• Snap Inc. v. You Map Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 4, 2026 · IPR2022-00568 · APJ Jason M Repko · IPR · Remand

  Claims 1–20 remain unpatentable; the contingent motion to amend is denied because the proposed substitute claims would have been obvious over Feldman and Jackson in view of ordinary skill.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for patent owner

    “challenge fails even if Petitioner’s summary of the references were correct because Petitioner did not present a sufficient reason to modify Feldman to include a current zoom level in its search request. FWD 56. The Federal Circuit vacated this finding specifically and contemplated that there would be a “consideration of obviousness” on remand. CAFC Dec. 10–11. That consideration requires more than determining whether any one reference teaches a current zoom level and a search, generally. See FWD 56 (quoting MTA Reply 10). Here, Petitioner’s challenge is based on modifying the Feldman-Jackson combination. So the Board must determine on remand whether the Feldman-Jackson combination in view of knowledge of a POSA meets the claim limitations at issue. We also disagree to the extent that Petitioner argues that the Board is precluded from considering additional arguments on the relevant issues on remand. The Board’s preliminary guidance on the Motion to Amend stated that Petitioner’s obviousness rationale was based on convenience and this reason was not sufficiently supported: reference lacks a sufficient explanation of why one of ordinary skill in the art would have added the zoom levels in the prior art to Feldman. See id. At most, Petitioner argues that it would be convenient to “specify the area the user desires to search for content” in this way. Id. at 14. But, on this record, Petitioner has not sufficiently explained why it would be convenient to do so in Feldman. See id. Nor has Petitioner sufficiently explained how or why the prior-art features confer this convenience. See id. MTA PG, 13. Because the Board’s conclusion turned on the lack of sufficient explanation, the briefing that followed was limited to Petitioner’s obviousness rationale. See, e.g., MTA Reply 9–12, MTA Sur-reply 1–12. Under these specific circumstances, we determine that it would be procedurally fair to fully consider the arguments on remand about whether the cited prior art teaches or suggests the limitations recited in the substitute claims. And, as discussed above, the Federal Circuit has directed the Board to consider obviousness. CAFC Dec. 10–11.” slip op. at 11

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. See PO Resp.; Sur-reply. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Shamos, and provides substantially the same expression of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex, 2003 ¶¶ 30–31; see FWD 6–7. In this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s proposed definition.” slip op. at 6

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, deniedDenied

    “In sum, Petitioner has shown that replacing Feldman’s radius with Badger’s zoom level meets all the limitations of the claim considered in the context of the Feldman-Jackson combination. Also, the evidence shows a motivation to modify the radius in Feldman’s search request to instead be based on the zoom-level parameter disclosed in Badger. See Intel Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“There is a motivation to combine when a known technique ‘has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way,’ . . . using the ‘prior art elements according to their established functions.’”) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007)). substitute claim 21 is unpatentable over Feldman, Jackson, and knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. See Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Google LLC, 948 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[U]nder 35 U.S.C. § 103, the obviousness inquiry turns not only on the prior art, but whether ‘the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.’”).” slip op. at 19

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredDecided for patent owner

    “precluded from considering additional arguments on the relevant issues on remand. The Board’s preliminary guidance on the Motion to Amend stated that Petitioner’s obviousness rationale was based on convenience and this reason was not sufficiently supported: reference lacks a sufficient explanation of why one of ordinary skill in the art would have added the zoom levels in the prior art to Feldman. See id. At most, Petitioner argues that it would be convenient to “specify the area the user desires to search for content” in this way. Id. at 14. But, on this record, Petitioner has not sufficiently explained why it would be convenient to do so in Feldman. See id. Nor has Petitioner sufficiently explained how or why the prior-art features confer this convenience. See id. MTA PG, 13. Because the Board’s conclusion turned on the lack of sufficient explanation, the briefing that followed was limited to Petitioner’s obviousness rationale. See, e.g., MTA Reply 9–12, MTA Sur-reply 1–12. Under these specific circumstances, we determine that it would be procedurally fair to fully consider the arguments on remand about whether the cited prior art teaches or suggests the limitations recited in the substitute claims. And, as discussed above, the Federal Circuit has directed the Board to consider obviousness. CAFC Dec. 10–11.” slip op. at 11

  Patent outcomesUS 10,616,727 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,616,727
• Microsoft Corporation v. Edge Networking Systems, LLCAdverse judgment
  PTAB · Mar 25, 2026 · IPR2025-00618 · APJ Nabeel U Khan · IPR · Adverse judgment

  After Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims, the Board entered adverse judgment against Patent Owner under 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b)(2).

  RulingsAdverse judgment

  • Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentOther

    “Our rules state that “disclaimer of a claim such that a party has no remaining claim in the trial” is “construed to be a request for adverse judgment.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(b). Because Patent Owner has disclaimed all challenged claims and no claims remain in this proceeding, adverse judgment is appropriate. We, therefore, enter judgment adverse to the Patent Owner.” slip op. at 2

  None
  Patents in suitUS 11,695,823
• Aptiv Services US, LLC v. Microchip Technology, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 20, 2026 · IPR2024-00646 · APJ Christopher L Ogden · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 are unpatentable under § 103 over Al-Shyoukh, Ivanov, and Stanescu; the Board did not reach the alternative ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner’s proposal is most like Petitioner’s alternative proposal which would include a bachelor’s degree and two years of experience. However, Patent Owner does not provide a specific number of years of industry experience and Patent Owner would include mixed-signal IC design as an alternative to analog circuit design. We consider analog circuit design to be most pertinent to the problems and solution discussed in the ’074 patent. See Ex. 1001, 1:15–2:44. In addition, we find credible Petitioner’s argument that an ordinarily skilled artisan with a bachelor’s degree would have had two years of experience, whereas Patent Owner’s proposal does not provide a specific number of years. Thus, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree and two years of experience in analog circuit design. Nevertheless, the outcome of our decision would be the same under either of the party’s proposals.” slip op. at 8

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Because neither party has argued that the district-court constructions should be modified or elaborated for this proceeding, and the constructions appear reasonable, we adopt these constructions for this decision. We also take judicial notice of the district court’s Memorandum supporting the claim construction order. Ex. 3001.9” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that “gm boosting” is the only gm enhancement referred to in the ’074 patent, that the ’074 patent uses the terms “gm enhanced” and “gm-boost” synonymously, and that Patent Owner has failed to point to any credible intrinsic evidence of this alleged distinction. Although, “[i]n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use of . . . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings, CAE Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH, 224 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in this case there is evidence to the contrary. In particular, the ’074 patent never refers to “gm enhancement” as a function separate from “gm boosting.” Indeed, the transistors (368, 370, and 382) that Patent Owner identifies as performing the function of “gm enhancement” are disclosed as part of a “gm-boost stage.” Ex. 1001, 5:8–24. Patent Owner’s alleged separation of Figure 3B into distinct “gm boosting” and “gm enhancement” is not consistent with the intrinsic evidence and is based on the conclusory testimony of Dr. Taylor. Thus, based on the evidence of record, we disagree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction distinguishing the terms “gm enhanced” and “gm-boost” in claim 1. Rather, we find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have regarded these terms to be synonymous. We need not otherwise construe these two terms to resolve the contested issues in this proceeding. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundDecided for petitioner

    “We find Petitioner’s argument persuasive that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to follow Ivanov’s teachings to include an enable/disable function in Al-Shyoukh’s biasing circuit to limit that circuit’s standby current for reasons of power-efficiency. Pet. 25–26; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 67–68. The evidence of record also suggests that an enable/disable function was well known in the art and that it would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art to add such a function to a biasing circuit, taking into consideration any known tradeoffs. Pet. Reply 17–18; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 60, 67–68; PO Resp. 13–14 (acknowledging that “any [person of ordinary skill in the art” would attest[ that] engineering is full of tradeoffs” and listing some of the known tradeoffs that “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would need to consider”). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Al-Shyoukh, Rincon-Mora, or other references teach away from adding an enable/disable function to Al-Shyoukh. Patent Owner has not pointed to anything in the prior art that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages investigation into the claimed invention. Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d at 1382.” slip op. at 34

  Patent outcomesUS 9,471,074 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 9,471,074
• Deltran USA LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2025-00885 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable under Richardson-based obviousness grounds; the Yu and Paparrizos grounds do not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, “[a]s of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, . . . would have been a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience in design of battery charging systems.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–30). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art[.]” PO Resp. 16. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, because it is supported by the testimony of C. Arthur MacCarley and not disputed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached

    “arguments relating to whether the prior findings are “necessary to the determination” or whether estoppel applies to arguments relating to Richardson being inoperative. See Pet. Reply 27. Nor does Petitioner respond to our inquiry about whether collateral estoppel maybe applied on a limitation by limitation basis. See Pet. Reply 27. At the hearing, however, Petitioner confirmed that resolution of the issue is not necessary to our final determination. JUDGE ROSS: Do we even need to decide the collateral estoppel issue? I mean, it seems to me that if your petition clearly made out your case for the combination of Richardson and Zhao, then we don't even need to reach that. MR. CHANDRA: That’s exactly right, Your Honor. That is our position, as well. We believe collateral estoppel applies, but you don't need to decide that issue in order to find these claims unpatentable. As I mentioned before, these are the same references. We have fairly sought out all of the portions of Richardson, we cited to specific portions. Not just relying on collateral estoppel, but the teachings of the reference itself. So, while this is an issue, we believe that collateral estoppel should apply. It does not have to apply in order to find the challenged claims unpatentable. Tr. 19:9–20. We are persuaded, as discussed in Section II.G., that Petitioner has shown where Richardson in combination with Zhao meets each limitation of the claims of the ’203 patent. Accordingly, we need not address whether Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that collateral estoppel applies here.” slip op. at 14

  • Strike new argumentNew argument consideredOther

    “Our Practice Guide states, that “[o]nce a trial is instituted, the Board may decline to consider arguments set forth in a preliminary response unless they are raised in the patent owner response.” Consolidated Trial Practice Guide (“Practice Guide”), 52 (Nov. 2019) (citing In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that a patent owner waives an issue presented in its preliminary response if it fails to renew the issue in its response after trial is instituted)).12 In addition, in our Scheduling Order, we stated that “Patent Owner is cautioned that any arguments not raised in the response may be deemed waived.” Paper 9 at 10; see also Practice Guide, 94 (same). Patent Owner confirmed at the Oral Hearing its understanding that arguments raised in its Preliminary Response and not reasserted in its Patent Owner Response were not appropriate for consideration during trial. Tr. 4:10–6:17. Petitioner does not identify any particular argument raised in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response that is not present in the Patent Owner Response. But, in this Final Written Decision, we do not consider arguments made in the Patent Owner Preliminary Response and instead assess only those fairly presented in the Patent Owner Response.” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 11,667,203 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,667,203
• Deltran USA LLC / Adc Solutions Auto LLC v. The Noco CompanyAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2026 · IPR2024-01219 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–11 are unpatentable as obvious over the Richardson-based grounds; the Yu and Paparrizos grounds do not establish unpatentability.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, “[a]s of the claimed priority date of July 3, 2014, . . . would have been a person with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or its equivalent and two years of experience in the field of electrical engineering including some experience in design of battery charging systems.” Pet. 21 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 19–30). Patent Owner “does not propose a different level of skill in the art[.]” PO Resp. 16. In light of the record before us, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, because it is supported by the testimony of C. Arthur MacCarley and not disputed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Petitioner submits there are no formal claim constructions necessary in this proceeding[.]” Pet. 22. Patent Owner also “does not propose any terms need to be construed.” PO Resp. 15. As neither party proposes an express construction for our consideration and because we determine that claim construction is not necessary, we do not expressly construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co. Matal, 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). slip op. at 11

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelNot reached

    “arguments relating to whether the prior findings are “necessary to the determination” or whether estoppel applies to arguments relating to Richardson being inoperative. See Pet. Reply 27. Nor does Petitioner respond to our inquiry about whether collateral estoppel maybe applied on a limitation by limitation basis. See Pet. Reply 27. At the hearing, however, Petitioner confirmed that resolution of the issue is not necessary to our final determination. JUDGE ROSS: Do we even need to decide the collateral estoppel issue? I mean, it seems to me that if your petition clearly made out your case for the combination of Richardson and Zhao, then we don't even need to reach that. MR. CHANDRA: That’s exactly right, Your Honor. That is our position, as well. We believe collateral estoppel applies, but you don't need to decide that issue in order to find these claims unpatentable. As I mentioned before, these are the same references. We have fairly sought out all of the portions of Richardson, we cited to specific portions. Not just relying on collateral estoppel, but the teachings of the reference itself. So, while this is an issue, we believe that collateral estoppel should apply. It does not have to apply in order to find the challenged claims unpatentable. Tr. 19:9–20. We are persuaded, as discussed in Section II.G., that Petitioner has shown where Richardson in combination with Zhao meets each limitation of the claims of the ’203 patent. Accordingly, we need not address whether Petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently that collateral estoppel applies here.” slip op. at 14

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “With respect to Petitioner’s allegations that rest on AAPA, we determine Petitioner has failed to show that claims 2, 10, and 11 are unpatentable. Our rules require that a petition for inter partes review must base the asserted challenges on “prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.” 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) and (4). And, a petitioner who relies on applicant admitted prior art as the basis, or part of the basis, of a ground, runs afoul of § 311. Qualcomm, 134 F.4th at 1365; see also USPTO Memorandum, Enforcement and Non-Waiver of 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) and Permissible Uses of General Knowledge in Inter Partes Reviews (Jul. 21, 2025), available at www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/aapa_memo_final__signed.pdf. We acknowledge but reject Petitioner’s position that its combinations discussing AAPA do not “rely” on AAPA but rather rely on U.S. Patent No. 5,793,185 (“the ’185 patent”), described in the ’203 patent as prior art. Pet. Reply 26. A petition for inter partes review must identify, “in writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3); 37 C.F.R. § 42.104 (b)(4). Here, Petitioner’s contention that the Grounds 2 and 5 actually rely on the ’185 patent when discussing AAPA is inconsistent with the Petition. In particular, the Petition does not cite to or direct our attention to any specific details from the ’185 patent to support its challenges. See generally Pet. 54–57, 76–77. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 2, 10, and 11 would have been unpatentable over the combination of Richardson, Zhao, and AAPA as well as over the combination of Yu, Paparrizos, and AAPA. Petitioner’s alternative allegations based on Epower-20/Epower-21 are considered below.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 11,667,203 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,667,203
• BMW Of North America, LLC v. Foras Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01347 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–27 were not shown unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not teach switching the boot-processor role to a spare processor.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “This reference point prevents . . . factfinders from using their own insight or, worse yet, hindsight, to gauge obviousness.” Id.” slip op. at 17

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “processor” to the spare processor, we determine that the claim is describing this transfer of identification of “boot processor,” which is required when transferring a boot processor’s functions to a spare because of the “problems [that] arise in attempting to idle (or eject) the boot processor.” Id. at 6:25– 27. This is confirmed by the language of limitation [1d], stating that the switching of the role of boot processor involves “changing a system identifier of the spare processor to that of the boot processor.” Thus, the firmware and operating system exchange this information identifying the boot processor, which is described in the specification as a device tree. See, e.g., id. at 13:21–35. The ’302 patent makes clear that accurate identification of which processor is the boot processor remains critical during runtime. See, e.g., id. at 6:25–27. Thus, Patent Owner is correct in requiring the system to have a way to identify the boot processor and to transfer this identification during runtime. However, as made clear in the embodiments described in the ’302 patent discussed above, this identification is for runtime purposes to accommodate runtime problems, not for booting purposes. Although Patent Owner may be correct that a function of the boot processor is to boot the system (PO Sur-reply 5), the problem identified in the ’302 patent is a problem relating to the runtime reassignment of the boot processor identity, to address a runtime need to identify the boot processor. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 11:6–9. Accordingly, based on our analysis of the claims and specification, we determine that “switching the role of boot processor to a spare processor without shutting down the system’s operating system” means causing the system to identify the spare processor as the boot processor (e.g., in a device tree), which then causes the spare processor to appear as the boot processor to the system during runtime. Ex. 1001, 6:25–41, 11:4–18 (describing why boot processors are treated differently even after the boot process has completed); compare id. at 9:65–11:3 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a non-boot processor without using a spare), with id. at 11:4–43 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a boot processor using a spare because boot processors, during runtime, need special treatment); see also 14:66–15:21 (emphasizing that spares are only needed for recovering boot processors). We construe switching a “role of boot processor” to mean transferring an identification in the system of which processor is the boot processor. This construction comports with the embodiments described in the specification. We do not adopt an additional requirement that this procedure also requires designating which processor will boot the system in the next reboot, which is not disclosed in the specification.” slip op. at 24

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “may swap processors that are failing, and perform the necessary bookkeeping to keep the operating system informed as to how to address the processors available, nothing in the Petition persuasively explains whether this generic processor swapping switches the boot processor role. As we explained in our claim construction section, the term “boot processor” is not merely a label of convenience to describe the processor that happened to have earlier booted the system. The role of boot processor is specifically switched to the spare; it is a piece of information tracked by the system. As we explain below, Petitioner does not adequately address the transfer of this information to make the system aware of which processor has the boot processor role. Petitioner asserts that “the BSP flag” of the IA-32 system is used to “determine whether a processor is the boot processor.” Pet. 17–18. Petitioner here is relying on a register used in IA-32 processors to identify whether or not they are the boot processor. This register is used during booting so that only the boot processor boots the system. See, e.g., Ex. 1008, 238–40, 710. This register does not appear to serve any further role, and Petitioner offers no persuasive evidence or argument that the processor register flag is exposed or copied to the operating system or APIC table. Petitioner’s proposed combination does not involve updating this register, nor does Petitioner explain how, even if the register were updated, it would meet the “switching” a “role of boot processor” in limitation [1d].” slip op. at 32

  • ExcludeOther

    “The USPTO has established Rules for objecting to and challenging evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64. This process sets various timeframes and permits briefing and curative actions, all of which are designed to crystallize 5 We follow the parties’ convention of citing to the later-added “Page X of Y” pagination rather than the native pagination. the issues and ensure a full and fair opportunity for the parties to be heard. See id. In this instance, Patent Owner’s evidentiary arguments regarding Exhibits 1008 and 1028 are untimely. Accordingly, we will not exclude Exhibits 1008 or 1028 on the basis of their authenticity, admissibility, or for any reason that should have been raised under the proper procedures. See, e.g., PO Resp. 7–8; PO Sur-reply 7–8; see also Pet. Reply 11 (asserting that “Patent Owner has not filed any objection to or a motion to exclude these references”). We consider Petitioner’s citations to these documents in our prior art analysis below. Notwithstanding, as is clear from our patentability analysis below, Exhibits 1008 and 1028 do not serve to demonstrate the unpatentability of any claim.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 7,624,302 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,624,302
• BMW Of North America, LLC v. Foras Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 5, 2026 · IPR2024-01346 · APJ Russell E Cass · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–30 were not shown unpatentable because the prior-art combinations did not establish transfer of the role of boot processor during system runtime.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Patent Owner asserts that: A person of ordinary skill in the art in the field of the ’781 patent would have been a person with at least a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or equivalent, and at least two years of prior work experience with computer architecture, including experience relating to fault tolerant computer architecture, as of the earliest priority date of the ’781 patent—October 25, 2004. If a person did not have a bachelor’s degree, additional relevant and practical experience with fault tolerant computer systems could provide an acceptable substitute. Likewise, further education beyond a bachelor’s degree could compensate for a deficiency in practical experience. See EX2004, Declaration of Nigel A. Jones (“Jones”), ¶ 26. PO Resp. 3. Patent Owner further notes that its position is “similar, but not identical to, Petitioner’s [position]” but that “the analysis [of the claims] is identical for both proposed determinations.” Id. We agree that our analysis would not differ based on choosing one proposed level of skill over the other, but as the losing party, we select Petitioner’s proposed level of skill.” slip op. at 20

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, based on our analysis of the claims and specification, we determine that “logic . . . for transferring, during system runtime, the role of boot processor” means logic that causes the system to identify the spare processor as the boot processor (e.g., in a device tree) which then causes the spare processor to appear as the boot processor to the system during runtime. Ex. 1001, 5:39–55, 10:43–67 (describing why boot processors are treated differently even after the boot process has completed); compare id. at 9:37– 10:42 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a non-boot processor without using a spare), with id. at 10:43–11:42 (process for recovering from loss of lockstep of a boot processor using a spare because boot processors, during runtime, need special treatment); see also 15:21–42 (emphasizing that spares are only needed for recovering boot processors). We construe transferring a “role of boot processor” to mean transferring an identification in the system of which processor is the boot processor. This construction comports with the embodiments described in the specification. We do not adopt an additional requirement that this procedure also requires designating which processor will boot the system in the next reboot, which is not disclosed in the specification.” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the clear support in the specification for the above interpretation, we see no need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If the meaning of a claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no reason to resort to extrinsic evidence.”) (citing Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., 823 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Extrinsic evidence may not be used ‘to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic evidence.’” (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324)). In general, the cited portions of testimony from the declarants from both parties in the briefs do little more than point to the portions of the ’781 patent described above or argue about what a boot processor does during booting. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2–8. The specification makes clear that it is focused on the role of boot processor during runtime because of problems encountered during runtime; it is not focused on the boot processor during booting. Ex. 1001, 5:39–55, 10:43–67. Thus, the testimony about what a boot processor does during booting, or that the primary function of the boot processor is to boot, is not particularly pertinent, and does not undo the unambiguous discussion in the ’781 patent.” slip op. at 27

  • BurdenDecided for patent owner

    “whether they are the boot processor or not (Ex. 1008, 238, 710), Petitioner does not explain how such information is exposed to the BIOS or operating system, nor how it is changed during runtime, after its purpose has been fulfilled. In sum, even if Petitioner’s proposed combination swaps the spare processor for the processor that booted the system, Petitioner’s proposed combination does not appear to transfer the role of boot processor to the spare processor. At best, Petitioner’s proposed combination transfers the tasks of one processor to another. See Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 15 (Fox describing its disclosure as “updat[ing] the ‘active’ processor list” and “[re-]allocat[ing] the threads that were running on the failing processor”), 46 (transferring “processes (instructions, threads, etc.) initially allocated to the failing processor” to the spare processor)). Of the art of record, we are only aware of the ’781 patent transferring a designation of which processor is the boot processor during the swap to a spare processor. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:43– 55, 11:10–12, 16:19–21, 17:51–55; claims 1, 9, 16, 25. In conclusion, we find that Petitioner has not shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, how the prior art teaches “transferring” a “role of boot processor” as required by limitation 1[c].” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 7,627,781 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,627,781
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01223 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 34–37 and 40–46 were not shown unpatentable because Suzuki’s organic barrier layer was not shown to meet the agreed construction of “planarization layer.”

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “layer of material that planarizes such that the propagation of defects from one layer to another layer can be interrupted and the topography of the underlying layer and/or structure is not reproduced.” PO Resp. 10. According to Patent Owner, we should adopt this construction because the parties agreed to it in a related district court proceeding and it is supported by the intrinsic evidence. Id. at 10–14. Petitioner does not dispute this 1 Japanese Published Application No. H09-245964, Pub. Sep. 19, 1997 (Ex. 1010, “Kijima”) (English translation). 2 US 6,198,217, Pub. Mar. 6, 2001 (Ex. 1012, “Suzuki”). 3 US 6,087,196, Pub. July 11, 2000 (Ex. 1013, “Sturm”). 4 WO 2001/08242, Pub. Feb. 1, 2001 (Ex. 1016, “Duthaler”). 5 Japanese Published Application No. H10-41069, Pub. Feb. 13, 1998 (Ex. 1014, “Fujimori”) (English translation). construction. Paper 33, 6:17–8:1; see Pet. Reply 5. We adopt the parties’ agreed-to construction.” slip op. at 4

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner argues Suzuki’s organic barrier layer does not reproduce the underlying layer’s/structure’s topography because “Suzuki’s organic barrier layer 20 ‘makes a smooth surface on the relatively irregular surface of the cathode 18.’” Pet. Reply 7 (quoting Ex. 1012, 5:59–67). We disagree. Instead, we agree with Patent Owner that Suzuki’s irregular-surface smoothing describes covering defects, not suppressing the underlying cathode’s topography. PO Sur-reply 5. The smooth-surface passage that Petitioner highlights comes immediately after two sentences describing inevitable “defects,” “pinholes,” and “foreign matter” on the cathode surface and before a sentence describing “ensuring the formation of the layer 22, which is substantially defect-free.” Ex. 1012, 5:52–67. Suzuki’s organic barrier 20 “makes a smooth surface” by covering defects because the defects are the only source of the “irregularity” that Suzuki refers to here. Id. We note Mr. Humphrey’s testimony, which we credit in this regard, that the “defects are created incidentally on the surface of the underlying layer and are generally not considered to be part of the underlying layer’s topography, which is a macroscopic property by design” and that the organic layer is not a planarization layer because it would reproduce the topography of the underlying layer. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 47–48. Because the parties’ agreed-to construction of “planarization layer” “requires ‘a layer of material that planarizes’ for two distinct functions,” Petitioner’s showing of just one of those functions is insufficient. PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “G. Level of Skill in the Art Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and at least one year of experience in display technologies” and that “[a]dditional education might compensate for a deficiency in experience, and vice-versa.” Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. We agree with and adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the level of skill reflected in both the prior art and the ’389 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 6

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “which is substantially defect-free.” Ex. 1012, 5:52–67. Suzuki’s organic barrier 20 “makes a smooth surface” by covering defects because the defects are the only source of the “irregularity” that Suzuki refers to here. Id. We note Mr. Humphrey’s testimony, which we credit in this regard, that the “defects are created incidentally on the surface of the underlying layer and are generally not considered to be part of the underlying layer’s topography, which is a macroscopic property by design” and that the organic layer is not a planarization layer because it would reproduce the topography of the underlying layer. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 47–48. Because the parties’ agreed-to construction of “planarization layer” “requires ‘a layer of material that planarizes’ for two distinct functions,” Petitioner’s showing of just one of those functions is insufficient. PO Sur-reply 2.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 6,949,389 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness
  Patents in suitUS 6,949,389
• Samsung Display Co., Ltd. v. Pictiva Displays International Ltd.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01222 · APJ Garth D Baer · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 34–37 and 40–46 are unpatentable as obvious over the Yamazaki-based and Weaver-based grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner bears the burden of production to establish that its claimed invention is entitled to an earlier priority date for this fact-intensive issue. See In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We agree with Petitioner that the email chain does not support Patent Owner’s conception claim because it “does not discuss depositing a planarization layer, as required by both independent claims.” Pet. Reply 3. Patent Owner asserts that the inventor’s discussion of “PML” (polymer multi-layer) encapsulation in the email chain shows their conception of the claimed planarization layer because the ’389 patent describes that PMLs “‘[t]ypically’ include[e] ‘a planarization layer’ that ‘is provided to give a planar surface’ for deposition of an upper layer,” and “‘address ‘any point defects (i.e. pin holes)’ that might appear in the barrier layer’s surface.” PO Resp. 6 (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:31–37, 1:41–44, 1:56–62). We disagree with Patent Owner for two reasons. First, the challenged patent’s specification does not corroborate that the inventors conceived the claimed planarization before the challenged patent’s priority because it did not exist at the time of the email. Whether the inventors, at the time of filing, considered PMLs to typically include a planarization layer as of the claimed priority date does not support the allegation that they conceived of that same planarization layer more than a year earlier. Moreover, the ’389 patent’s teaching that “[t]ypically, for PML structures, a planarization layer 106 is formed” (Ex. 1001, 1:30–31) shows that the inventors recognized PML structures and planarization layers were distinct because only a subset of PML structures formed planarization layers, even if they do so typically. Thus, the inventor’s discussion of a PML layer in the email chain does not evidence their conception of the claimed planarization layer, as Patent Owner contends. Additionally, even if we were to understand the inventors’ mention of PML encapsulation in the emails, together with the discussion of patterning techniques for an organic layer, as discussing a planarization layer, such discussions are evidence of brainstorming ideas, rather than documenting the path taken with the claimed invention. For instance, the inventors use phrases like “don’t know if this will work,” “these are all just ‘undeveloped’ ideas,” and “looking forward to keep this discussion rolling.” Ex. 2006, 1; see also Ex. 1034, 59:22−59:18. As Petitioner argues, and we agree, these are more theoretical and future-development discussions than an exchange of a definite idea. Pet. Reply 2−3 (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For these reasons, we agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not” slip op. at 6

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Applicant-admitted prior artDecided for petitioner

    “B. Whether Petitioner Relies on Applicant Admitted Prior Art Patent Owner asserts we should “not consider” Yamazaki-based challenges because Petitioner included Applicant Admitted Prior Art (AAPA) in those grounds. See PO Resp. 16 (citing Qualcomm Incorporated v. Apple Inc., 134 F.4th 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2025)) (holding that AAPA may not be part of the basis for an inter partes review). We disagree. As Petitioner notes, it “utilizes the AAPA in the alternative with Ghosh, to show that it was known to manufacture OLED devices in bulk (which [Patent Owner] does not dispute).” Pet. Reply 9. Because “[t]he Petition identifies disclosures in Ghosh that independently demonstrate the same teachings for which the AAPA is cited,” we agree with Petitioner that it does not improperly rely on AAPA for any of its challenges. Id.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “C. Whether Yamazaki, Weaver, and Palanisamy Are Printed Publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) Patent Owner asserts that Yamazaki, Weaver, and Palanisamy do not qualify as printed publications under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) because they only qualify as prior art under § 102(e). PO Resp. 17. According to Patent Owner, “[e]ven though the Federal Circuit has held that such references are ‘printed publications’ under 311(b), to preserve arguments on appeal, Patent Owner submits that such an interpretation is inconsistent with the plain statutory language, the precedent, and non-public accessibility of an unpublished patent application.” Id. We disagree with this argument because the Federal Circuit has rejected it, as Patent Owner acknowledges. See Lynk Labs, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2023-2346, Slip. Op. (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2025).” slip op. at 8

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “Yamazaki does not involve multiple devices on a substrate” and Ghosh teaches “non-selective deposition of at least the barrier layer.” PO Resp. 31. We disagree with this argument because it attacks Yamazaki and Ghosh individually, rather than the combination of Yamazaki’s selective deposition and Ghosh’s plurality of devices that Petitioner asserts. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). We also disagree with Patent Owner’s criticism that Petitioner fails to explain why skilled artisans would have ignored Ghosh’s non-selective deposition method for barrier layers on multiple devices. PO Resp. 32. This argument attacks a straw man as Petitioner does not propose modifying Ghosh’s method with Yamazaki’s selective deposition. See Pet. 21–23. Rather, Petitioner proposes modifying Yamazaki’s selective deposition method by applying it to Ghosh’s teaching of encapsulating a plurality of OLED devices. Id. Next, Patent Owner asserts that skilled artisans would not have extended Yamazaki’s single-device fabrication/encapsulation method to a plurality of devices on a substrate because doing so would “multiply defects and errors, drop the yield exponentially, and increase the cost.” PO Resp. 34. Patent Owner asserts that precision/defect problems would be particularly acute when using Yamazaki’s inkjet method to print devices’ electro luminescence layers. Id. at 35–36. We disagree. Even if extending Yamazaki’s method to Ghosh’s multiple devices comes at a cost of potential defects, that tradeoff would not undermine Petitioner’s proffered combination given Petitioner’s articulated benefits outline above, including facilitating manufacturing display panels for OLEDs with improved throughput, improved productivity, and reduced manufacturing costs, as compared to fabricating/encapsulating just a single device. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1349 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another.”). It also does not matter that “inkjet printing yielded devices of half the efficiency than spin coating,” as Patent Owner asserts (PO Resp. 35), because Petitioner does not need to show that Yamazaki’s inkjet printing would be the best option for batch fabrication/encapsulation, only that it would was a suitable one from which the prior art did not teach away. See Par Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharms., Inc., 773 F. 3d 1186, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir 2014). That is, Petitioner does not need to show that Yamazaki’s inkjet method was an improvement over other known fabrication/encapsulation methods, so long as it was a known fabrication/encapsulation method and skilled artisans would understand that implementing it for a plurality of devices had known advantages over fabricating/encapsulating a single device, which Petitioner identifies. See Pet. 22. We also agree with Dr. Subramanian that skilled artisans would have a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination given similarities between the references (both are directed to encapsulation of an OLED display device with multiple thin-film layers and at least the first encapsulation is selectively deposited) and because “as the ’389 patent admits, in the prior art it was conventional to use batch fabrication to manufacture OLED display devices with thin-film encapsulation.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 86. As Dr. Subramanian explains, a particular advantage of inkjet printing is that it scales well to larger areas and it was known at the time of the ’389 patent that inkjet could be used to print multiple devices on a glass substrate. Ex. 1032 ¶¶ 2, 27–28. Patent Owner’s argument that “Yamazaki’s methods are far from ready for manufacturing” (PO Resp. 34) goes well beyond what is necessary to show that skilled artisans would have had a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed. See Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Given Petitioner’s analysis outlined above, we agree with Petitioner that it would have been obvious to skilled artisans to fabricate and encapsulate multiple OLED devices on a substrate using Yamazaki’s ink-jet methods. slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 6,949,389 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 6,949,389
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Lionra Technologies LimitedAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 4, 2026 · IPR2024-01281 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 5–10, 12–15, and 17–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Cornett, Paatela, and Nelson; claim 8 is also unpatentable with Russell.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable

    “been motivated to combine the teachings of Cornett, Paatela, Nelson, and Russell in the way Petitioner proposes and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See supra §§ III.E.2(a)–(b). Hence, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 8 is unpatentable under § 103(a) because the claim would have been obvious over Cornett, Paatela, Nelson, and Russell.” slip op. at 122

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Factors pertinent to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art” slip op. at 13

  Patent outcomesUS 7,738,471 unpatentable
  § 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,738,471

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.