 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶¶ 38–39). According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars.” Id. (citing Ex. 2035 ¶¶ 34, 38). The parties agree that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in a discipline related to mechanical engineering, physics, structural design, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years 5 Because Patent Owner statutorily disclaimed claim 1, this ground is moot. Patent Owner, however, disagrees that the experience should include designing or analyzing “similar vehicles.” Prelim. Resp. 12. At this stage, for the reasons below, limiting the ordinary skill in the art to “at least two years of experience designing or analyzing rail cars” does not affect our analysis of the parties’ dispute or our determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, based on the preliminary record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill to determine whether review should be instituted.” slip op. at 12

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner also argues that Petitioner’s declarant does not have “actual industry experience with railcar structures” and, thus, “makes the wrong conclusions and conflates various concepts that a [person of ordinary skill in the art] with practical industry experience and knowledge would not.” Prelim. Resp. 12–13 (citing Ex. 2035 ¶ 39). For the reasons discussed below, in our preliminary analysis, we give credit to the cited testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, because it finds support in the relied-upon portions of the record.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “At this stage, we need not construe expressly any claim term to resolve the parties’ dispute regarding whether Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))” slip op. at 14

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “been obvious over the 1946 Cyclopedia and Wong. Weighing the parties’ arguments and evidence, we find Petitioner provides sufficient rational underpinning for its assertion that it would have been obvious in view of Wong to implement a cross-wise extending beam to reinforce the 1946 Cyclopedia’s NSC ore car’s end slope sheet. Pet. 52–53; Prelim. Resp. 28– 30. In response to Petitioner’s assertion that “[t]he upper, outboard end of [Wong’s slope sheet 26] is reinforced by a cross-wise, L-shaped beam positioned under the slope sheet,” Patent Owner argues that “Wong does not provide reinforcement, but simply shows two sheets being connected for lading containment and load transfer.” Pet. 52; Prelim. Resp. 29. At this stage, we find Petitioner has the better position. Although we agree with Patent Owner that Wong shows two sheets connected to one another, that does not negate Petitioner’s correct observation that Wong shows an upper end of its end slope sheet 26 resting on an L-shaped structure, which apparently would reinforce end slope sheet. Pet. 52; Ex. 1003 ¶ 56. reason to look to Wong in the first place,” we again find that Petitioner has the better position at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 29. For example, Wong’s disclosure of “hopper railcar 10” (Ex. 1006, 3:6–9) and the 1946 Cyclopedia’s disclosure of “Freight Cars: Hopper Ore” (Ex. 1004, 27–28; Ex. 1054, 27–28) support Petitioner’s position that “Wong and the 1946 Cyclopedia are in the same field.” Pet. 52; see also id. at 76 (“Wong discloses a rail road hopper car (‘hopper railcar’ 10)”), 18–19 (“The ore-car section of the 1946 Cyclopedia—entitled ‘Freight Cars: Hopper Ore’— contains drawings and a photograph of an ore car manufactured by Patent Owner NSC.”); Ex. 1003 ¶ 56 (“Wong and the 1946 Cyclopedia are in the same field of hopper railcars”) (citing Ex. 1004, 27–28; Ex. 1006, code [57]). This position is not persuasively rebutted by Patent Owner’s argument that Wong’s hopper railcar 10 uses aluminum and steel together for certain reasons. Prelim. Resp. 28–29.” slip op. at 23

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 8,166,892

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.