- PTAB · Mar 24, 2022 · PGR2021-00112 · APJ Bryan F Moore · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR on claims 1–20 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 lacks written description support; all petition grounds were included.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“content for output.” Id. at 89. We determine, however, that Petitioner’s argument under Step 2A Prong One that claim 1 is directed to the “obtaining content for output” is not substantially different from the Examiner’s determination that claims 1‒20 recite “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis.” Compare Pet. 37–88 (citing e.g. Electric Power), with Ex. 2001, 193–194 (also citing Electric Power). In both cases, the argument is the same or substantially the same, i.e., that similarly identified subject matter of the claim is obtaining (collecting) data and displaying (outputting) it. Nevertheless, as to Step 2A Prong Two, we determine that the claims at issue in the ’096 prosecution differ in material ways from the ’903 patent claims at issue in this PGR. Specifically, the ’096 patent claims recite a touchscreen interface not recited in the ’903 patent claims. Additionally, the ’903 claims focus on the “output device” as performing the patented steps but in the ’096 prosecution history the “‘information apparatus performs the patented steps and “is integral to the claims” (as the Applicant argued). See Ex. 2008 [comparison of ’096 prosecution claims and ’903 claims]; Ex. 2001, 150; see also Pet. 89 (“the claims at issue in the ’067 application were different than the claims of the ’903 patent addressed here.”). rejection and arguments in the ’096 prosecution history turns on whether the claims in this PGR recite different elements that must be determined to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (i.e., Prong Two of Step 2A). Petitioner argues that an essential element different than the ’096 claims, i.e. the output device, does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because the claims do not amount to an improvement to computer functionality. Pet. 37–72. We find this a close case. Nevertheless, due to the differences in the claims, we determine that the Examiner’s withdrawal of the § 101 rejection in light of the applicant’s arguments regarding the claim being directed to a specific technical solution is not substantially the same argument that Petitioner’s presents in the Petition as to Prong Two of Step 2A.” slip op. at 22
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“C. Lack of Written Description Support Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable for lack of written description for the same reasons it contends the ’903 patent is PGR eligible. Pet. 13–36. The Specification of the ’903 patent has substantially the same disclosures as the Specification of the ’413 application relied on by Patent Owner (see Prelim. Resp. 20) to which the ’903 patent claims priority. Having determined that the disclosures in the ’903 patent Specification and the ’413 application is insufficient to provide written description support for the at least claim 1, we also determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that at least claim 1 is unpatentable for the same reasons. Thus, we exercise our discretion and institute post grant review of claims 1–20 challenged under this ground. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1369–60 (2018).” slip op. at 33
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateInstituted
“in the art at the time of the invention] would have understood that an output system/device could be (or include) an information apparatus. Prelim. Resp. 24. We determine that Patent Owner’s argument has a logical flaw––i.e., the fact that a particular device could be used alternately as an information apparatus or an output device does not necessarily mean that it was known by one of ordinary skill in the art to use a combined information apparatus/output device and have the new combined device perform all the additional functions required by the claims. “The knowledge of ordinary artisans may be used to inform what is actually in the specification, but not to teach limitations that are not in the specification, even if those limitations would be rendered obvious by the disclosure in the specification.” Rivera v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 857 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Rivera”). “The question is not whether a claimed invention is an obvious variant of that which is disclosed in the specification . . . . It extends only to that which is 1997). Patent Owner has not pointed to any disclosure in the ’413 application teaching that an “output device” can perform the functions of the “information apparatus” including its interactions with the “output device.” For example, claim 1 recites “wirelessly receiving, by the output system . . . output data from at least one server of the one or more servers over the Internet.” Ex. 1001, 37:28–32. At this stage, we find sufficiently persuasive Petitioner’s argument, which we discuss above, that the only written description support for an “output device” that performs the claimed functions by accessing the Internet provided by Patent Owner is not an “output device” but an “information apparatus.” Prelim. Resp. at 27–29.” slip op. at 29
§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Mayo · Bilski · Electric PowerPatents in suitUS 11,029,903 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 22, 2022 · IPR2021-01520 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution of inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 9-11, 13, 18, and 19 under § 325(d), finding the same art had been evaluated and no material Office error was shown.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“If “either condition of first part of the framework is satisfied,” we must then determine “whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. “An example of a material error may include misapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art where those teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Id. at 8 n.9.” slip op. at 16
- Other 314aNot reached
“III. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL Patent Owner argues that we should exercise our discretion under § 314(a) or § 325(d) to deny institution. See Prelim. Resp. 13–43; Prelim. Sur-reply 1–8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 325(d). Petitioner argues that we should decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution. See Pet. 8–12; Prelim. Reply 1–10. For the reasons explained below, we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution. Because we exercise our discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution, we do not reach discretionary denial under § 314(a).” slip op. at 15
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,686,193 - PTAB · Mar 17, 2022 · IPR2022-00093 · APJ Brent M Dougal · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–14 on all grounds in the Petition, granted LG’s motion for joinder with IPR2021-00923, and terminated and joined this proceeding.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Applying the standard set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim, we institute an inter partes review.1 Further, for the reasons set forth below, we grant the Motion for Joinder.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“In Apple v. Uniloc, the petitioner filed a first petition for inter partes review that was denied and then, after another party filed an additional petition for inter partes review of the patent, the petitioner filed its second petition with a motion for joinder. Apple v. Uniloc at 6. However, not only was that the second petition for inter partes review filed by the petitioner, but the petitioner was also barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) from filing any further petitions. Id. at 6–7. Thus, under these facts, among others, the panel exercised its discretion to decline institution of the petition after applying the General Plastic factors. Id. at 13. Here, however, none of the unique facts in Apple v. Uniloc are present. The Petition is substantially identical to the petition in IPR2021- 00923 (“the Apple IPR”), which it seeks to join, and it presents us with a standard “me too” petition with a motion for joinder. Patent Owner presents no unique facts here that separate the Petition from most other “me too” petitions with a motion for joinder, with the possible exception that Patent Owner sued both Petitioner and the petitioner in the Apple IPR for patent infringement, which is those parties only connection to one another identified by Patent Owner. See Prelim. Resp. 22–23.8” slip op. at 5
- Other 314aDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner argues that “[i]n view of the finite resources of the Board and . . . co-pending [ex parte] reexamination [No. 90/014,902 of the ’924 patent], the Director should deny the Petition” under 35 U.S.C. § 315(d). Prelim. Resp. 27.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Petitioner timely filed the Motion no later than one month after institution of the Apple IPR. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.122 (b). As noted, the Petition in this case asserts the same unpatentability grounds on which we instituted review in the Apple IPR. See Mot. 2. Petitioner also relies on the same prior art analysis and expert testimony submitted by the Apple petitioner. See id. Indeed, the Petition is nearly identical to the petition filed by the Apple petitioner. See id. at 6. Thus, this inter partes review does not present any ground or matter not already at issue in the Apple IPR. Id. If joinder is granted, Petitioner agrees to assume an “understudy role” and “will only assume the lead role in the proceedings if Apple is no longer a party to the proceedings or unable to advance arguments for one or more claims, or grounds, for example, because of § 315(e)(1).” Id. at 2. Petitioner further represents that it “will not advance any arguments separate from those advanced by Apple in the consolidated filings.” Id. at 3. Because Petitioner expects to participate only in a limited capacity, Petitioner submits that joinder will not impact the trial schedule for the Apple IPR. Id.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,194,924 - PTAB · Mar 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01158 · APJ Lynne E Pettigrew · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–20 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Palo Alto Networks would prevail in showing at least one challenged claim unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We consider each of these factors below.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“35 U.S.C. § 325(d) because every ground asserted in the Petition is based on the same or substantially similar art and arguments already considered during prosecution of the ’899 patent. Prelim. Resp. 13–26. Section 325(d) states, in relevant part, “[in] determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses the following two-part framework in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In applying the two-part framework, we consider the following non-exclusive factors: (a) the similarities and material differences between the asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between the arguments made during examination and the manner in which Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586, Paper 8 at 17–18 (PTAB Dec. 15, 2017) (precedential as to § III.C.5, first paragraph). Factors (a), (b), and (d) relate to whether the art or arguments presented in the Petition are the same or substantially the same as those previously presented to the Office. Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10. Factors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the petitioner has demonstrated a material error by the Office. Id.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute an inter partes review if “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). After considering the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of at least one of the challenged claims of the ’899 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–20 of the ’899 patent on the grounds asserted in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and approximately two years of professional experience or equivalent study in network security and the use of machine-learning algorithms.” Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 30). Petitioner further asserts that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 30). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. Based on the information presented in the Petition and Dr. Lee’s testimony, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,503,899 - PTAB · Mar 15, 2022 · IPR2021-01157 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–17, finding a reasonable likelihood that the challenged claims are obvious over four combinations of Jungck, Shah, Ke, and Sarathy.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“1. whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may be granted if a proceeding is instituted; 2. proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected statutory deadline for a final written decision; 3. investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties; 4. overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel proceeding; 5. whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel proceeding are the same party; and 6. other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of discretion, including the merits. Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (“Fintiv”). In evaluating these factors, we “take[] a holistic view of whether efficiency and integrity of the system are best served by denying or instituting review.” Id. at 6. We consider each of these factors below.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“35 U.S.C. § 325(d). See Prelim. Resp. 19–35. Pursuant to § 325(d), the Director may elect not to institute a proceeding if the challenge to the patent is based on matters previously presented to the Office. Section 325(d) states, in relevant part, “[in] determining whether to institute or order a proceeding under this chapter, chapter 30, or chapter 31, the Director may take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to the Office.” The Board uses the following two-part framework in determining whether to exercise discretion under § 325(d) to deny institution: (1) whether the same or substantially the same art previously was presented to the Office or whether the same or substantially the same arguments previously were presented to the Office; and (2) if either condition of the first part of the framework is satisfied, whether the petitioner has demonstrated that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims. Advanced Bionics, LLC v. MED-EL Elektromedizinische Geräte GmbH, IPR2019-01469, Paper 6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential) (footnote omitted).” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“VII. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and four years of professional experience” and that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1004, Decl. of Dr. Vijay Madisetti (“Madisetti Decl.”) ¶¶ 34–36). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill. The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Petitioner’s description of a person of ordinary skill is commensurate with the subject matter of the ’906 patent and we apply it for purposes of this Decision.” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,749,906 - ROKU, Inc. v. Flexiworld Technologies, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Mar 14, 2022 · PGR2021-00111 · APJ Bryan F Moore · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because the challenged patent was not eligible for post-grant review; it found the priority applications supported claims 6 and 19 and did not reach the § 101 ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“For the above reasons, we are persuaded that the ’031 patent’s priority applications (pre-AIA applications) provide written description support for the claim limitation that “that the “output system” (claim 6) or “output device” (claim 19) can be an “Internet appliance.” Thus, we are not persuaded by Petitioner that claims 6 and 19 have an effective filing date after March 16, 2013. Accordingly, claims 6 and 19 do not render the ’031 patent eligible for post-grant review under AIA § 6(f)(2)(A). Accordingly, the information presented in the Petition does not establish that the ’031 patent is eligible for post-grant review.” slip op. at 16
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“Finally, the definition of output device in the priority ’765 Application (as in the Specification of the ’031 patent) is that an “[o]utput device [] is an electronic system capable of outputting digital content … Any device capable of playing or reading digital content in voice (e.g., music, speech) or data (e.g., text, document) is also a possible output device.” Prelim. Resp. 15 (alterations in original) (quoting Ex. 1011 (’765 application) ¶ 89, Ex. 1001, 16:29–41). An Internet appliance does fall within that definition. The ’765 Application also contemplates that an output device is a network device accessible through an IP address. See Ex. 1011, 14 (referring to “[i]dentification of an output device” by “IP address”). Put another way, the priority application adequately describes a device fitting the description of” slip op. at 14
§ 112 disclosurePatents in suitUS 10,846,031 - Attends Healthcare Products, Inc. v. Paul Hartmann AGAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 24, 2022 · IPR2020-01480 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–21 are unpatentable as obvious over Benning and Karami ’626; claims 8 and 21 are also unpatentable over that combination with Miyamoto ’499.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Decision granting institution, we preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s unopposed proposal. Inst. Dec. 8–9. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill and does not propose a level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp.; PO Sur-reply. In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the full record before us, we see no reason to disturb our preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, mechanical, chemical, or process engineering, or a related degree and 2–3 years of experience designing diapers” and “would have been familiar with different diaper wing configurations (e.g., integral- and separate-wing), nonwoven materials, cloth-like backsheets, and hook-and-loop fastening systems.” Pet. 17–18; Inst. Dec. 8–9; Ex. 1012 ¶ 18. This level of skill in the art is consistent with the disclosure of the ’990 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner proposes interpretations for “closure aid, comprising a . . . mechanical closure aid” and “over-abdomen retaining forces” with citations to the ’990 patent and declarant testimony. Pet. 22–23. Petitioner contends that formal interpretations of these claim terms are not required. Id. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed interpretations and does not provide expressly any proposed interpretation. See generally PO Resp.; PO Sur-reply. Patent Owner, however, argues that claim 1 “requires that the retaining forces between the closure aids and the chassis secure the diaper on the adult user and are lower than the retaining forces between the closure aid and the front side parts.” PO Resp. 9. Patent Owner argues that claim 21 has similar requirements. Id. In our analysis of claims 1 and 21, we consider the parties’ dispute in view of Patent Owner’s reading of the claims and determine that Petitioner still shows that its proposed combination teaches or would have rendered obvious the above-quoted limitations. Thus, we determine that an express interpretation of the claims’ limitations is not necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Vivid, 200 F.3d at 803 (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017 (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“’626 states that “fastener elements 41, 42 do not require landing zones and may engage directly with any portion of the nonwoven surface constituting the frontsheet 30, backsheet 32 or wings 40 of the brief.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 40. We also find that other relied-upon portions state that “nonwoven 50, which defines an exposed outer surface of at least one of the frontsheet 30, backsheet 32, and wing 40, contains a plurality of bonded fibers” and “[i]t will be appreciated that the backsheet may be formed of the above-identified nonwoven with a polypropylene or polyethylene film backing or as a laminate or like composite of a plurality of nonwovens.” Id. ¶¶ 62, 64. Karami ’626, thus, expressly teaches fastener elements that can engage directly with any portion of a nonwoven surface that may be formed with a film or laminate and that such a nonwoven can form a backsheet.” slip op. at 43
- Obviousness (§103) › KSR rationalesMotivation foundDecided for petitioner
“Benning to use Karami ’626’s film-nonwoven laminate for Benning’s underlayer 30, then the modified diaper would have material sections “of a non-woven material” with “a surface weight of 10 to 150 g/m2, in particular 20–100 g/m2, and specifically of 25–50 g/m2” and a backsheet with “relatively lower basis weights of 15–30 gsm (optimally 20 gsm).” Pet. 57; Ex. 1002 ¶ 32; Ex. 1004 ¶ 65. Based on these express teachings, we determine that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified Benning’s diaper to have material sections made of nonwoven material of “25–50 g/m2” and an underlayer or backsheet of “optimally 20 gsm.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 32; Ex. 1004 ¶ 65. In other words, one of ordinary skill in the art following the express preferences of Benning and Karami ’626 would have modified Benning’s diaper to have a lower basis weight nonwoven for the underlayer or backsheet (“20 gsm”) with the already relatively heavier basis weight nonwoven for the material sections or wings (“25–50 g/m2”). Ex. 1002 ¶ 32; Ex. 1004 ¶ 65. Turning to whether the stated preferences in paragraph 65 of Karami ’626 relate only to Karami ’626’s T-shaped diaper, we find that Karami ’626 in other paragraphs repeatedly describes its improved and preferred minihook fastener element together with a preferred nonwoven having a “basis weight of 13–50 gsm.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 14, 15, 63; see also id. at claims 16, 17, 20, 54. Karami ’626, thus, teaches that its preferred minihook fastener element would engage an “optimally 20 gsm” backsheet, regardless of whether it was used in its T-shaped brief 12 or diaper 14, because it would still be a preferred nonwoven having a “basis weight of 13–50 gsm.” See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 14, 15, 63. Karami ’626 also does not further limit its preferred nonwoven to those that have a film backing or laminate. See id. ¶ 64 (“It will be appreciated that the backsheet may be formed of the aboveidentified nonwoven with a polypropylene or polyethylene film backing or as a laminate or like composite of a plurality of nonwovens.”) (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 15, 63 (describing a preferred nonwoven with particular fibers and interstice size but not specifying any film or laminate). Having determined above that the full record supports Petitioner’s asserted motivations of “provid[ing] a more comfortable and visually appealing cloth-like outer surface for Benning’s diaper” and “improv[ing] adjustability by enabling fasteners like Karami ’626’s” for using Karami ’626’s film-nonwoven laminate, we determine that Petitioner shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use a lower basis weight nonwoven, such as a “20 gsm” nonwoven, because (1) such a nonwoven is described as “optimal[],” (2) would be in a lower part of the “13–50 gsm” range for the preferred nonwoven to use with Karami ’626’s preferred minihook fastener element, and (3) would “provide a more comfortable and visually appealing cloth-like outer surface for Benning’s diaper.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 65; Ex. 1019, 1:55–2:32; Ex. 1023, 8:3–28; Ex. 1037 ¶ 60; see also Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 14, 15, 63.” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 8,708,990 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,708,990 - Attends Healthcare Products, Inc. v. Paul Hartmann AGAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 23, 2022 · IPR2020-01479 · APJ Neil T Powell · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–54 are unpatentable under §103 over combinations including Benning and Karami ’626, with additional references for certain claims.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In our Decision granting institution, we preliminarily adopted Petitioner’s unopposed proposal. Inst. Dec. 8–9. Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill and does not propose a level of ordinary skill. See generally PO Resp.; PO Sur-reply.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“In our analysis of claims 1 and 34, we consider the parties’ dispute in view of Patent Owner’s reading of the claims and determine that Petitioner still shows that its proposed combination teaches or would have rendered obvious the above-quoted limitations. Thus, we determine that an express interpretation of these limitations is not necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute. Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803 (holding that “only those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy”); Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017 (citing Vivid Techs. in the context of an inter partes review). We also determine that no other claim term requires express interpretation. See id.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Taking these express teachings together, we determine that Karami ’626 provides factual support for Petitioner’s asserted motivation to use a film-nonwoven laminate like Karami ’626’s for Benning’s underlayer 30 because the film-nonwoven laminate would “improve adjustability by enabling fasteners like Karami ’626’s to ‘[e]ngage directly with any portion of [a diaper’s] nonwoven surface[s]’ to secure the diaper on a wearer.” Pet. 53–54 (alterations in original) (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 40; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 112– 113). Petitioner also contends that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to use Karami ’626’s film-nonwoven laminate for Benning’s underlayer 30 because Karami ’626’s film-nonwoven laminate would “provide a more comfortable and visually appealing cloth-like outer surface for Benning’s diaper.” Pet. 53 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 40; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 112–113). Record evidence also supports Petitioner’s additional asserted motivation. Ex. 1012 ¶ 113; Ex. 1019, 1:55–2:32; Ex. 1023, 8:3–28; Ex. 1037 ¶ 60. Regarding whether these teachings are limited to Karami ’626’s T-shaped diaper, Karami ’626 expressly states that “absorbent article 10 is in the form of a T-shaped brief 12, although it may alternatively be in the form of a diaper 14 (as illustrated in FIGS. 9 and 10) or a pull-up 16 (as illustrated in FIG. 8)” and that “[t]he disposable article may be a diaper, a T-shaped brief, or a pull-up.” Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 35, 78. Karami ’626 also states that: Referring now to FIGS. 9 and 10, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the same or analogous improvements in the fit, appearance and economy of diapers 14 according to the present invention, with tape tab or patch fastener elements 76 (adjacent opposed lateral edges of the back portion 20), may be realized.” slip op. at 43
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“In particular, we find that (1) Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the prior art of record, (2) Benning, Karami ’626, Miyamoto ’499, Jacobs, Anderson, and Fernfors teach or suggest all the limitations of claims 1–54, (3) one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Benning, Karami ’626, and at least one of Miyamoto ’499, Jacobs, Anderson, and Fernfors with a reasonable expectation of success, and (4) no objective evidence of nonobviousness has been presented in relation to claims 1–54. Weighing these underlying factual determinations, a preponderance of the evidence persuades us that claims 1–54 of the ’249 patent are unpatentable over Benning and Karami ’626, and the same combination further modified by Miyamoto ’499, Jacobs, Anderson, or Fernfors. Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361.” slip op. at 62
Patent outcomesUS 8,771,249 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,771,249 - Palo Alto Networks, Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 22, 2022 · PGR2021-00108 · APJ Aaron W Moore · PGR · Institution
Institution was denied because the petition did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–20 were unpatentable, including because the asserted combination did not link rule generation to the packet correlation.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Obviousness Analysis A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, primarily: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.6 Petitioner asserts that claims 1–2, 7–8, 10, 12–13, and 17–18 are unpatentable under § 103 as obvious in view of Paxton and Sutton. See Pet. 6, 18–64. For the reasons described below, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and evidence.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field, and approximately 2-3 years of experience in the design or development of telecommunication systems, or the equivalent” and that “[a]dditional graduate education could substitute for professional experience, or significant experience in the field could substitute for formal education.” Pet. 13–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 18–20). Patent Owner does not address this issue in the Preliminary Response. As Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s characterization of the level of skill in the art, and because we find it generally consistent with the disclosures of the ’797 patent and the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of this analysis. C.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Patent Owner argues that “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of the terms “determining . . . a first plurality of log entries” and “determining . . . a second plurality of log entries” is “identifying” or “ascertaining” log entries.” Prelim. Resp. 16. Patent Owner also argues that “[t]he terms “provisioning, . . . based on the determined correlation, . . . rules configured to identify the first plurality of packets received by the network device,” and “provisioning, . . . based on the determined correlation, . . . rules configured to identify the second plurality of packets transmitted by the network device” (“provisioning rules”) . . . should be given their plain and ordinary meaning—rules configured to identify packets.” Prelim. Resp. 20. Neither party, however, argues that the prior art arguments presented in the Petition turn on the construction of these terms. Instead, it appears that they are raised as claim construction issues only because Petitioner is challenging the language under Section 112. We will discuss the Section 112 arguments below, but do not see a dispute about the constructions offered by the parties above the makes a difference in the prior art analysis and, therefore, do not construe these terms at this time. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“respect to this limitation for several reasons, including that Petitioner’s “alleged rule generation and provisioning” is responsive to detecting malicious activity, not “based on the determined correlation.” Prelim. Resp. 38. On this record, we agree with Patent Owner. The claims require “generating, by the computing system and based on the determined correlation, one or more rules configured to identify packets received from the first host.” We do not have sufficient argument or evidence to show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to generate these rules “based on” the determined correlation.” slip op. at 16
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 10,931,797 - Attends Healthcare Products, Inc. v. Paul Hartmann AGAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 22, 2022 · IPR2020-01478 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–30 are unpatentable; the Board found them obvious over combinations based on Benning and Karami ’626.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, physics, mechanical, chemical, or process engineering, or a related degree and 2–3 years of experience designing diapers” and would have been “familiar with different diaper wing configurations (e.g., integral- and separate-wing), nonwoven materials, cloth-like backsheets, and hook-and-loop fastening systems.” Pet. 14–15; Inst. Dec. 8. This level of skill in the art is consistent with the disclosure of the ’398 patent and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 10
- BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable
“Because we determine that the same claims are unpatentable over proposed combinations including Benning and Karami ’626, we do not reach these additional challenges to these claims. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359 (2018) (holding a petitioner “is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged”).” slip op. at 114
Patent outcomesUS 8,784,398 unpatentableNonecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,784,398
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.