- Helen Of Troy Limited v. Tomy International, Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Feb 7, 2022 · IPR2021-01208 · APJ Frances L Ippolito · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–21 because the Petition did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on anticipation by Song or obviousness over Song alone, with Kilion, or with Kassai.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and any response thereto shows “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the Petition, Preliminary Response, and evidence of record, we determine the information presented in the Petition does not establish a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not institute inter partes review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. U.S., 702 F.2d 1005, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the invention of the ’176 patent “would be someone with a Bachelor’s degree in industrial design or furniture design with a focus on designing adjustable or reconfigurable furniture, or with one to two years of experience designing adjustable furniture or other products for infants or children.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 10). Patent Owner indicates that it “does not submit a different level of ordinary skill than the Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 11. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal as reasonable and consistent with the prior art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner states that it “does not believe any special claim constructions are required for the Board to conclude that the asserted prior art renders the challenged claims unpatentable.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner generally agrees, stating that “the Board does not need to construe the claims to deny institution.” Prelim. Resp. 11. We determine that for the purposes of this Decision, it is unnecessary to expressly construe these claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Only terms in controversy must be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy); see also Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs in the context of an inter partes review).” slip op. at 8
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“that Patent Owner has the better position. With respect to Petitioner’s annotated versions of Song’s Figures 2 and 3, we agree that Petitioner’s arguments are not supported. To be sure, drawings may be relied upon for the purposes of anticipation. In re Bager, 47 F.2d 951, 953 (CCPA 1931) (“Description for the purposes of anticipation can be by drawings alone as well as by words.” (citation omitted)). Nonetheless, an ambiguous reference cannot anticipate a claim. Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017). With respect to Figure 3, Song does not expressly teach that the bottom portion of water tank 3 is rigid. Rather, Song teaches that water tank 3 is made with foldable wall 2 that can be folded inward. Ex. 1005, 3. The support legs are also foldable to the inside of support levers 4 and each part can be joined and affixed in a small volume. Id. In other words, the walls, legs, and levers are folded together into a small volume to make the bathtub “convenient to carry.” Id. As such, we agree with Patent Owner that Figure 3 may very well depict the folded bathtub with a taut or folded wall (including the tank bottom) rather than a rigid material. The point, here, though is that we cannot tell from Figure 3 why the tank bottom is depicted as it is shown. Moreover, Song’s express description of the folded bathtub shown in Figure 3 does not support Petitioner’s position that the straight tank bottom must be rigid. Similarly, it is ambiguous as to whether Figure 2 uses cross-hatching to depict a rigid material for any illustrated structural components. Indeed, the left-side leg attachment of Figure 2 shows white dots against black. Id. at Fig. 2. But at the opposite side, the companion leg attachment near “6” does not show the same pattern. Id. Moreover, lid body 9, which is made from a synthetic resin, has no cross-hatching. Id. Further, the pattern presented in the magnified version (provided by Patent Owner) of Figure 2 shows uneven and inconsistent markings at the bottom of water tank 3. Thus, it is unclear whether the identified portion at the tank bottom contains any cross-hatching or intentional markings. Likewise, even if we were to apply purported drafting conventions (e.g., MPEP § 608.02) to a Japanese patent application, the relied upon markings shown in Figure 2 still do not show cross-hatching “with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.” Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Sys., Inc., 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).” slip op. at 15
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,545,176 - Amazon.Com, Inc. / Amazon.Com LLC et al. v. VB Assets, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 1, 2022 · IPR2020-01346 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–20 are unpatentable: claims 1–6, 10–16, and 20 as obvious over Kennewick, and claims 7–9 and 17–19 as obvious over Kennewick and Cooper.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have at least a Bachelor-level degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related field in computing technology, and two years of experience with automatic speech recognition and natural language understanding, or equivalent education, research experience, or knowledge.” Pet. 4. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertion. Resp. 3. Patent Owner and its declarant, Dr. Gershman, both apply Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA. Id.; Ex. 2021 ¶ 41. On this record and given the absence of any dispute, we adopt and apply Petitioner’s proposed formulation regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, which we find is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the cited prior art references. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. C. slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“1. “model” Petitioner asserts “the challenged claims should be interpreted in accordance with ‘the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.’” Pet. 6–7 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b)). Petitioner then contends that the plain and ordinary meaning of “model” encompasses at least the following IEEE definition of “model”: “An approximation, representation, or idealization of selected aspects of the structure, behavior, operation, or other characteristics of a real-world process, concept, or system.” Pet. 19; Ex. 1007 (IEEE definition of “model”). In its Response, “Patent Owner does not dispute the use of the IEEE definition of ‘model.’” Resp. 32. Accordingly, and consistent with our Institution Decision (see Institution Decision, 11), we determine that the claim limitation “model” encompasses an “approximation, representation, or idealization of selected aspects of the structure, behavior, operation, or other characteristics of a real-world process, concept, or system.” See Pet. 19.2 We decline to further construe this claim term. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017. 2 We note that this construction is consistent with the agreed-upon construction in the Related District Court Litigation. See Ex. 1032, 1.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITAPlain and ordinary meaningDecided for petitioner
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner has not sought to exclude Dr. Smyth’s testimony; it has merely raised questions about Dr. Smyth’s credibility and the weight we should provide this evidence. We have reviewed Patent Owner’s arguments regarding Dr. Smyth’s credibility and considered them when deciding how much weight to accord Dr. Smyth’s testimony. Notably, however, our Decision is supported by the entirety of the record, including the teachings of the prior art references detailed below.” slip op. at 16
Patent outcomesUS 9,015,049 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,015,049 - PTAB · Jan 13, 2022 · IPR2021-01215 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–24 and all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including over Yoshimura and Srinivas.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied discretionary otherDenied
“pending resolution of the PTAB trial allays concerns about inefficiency and duplication of efforts.” Fintiv, Paper 11 at 6. On the record before us, Petitioner has not produced evidence that a stay for the results of the instant inter partes review has been requested. The district court stay currently in force is for a limited time, until February 2022. Thus, the stay will expire approximately one month after issuance of this decision on institution. The effect of the current stay on the pending inter partes review proceeding would be extremely minimal, and would not appear to meaningfully allay any concerns of inefficiency or duplication of efforts. Furthermore, the parties’ reliance on other cases in which the district court judge considered requests for stay is misplaced. As the Board has explained, “[a] judge determines whether to grant a stay based on the facts of each specific case as presented in the briefs by the parties.” See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15, 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv II”). “We decline to infer, based on actions taken in a different case with different facts, how the District Court would rule should a stay be requested by the parties in the parallel case here.” Id. Accordingly, we find that this factor is neutral; i.e., it does not weigh for or against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 7
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review (“IPR”) of claims 1–24 of U.S. Patent No. 8,407,655 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’655 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Patent Owner, Synopsys, Inc., (“Patent Owner”), filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). An inter partes review may not be instituted on fewer than all claims challenged in the Petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359–60 (2018). Having considered the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we conclude that the information presented in the Petition establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail in challenging at least one of claims 1–24 of the ’655 patent as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §103(a). Pursuant to § 314, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 1–24 of the ’655 patent on all grounds raised in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has provided sufficient explanation, supported by evidence, of how each limitation of these claims is disclosed by Yoshimura. In view of the foregoing, we are persuaded that Petitioner is reasonably likely to prevail on its assertion that claims 1–3, 8, 11–13, 18, 21, and 22 would have been anticipated by Yoshimura.” slip op. at 23
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner alleges that a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made would have been motivated to use capacitive load values as a parameter value in Yoshimura, because the capacitive load values at the pins affect the rate at which the pins’ voltage can change, and would be needed to determine whether a timing or power requirement has been violated. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 180–181). Petitioner further alleges that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of succeeding in including capacitive load values in Yoshimura’s scenario image and/or multi-scenario ECO database, because Yoshimura’s database already includes similar types of parameter values. Id. at 40–41 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 181).” slip op. at 26
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,407,655 - PTAB · Jan 13, 2022 · IPR2021-01213 · APJ Michael T Cygan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 12, 13, and 16–19 based on both § 103 grounds: Block and Mehrotra, and Andreev and Sherwani.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Therefore, weighing the facts in this particular case, including the time invested by the parties and the district court in the parallel litigation, the extent to which the investment in the district court proceeding relates to issues of patent validity, and the timing of the filing of the Petition, we find that this factor weighs marginally, if at all, in favor of exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, for purposes of institution, Petitioner has provided sufficient explanations and supporting evidence concerning these claims. These explanations identify how each limitation of these claims is taught or suggested by the applied combination of prior art. Petitioner has further provided a rationale for each proposed combination, as well as an explanation how each combination would be accomplished with a reasonable expectation of success. Pet. 27–29.” slip op. at 27
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“the time the ’614 patent was filed. Pet. 4. For purposes of this proceeding, Petitioner and Petitioner’s expert “adopt the [following] definition for the person of ordinary skill in the art”: a person with “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering or electrical and computer engineering or equivalent and two or more years of experience with CMOS VLSI (very large-scale integration) circuit design, electronic design automation for VLSI, or ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) design fields.” Id. at 11; Ex. 1003 ¶ 70 (Robins Declaration). Petitioner notes that this assessment was presented to the district court by Patent Owner, but that Petitioner has also argued for a higher level of skill in the art. Pet. 11. Here, Patent Owner has not provided an assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. To the extent necessary, and for purposes of this Decision, we accept the assessment 2 Patent Owner does not identify any secondary considerations to be considered. Accordingly, we do not consider this aspect of the obviousness analysis at this stage of the proceeding. offered by Petitioner as it is supported by the Robins Declaration and is consistent with the ’614 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We apply the same standard that is used to construe a patent claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. §282(b), and construe each claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the patent, and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent, as articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019)). “[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). For the purposes of institution, we do not expressly construe any claim terms beyond the extent necessary in our discussion of the parties’ arguments below.” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,234,614 - PTAB · Jan 13, 2022 · IPR2021-01212 · APJ Jennifer Meyer Chagnon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–8, 11–20, and 23–25 on all petitioned grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Sano.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“a stay for the results of the instant inter partes review has been requested. The district court stay currently in force is for a limited time, until February 2022. Thus, the stay will expire approximately one month after issuance of this decision on institution. The effect of the current stay on the pending inter partes review proceeding would be extremely minimal, and would not appear to meaningfully allay any concerns of inefficiency or duplication of efforts. Furthermore, the parties’ reliance on other cases in which the district court judge considered requests for stay is misplaced. As the Board has explained, “[a] judge determines whether to grant a stay based on the facts of each specific case as presented in the briefs by the parties.” See Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 15 at 12 (PTAB May 13, 2020) (informative) (“Fintiv DI”). “We decline to infer, based on actions taken in a different case with different facts, how the District Court would rule should a stay be requested by the parties in the parallel case here.” Id. Accordingly, we find that this factor is neutral; i.e., it does not weigh for or against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Conclusion as to Claim 1 Petitioner’s contentions and cited evidence as to claim 1, summarized above, are persuasive on the preliminary record now before us. As noted, Patent Owner does not present any argument directed to the patentability of the challenged claims at this stage of the proceeding. Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of Sano. 3. Independent Claims 13 and 25 Independent claims 13 and 25 recite a computer-readable storage medium and computer system, respectively, for generating a clock-tree on an integrated circuit, but otherwise recite limitations similar to those of claim 1. Petitioner relies on the same teachings of Sano for claims 13 and 25 as those discussed above for claim 1. See Pet. 57–58; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 138, 140–141. Based on the current record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that independent claims 13 and 25 would have been obvious in view of Sano.” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness.8 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). An obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; accord In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, Petitioner cannot satisfy its burden of proving obviousness by employing “mere conclusory statements.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, Petitioner must articulate a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the prior art references. In re NuVasive, 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We analyze the asserted grounds of unpatentability in accordance with these principles to determine whether Petitioner has met its burden to establish a reasonable likelihood of success at trial.” slip op. at 20
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,546,567 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Arbor Global Strategies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00391 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 3, 5–9, 11, 13–17, 19–22, 25, 26, 28, and 29 are unpatentable as anticipated by Alexander or obvious over the stated prior-art combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art as we did in the Institution Decision, which comports with the teachings of the ’035 patent and the asserted prior art. See Inst. Dec. 19. Patent Owner’s proposed level is slightly lower than Petitioner’s but it overlaps with Petitioner’s proposed level. Even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level, the outcome would remain the same. C.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under the same standard applied by district courts, claim terms acquire their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Based on the current record, no terms require explicit construction. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’. . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D.” slip op. at 9
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“does not support Patent Owner’s argument about “undue experimentation” with respect to how to combine the teachings of Koyanagi and Alexander to arrive at the claimed processor module. In the passage containing the quoted testimony that Patent Owner relies upon, Dr. Shanfield testifies as follows: You have obviously got to have a circuit in mind that you're wanting to create a system-level circuit, a module-level circuit; and so you’re going to need to consider which connections you want a TSV connecting to something below. So you don't just slap it together without worrying about what connects to what. On the other hand, the putting together of the -- in Bertin, he describes the putting together of these chips and how that can be done in detail. And that piece of it is -- I guess you could characterize that as something that comes with the process and in itself isn’t something you think specifically about every one of 50,000 connections. They’re all done by the process that he gives an example of. Ex. 2014, 82:4–19.13 Dr. Shanfield’s testimony indicates that artisans of ordinary skill readily would have been able to connect different die circuits together “obviously” with “a circuit in mind . . . to create a system-level circuit, [or] a module-level circuit . . . consider[ing] which [TSV] connections [she] 13 Bertin (Ex. 1009) is employed in the ground discussed below. See infra § II.G. want[s].” See id. As Petitioner similarly argues, “[n]othing in Dr. Shanfield’s testimony, however, suggests that Petitioner ‘slap[ped] together’ Koyanagi and Alexander.” Reply 14; Ex. 1030 ¶ 79 (testifying that Patent Owner quotes his testimony “out of context” and that “at the system or circuit design level, each TSV is an interconnection between specific circuits”).” slip op. at 34
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“Initially, Alexander, a prior art reference, carries a presumption of enablement. Antor Media, 689 F.3d at 1287–1288; Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355. Patent Owner argues that the presumption does not apply because “for a non-patent publication, such as Alexander, to be presumptively enabling, it must have been “cited by an examiner . . . barring any showing to the contrary by a patent applicant or patentee.” PO Resp. 13 (quoting Antor Media, 689 F.3d at 1288. Patent Owner also argues that “[w]hile it is true that a ‘[e]nablement of an anticipatory reference may be demonstrated by a later reference,’ the Federal Circuit has made clear that the later reference ‘must show that the claimed subject matter was in possession of the public more than one year prior to the applicant’s filing date.’” Id. at 16 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).8 Petitioner argues that Patent Owner “mispresents the law.” As Petitioner argues, ‘[a] prior art printed publication does not need to have been ‘cited by an examiner’ to be presumed enabling.” Reply 5. In Corephotonics, 2021 WL 2577597, at *4 (nonprecedential), in the context of AIA trial proceedings, the court held that “regardless of the forum, prior art patents and publications enjoy a presumption of enablement, and the patentee/applicant has the burden to prove nonenablement for such prior art” and that “[i]t was error for the Board to suggest otherwise.” The 1995 publication date of Alexander antedates the’035 patent’s effective filing date of December 5, 2001 by more than six years. See Ex. 1006, 1 (“0-7803-2702-1/95 $ 4.00 © IEEE-1995”); PO Resp. 4 (specifying “December 5, 2001” as “the earliest effective filing date of the ’035 Patent”); Inst Dec. 20–25 (finding the publication date of Alexander is 8 The “more than one year prior to the applicant’s filing date” requirement arises from “anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” See Bristol-Myers Squibb, 246 F.3d at 1379.” slip op. at 14
Patent outcomesUS RE42,035 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Arbor Global Strategies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2021 · IPR2020-01020 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
The Board held claims 1, 5, and 7 anticipated by Alexander, and all challenged claims unpatentable as obvious over the stated combinations.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner contends that “a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . would have had a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering or a related and either (1) two or more years of industry experience; and/or (2) an advanced degree in Electrical Engineering or related field.” PO Resp. 4–5 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 33). We adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art as we did in the Institution Decision, which comports with the teachings of the ’035 patent and the asserted prior art. See Inst. Dec. 19. Patent Owner’s proposed level is slightly lower than Petitioner’s but it overlaps with Petitioner’s proposed level. Even if we adopted Patent Owner’s proposed level, the outcome would remain the same. C.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). Under the same standard applied by district courts, claim terms acquire their plain and ordinary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Based on the current record, no terms require explicit construction. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’. . . .” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))). D.” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“In other words, contrary to Patent Owner’s arguments, Alexander need not enable “wafer-thinning technology,” because challenged claims 1, 5, and 7 at issue here do not require that technology. Even so, the ’035 patent admits the “wafer-thinning technology” was known and “developed by Tru-Sci Technologies” prior to the invention. See Ex. 1001, 2:20–30; Prelim. Resp. 18–19 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:20–30; Ex. 2008); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Enablement of an anticipatory reference may be demonstrated by a later reference”). Accordingly, an artisan of ordinary skill reading Alexander 9 Patent Owner does not challenge this preliminary finding in its Response. After a full review of the record, we incorporate and adopt this finding as supported by a preponderance of the evidence. would have considered Alexander enabled for such known technology at the time of the invention.10” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Contrary to these arguments, claim 9 does not recite or require a “stacked die hybrid,” “buffer cells,” any improvements in FPGA reconfiguration times, or a “3D IC.” Claim 9 recites a “reconfigurable computer system” in the preamble, but it does not even recite how the “memory” and “processor” functionally or structurally relate to the “first and second integrated circuit die elements” of the “processor module.” As indicated above, Alexander carries a presumption of enablement as a prior art reference. See Antor Media, 689 F.3d at 1288; Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355. Alexander employs multi-chip module fabrication techniques “to establish electrical contacts between the interconnect substrate and pads on individual dies.” Ex. 1006, 4. As to obviousness, Petitioner relies on known systems that include a microprocessor, FPGA, and memory. Pet. 22–23 (citing “APA Figure 1”). Petitioner persuasively shows that an artisan of ordinary skill readily could have connected the known FPGA module in a processor and memory system as a substitute for a prior art FPGA, with the system performing as predicted, as evidenced by the block diagram wiring connections in admitted prior art Figure 1 of the ’035 patent, in order to save space and increase processing speed with a reasonable expectation of success. See Pet. 10–11, 21–25 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 85–93). Patent Owner also alleges thermal issues in Alexander render the claimed combination “inoperable.” PO Resp. 25–28. Again, however, Patent Owner relies on a module or stack of a “3D FPGA with other power hungry components, such as logic dies including microprocessors” to support its arguments. Id. at 27. This argument mischaracterizes the breadth of claims 9, 13, and 15, which do not require a stack that includes a 3D FPGA stack with a microprocessor and memory in that stack, as Petitioner shows and as outlined above. Based on the foregoing discussion, Petitioner shows persuasively that” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS RE42,035 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Arbor Global Strategies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00394 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 13–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Koyanagi and Alexander, and independently over Bertin and Cooke.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Dr. Shanfield, Petitioner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention would have been a person having a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Physics with three to five years of industry experience in integrated circuit design, layout, packaging or fabrication. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 55–58. A greater level of experience in the relevant field may compensate for less education, and vice versa. Pet. 10.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“the Board’s preliminary construction only adds ambiguity to the meaning of this term because it requires “a number of vertical contacts that . . . provide contacts on the surface of the memory die,” and further, claim 1 already recites that “‘a second integrated circuit functional element’ has ‘a number of contact points distributed throughout the surfaces of said functional element.’” See id. at 9 (emphasis added). Therefore, Patent Owner offers the following “suggest[ion]”: “To the extent that the Board finds it necessary to mention contacts in the context of the claimed ‘memory array,’ Patent Owner suggests that the Board use the term ‘a number of vertical contacts distributed throughout the surface of and traversing the memory die.’” PO Resp. 8 (emphasis added). For reasons discussed further below and in the Institution Decision, the record, including the specification, supports Patent Owner’s suggestion, and we determine that Patent Owner’s claim construction suggestion is materially the same as the preliminary claim construction set forth in the Institution Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:41–44 (“[S]ince these differing die do not require wire bonding to interconnect, it is now also possible to place interconnect pads throughout the total area of the various die rather than just around their periphery.”) (emphasis added); Inst. Dec. 24–25. In addition to Patent Owner’s suggestion above, Patent Owner also argues that “the term ‘a memory array functional to accelerate external memory references to the processing element’ means ‘a memory array that allows the parallel loading of data through buffer cells.’” PO Resp. 6 (emphasis added). Patent Owner asserts that “[i]n its preliminary response, Patent Owner advocated that this term should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning.” PO Resp. 5. It is not clear if Patent Owner maintains (i.e., in its Response) that the phrase carries its plain and ordinary meaning.9 In any event, the record does not support Patent Owner’s proposed requirement for “buffer cells” under the plain and ordinary meaning of the “functional to accelerate” clause or under lexicography principles, prosecution history or otherwise, for the reasons advanced by Petitioner and as addressed below. In line with Patent Owner’s suggestion and as we similarly determined in the Institution Decision, the “functional to accelerate” limitations require “a number of vertical contacts distributed throughout the surface of and traversing the memory die in a vertical direction (vias) to allow multiple short paths for data transfer between the memory and processor.” See Ex. 1001, Fig. 4 (showing numerous contact points); Inst. Dec. 25 (materially similar construction); PO Resp. 8 (Patent Owner’s suggestion). We adopt and incorporate the claim construction findings in the Institution Decision, much of which we repeat here for completeness. See Inst. Dec. 19–25. slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“As Petitioner argues, the combined Koyanagi and Alexander system mimics the ’951 patent’s disclosure by employing stacked dies with a “large number of contact points distributed throughout the surfaces of the dies.” Pet. 29; see also supra notes 14, 16. Petitioner also provides evidence that an artisan of ordinary skill would have known of several advantages in stacking 3D chips with multiple vias including “high packing density,” “high speed,” “parallel signal processing,” and “integration of many functions on a single chip.” Id. at 4 (citing Ex. 1010, 1704; Ex. 1002 ¶ 39). Petitioner points to Koyanagi’s “key benefit” as “enab[ling]large data bandwidth in vertical data transfers” (Ex. 1007, 17) to mitigate bus bottlenecks, further showing that multiple vias provide for parallel signal processing and increased processing speed in stacked dies as found above. See Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1007, 17, 19); supra § II.C (Claim Construction); supra notes 14, 16. In other words, Petitioner shows how the combined teachings of Koyanagi and Alexander teach or suggest to an artisan of ordinary skill the accelerate clause in the challenged claims by providing a large number of short parallel via connections, thereby functionally enabling large data bandwidths and parallel processing, as was well-known at the time of the invention. See Pet. 4, 17–23, 28–29; Ex. 1007, 17–18; supra notes 14, 16; Reply 15–17; In re Graves, 69, F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(holding that “Rockwell . . . anticipates claim 4, even if it does not specifically disclose simultaneous monitoring of the output points, if simultaneous or parallel monitoring is within the knowledge of a skilled artisan”).” slip op. at 35
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“As Petitioner also argues and as summarized above, the Petition “provide[s] a detailed explanation of how Koyanagi and Alexander would have been combined to disclose each limitation of the Challenged Claims and why a POSITA would have been motivated to combine them––‘to create a 3D reconfigurable processor module with improved performance and areaefficiency.’” Reply 16 (quoting Pet. 17). By way of example, Petitioner’s annotated Figure 1M, which represents combined teachings of Koyanagi and Alexander, shows how to connect the dies together using conductive vias as challenged claim 1 requires. Petitioner also provides persuasive detail with respect to the remaining challenged claims at issue in this section (i.e., claims 4, 5, 8, 10, 13–15). See Pet. 31–46. By teaching similar stacking techniques for similar circuits including the use of conductive vias with logic dies including FPGAs, memory, and microprocessors, Koyanagi and Alexander collectively evidence a reasonable expectation of success without undue experimentation in arriving at the claimed invention. See Otsuka Pharm. Co., v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The inventor's own path itself never leads to a conclusion of obviousness; that is hindsight. What matters is the path that the person of ordinary skill in the art would have followed, as evidenced by the pertinent prior art.”). In other words, Petitioner shows that the claimed invention involves a routine combination of familiar elements to yield predictable results, namely combining Alexander’s known 2D-FPGA die with Koyanagi’s similar die stack, or simply substituting Alexander’s known 2D-FPGA die in place of a similar DRAM memory die in the die stack of Koyanagi, with the coupled circuits functioning with processing speed gains and other benefits as expected. See Pet. 27–29; Reply 14 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”)).” slip op. at 42
Patent outcomesUS 7,282,951 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,282,951 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Arbor Global Strategies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2021 · IPR2020-01021 · APJ Karl D Easthom · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 10, and 13–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Koyanagi and Alexander, and independently over Bertin and Cooke.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Dr. Shanfield, Petitioner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the alleged invention would have been a person having a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Physics with three to five years of industry experience in integrated circuit design, layout, packaging or fabrication. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 55–58. A greater level of experience in the relevant field may compensate for less education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“the Board’s preliminary construction only adds ambiguity to the meaning of this term because it requires “a number of vertical contacts that . . . provide contacts on the surface of the memory die,” and further, claim 1 already recites that “‘a second integrated circuit functional element’ has ‘a number of contact points distributed throughout the surfaces of said functional element.’” See id. at 9 (emphasis added). Therefore, Patent Owner offers the following “suggest[ion]”: “To the extent that the Board finds it necessary to mention contacts in the context of the claimed ‘memory array,’ Patent Owner suggests that the Board use the term ‘a number of vertical contacts distributed throughout the surface of and traversing the memory die.’” PO Resp. 8 (emphasis added). For reasons discussed further below and in the Institution Decision, the record, including the specification, supports Patent Owner’s suggestion, and we determine that Patent Owner’s claim construction suggestion is materially the same as the preliminary claim construction set forth in the Institution Decision. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 2:41–44 (“[S]ince these differing die do not require wire bonding to interconnect, it is now also possible to place interconnect pads throughout the total area of the various die rather than just around their periphery.”) (emphasis added); Inst. Dec. 24–25. slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“These claim construction arguments that rely on “buffer cells” fail for the reasons noted above, the challenged claims do not require buffer cells. See supra § II.C (Claim Construction). As summarized above, the ’951 patent describes in its abstract and other places, including in reference to Figure 4, providing accelerated data transfers and reconfiguration without buffer cells by using numerous short vias to connect circuits in the stacked dies. See id. As outlined above, Petitioner provides ample motivation supported by the record as to “how and why” an artisan of ordinary skill would have combined the stacked die features of Koyanagi with the similar features of Alexander, to include the well-known FGPA, and it shows how the vertical interconnections employed in both references track the disclosed invention to obtain the claimed acceleration. See, e.g., Pet. 29 (annotating Koyanagi’s Figure 1). Wiring similar well-known circuits with short conductive vias instead of long conventional conductors would have been obvious and well-within the ordinary skill of an artisan, motivated by many reasons (for example, speed/bandwidth gains, compactness, power consumption, FPGA design flexibility) as the Petition shows and as Koyanagi and Alexander suggest as discussed above. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, Abstract (describing a “fabrication technology” and “expected manufacturing yield”), 1 (describing “10,000 solder bumps” “to establish the vertical interconnections” and “enabling electrical interconnections between the two sides of the die,” by “adapting multi-chip module (MCM) fabrication technology”); Ex. 1007, 17 (similarly describing MCM technology and using 10,000 (105) “interconnections per chip” to make 3D MCMs “fabricated using our new integration technology”), Fig. 6 (showing “Fabrication sequence of 3D LSI”).” slip op. at 37
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“However, as Petitioner argues and as Dr. Chakrabarty confirms, using many short vertical conductive vias (e.g., TSVs) versus long conductive runs “reduces power consumption and improves heat removal (because TSVs also serve as heat pipes).” Reply 17 (citing Ex. 1007, 17). In other words, Dr. Chakrabarty acknowledges that [w]hat Koyanagi says is actually obvious to anybody who is skilled in the art. Anybody who is skilled in the art would know that via is conductive. It is a conductor for both electricity and for heat. And therefore, if you have lots of vias, you’re going to take out the heat. Ex. 1035, 256:9–15 (emphasis added); see Reply 17 (partially quoting Ex. 1035, 256:9–15). Therefore, as Petitioner persuasively argues, rather than ignoring thermal issues or deterring a person of skill in the art from combining Koyanagi and Alexander, “a POSITA would have been motivated to find a solution to the alleged thermal issues, and would have recognized that a large number of 3D interconnections between dies contribute to such a solution.” See Reply 21 (citing Ex. 1030 ¶ 53).” slip op. at 50
Patent outcomesUS 7,282,951 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,282,951 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Arbor Global Strategies LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 24, 2021 · IPR2021-00393 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 13, 14, 16–23, and 25–30 are unpatentable as obvious over Koyanagi and Cooke and over Bertin and Cooke.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Relying on the testimony of Dr. Shanfield, Petitioner contends that [a] person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) at the time of the ’226 Patent would have been a person having a Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, or Physics with three to five years of industry experience in integrated circuit design, layout, packaging or fabrication. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 45–48. A greater level of experience in the relevant field may compensate for less education, and vice versa.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“13.4 in claim 13) and “means for updating the plurality of configuration logic cells within one clock cycle” (limitation 22.4 in claim 22) are means-plus-function limitations and should be construed as per 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Pet. 9; PO Resp. 6–7. Both of these limitations listed above recite “means” and further recite a function, thus creating a presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 applies. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (“An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”); see also Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part) (quoting Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (holding that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 applies”). We agree with the parties that these limitations are means-plus-function limitations subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner, in focusing on this portion of the ’226 patent disclosure, does not adequately explain why buffer cells and configuration memory cells must be included in the proper construction of “wide configuration data port,” and seeks to import a functional description of the use of a wide configuration data port (“that allows parallel updating of logic cells in a programmable array through use of buffer cells”) into the claim construction. PO Resp. 11–14; PO Sur-reply 2–4. While the discussion in the ’226 patent describes an example of a wide configuration data port used in a specific way that aligns with Patent Owner’s proposal (Ex. 1001, 4:45– 59), other examples of the use of a wide configuration data port are included (id. at 4:59–65), and therefore we do not agree that one of ordinary skill would understand this use to be part of the construction of the term. We agree with Petitioner that the proper construction of the term does not require buffer cells to be specifically described. See Pet. Reply 6–9. Rather, we note that the specification of the ’226 patent contrasts loading of data to an FPGA in a byte serial fashion through a narrow port, which “results in [] long reconfiguration times,” with the use of a wide configuration data port, and therefore we determine that one of ordinary skill would understand the wide configuration data port, in contrast to the byte serial “relatively narrow” port, to include parallel connections between cells in the dies. See Ex. 1001, 4:3–9. This additionally is consistent with certain arguments by Patent Owner, for example in the Patent Owner’s Response, which opens with a discussion of the “inventive” processor’s arrangement of die-area contacts, such as through-silicon vias, “into a wide configuration data port” and we find that description more consistent with the proper construction of this term. PO Resp. 1–2; see also id. at 8 (“[T]he ’226 Patent specifically identifies that the wide configuration data port reconfigures both a programmable array and/or logic cells in one clock cycle because it can communicate with many cells (which form an ‘array’) in parallel, and is therefore considered ‘wide.’”)” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“While corresponding structure need not include all things necessary to enable the claimed invention to work, it must include all structure that actually performs the recited function.” Default Proof Credit Card Sys. Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Conversely, structural features that do not actually perform the recited function do not constitute corresponding structure and thus do not serve as claim limitations. Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1308–09, (Fed. Cir. 1998); see B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[S]tructure disclosed in the specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.”). Given our construction of wide configuration data port, Patent Owner’s argument that the corresponding structure for this limitation must require that buffer cells on one die element are connected in parallel to cells on another die element is based on the description of the use of buffer cells as used in the updating of the FPGA while it is in operation. PO Supp. Br. 3 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:50–54, Fig. 5). However, we note that this description is followed by the disclosure that “[t]he buffer cells 88 are preferably a portion of the memory die 66.” Ex. 1001, 4:50–54. It does not appear, therefore, that buffer cells are always a portion of the memory die, or are required when the FPGA is not in operation, and thus we decline to require in the corresponding structure that they be specified to be on a specific separate die element. Rather, we find that what is disclosed as actually performing the recited function of “reconfiguring the programmable array within one clock cycle” is “a wide configuration data port and contact points formed throughout the area of the first integrated circuit die element and another integrated circuit die element.” The support for this is found in the ’266 patent’s comparison of the long reconfiguration times through a narrow port (Ex. 1001, 4:3–9) with the time to reconfigure through a wide configuration data port with a significantly increased number of connections (id. at 4:45– 65), and the implementation of this in a module that has multiple dies “which have a number of corresponding contact points, or holes, 70 formed throughout the area of the [die] package” (id. at 4:9–20). The use of a wide configuration data port, as per our construction, implicates two die elements. This was reflected in our preliminary claim construction, for which the corresponding structure described “contact points distributed through the slip op. at 18
Patent outcomesUS 6,781,226 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,781,226
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.