- Ascend Elements, Inc. v. Duesenfeld GmbHInstitutedPTAB · Nov 22, 2024 · IPR2024-00948 · APJ Kevin W Cherry · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 7–10, 12, 13, and 19 on all asserted grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the Hanisch-Dunagan combinations with added references.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“d) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious over Hanisch in view of Dunagan and Hayashi, Meador, or Shin. 5. Claims 2, 3, and 7–10 Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’097 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue those claims. Those challenges, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 26
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a master’s degree in chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, materials science/engineering, or a related field, and three to five years of experience in design and implementation of battery recycling processes.” Pet. 15–16. Patent Owner argues to the contrary that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have [had] at least a Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, materials science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry experience in the recycling or processing of lithium-ion batteries.” Prelim. Resp. 13. On the present record, neither party argues that the result would be any different should we adopt a different definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Patent Owner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’097 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner argues that “[t]he ’097 Patent expressly defines ‘drying’ to mean ‘the removal of at least one solvent in the conducting salt.’” Pet. 16 (quoting Ex. 1001, 2:23–25). Petitioner also argues that “[a]ll other terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning under Philips and do not need further construction for the purposes of this Petition.” Id. Patent Owner argues that “[n]o claim terms require express construction to determine that the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability of any claim and, thus, deny institution.” Prelim. Resp. 13. Based on the present record, we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this time.6 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“On the present record, we do not find the relationship between URT and Petitioner to be significant to the degree that raises concerns under Valve and General Plastic. In Valve, two factors affected the determination that there was a significant relationship between the two petitioners at issue: “Valve and HTC were co-defendants in the District Court litigation,” and “the petitions . . . challenge[d] the same claims of the [challenged] patent.” IPR2019-00062, Paper 11, 10. Here, one of these factors is absent, and the other is not entirely present. URT and Petitioner are not co-defendants in the related infringement lawsuit, which accuses only Petitioner. Ex. 2014, 1. As for the claims challenged in the two petitions, Patent Owner is correct that all claims challenged in the present proceeding are also challenged in IPR2024-00887, but the reverse is not true. The petition in IPR2024-00887 challenges claims 15–17 of the ’097 patent, none of which is challenged here. Compare Pet. 3, with IPR2024-00887, Paper 2, 4–5. Thus, there is a significant difference between the present situation and that in Valve.” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,050,097 - PTAB · Nov 20, 2024 · IPR2024-00887 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–3, 7–10, 12, 13, and 15–19 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 12 is anticipated by LithoRec.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with 1 In the Introduction and section headings of the Petition, Petitioner identifies claims 1–3, 7–9, 12, 13, and 15–19 as the challenged claims. Pet. i–ii. In the substantive content of the Petition, however, Petitioner includes claim 10 as a challenged claim as well. Id. at 34–35. respect to at least one of the challenged claims, and we institute inter partes review on all of the challenged claims based on all of the grounds identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, materials science, chemical engineering, or an equivalent field, as well as at least 2 to 3 years of academic or industry [experience] in the recycling or processing of lithiumion batteries.” Pet. 14. On the present record, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Prelim. Resp. 19. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’097 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner argues that “[n]o claim construction is needed,” because “[t]he claims are unpatentable under any reasonable interpretation.” Pet. 15. That said, Petitioner directs us to alleged definitions of several terms in the specification or prosecution history of the ’097 patent. Id. at 15–17. Patent Owner argues that “[c]laim construction is not required to deny the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 26. Based on the present record, we agree with both parties that we need not expressly construe any claim terms at this time.6 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“In order to anticipate a claimed invention, a prior art reference must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation.” Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In addition, “[a]n anticipatory reference need only enable subject matter that falls within the scope of the claims at issue, nothing more.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,050,097 - PTAB · Nov 1, 2024 · IPR2024-01010 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 8 on all petition grounds and granted Texas Instruments’ motion to join the NXP IPR as an understudy petitioner.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Thus, for the same reasons set forth in our institution decision in the NXP IPR, we determine that the information presented in the Petition shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in showing that claims 1–6 and 8 are unpatentable. See NXP Dec. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of the same claims on the same grounds as the ones on which we instituted review in the NXP IPR. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 5
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Petitioner agrees that, if joinder is granted, it will have an “understudy role.” Id. at 2–3, 6–8. Petitioner agrees to various restrictions as an understudy. Id. Along these lines, Petitioner will abide by the following conditions so long as NXP is actively participating in this proceeding: (a) TI shall not make any substantive filing and shall be bound by the filings of Petitioner NXP, unless a filing concerns termination and settlement, or issues solely involving TI; (b) TI shall not present any argument or make any presentation at oral argument unless an issue solely involves TI, or when addressing Board-approved motions that do not affect Petitioner NXP or its respective position; (c) TI shall not seek to cross-examine or defend the cross-examination of any witness, unless the topic of cross-examination concerns issues solely involving TI; (d) TI shall not seek discovery from Patent Owner on issues not solely involving TI; (e) TI will not rely on expert testimony beyond that submitted by Petitioner NXP unless Petitioner NXP is terminated from the case. If Petitioner NXP is not terminated from the case, TI agrees to rely entirely on, and be bound by, the expert declarations and depositions in the NXP IPR. Mot. 6–7. In sum, TI “will not assume an active role unless Petitioner NXP ceases to participate in the proceeding.” Mot. 2.13 The conditions above mean that joinder will have no impact on the NXP IPR trial schedule and will not complicate the NXP IPR briefing or discovery. These understudy provisions are consistent with the provisions imposed by, for example, Ecobee Techs. ULC v. EcoFactor, Inc., IPR 2022-01460, IPR2022-00473, Paper 7 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2023) and Apple Inc. v. INVT SPE LLC, IPR2019-00959, Paper 8 (PTAB May 30, 2019).” slip op. at 6
NonePatents in suitUS 7,345,245 - PTAB · Oct 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00679 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 28, 38, 39, 41–43, 53, 56–59, 61–63, and 65–68 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 28 was obvious over Krantz and Herrmann.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Inter partes review may not be instituted unless “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C.] section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of relevant experience in networking and network security, and related fields.” Pet. 4. Petitioner also asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering and at least three years of experience in networking operating systems and cybersecurity.” Prelim. Resp. 1. Alternatively, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in one of the foregoing and at least two years of experience in the aforementioned fields.” Id. On the present record, neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’484 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther
“Based on the present record, we agree with Patent Owner that the recited “reconfiguring the communication port” at least encompasses changing the association between the input port and output port of the access point. This is supported by the specification of the ’484 patent, which states: “Access Control 320 is configured to send commands to Switch Logic 317 in order to reconfigure members of Ports 305A-305G. This reconfiguration includes modifying the association of members of Ports 305A-305G with different members of VLANs 310A-310D.” Ex. 1501, 9:21–25; see also id. at 8:16–21 (similar disclosure with respect to “configuring and reconfiguring”). Notwithstanding, based on the present record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “reconfiguring the communication port” is limited to changing the connection between the input port and the output port of the access point. Instead, the ’484 patent makes clear that reconfiguration is merely “typically,” not necessarily, of this type. Ex. 1501, 3:20–25. For this reason, we need not and do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction at this juncture.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Based on the present record, we find Petitioner’s rationale sufficient for institution. Petitioner points to Krantz’s alleged goals of security and automation. Pet. 19. Petitioner (id.) and Dr. Houh (Ex. 1503 ¶ 64) both cite paragraph 19 of Krantz, which states that “[i]f credentials do not authorize full access . . . the server can respond by sending a notification . . . includ[ing] conditions (e.g., signup, renewal etc.) a user must satisfy to become authorized for []full access to resources.” Ex. 1505 ¶ 19. We are persuaded preliminarily that an ordinarily skilled artisan considering Krantz’s teachings of such conditions for full access would have had reason to apply Herrmann’s technique for checking a client’s antivirus security policy in the manner suggested by Petitioner. See, e.g., Ex. 1503 ¶ 64; Ex. 1506 ¶ 68. Krantz’s express teaching of conditions for a client to fully access a network (Ex. 1505 ¶ 19) also undermines Patent Owner’s argument about impermissible hindsight and Patent Owner’s suggestion that Krantz is limited to user authentication. Finally, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently, for purposes of instituting review, that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have expected success in making the combination because it would only require software modifications to Krantz’s system. See, e.g., Ex. 1503 ¶ 64.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,523,484 - PTAB · Oct 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00675 · APJ Christopher M Kaiser · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6, 11–13, 15–19, and 23–25 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success at least on obviousness over Krantz and Herrmann.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“e) Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 Based on the current record, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable as obvious in view of Krantz and Herrmann. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review with respect to all grounds asserted in the Petition. 5. Claims 2–6, 11–13, 15–19, and 23–25 Because Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success in proving that at least one claim of the ’484 patent is unpatentable, we institute on all grounds and all claims raised in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding, it is not necessary for us to provide an assessment of every challenge raised by Petitioner, especially, as in this case, when Patent Owner does not separately argue those claims. Those challenges, in our view, are best left for trial after full development of the record.” slip op. at 22
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“III. PARALLEL PETITIONS As noted above, Petitioner challenges the ’484 patent both in this proceeding and in IPR2024-00679. Petitioner argues that we should institute review in both proceedings because “the analysis of all 33 challenged claims . . . of the 484 Patent could not reasonably fit within the word limit for a single petition.” Paper 4, 2. Petitioner notes further that “addressing different sets of independent claims in each petition was most efficient given the differences between independent claim 1 (Petition 1 - IPR2024-00675) and independent claims 28, 41, 56, and 57 (Petition 2 - IPR2024-00679).” Id. Patent Owner does not argue that we should deny institution either in this proceeding or in IPR2024-00679 due to Petitioner’s having filed parallel petitions challenging the ’484 patent. Prelim. Resp. 1–44. Given Patent Owner’s acquiescence and Petitioner’s arguments, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution due to the parallel petitions.” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“in networking operating systems and cybersecurity.” Prelim. Resp. 1. Alternatively, Patent Owner argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “a master’s degree in one of the foregoing and at least two years of experience in the aforementioned fields.” Id. On the present record, neither party explains why the outcome of this case would be affected by the adoption of any of the proffered definitions of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art, as, on the present record, it appears consistent with the ’484 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on the present record, we agree with Patent Owner that the recited “reconfigur[ing] the communication device” at least encompasses changing the association between the input port and output port of the access point. This is supported by the specification of the ’484 patent, which states: “Access Control 320 is configured to send commands to Switch Logic 317 in order to reconfigure members of Ports 305A-305G. This reconfiguration includes modifying the association of members of Ports 305A-305G with different members of VLANs 310A-310D.” Ex. 1501, 9:21–25; see also id. at 8:16–21 (similar disclosure with respect to “configuring and reconfiguring”). Notwithstanding, based on the present record, we do not agree with Patent Owner that “reconfigur[ing] the communication device” is limited to changing the connection between the input port and the output port of the access point. Instead, the ’484 patent makes clear that reconfiguration is merely “typically,” not necessarily, of this type. Ex. 1501, 3:20–25. For this reason, we need not and do not adopt Patent Owner’s proposed construction at this juncture. Based on the present record, we need not expressly construe any other claim terms.3 See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,523,484 - PTAB · Oct 23, 2024 · IPR2024-00676 · APJ Aaron W Moore · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4, 7–10, 14, 16, 22–23, 25, and 27 on the asserted obviousness ground based on Krantz and Herrmann.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“combination of Krantz and Herrmann (see Pet 19–99) and find that, on the record as it now stands, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one claim. As described above,” slip op. at 16
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of relevant experience in networking and network security, and related fields.” Pet. 4. Petitioner also asserts that “[l]ack of professional experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Id.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“combination of Krantz and Herrmann (see Pet 19–99) and find that, on the record as it now stands, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail with respect to at least one claim. As described above,” slip op. at 16
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportNot reached
“qualifies as prior art to the ’450 patent “because the InfoExpress inventors conceived of the invention [of the ’450 patent] before the effective dates [of Krantz and Herrmann] and exercised reasonably continuous diligence in reducing the claimed inventions to practice.” Prelim. Resp. 33–45. Petitioner disagrees that the present record sufficiently shows that the inventors of the ’450 patent conceived of the invention before the effective date of Krantz or Herrmann and that the inventors exercised reasonably continuous diligence in reducing that invention to practice. See Prelim. Reply 1–7. In particular, Petitioner raises questions with respect to the independence of Patent Owner’s evidence from the inventor testimony that evidence is intended to corroborate, as well as with respect to whether the evidence offered by Patent Owner sufficiently shows conception, reduction to practice, and reasonably continuous diligence. Id. We do not think the information of record is sufficient to antedate Krantz and Herrmann such that we should deny institution of inter partes review on that basis. First, Patent Owner’s arguments rely on the testimony of inventor Stacey C. Lum, who has not yet been subject to cross-examination. See Prelim. Resp. 35–45 (citing Ex. 2003). Second, Petitioner identifies several issues where further development of the record may be helpful. For example, Patent Owner’s asserted date of conception is associated with the date of an engineering specification included in the record as Exhibit 2011. See Prelim. Resp. 35–36 (citing Ex. 2003 ¶ 12; Ex. 2011; Ex. 2012). We agree with Petitioner (see Prelim. Reply 4–5) that it is unclear, based on the present record, whether Exhibit 2011 corroborates the testimony supporting Patent Owner’s conception date given that the present record does not establish the author of Exhibit 2011. See Ex. 2003 ¶ 22 (inventor Stacey C. Lum testifying only that “InfoExpress personnel drafted EX2011”). These and other issues relating to the prior-art status of Krantz and Herrmann are, in our view, best left for trial after full development of the record.3” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,677,450 - PTAB · Oct 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00697 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. Prelim. Resp. 3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Preamble limiting or notPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends “the preamble of claim 1 is limiting based on Petitioner’s assertion in the District Court and based on the District Court’s order.” Prelim. Resp. 6. Patent Owner also contends “the District Court agreed with Patent Owner and ordered that the ‘control component’ term has its plain and ordinary meaning and is not subject to means-plus-function treatment.” Id. Patent Owner finally contends “there is no need for the Board to make claim construction determinations about Section 112, Paragraph 6 to decide institution.” Id. As to the preamble, we agree, for purposes of this decision, that claim 1’s preamble is limiting. The parties agreed that this preamble is limiting in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Const. 10.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)Term construed board ownTerm construed patent owner constructionMixed
“As to the “driving component” recitation, the parties agreed to a construction in the District Court case. Dist. Ct. Constr. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the parties’ agreed construction. Pet. 6. The parties agreed the “driving component” term is a means-plus-function term. Dist. Ct. Constr. 11. The function is “drives the moveable component in each of two opposite directions.” Id. Corresponding structure includes “coils 420, 514, 626, 1202, 1204, 1302, 1304, 1412, 1414, 1510 (also shown in Figs. 16–17); electromagnets shown in Figs. 10–11; and equivalents thereof.” Id. As to “control component,” the District Court held that the term is not a means-plus-function term because the claim defines the term structurally by requiring a “microprocessor,” “control program,” and “switch.” Dist. Ct. Constr. 17–22. For purposes of this Decision, we agree with the District Court that means-plus-function treatment does not apply to the “control component” recitation because structure in claim 1 defines the component. Given the context provided by claim 1 as a whole, a person having ordinary skill in the art would have understood the “control component” as identifying a specific structure (requiring a microprocessor, control program, and switch as claim 1 recites). See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that the means-plus-function inquiry depends on “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for a structure”).” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“With respect to other claim terms, Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim based on the ordinary and customary meaning of these terms. Thus, no other claim terms require express construction for purposes of this Decision. See, e.g., Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 11
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,093,767 - PTAB · Oct 21, 2024 · IPR2024-00698 · APJ Brian D Range · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–5 under all six asserted § 103 grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Apple would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” The following findings of fact and conclusions of law are not final, but are made for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner meets the threshold for initiating review. Any final decision shall be based on the full trial record, including any response timely filed by Patent Owner. Any arguments not raised by Patent Owner in a timely-filed response may be deemed waived. For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We hereby institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–5 of the ’767 patent based upon Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“On June 21, 2022, the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Memorandum”),7 which states, among other things, that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Memorandum 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). In a September 25, 2024, submission, Petitioner has stated that “[Petitioner] will not pursue [in the related litigation] the same invalidity grounds raised (or any grounds that could have been raised) [in this IPR].” Ex. 1048 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12). In view of this stipulation, we do not exercise discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 12
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“Second, we determine both petitions, at this stage, to be strong. Patent Owner has not refuted the obviousness merits of either Petition, and, at this stage, we do not independently identify a flaw in Petitioner’s analysis. Third, we agree with Petitioner that it could not have reasonably addressed both the Shahoian and Izumi theories in one petition. Petitioner’s Notice 4. At the time Petitioner filed its petitions, Petitioner was reasonably uncertain as to whether or not the term “control component” is a means-plus-function term. If means-plus-function, Petitioner was reasonable in taking extra effort to address the term. Petitioner did not have space in one Petition to address both a means-plus-function possibility while also addressing both Shahoian and Izumi theories. Fourth, granting both Petitions will not place an undue burden on Patent Owner. As Patent Owner emphasizes, only five claims are at issue. Resp. 19–20. Moreover, we indicate, in this decision, our preliminary agreement with the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas that “control component” should not be construed as means-plus-function. See Section III(C), supra. Based on this indication, we hope that the parties may be able to narrow the focus of this proceeding at trial. We determine that these four reasons, along with all other circumstances specific to this particular matter, cumulatively weigh against exercising discretion to deny institution for this particular matter.” slip op. at 14
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the degree. Pet. 4 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30–31). Patent Owner contends a POSITA would have had (1) a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a comparable field of study, and (2) at least two years of professional experience with electro-mechanical control systems, or other similarly relevant industry experience. Prelim Resp. 3. Additional relevant industry experience may compensate for lack of formal education or vice versa. Id. Patent Owner further contends this is similar to Petitioner’s POSITA contention. Id. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the ’767 patent specification and the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,093,767 - Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Oct 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00808 · APJ Norman H Beamer · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding Apple had not shown that a second petition challenging the same claims was warranted.
RulingsInstitution decision- Other 314aInstitution denied discretionary otherInstitution denied
“Given Patent Owner’s stipulation, we see little justification for instituting both IPRs. In addition, we note that the primary reference asserted here is also asserted as a secondary reference in IPR806. IPR806, Paper 3, 1. Moreover, there are 14 claims of the ’830 patent are at issue, and the Board has previously held that a “Petitioner’s contention that 20 claims is a quantum of claims that could not addressed in a single petition strains credulity.” Apple, Inc. v. Koss Corp., IPR2021-00686, Paper 12 at 13 (PTAB Oct. 12, 2021). Therefore, based on these circumstances, we find that the reasons provided by Petitioner do not show that a parallel petition is warranted.” slip op. at 10
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 9,941,830 - Apple Inc. v. Resonant Systems, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 15, 2024 · IPR2024-00807 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 2 and 3 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“Office (“USPTO”) issued a Memorandum titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings With Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Memorandum”),8 which states, among other things, that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Memorandum 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). In a September 18, 2024 letter, Petitioner states that “Apple hereby stipulates that if the PTAB authorizes petitioner to enter this stipulation into evidence in IPR2024-00807 and institutes the proceeding, Apple will not pursue in the above-captioned litigation the same invalidity grounds raised (or any grounds that could have been raised) in IPR2024-00807 for any claim of the patent.” Ex. 1048 (citing Sotera, IPR2020-01019, Paper 12). 8 The Memorandum is available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/interim_proc_discretion ary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_memo_20220621_.pdf. Applying the guidance provided in the Memorandum, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution in this proceeding under Fintiv because Petitioner submitted a Sotera stipulation.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any preliminary response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons explained below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all remaining challenged claims, claims 2 and 3, and the grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s expert declarant contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA), would have had a degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or a related technical field, and at least 2–3 years of experience related to the design or development of systems incorporating linear actuators; additional years of experience could substitute for the advanced-level degree. Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. Patent Owner offers “a similar level of ordinary skill in the art.” Prelim. Resp. 4. Based on a review of the record, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art and ’337 patent specification.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this proceeding, the parties agree that independent claim 2 includes means-plus-function limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.9 Pet. 2–6; Prelim. Resp. 7–14. An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means . . . for performing a specified function without the 9 As indicated above, statutory citations are to the pre-AIA version of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See supra note 1. recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. In particular, the parties agree that the “driving component” and “control component” requirements of independent claim 2 are means-plus-function limitations. Pet. 2–6; Prelim. Resp. 7–14. Construing a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 involves two steps: 1) identifying the claimed function and 2) identifying in the specification the corresponding structure that performs the claimed function. Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002).” slip op. at 10
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,860,337
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.