- Micron Technology, Inc. / Micron Semiconductor Products, Inc. et al. v. Netlist, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 30, 2023 · IPR2022-00745 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 15–20 and 22–33 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner did not adequately explain how the proposed combination would use active and non-active chip select signals.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“have been someone with an advanced degree in electrical or computer engineering and at least two years working in the field, or a bachelor’s degree in such engineering disciplines and at least three years working the field,” and Petitioner identifies particular knowledge that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had. Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 52).” slip op. at 5
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“C. Claim Construction We need not construe expressly any claim terms to decide the issues before us. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“As outlined above, Petitioner presents reasoning as to why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have included chip select signals in Halbert’s Figure 4 device. See Pet. 20–31 (addressing limitations 15.4 and 15.5). But Petitioner’s contentions about the use of chip select signals do not address sufficiently how Halbert’s Figure 4 device would operate with active and non-active chip select signals, as recited in claim 15. Indeed, as Patent Owner points out (PO Resp. 12), Petitioner’s contentions for limitation 15.6 only rely on Halbert’s Figure 2 prior art device. See Pet. 31–32. Petitioner’s lack of explanation as to how active and non-active signals would affect the operation of Halbert’s Figure 4 device is significant, as explained below.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 10,489,314 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 10,489,314 - Universal Electronics, Inc. / Gemstar Technology (Qinzhou) Co. Ltd. et al. v. ROKU, Inc.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 23, 2023 · IPR2022-00818 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 8–10, and 14 are unpatentable over RadioShack; claim 11 was not shown unpatentable over Wouters and Verzulli because the combination did not disclose the claimed combining and installing steps.
RulingsFinal written decision- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“disseminated to the interested public, ‘public accessibility’ has been called the touch-stone in determining whether a reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ . . . .” Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898–99 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). A reference is considered “publicly accessible” if it was “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art, exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” Id. at 1355–56 (citing In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (CCPA 1981)). Petitioner treats this requirement as having two aspects, namely (1) whether a person of ordinary skill could reasonably have found RemoteCentral.com and (2) whether such a skilled artisan could reasonably have found RadioShack on RemoteCentral.com. Reply 8–13; see also Tr. 33:25–34:8 (Patent Owner asserting that there are two aspects to the analysis on public accessibility: “The first is whether a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have known to arrive at the website containing the prior art reference. The second one is . . . , [a]ssuming the [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have done so, would the [person of ordinary skill in the art], exercising reasonable diligence, have located the prior art reference on the site? And these are separate and distinct requirements, and if you fail one of them, the document is not publicly accessible.”).” slip op. at 27
- Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for petitioner
“addressed squarely by the principles set forth in Hulu, which addresses the standards at the institution stage and during the trial for evaluating evidence proffered to show asserted art qualifies as a printed publication. Specifically, after a petitioner has presented “evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that the reference was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent,” such that trial is instituted, “some limited opportunities exist for the petitioner to present new evidence later.” Hulu at 13–14. These “limited opportunities” include “in a reply to the patent owner response,” provided that the additional evidence is “responsive to the prior briefing” and provided that the additional evidence does not require “completely reopen[ing] the record, by, for example, changing theories after filing a petition.” Id. at 14–15. Although Patent Owner contends that “[t]his is not an example of permissible rebuttal evidence, but rather a belated attempt to fill a gap in the evidence in the Petition,” we disagree. See Sur-reply 6. Rather, the 7 Patent Owner appears to refer incorrectly to Exhibit 1040 instead of Exhibit 1041 when identifying “articles allegedly referring to RemoteCentral.com.” See Sur-reply 5–6. progression within the instant proceeding comports well with the Hulu framework. During the preliminary proceeding, Petitioner came forth with “evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that [RadioShack] was publicly accessible before the critical date of the challenged patent,” just as Hulu demands. Hulu at 13; Inst. Dec. 23 (“[W]e determine that Petitioner’s showing regarding public accessibility of RadioShack is sufficient under the standard we apply at this stage of the proceeding.”). Patent Owner challenges RadioShack’s status as a printed publication in its Response, just as Hulu contemplates. Hulu at 15; PO Resp. 28–41. And Petitioner submits additional evidence that replies to that challenge without changing its theory that RadioShack qualifies as a printed publication by virtue of its accessibility on the RemoteCentral.com web site and in light of date indicia on RadioShack itself.8 See Hulu at 15–16; Reply 7–13. Moreover, in determining that Petitioner’s additional evidence directed at RemoteCentral.com is properly considered, we are further mindful of the Federal Circuit’s endorsement that “the petitioner in an inter partes review proceeding may introduce new evidence after the petition stage if the evidence is a legitimate reply to evidence introduced by the patent owner.” Anacor Pharm., Inc. v. Iancu, 889 F.3d 1372, 1830–81 (Fed. 8 In its Reply, Petitioner also relies on evidence of publication of RadioShack on Radio Shack’s own public website and on “a third location,” hifi-remote.com. Reply 14. As we discuss below, we determine that the presence of RadioShack on RemoteCentral.com is sufficient to qualify RadioShack as a printed publication. We therefore do not reach the issue of whether presence on either the Radio Shack web site or on hifi-remote.com is an improper new theory raised by Petitioner in its Reply. See Tr. 8:13– 9:23 (Petitioner discussing whether reliance on hifi-remote.com presents a different theory than set forth in the Petition). Cir. 2018); see also Vidstream LLC v. Twitter, Inc., 981 F.3d 1060, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The Board denied VidStream’s Motion to Exclude, holding that it was appropriate to permit Twitter to respond to VidStream’s challenge [to the status of Bradford as a printed publication] by providing additional evidence to establish the Bradford publication date. We conclude that the Board acted appropriately, for the Board permitted both sides to provide evidence concerning the reference date of the Bradford book, in pursuit of the correct answer.”). We accordingly give due weight to Petitioner’s additional evidence of RadioShack’s accessibility on the RemoteCentral.com web site.” slip op. at 25
- ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied
“1 Patent Owner objected to Petitioner’s demonstrative slides 45 and 68 as presenting a new argument that was not previously made with respect to challenged claims 2 and 10. Paper 27; see Paper 26 (Petitioner’s demonstratives), 45, 68. At the oral hearing, we reserved ruling on the objections. Tr. 5:23–6:3. Both slides reproduce the same portions of Exhibits 1002 and 1025, with the statement that “A press and hold for an auto-scan or brand-scan is admitted prior art.” Paper 26, 45, 68. As explained below, we do not reach the predicate position upon which the objections are based. See Tr. 5:8–11 (Petitioner stating that “this Board only needs to resolve this objection if it accepts Roku’s claim construction argument that the claims cover a press and hold of a single button, but that they do not cover pressing multiple buttons to present that argument in the alternative. So, if you reject that argument, you don’t even have to resolve the objection.”). We accordingly dismiss the objections as moot.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We agree with this assessment, and the parties do not specifically advocate for one articulation over the other in this proceeding. See Pet. 8 (Petitioner asserting that “[t]he Challenged Claims are unpatentable under both proposed levels”); PO Resp. 5 (Patent Owner stating its “position that the challenged claims are unpatentable under either proposed level of ordinary skill”). We adopt Patent Owner’s proposed statement of the level of ordinary skill as advanced in the related ITC Investigation. But we note that we would reach the same ultimate conclusion that Petitioner shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that all challenged claims are unpatentable were we to adopt Petitioner’s proposal instead.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 8,378,875 mixedClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,378,875 - Trend Micro, Inc. v. Webroot Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 13, 2023 · IPR2023-00662 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We may institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review. B.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“4 Petitioner also cites page 10 of Tahan, but we find no mention of either SVP or SVM there, and Petitioner does not explain where it might be disclosed. 5 Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach Patent Owner’s request that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition based on the state of the related litigation. See Prelim. Resp. 3–18.” slip op. at 19
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the alleged invention “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, or a related field, or an equivalent technical degree or equivalent work experience, and an additional one to two years of education or experience in the field of computer security topics such as malware/exploit detection and/or machine learning” and that “[m]ore education can supplement practical experience and vice versa” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 94). Patent Owner “does not dispute Petitioner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill.” Prelim. Resp. 29. 1 Gil Tahan, et al., Mal-ID: Automatic Malware Detection Using Common Segment Analysis and Meta-Features, Journal of Machine Learning Research 13, 949–979 (April 13, 2012) (Exhibit 1003). 2 Eitan Menahem, et al., Improving Malware Detection by Applying Multi- Inducer Ensemble, Computational Statistics & Data Analysis 53, 1483–1494 (2009) (Exhibit 1004). 3 U.S. Patent App. Pub. No. 2009/0254992 A1 (Exhibit 1005). For purposes of this decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’844 patent. B.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner asserts that “all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meanings.” Pet. 9. For its part, Patent Owner “agree[s] that no claim terms need be construed for this petition,” and that “all claim terms should carry their plain and ordinary meaning in light of the intrinsic record.” Prelim. Resp. 27. We find that no express claim construction is necessary to resolve the institution question. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy). C.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,599,844 - Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00594 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–23 and 25–30 were unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 45–46; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt. First, the passage that Petitioner cites from Shimizu’s Summary of the Invention refers to “an application program” that causes switching of nodes displayed “at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1003, 5:11–14. The other passage that Petitioner cites similarly refers to “an application program” that may be displayed by reading node information within “a predetermined time.” Id. at 3:12–16. Although not cited by Petitioner, Shimizu also states: As described, the hypertext apparatus of the invention offers a user interface capable of putting into a desired order the links between the nodes to be managed and of manipulating the established link order. This makes it easy to create illustratively an application program allowing the display of node contents to be switched in a desired order and at predetermined intervals on the hypertext apparatus. Id. at 9:60–66. All of these passages are more consistent with Patent Owner’s position that the predetermined time or intervals are included in the application program rather than in the hypertext nodes. Petitioner does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that Shimizu should instead be read as describing hypertext nodes that include predetermined times or intervals. Second, we have also considered Mr. Schmandt’s testimony, and he provides no meaningful additional information to support reading Shimizu as Petitioner advocates. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 118, 120–127. In testimony not cited by Petitioner, Mr. Schmandt admits that “Shimizu does not appear to disclose further details about how duration information is specified or stored within its system, or whether such intervals between nodes can be changed.” Id. ¶ 119. This testimony undermines Petitioner’s position that Shimizu’s hypertext nodes include duration information. Mr. Schmandt elaborates in testimony that Petitioner cites, but does not explain: In a real-world implementation of the proposed combination, for example, the display time could have been specified within the node information structure 9 of Shimizu. I note that node information structure 9 in Shimizu also contains display procedure slot 62 (Fig. 6), which points to “a procedure program function used when the node in question is to be displayed on the screen.” (Shimizu, 6:52–55.) Shimizu thus contemplates that node information structure 9 may contain information about how the node will be displayed to the user, and as such, it would have been obvious that durational information could also have been included as part of node information structure 9. This durational amount could have been a default display time specified by the user, or a display time specific to the node in question, as explained above. * * * Shimizu itself clearly contemplates the ability to customize the display of nodes, and as explained above, node information structure 9 (Fig. 6) includes display procedure slot 62 which points to a program function or procedure used to display the node content, thus making clear that node information structure 9 can hold information about how the node will be displayed. Id. ¶¶ 123, 127. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that Shimizu would need to be modified for its hypertext nodes to include duration information is strong evidence that Shimizu does not disclose hypertext nodes that include duration information. This testimony (from ¶ 123) also suggests that Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times could be included in the procedure program function to which display procedure slot 62 points, rather than in the hypertext node, thereby providing additional evidence Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times are included in structure other than hypertext nodes. See also Ex. 1003, 6:52–55.” slip op. at 27
- BurdenInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 45–46; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt. First, the passage that Petitioner cites from Shimizu’s Summary of the Invention refers to “an application program” that causes switching of nodes displayed “at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1003, 5:11–14. The other passage that Petitioner cites similarly refers to “an application program” that may be displayed by reading node information within “a predetermined time.” Id. at 3:12–16. Although not cited by Petitioner, Shimizu also states: As described, the hypertext apparatus of the invention offers a user interface capable of putting into a desired order the links between the nodes to be managed and of manipulating the established link order. This makes it easy to create illustratively an application program allowing the display of node contents to be switched in a desired order and at predetermined intervals on the hypertext apparatus. Id. at 9:60–66. All of these passages are more consistent with Patent Owner’s position that the predetermined time or intervals are included in the application program rather than in the hypertext nodes. Petitioner does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that Shimizu should instead be read as describing hypertext nodes that include predetermined times or intervals. Second, we have also considered Mr. Schmandt’s testimony, and he provides no meaningful additional information to support reading Shimizu as Petitioner advocates. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 118, 120–127. In testimony not cited by Petitioner, Mr. Schmandt admits that “Shimizu does not appear to disclose further details about how duration information is specified or stored within its system, or whether such intervals between nodes can be changed.” Id. ¶ 119. This testimony undermines Petitioner’s position that Shimizu’s hypertext nodes include duration information. Mr. Schmandt elaborates in testimony that Petitioner cites, but does not explain: In a real-world implementation of the proposed combination, for example, the display time could have been specified within the node information structure 9 of Shimizu. I note that node information structure 9 in Shimizu also contains display procedure slot 62 (Fig. 6), which points to “a procedure program function used when the node in question is to be displayed on the screen.” (Shimizu, 6:52–55.) Shimizu thus contemplates that node information structure 9 may contain information about how the node will be displayed to the user, and as such, it would have been obvious that durational information could also have been included as part of node information structure 9. This durational amount could have been a default display time specified by the user, or a display time specific to the node in question, as explained above. * * * Shimizu itself clearly contemplates the ability to customize the display of nodes, and as explained above, node information structure 9 (Fig. 6) includes display procedure slot 62 which points to a program function or procedure used to display the node content, thus making clear that node information structure 9 can hold information about how the node will be displayed. Id. ¶¶ 123, 127. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that Shimizu would need to be modified for its hypertext nodes to include duration information is strong evidence that Shimizu does not disclose hypertext nodes that include duration information. This testimony (from ¶ 123) also suggests that Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times could be included in the procedure program function to which display procedure slot 62 points, rather than in the hypertext node, thereby providing additional evidence Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times are included in structure other than hypertext nodes. See also Ex. 1003, 6:52–55.” slip op. at 27
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019); see Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Certain terms recited in the challenged claims were construed during prior litigation of the ’451 patent, i.e., an ancestor of the challenged ’819 patent that Petitioner characterizes as “shar[ing] a near-verbatim written description with the ’819 patent”). Ex. 1023 (claim construction order in cases involving Microsoft and Apple); Ex. 2003, 5 (clarification of certain claim constructions on summary judgment); Pet. 8–9. Patent Owner advocates that we adopt such prior constructions in this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 6. Although “Petitioner does not believe express claim construction is necessary at this time,” Petitioner takes the position that its asserted prior art “renders the challenged claims obvious under the district court’s constructions.” Pet. 10. And we agree with Patent Owner that the Petition “presents extensive arguments” that apply the district court’s constructions. See Prelim. Resp. 6 (citing Pet. 9–10, 12–20, 33). We have reviewed the court’s claim-construction order, and adopt its construction of the following terms for purposes of this Decision. First, we construe “node,” which is recited in multiple claims, as “an identifier of a resource that includes an address to the resource and the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.” See Ex. 1023, 16–17; Prelim. Resp. 8–10. Second, we construe “show structure of nodes,” which is recited in each of challenged independent claims 1, 16, 23, and 26, as well as in certain dependent claims, as “a structure that is arranged for the display of content by specifying one or more paths through a plurality of nodes. The show structure of nodes specifies the duration of any display,” but there is no durational requirement separate from the construction of “node.” See Ex. 1023, 2–13; Ex. 2003, 5; Prelim. Resp. 7–8. Third, we construe “interactively variable duration information,” which is recited in each of challenged independent claims 1, 23, and 26, as “a parameter specifying how long a content is to be displayed by default before a subsequent content is displayed, where the viewer of the content can change the parameter.” Ex. 1023, 22–23; Prelim. Resp. 10–12.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with at least two years of experience developing and implementing network-based computer systems, such as systems for storing and retrieving information over the Internet or communicating using the Web.” Pet. 7. Petitioner adds that “[s]uch a person could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–18). Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent, and experience with, or exposure to, topics in computer networking, multimedia, and web systems. A person of ordinary skill in the art would also have approximately 3-5 years of professional experience with these topics.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6. In addition, Patent Owner say that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, while significant experience in the field might substitute for formal education.” Id. Petitioner supports its proposal with testimony by Dr. Schmandt. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 16. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. See id. (Dr. Schmandt testifying that “Patent Owner’s proposed articulation is not meaningfully different” and that his “analysis, opinions and conclusions . . . would not change if Patent Owner’s articulation were applied”). Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 13
Claim constructionDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,606,819 - Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00593 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 22–62 were unpatentable under the asserted §103 grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 39; see also id. at 45–46 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt.” slip op. at 26
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“E. Real Parties in Interest Petitioner identifies Google LLC and YouTube, LLC as real parties in interest. Pet. 1. Patent Owner identifies Robocast, Inc., as a real party in interest. Paper 5, 2.” slip op. at 7
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner supports its proposal with testimony by Dr. Schmandt. See Ex. 1102 ¶ 16. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. See id. (Dr. Schmandt testifying that “Patent Owner’s proposed articulation is not meaningfully different” and that his analysis, opinions and conclusions . . . would not change if Patent Owner’s articulation were applied”). Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 14
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We have reviewed the court’s claim-construction order, and adopt its construction of the following terms for purposes of this Decision. First, we construe “node,” which is recited in multiple claims, as “an identifier of a resource that includes an address to the resource and the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.” See Ex. 1123, 16–17; Prelim. Resp. 10–12. Second, we construe “show structure of nodes,” which is recited in each of challenged independent claims 22 and 46, as well as dependent claim 45, as “a structure that is arranged for the display of content by specifying one or more paths through a plurality of nodes. The show structure of nodes specifies the duration of any display,” but there is no durational requirement separate from the construction of “node.” See Ex. 1123, 2–13; Ex. 2107, 5; Prelim. Resp. 9. For purposes of this Decision, we accord all other terms recited in the challenged claims their plain and ordinary meaning. See Ex. 1123, 17–20, 26–29 (court adopting plain and ordinary meaning of “plurality of accessible resources,” “content,” “without requiring user input,” “in accordance with said show structure,” “providing,” and “search results”); see Prelim. Resp. 8 (Patent Owner advocating that “any additional claim language be[] accorded its plain and ordinary meaning”).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,965,932 - Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00592 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–21 and 63–67 were unpatentable over the asserted obviousness combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 42; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt. First, the passage that Petitioner cites from Shimizu’s Summary of the Invention refers to “an application program” that causes switching of nodes displayed “at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1003, 5:11–14. The other passage that Petitioner cites similarly refers to “an application program” that may be displayed by reading node information within “a predetermined time.” Id. at 3:12–16. Although not cited by Petitioner, Shimizu also states: As described, the hypertext apparatus of the invention offers a user interface capable of putting into a desired order the links between the nodes to be managed and of manipulating the established link order. This makes it easy to create illustratively an application program allowing the display of node contents to be switched in a desired order and at predetermined intervals on the hypertext apparatus. Id. at 9:60–66. All of these passages are more consistent with Patent Owner’s position that the predetermined time or intervals are included in the application program rather than in the hypertext nodes. Petitioner does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that Shimizu should instead be read as describing hypertext nodes that include predetermined times or intervals. Second, we have also considered Mr. Schmandt’s testimony, and he provides no meaningful additional information to support reading Shimizu as Petitioner advocates. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 119, 121–128. In testimony not cited by Petitioner, Mr. Schmandt admits that “Shimizu does not appear to disclose further details about how duration information is specified or stored within its system, or whether such intervals between nodes can be changed.” Id. ¶ 120. This testimony undermines Petitioner’s position that Shimizu’s hypertext nodes include duration information. Mr. Schmandt elaborates in testimony that Petitioner cites, but does not explain: In a real-world implementation of the proposed combination, for example, the display time could have been specified within the node information structure 9 of Shimizu. I note that node information structure 9 in Shimizu also contains display procedure slot 62 (Fig. 6), which points to “a procedure program function used when the node in question is to be displayed on the screen.” (Shimizu, 6:52-55.) Shimizu thus contemplates that node information structure 9 may contain information about how the node will be displayed to the user, and as such, it would have been obvious that durational information could also have been included as part of node information structure 9. This durational amount could have been a default display time specified by the user, or a display time specific to the node in question, as explained above. * * * Shimizu itself clearly contemplates the ability to customize the display of nodes, and as explained above, node information structure 9 (Fig. 6) includes display procedure slot 62 which points to a program function or procedure used to display the node content, thus making clear that node information structure 9 can hold information about how the node will be displayed. Id. ¶¶ 124, 128. Mr. Schmandt’s testimony that Shimizu would need to be modified for its hypertext nodes to include duration information is strong evidence that Shimizu does not disclose hypertext nodes that include duration information. This testimony (from ¶ 124) also suggests that Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times could be included in the procedure program function to which display procedure slot 62 points, rather than in the hypertext node, thereby providing additional evidence Shimizu’s predetermined intervals and times are included in structure other than hypertext nodes. See also Ex. 1003, 6:52–55.” slip op. at 27
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have possessed a bachelor’s in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with at least two years of experience developing and implementing network-based computer systems, such as systems for storing and retrieving information over the Internet or communicating using the Web.” Pet. 6–7. Petitioner adds that “[s]uch a person could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Id. at 7 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 13–17). Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent, and experience with, or exposure to, topics in computer networking, multimedia, and web systems. A person of ordinary skill in the art would also have approximately 3-5 years of professional experience with these topics.” Prelim. Resp. 6. In addition, Patent Owner say that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, while significant experience in the field might substitute for formal education.” Id. Petitioner supports its proposal with testimony by Mr. Schmandt. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 16. Although the proposals differ in certain respects, they do not differ in ways that affect our decision to deny institution of the proceeding. See id. (Mr. Schmandt testifying that “Patent Owner’s proposed articulation is not meaningfully different” and that his “analysis, opinions and conclusions . . . would not change if Patent Owner’s articulation were applied”). Both proposals include baccalaureate degrees and experience in generally related fields, with both parties indicating that additional education or experience could compensate for some lack in the other. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 14
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner
“We have reviewed the court’s claim-construction order, and adopt its construction of the following terms for purposes of this Decision. First, we construe “node,” which is recited in multiple claims, as “an identifier of a resource that includes an address to the resource and the duration for which the resource’s content is to be presented by default.” See Ex. 1023, 16–17; Prelim. Resp. 10–12. Second, we construe “show structure of nodes,” which is recited in each of challenged independent claims 1 and 63, as well as in certain dependent claims, as “a structure that is arranged for the display of content by specifying one or more paths through a plurality of nodes. The show structure of nodes specifies the duration of any display,” but there is no durational requirement separate from the construction of “node.” See Ex. 1023, 2–13; Ex. 2007, 5; Prelim. Resp. 9. Third, we construe “interactively variable duration information,” which is recited in each of challenged claims 1, 11, 12, and 64, as “a parameter specifying how long a content is to be displayed by default before a subsequent content is displayed, where the viewer of the content can change the parameter.” Ex. 1023, 22–23; Prelim. Resp. 12–15.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner that “[i]f anything, Petitioner’s cited passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 42; see also id. at 59 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). Several considerations support this understanding of Shimizu, including both Shimizu’s disclosure and certain testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Schmandt. First, the passage that Petitioner cites from Shimizu’s Summary of the Invention refers to “an application program” that causes switching of nodes displayed “at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1003, 5:11–14. The other passage that Petitioner cites similarly refers to “an application program” that may be displayed by reading node information within “a predetermined time.” Id. at 3:12–16. Although not cited by Petitioner, Shimizu also states: As described, the hypertext apparatus of the invention offers a user interface capable of putting into a desired order the links between the nodes to be managed and of manipulating the established link order. This makes it easy to create illustratively an application program allowing the display of node contents to be switched in a desired order and at predetermined intervals on the hypertext apparatus. Id. at 9:60–66. All of these passages are more consistent with Patent Owner’s position that the predetermined time or intervals are included in the application program rather than in the hypertext nodes. Petitioner does not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that Shimizu should instead be read as describing hypertext nodes that include predetermined times or intervals.” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,965,932 - Google LLC / Youtube, LLC v. Robocast, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Sep 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00591 · APJ David C Mckone · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution for claims 22–36 and 39–45 because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that the asserted obviousness grounds would succeed.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“passages appear to suggest to the contrary that these ostensible default duration parameters would instead be features of the application programs used for managing Shimizu’s alleged show structures.” Id. at 42–43; see also id. at 48 (“[T]he passages Petitioner relies on teach only that the ‘predetermined time’ would be associated with the application program used to display the nodes.”). We agree with Patent Owner. In its Summary of the Invention, Shimizu describes “mak[ing] it possible to build with ease an application program illustratively causing the display of the nodes to be switched in a specific order and at predetermined intervals.” Ex. 1103, with the predetermined intervals being included in the application program, rather than the hypertext nodes. Similarly, in its Description of the Related Art, Shimizu describes “mak[ing] it possible to create an application program that may be displayed on the screen by reading, from primary or secondary storage and within a predetermined time, the node information held by the nodes that are linked sequentially starting from a particular node.” Id. at 3:12–16 (emphasis added). This passage, too, is better read as disclosing that the predetermined times are included in the application program, rather than the hypertext nodes. Neither of Petitioner’s cited passages states that the hypertext nodes include predetermined intervals/times.” slip op. at 24
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“1 Petitioner filed a paper explaining its basis for filing multiple petitions challenging the ’451 patent and arguing that we should not exercise discretion to deny one of the petitions pursuant to the guidance in the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) at 59 (“Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.”). Paper 3. Patent Owner filed an objection to Petitioner’s filing of multiple petitions, arguing that we should deny one of them pursuant to the Trial Practice Guide’s guidance. Paper 8. Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach whether multiple petitions are appropriate to challenge the ’451 patent.” slip op. at 3
- Parallel petitionsNot reached
“1 Petitioner filed a paper explaining its basis for filing multiple petitions challenging the ’451 patent and arguing that we should not exercise discretion to deny one of the petitions pursuant to the guidance in the Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (Nov. 2019) at 59 (“Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations.”). Paper 3. Patent Owner filed an objection to Petitioner’s filing of multiple petitions, arguing that we should deny one of them pursuant to the Trial Practice Guide’s guidance. Paper 8. Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach whether multiple petitions are appropriate to challenge the ’451 patent.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“possessed a bachelor’s in electrical engineering, computer science, or similar field, with at least two years of experience developing and implementing network-based computer systems, such as systems for storing and retrieving information over the Internet or communicating using the Web,” and “could also have qualified with more formal education and less technical experience, or vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1102 ¶¶ 13–18). Patent Owner, without citing evidence, contends that a skilled artisan “would have the equivalent of a four-year degree from an accredited institution (usually denoted as a B.S. degree) in computer science, computer engineering or the equivalent, and experience with, or exposure to, topics in computer networking, multimedia, and web systems”; “would also have approximately 3–5 years of professional experience with these topics”; and “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, while significant experience in the field might substitute for formal education.” Prelim. Resp. 5–6. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art, and which is supported by expert testimony. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). However, we do not see a substantial difference between the parties’ proposals. Thus, our Decision would be the same under Patent Owner’s proposal.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,155,451 - Sophos Ltd. / Sophos Inc. v. Webroot Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 14, 2023 · IPR2023-00528 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–30 were unpatentable over Ideses, Mori, or their combination.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For these reasons, we find that Petitioner has failed to show that Ideses or Mori teaches or suggests “extracting a plurality of static data points from an executable file” and “generating a feature vector from the plurality of static data points using a classifier trained to classify the plurality of static data points based on a collection of data,” where “one or more features of the feature vector are selectively turned on or off based on whether a value of one or more static data points from the plurality of extracted static data points is within a predetermined range,” as recited in each independent claim.4 III. CONCLUSION We determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable likelihood of proving that at least one challenged claim of the ’844 patent is unpatentable over the cited prior art. We accordingly do not institute an inter partes review.5 IV. ORDER For the reasons given, it is ORDERED that no inter partes review is instituted in this proceeding.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“We agree with Patent Owner that the claims are directed to the classification stage, as they require “extracting a plurality of static data points from an executable file” and “generating a feature vector from [that] plurality of static data points using a classifier” (emphasis added). The claims also recite that the feature vector generated from the static data points that were extracted from the executable file is used “to determine whether the executable file is harmful,” confirming that the claimed method is about classification of an executable file, not creation of a classifier. We also agree with Patent Owner that neither Ideses nor Mori teaches or suggests a classification method in which one or more features of a feature vector generated from a plurality of static data points extracted from a file being analyzed are selectively turned on or off based on the value of the static data point.” slip op. at 18
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,599,844 - PTAB · Aug 2, 2023 · IPR2023-00455 · APJ Daniel J Galligan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–29 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Perego and JESD79-2 obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) because the factors identified in Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”), weigh in favor of denying institution in view of the district court litigation. Prelim. Resp. 53–56. A Memorandum from Director Vidal titled Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (USPTO June 21, 2022) (“Interim Procedure”)6 provides that “the PTAB will not deny institution of an IPR or PGR under Fintiv . . . where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Interim Procedure 9. Petitioner has submitted such a stipulation for all claims in this proceeding, which are all of the claims of the ’215 patent. Ex. 1093; Paper 8 at 1; Paper 9 at 1. Thus, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“In evaluating arguments under Section 325(d), we use a two-part framework, determining, first, “whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office.” Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). If either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, we then determine “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Id.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“On this record, we are sufficiently persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of Perego and JESD79-2. As Petitioner correctly points out (Pet. 32), Perego discloses using DDR2 memory devices. Ex. 1071, 10:56–59 (“Other memory devices may be implemented on module 400, for example, Double Data Rate 2 (DDR2) DRAM devices and Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) devices.”). On this record, we find this teaching to use DDR2 sufficiently supports Petitioner’s rationale to combine Perego with JESD79-2, which is the JEDEC DDR2 SDRAM Specification. Ex. 1064, 1 (cover page); see also Prelim. Resp. 44 (parenthetical noting that “JESD79-2 is a specification for individual DDR2 SDRAMs”). As to Patent Owner’s argument that Rambus memories lack a chip select network (Prelim. Resp. 25–26), the reference on which Patent Owner relies discloses that chip select information is still used in the particular Rambus devices described. See Ex. 1069, 11 (“[I]n the Rambus bus organization, all addresses, commands, data, and chip-select information are sent on the same bus lines.”), 12 (“[T]he example system uses a total of nine (9) lines to carry all necessary information, including addresses, commands, chip-select information, and data.”). Thus, on this record, Patent Owner’s focus on the lack of a chip select network, which is not recited in the claims of the ’215 patent, appears misplaced. We address Patent Owner’s more specific arguments below in the discussion of individual claim recitations.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Claim 21 is method claim and recites similar structure in the preamble. Petitioner cites this claim language in support of its position that a rank can have just one memory device. Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1001, 37:32–38 (portion of claim reproduced above)). On this record, we determine that the claim language supports Petitioner’s position. Claim 1 recites “at least one first memory integrated circuit in the first rank and at least one second memory integrated circuit in the second rank.” This language is met if there is one memory integrated circuit in each rank because “at least one” includes just one. On this record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that this claim language “do[es] not define the term ‘rank’” but, rather, “provide[s] context that a claimed ‘buffer’ can be, but need not be, coupled to multiple memory devices in the rank.” See Prelim. Resp. 9–10. Claim 1 recites “a buffer coupled between the at least one first memory integrated circuit and the memory bus, and between the at least one second memory integrated circuit and the memory bus,” and it further recites “enabl[ing] communication of the first data burst between the at least one first memory integrated circuit and the memory controller through the buffer” and “enabl[ing] communication of the second data burst between the at least one second memory integrated circuit and the memory controller through the buffer.” If there is only one memory device in each rank, then the buffer will only be connected to the one memory device in each rank. If two memory devices are the “at least one first memory integrated circuit in the first rank” then the buffer would be “coupled between the [two memory devices] and the memory bus.”” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 9,858,215 - Sophos Ltd. / Sophos Inc. v. Open Text Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Aug 2, 2023 · IPR2023-00491 · APJ Patrick M Boucher · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1, 8, 9, 14, or 15 were unpatentable over Liu, Tuvell, and Kester.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For these reasons, we determine that Petitioner does not make a sufficient showing that its proposed combination of Liu, Tuvell, and Kester meets the limitations of independent claim 1 that include a “central server.” We accordingly conclude that Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge of independent claim 1 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Liu, Tuvell, and Kester.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableDecided for patent owner
“There are a number of difficulties with Petitioner’s position, which appears to be conceived with the aid of hindsight to reconstruct the claimed invention. See Sensonics Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The invention must be viewed not after the blueprint has been drawn by the inventor, but as it would have been perceived in the state of the art that existed at the time the invention was made.”). First, Petitioner considers each of the mirrored servers in its conception of Liu also to correspond to the claim’s recited “threat servers.” Pet. 50. As Dr. Orso testifies, “Liu’s mirror servers are effectively identical to each other” and “even if Liu’s mirror servers could be interpreted as teaching the claimed threat servers . . . [,] there is no ‘central server’ in Liu’s peer-to-peer network of mirrored servers.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 70.” slip op. at 22
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Not reached
“H. Discretion Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) As noted above, the ’721 patent is the subject of parallel proceedings in the form of the related litigation. Supra, § I.E. Patent Owner asks that we exercise our discretion to deny the Petition based on the state of the related litigation. Prelim. Resp. 4–21. Because we deny the Petition on the merits, we do not reach this issue.” slip op. at 25
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, Electrical Engineering, or an equivalent discipline, and at least two years’ worth of experience developing computer networking or network architecture, or a Master’s degree in a related field.” Pet. 9. Petitioner adds that, alternatively, a person of ordinary skill in the art “could have four or more years of work experience in computer networking and in the development of client-server systems.” Id. Petitioner supports its articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art with testimony by Dr. Newman. Ex. 1003 ¶ 17. Patent Owner’s statement of the level of ordinary skill is generally similar, and supported with testimony by Dr. Orso, who characterizes the parties’ respective positions as having “minor variations.” Prelim. Resp. 27; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 39–42. According to Patent Owner, a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in an accredited program of electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science, or a similar discipline, and have 2-3 years of practical work experience in the general fields of electrical engineering, computer science, networking communications, and/or device and network security.” Prelim. Resp. 27. Patent Owner adds that “[m]ore advanced degrees and/or training in a related discipline can compensate for shorter work experience.” Id. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, which we find consistent with the level of skill reflected by the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). But we note that we would reach the same ultimate conclusion not to institute inter partes review if we were to adopt Patent Owner’s proposal. See Prelim. Resp. 27 (Patent Owner stating that “[a]lthough Patent Owner’s [person of ordinary skill in the art] definition differs slightly from Petitioner’s, Patent Owner’s positions and arguments do not change based on which [person of ordinary skill in the art] definition the Board applies”); Ex. 2001 ¶ 42 (Dr. Orso testifying that the “minor variations” in the parties’ proposals “would not alter [his] opinions.”).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,413,721
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.