- Ipr2026-00195InstitutedPTAB · Jun 12, 2026 · IPR2026-00195 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Institution
The Director granted institution of IPR2026-00195 after determining the petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as appropriate, and no other non-discretionary considerations warrant denial of institution. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review and post-grant review is granted in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,250,877 - Ipr2026-00184InstitutedPTAB · Jun 12, 2026 · IPR2026-00184 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Institution
The Director granted institution of IPR2026-00184 after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim and no other non-discretionary reason to deny institution.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as appropriate, and no other non-discretionary considerations warrant denial of institution. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review and post-grant review is granted in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,231,426 - Ipr2026-00180InstitutedPTAB · Jun 12, 2026 · IPR2026-00180 · APJ John A Squires · IPR · Institution
The Director granted institution of IPR2026-00180 after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“the petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition, or that it is more likely than not that at least one of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable, as appropriate, and no other non-discretionary considerations warrant denial of institution. Accordingly, institution of inter partes review and post-grant review is granted in the following proceedings:” slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 10,701,173 - Abbott Laboratories v. Miracor Medical SANo claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 11, 2026 · IPR2025-00116 · APJ John D Hamann · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1–5, 7, 10, 16–24, 26, and 28 not unpatentable under any of the four § 103 grounds because the petition failed to prove required limitations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We find that the ’077 patent and the cited prior art references reflect the appropriate level of skill at the time of the claimed invention and that the level of skill reflected in these references and in the ’077 patent is consistent with the definition of one of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, which we adopt. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We further find that our determinations in this Decision would be the same if we were to instead adopt the level of skill proposed by Patent Owner.” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We agree with Patent Owner that “axially adjacent” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis.” PO Resp. 5–6; see also Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 73–79 (Mr. Leschinsky addressing the claim term “axially adjacent” and explaining that a person of ordinary skill would have understood it to mean that the “first magnetic device and the rotor are ‘adjacent’ to one another, i.e., disposed next to one another, as measured along the central axis about which the rotor spins”). Patent Owner’s construction also is supported by Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Crosby, who agrees that “adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis,” could be “one meaning,” along with “many other meanings.” Ex. 2014,8 19:13–20:11. In sum, consistent with our Institution Decision, we conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of “axially adjacent” is “at a position adjacent to one another as measured along a central axis.” See Dec. on Inst. 12.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Second, for the reasons below, we determine that we do not need to construe any other claim terms to resolve the disputes between the parties. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[W]e need only construe” slip op. at 14
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“We agree with Patent Owner. As we discuss above, we find “axially adjacent” to mean “adjacent to one another as measured along a central arguments that rest on Petitioner’s assertion that in the Parallel Litigation, Patent Owner “asserts that a magnetic element sealed within a rotor is . . . ‘axially adjacent.’” Id. at 20–21, n.6 (citing Ex. 1019, 5–7). In particular, we find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that Wampler teaches that magnetic pieces 88 (“a first magnetic device”) “are inserted [‘axially adjacent’] in…the impeller.” Id. at 20–21 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 80, Fig. 13; Ex. 1003 ¶ 174). We also find unavailing Petitioner’s reliance on Wampler’s Figure 13 and Mr. Crosby’s cited testimony that “the ‘impeller’ and ‘magnetic pieces’ are axially adjacent—situated next to each other on the same axis.” Id. at 21–22 (annotating Ex. 1008, Fig. 13; citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 174–176). Petitioner does not sufficiently explain this argument, but appears to conflate being adjacent along a central axis with about an axis. Id. We also find unavailing Petitioner’s argument that under Patent Owner’s construction, Wampler also teaches this limitation, because Patent Owner “concedes that ‘axially adjacent’ components ‘have positioning that is next to one another, perhaps touching or sharing a common side, when measured along the axis.’” Pet. Reply 14–15 (citing PO Resp. 14). Petitioner mischaracterizes Patent Owner’s arguments and ignores Patent Owner’s showing that “axially adjacent” components are “distinct from components that are aligned with one another such that they overlap or occupy the same portion of an axis upon which they are positioned.” PO Resp. 14 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 78). For the preceding reasons, Petitioner fails to show by a” slip op. at 24
Patent outcomesUS 11,754,077 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,754,077 - Imperative Care, Inc. v. Inari Medical, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00289 · APJ Timothy G Majors · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–15 are unpatentable: claims 1–15 under Grounds 2 and 3, and claim 10 under Ground 4; Ground 1 did not establish unpatentability.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“We have construed the “filament” term in multiple related proceedings and agreed with Patent Owner that the claimed filament requires flexibility. See Ex. 1050 (Final Written Decision in 156 IPR); IPR2024-01157, Paper 35 (Final Written Decision) at 15–24. Specifically, we determined that the evidence supports Patent Owner’s position that “a POSA would have understood the plain and ordinary meaning of the claimed ‘filament’ as a flexible length of material (e.g., one or more string(s), wire(s), tape(s)).” See, e.g., Ex. 1050, 23. We maintain that construction in this Decision for the reasons given by Patent Owner (see PO Resp. 24–32; PO Sur-reply 6–8), we disagree with Petitioner’s argument to the contrary (Pet. Reply 27–31), and we incorporate our analysis concerning the meaning of the filament term from the related proceedings identified above, which applies equally here.13 Ex. 1050 (Final Written Decision in 156 IPR); IPR2024-01157, Paper 35 (Final Written Decision) at 15–24. The parties agreed at the oral hearing that there is no additional argument or evidence 13 Although the ’005 patent is not directly related to the patents at issue in the 1157 and 156 IPRs, the ’519 Application that the ’005 patent purports to incorporate for providing all relevant disclosures about the filament term is a parent application to the challenged patents in the 1157 and 156 IPRs (see supra n.3). SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Where multiple patents derive from the same parent application and share many common terms, we must interpret the claims consistently across all asserted patents.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also construed the filament term consistently in other ongoing proceedings on related patents. See, e.g., Ex. 1045 (Institution Decision in the 728 IPR), 12–18; Ex. 1046 (Institution Decision in the 989 IPR), 13–21. already addressed in those related matters. Tr. 6:13–23, 23:19–26.” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that the person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSA”) in August 2018 “would have had an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering or a related engineering discipline and 2–4 years of catheter design experience.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 35). Although Patent Owner states that it “disagrees” with Petitioner’s POSA definition, Patent Owner nevertheless applies that definition in this case. PO Resp. 32–33; see Tr. 22:23–23:5 (Patent Owner is “not disputing” Petitioner’s definition, asserting the definition “doesn’t make any difference in this case”).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert creditedMixed
“We credit Dr. Zalesky’s interpretation of Schaffer on whether the POSA would have understood Schaffer as describing rigid actuating members. Dr. Zalesky testifies, for example, that a POSA would have understood from Schaffer’s disclosures about the actuating members being “machined” from metal or plastic, that such actuating members would be rigid. Ex. 2026 ¶ 101 (explaining “machining is a manufacturing process in which the desired part . . . is created using the controlled removal of bulk material” to produce a “rigid material”); Ex. 1005 ¶ 82 (“The actuating member 55 and the actuating button 261 is machined from aluminum” and “[i]n another example, the actuating member 55 and the actuating button 261 are machined from plastic”); Ex. 2026 ¶¶ 102–103 (testifying the disclosed valve assembly technique in Schaffer (Ex. 1005 ¶ 83) also indicates that “rigid” actuating members are used). Mr. Thornton opines (without citation to any persuasive supporting disclosure) that a POSA “would have understood that Schaffer’s U-shaped actuating members would have preferably been formed from a thin, flexible material.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 113. But, at deposition, Mr. Thornton conceded that machined plastics and aluminum, like disclosed in Schaffer, are rigid. Ex. 2005, 168:2–6 (“Q. And you said that plastic that would be machined would be rigid, correct? A. I think that’s a fair statement.”). Although Mr. Thornton opines that Schaffer’s actuating members would “preferably”” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableUnpatentableMixed
“For the reasons above, Petitioner has not established that the claimed “filament” is disclosed in the combination of Garrison and Schaffer and, thus, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 1 would have been obvious over Garrison and Schaffer. Petitioner’s challenge to independent claim 10 (and the claims that depend from claim 1 and claim 10) fails for similar reasons. Each of the challenged claims requires a “filament” and, given our construction of that term and our findings above that Schaffer does not teach or suggest the claimed filament, Petitioner has not proved by a preponderance of the” slip op. at 31
Patent outcomesUS 11,554,005 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,554,005 - Shenzhen Tuozhu Technology Co., Ltd. v. Stratasys, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00321 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, and 17 not unpatentable because the asserted combinations did not establish the required purge-tower teachings or prior-art status.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a related field, and (2) at least two years of research or industry experience in 3D printing or materials used for 3D printing.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 14–16). Petitioner also argues that “[a]dditional experience could substitute for a formal degree or formal training (and vice versa).” Id. Patent Owner proposes a slightly different level of skill, arguing that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in Mechanical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Materials Science, or a comparable field and at least two years of experience related to 3D printing, with additional experience potentially being a substitute for a formal degree or training (and vice versa).” Prelim. Resp. 24. Neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. We adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as it appears consistent with the ’324 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“According to the ’713 patent, “[p]urge tower 24 itself may be . . . recycled or otherwise discarded as desired.” Ex. 1001, 8:27–28. This description provides some support for Patent Owner’s view, because a purge tower too intimately integrated with the part would be difficult or impossible to recycle or discard. This is further supported by the ’713 patent’s statement that “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Id. at 8:30–34. It also is supported by Dr. Hickner’s testimony that the ’713 patent “clearly shows . . . the 24 purge tower separated from the part” and that “the purge tower is a separate physical object.” Ex. 2016, 28:8–10, 64:1–9. On the other hand, there is evidence supporting Petitioner’s view that, as long as the purge tower is generally separate from the part and the support structure, it may still make contact with those portions of the print. As noted above, “purge tower 24 may be printed at any suitable location on build substrate 44 (i.e., at any location in the x-y build plane not occupied by 3D part 20 or support structure 22).” Ex. 1001, 8:30–34. This language does not exclude locations adjacent to or in contact with the part or the support structure. Thus, determine that a “purge tower,” as that term is used in the context of the ’713 patent, may not be an integrated portion of a printed part or support structure but need not be free of all contact with the printed part or support structure.” slip op. at 9
- BurdenNot shown unpatentable
“There is evidence of record to support both Petitioner’s view and Patent Owner’s view. On the record developed at trial, however, we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence favors Petitioner, who bears the burden of proof. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer teaches printing a layer of a purge tower each time the printer switches one extruder to the operating mode. Because proving the obviousness of claims 1 and 16 requires such a showing, Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 16 would have been obvious over the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer. 5. Analysis of Remaining Claims Claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 all depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1 or claim 16. Accordingly, they all include the limitations of either claim 1 or claim 16. Because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that the combination of Priedeman and KISSlicer teaches or suggests all the limitations of claims 1 and 16, Petitioner also has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 2, 6, 7, 9, and 17 would have been obvious over that combination of references.” slip op. at 21
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artOther
“On the record developed at trial, we agree with Petitioner. According to several industry forum posts, people interested in three-dimensional printing located the website where KISSlicer was posted between February 2012 and April 2012. Ex. 1028, 1 (post discussing and directing others to KISSlicer on April 11, 2012); Ex. 1031, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on March 16, 2012, and March 21, 2012); Ex. 1032, 1 (two posts discussing KISSlicer on February 11, 2012, and February 14, 2012). Thus, not only was it possible for people of ordinary skill in the art to locate KISSlicer; people of ordinary skill in the art actually did locate it. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that KISSlicer was publicly accessible.” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 9,421,713 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,421,713 - X Corp. v. Sterling Computers CorporationAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 9, 2026 · IPR2025-00299 · APJ Bach V Hoang · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–22 are unpatentable as obvious over the stated Dumais-based and Kircher/Krug grounds; Patent Owner’s and Petitioner’s motions to exclude are dismissed as moot.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Our Institution Decision adopted Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 8–9. In its response, Patent Owner adopts Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill. See PO Resp. 14–15 (“Patent Owner and its expert adopt the Board’s definition for purposes of this Response”). Having considered the record, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of skill, as articulated above. We are satisfied that Petitioner’s proposal comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and implement the teachings of the ’217 Patent. Accord Inst. Dec. 8–9.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)No construction neededNot reached
“1. “computer program modules” The parties dispute whether four “computer program modules comprising” (1) “a monitoring module,” (2) “a first relevance measurement module,” (3) “a second relevance measurement module,” and (4) “a relevance analysis module” (collectively, “module limitations”) invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and should be treated as means-plus-function limitations. See Pet. 8–18; PO Resp. 15–18; Pet. Reply 3–5; PO Sur-reply 4–7. However, the parties do not argue that the construction of these terms affects the analysis of Petitioner’s challenges. See PO Resp.; Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. Moreover, our analysis does not rely on any particular construction of these terms and, so, we need not resolve this dispute.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“2. “one or more measures derived from the group consistent of” Petitioner asserts limitations 1[g] and 1[g][i]–1[g][iv] recite an open Markush group listing alternatively useable members. Pet. 20–21 (citing Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbot Lab’ys v. Baxter Pharm. Prod., Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that the listing of specified alternatives within a claim is referred to as a Markush group or Markush grouping)); See Ex. 1001, 47:47–58. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s construction. See PO Resp; PO Sur-reply. As these terms are not in controversy, we need not opine on this construction.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITANo construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s respective constructions overlap in their requirement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. See Pet. 18; PO Resp. 20–21; PO Sur-reply 10. Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s construction “exclude[s] ‘groups’ from the claims” and further limits the scope of to users who share actions (Pet. Reply 8–9), but Patent Owner states that its proposed construction does not so limit the claims (PO Sur-reply 10). As such, there is no disagreement that “cognate” users share similar past user actions and assessments or are defined by similar direct input by the user. As there is no controversy, we need not, and do not, construe the meaning of “cognate.” However, Patent Owner’s requirement that “at least one other of the plurality of users” is specifically cognate to “the user” who was sent the content is plainly recited in the claim language itself. The claim recites a “relevance score of a piece of electronic content sent from a sender to a user” in the preamble and similarly again in limitation 1[g]. See Ex. 1001, 47:25–28 (emphasis added), 45:62–64. The limitation in question directly references the claimed “user” when reciting the cognate relationship: “identify at least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user.” Ex. 1001, 47:43–45 (emphasis added). As such, the claim language plainly supports Patent Owner’s requirement and Petitioner does not contest that requirement. See Pet. Reply 8. least one other of the plurality of users . . . that is cognate to the user” as requiring that the identified other user is cognate specifically to the user whose relevance score is being determined.” slip op. at 12
Patent outcomesUS 7,716,217 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSRPatents in suitUS 7,716,217 - Resmed Corp. v. Cleveland Medical Devices, Inc.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 5, 2026 · IPR2025-00160 · APJ Sheridan K Snedden · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–5, 7, 8, 10–13, 15–18, and 20–31 were not shown unpatentable because the proposed Toge-Kumar combination did not establish the claimed remote internet site hosted on a server.
RulingsFinal written decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner filed a Response. Paper 23 (“PO Resp.”). Petitioner filed a Reply. Paper 27 (“Reply”). Patent Owner filed a Sur-reply. Paper 35 (“Sur-reply”). Additionally, during trial, Patent Owner filed an authorized Motion to Terminate, alleging that Petitioner failed to name a real party in interest (namely, Petitioner’s corporate parent, Resmed Inc.). Paper 37. Petitioner filed an opposition. Paper 38. Patent Owner filed a reply. Paper 39. We denied the Motion to Terminate. Paper 44.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“We determine that no express construction of any claim term is necessary to resolve the dispute between the parties. Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). To the extent further discussion of the meaning of any claim term is necessary to our decision, we provide that discussion below in our analysis of the asserted grounds of unpatentability. C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art” slip op. at 11
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level). D. Summary of the Asserted Prior Art” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“summarized above, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have implemented Toge’s physician-side computer as a web server using a “localhost” architecture as proposed by Petitioner because such a configuration cannot communicate with external devices over the public internet, a deficiency that directly contradicts Petitioner’s stated motivations for the combination of permitting broad data access. Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Chatterjee, expressly acknowledged in his Reply Declaration that when a client and server reside on the same machine, the communications between them do not traverse the internet. Ex. 1069 ¶ 8. Specifically, Dr. Chatterjee cited the Microsoft Computer Dictionary’s definition of “localhost” as “[t]he name that is used to represent the same computer on which a TCP/IP message originates,” noting that “[a]n IP packet sent to localhost has the IP address 127.0.0.1 and does not actually go out to the Internet.” Id. (citing Ex. 1070, 316). Accordingly, Petitioner’s proposed configuration of placing both the client and web server on Toge’s physician-side computer would create a closed loop of communication that does not reach the broader network. Id. As noted by Patent Owner, “[i]f ‘the physician-side computer and the web server are on one machine,’ the local web server would not communicate with other devices via the Internet.” Sur-Reply, 3–4 (comparing Ex. 1069 ¶ 19 with id. at ¶ 8). Thus, the consequence of Petitioner’s proposed Toge-Kumar configuration is that other devices in the system, such as the PAP device that generates the treatment data and any remote client devices that might need to access that data, would be unable to send data to or retrieve data from the localhost web server. Patent Owner persuasively argues, supported by evidence of record, that under Petitioner’s proposed configuration, “the PAP device could not send data thereto nor could other clients receive data therefrom, as only the local client browser can exchange data.” Id. (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 8); see Ex. 2003, 4 (one-tier architecture “is not suitable for a web application” because “it can only access data available in a single computer or server” and therefore “is not suitable for a web application.”); Ex. 2022, 3 (Unlike more advanced multi-tier systems, a one-tier architecture “cannot transmit information from one client machine to another.”); Ex. 2020, 4 (While “the client process and server process can be on the same computer,” this architecture “is rarely used today” precisely because it cannot “take advantage of the distributed computing environment.”).” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 11,786,680 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,786,680 - Dr. Falk Pharma GmbH v. Ellodi Pharmaceuticals, L.P.Adverse judgmentPTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · PGR2025-00086 · APJ Tawen Chang · PGR · Adverse judgment
The Board granted Patent Owner’s request for adverse judgment and terminated the PGR as to claims 1–34 after Patent Owner disclaimed all challenged claims.
RulingsAdverse judgment- Adverse judgmentAdverse judgmentGranted
“A party may request judgment against itself at any time during a proceeding,” including by “[d]isclaimer of the involved application or patent” or “[c]ancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.73(b)(1)–(b)(2). Accordingly, we grant Patent Owner’s Request for Adverse Judgment and terminate the proceeding. slip op. at 2
NonePatents in suitUS 12,290,598 - Apple Inc. v. Smart Mobile Technologies LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Jun 3, 2026 · IPR2022-00981 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 8–11, 13, 17, and 19 were held unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton; claim 15 was not shown unpatentable.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandMixed
“8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and remanded “for consideration of the patentability of those claims.” Id. at 14. We understand both the reversal and vacature are with respect to Ground 1 of alleged unpatentability, not Ground 2, because the Federal Circuit’s decision did not discuss anything relating to Ground 2. Paper 43. The parties agreed. Paper 44. In this remand proceeding, neither party requested the filing of additional briefing or evidence. In a telephone conference call, both parties expressed agreement with the Board (1) that “there is no issue regarding collateral estoppel or issue preclusion with respect to dependent claims 8– 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19, and (2) that the remand proceeding would not involve the Board revisiting any matter or issue concerning alleged obviousness of claims 1, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, and 19 over Ground 2.4 Papers 43, 44. The parties also agreed that the remand proceeding would only involve the Board reviewing the alleged obviousness of dependent claims 8–11, 13, 15, 17, and 19 as obvious over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton. Id. We have authority to conduct this inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written Decision on Remand is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. On the record before us, which is the same as the record before us at the time we issued the first final written decision (Paper 34), we determine that Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 8– 11, 13, 17, and 19, but not claim 15, of the ’936 patent are unpatentable over Rautiola, Regnier, and Sainton.” slip op. at 3
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“5. Petitioner’s Request to Discredit Dr. Cooklev’s Declaration Petitioner makes several arguments discrediting Dr. Cooklev’s declaration (Ex. 2031) and asserts that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration should be accorded little to no weight. Reply 13–14. We have already considered and rejected this request in the Final Written Decision issued on November 7, 2023. Paper 34, 21–23. Our reasoning need not be reiterated here. Petitioner does not persuade us that Dr. Cooklev’s declaration testimony should be accorded little to no weight.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petition’s definition of level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Cooklev, accepts Dr. Kotzin’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Ex. 2031 ¶ 24. We adopt Petitioner’s proposal regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. This level of ordinary skill in the art is supported by the testimony of Dr. Kotzin (Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 20–22) and is consistent with the level reflected in the ’936 patent and the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“only when it is analogous to the claimed invention.” Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019). A prior art reference constitutes analogous art if it is “from the same field of endeavor” or “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that a reference is analogous art. See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2023).” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 8,472,936 mixed§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,472,936
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.