• Netflix Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 17, 2024 · IPR2020-00646 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand

  On remand, the Board held claims 1, 5, 8, 9, 13–15, 18, and 21–23 unpatentable as obvious over Zetts and Kaku, with claims 5, 18, and 21 also obvious over Zetts, Kaku, and Seo.

  RulingsRemand decision

  • RemandDecided for petitioner

    “the Federal Circuit. Paper 49. On September 11, 2023, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in the appeal vacating our Final Written Decision and remanding for further proceedings consistent with its decision. Netflix, 80 F.4th at 1362. The Federal Circuit determined that we abused our discretion in finding that Petitioner had failed to articulate a field of endeavor. Id. at 1359. The Federal Circuit remanded to allow us to decide the “factual question of whether Kaku is directed to the same field of endeavor as the patent-in-suit.” Id. at 1361. The Federal Circuit, however, did not address the other three issues raised by Patent Owner since we did not decide those issues in the Final Written Decision and they were not presented for appeal. See generally Netflix.” slip op. at 3

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we stated the following:” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Petitioner has not shown that one of the prior art references is analogous to the claimed invention.” Final Dec. 9. On remand, the construction of this claim is an issue that must be decided to reach a conclusion on the patentability of the Challenged Claims of the ’792 patent.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “1. Analogous Art – Field of Endeavor Before turning to Petitioner’s analysis of the claims, we address” slip op. at 29

  Patent outcomesUS 8,472,792 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,472,792
• Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 12, 2024 · PGR2022-00053 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable under collateral estoppel; revised substitute claims 23–37 are allowed because Petitioner did not prove them unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableDecided for petitioner

    “The party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must show: (1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) [the party against who collateral estoppel is being asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. Google, 54 F.4th at 1381 (quoting In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Collateral estoppel may also operate to bar re-litigation of common issues in actions involving different but related patents. Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 252 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 98 F.3d 1328, 1329–32 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). We are persuaded that each of the four Google requirements is satisfied and, accordingly, agree with Petitioner that the challenged claims of the ’256 patent are unpatentable in light of our Final Written Decision in PGR2021-00096.” slip op. at 13

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable

    “specific requirements of the claims.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). But “failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims” is what Petitioner’s analysis of the claim limitations appears to do. Petitioner’s argument that “the focus of the claims” is captured by a single claim element (f3) not only ignores that that limitation recites performing two specific software tasks simultaneously—which we are not persuaded is an abstract idea—but also asks us to disregard multiple technical aspects recited in the claims, such as identifying a link, determining whether an installation client is available on the device, invoking the installation client, and redirecting to the device an app store. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 21:12–41; Revised MTA 24–25. That is, under Step 2A of the Guidance, we are neither persuaded that limitation f3, which Petitioner points us to, recites an abstract idea (Prong 1), nor that the other limitations recited in the independent claims fail to integrate the alleged abstract idea into a practical application (Prong 2). Petitioner characterizes the claims as directed to multitasking, which Petitioner describes as an example applied to improve a user experience, i.e., as related to organizing human activity. Pet. 29. Although the Guidance recognizes certain methods of organizing human activity, including certain activity between a person and a computer, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea, we are not persuaded that the claims here fall within the scope of such activity. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (listing fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions, and managing personal behavior or relationships as organizing human activity). The claimed invention may result in multitasking on the device, but the background instead of directing the user to an app store, thereby maintaining user experience with the foreground application, and do not recite an abstract idea. And although that process does result in improving user experience, the claims recite more than that mere result; they recite specific steps—invoking, without exiting the foreground software application, the installation client for downloading and installing applications on the device to run in the background—that accomplish the desired result. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding a method that employs a new kind of file in a computer security system directed to a non-abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of computer security writ large). Petitioner thus fails to establish sufficiently that the claims are directed patent ineligible subject matter under Step 2A of the Guidance.” slip op. at 52

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “When the application package 172 has been received by the client system 130, the App Manager 180 may extract or retrieve a set of requested permissions 174 from the application package 172, and present a request to the user for asking for approval to perform operations corresponding to the requested permissions, e.g., opening files, accessing contact information, accessing a camera on the client device 130, and so on. . . . In particular embodiments, when the requested permissions 174 have been requested, and a response specifying a set of accepted permissions 176 has been received from the user, the set of accepted permissions 176 may be compared to the set of requested permissions 174. If the sets are the same, then the installation process may continue, and the App Manager 180 may invoke an installer 182 to install the application package 172. Ex. 1003, 8:67–9:22 (emphasis added). That is, the set of permissions to be checked are obtained by the App Manager once the download of the application package to be installed is initiated. See id. at 8:59–61 (“when the download is initiated by a request sent from the client system 130 to the server 162, the server 162 may send the requested object, e.g., the download page 168 or the application package 172, back to the client system 130”). And these permissions relate to operations that the installed applications may perform, e.g., opening files, accessing contact information, accessing a camera on the client device. Id. at 9:6–7. These permissions may also indirectly determine whether the installation client can install that app. See id. at 9:33–38. There is no suggestion in Pasha, however, that these permissions have anything to do with the host application, i.e., the second software application. said second software application is eligible to use capabilities of the installation client.” RMTA 25; see also Ex. 1001, 15:11–14 (“The installation client, upon receiving an instant install link, checks the eligibility of the caller and if identified as eligible continues the process of downloading the app.”). Pasha does not teach or suggest checking eligibility of its host application in any way or at any point. Moreover, as Patent Owner points out, Pasha’s App Manager performs the eligibility check after it downloads the app package, further supporting that Pasha’s eligibility check has nothing to do with the host application.9 Dr. Almeroth testifies that “Pasha discloses the App Manager 180 confirming that it has obtained the required permissions, which, in [his] opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand may include inter alia that the ‘second software application’ (e.g., the host application invoking the app manager) is eligible to use its capabilities.” Ex. 1035 ¶ 68. Dr. Almeroth fails to cite any supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Id. Because we find no basis in the record for Dr. Almeroth’s conclusion, we give little weight to this testimony.” slip op. at 40

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Dr. Almeroth testifies that “Pasha discloses the App Manager 180 confirming that it has obtained the required permissions, which, in [his] opinion, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand may include inter alia that the ‘second software application’ (e.g., the host application invoking the app manager) is eligible to use its capabilities.” Ex. 1035 ¶ 68. Dr. Almeroth fails to cite any supporting evidence or provide any technical reasoning to support his statement. Id. Because we find no basis in the record for Dr. Almeroth’s conclusion, we give little weight to this testimony. 9 During oral argument, Petitioner pointed us to disclosure in Pasha that teaches that the permission dialog may be displayed to the user at different points in the download process. Tr. 47:24–48:8 (citing Ex. 1003, 22:21–42). As Patent Owner pointed out, this disclosure was not relied up on by Petitioner in its papers and is new evidence. Id. at 51:19–22; Paper 46, 4. Petitioner’s argument based on this new evidence is therefore forfeited. But even if we were to consider the cited disclosure from Pasha, it still only suggests that permissions need to come from the server after the download process has been initiated, and are therefore, unrelated to the host application. See Ex. 1003, 22:46–49 (“the requested permissions may be downloaded prior to downloading the application or may be extracted from the application package”). 24, 2022) (precedential) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)). As the Board explained in Xerox, such expert testimony “is particularly problematic in cases where, like here, expert testimony is offered not simply to provide a motivation to combine prior-art teachings, but rather to supply a limitation missing from the prior art.” Id. (citing Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple, Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).” slip op. at 41

  Patent outcomesUS 11,157,256 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousnesscites Alice · Berkheimer · Enfish · Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,157,256
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Ramot At Tel Aviv University, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 20, 2024 · IPR2022-01283 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–63 not shown unpatentable under either §103 ground because Petitioner did not sufficiently support the asserted digital mapping and delta limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Even assuming, arguendo, we were to credit Petitioner’s arguments that “it is sufficient for the prior art to render obvious a mapping exhibiting the deltas features; the prior art need not calculate the deltas themselves” (Pet. Reply 11) and that “Dr. Dallesasse agrees that modeling a Mach- Zehnder modulator as exhibiting a sinusoidal response—as Dr. Blumenthal did—was ‘reasonable’ ‘to a first order’” and “[a]ny other sources of non-linearity would merely be less significant, ‘second order effects,’” (id. at 12– 13), Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the sinusoidal response curve would look like the one Dr. Blumenthal proposes. Dr. Blumenthal asserts, without specifically or credibly explaining why, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have selected a region of the sinusoidal response curve that includes an inflection point such that deltas both decrease and increase over some portion of the curve being linearized. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 173–174 (scaling and shifting a sinusoidal response curve so that the curve contains an inflection point within the linearized region, but without adequately explaining the evidentiary basis for these selections); id. ¶ 52 (opining that “in the close vicinity of the center of the positive or negative inflection regions, otherwise known as the Quadrature point, the modulator is almost would have included regions on both sides of an inflection point). If a person of ordinary skill would have selected a region of the sinusoidal response curve on only one side of an inflection point, the evidence does not suggest that such a mapping would satisfy both limitations 1.8 and 1.9. At best, Petitioner presents an “obvious to try rationale”: In addition to the reasons mentioned above, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try a mapping scheme in which entries in the look-up table as taught by Taraschuk are selected such that successively decreasing inputs correspond to digital output entries with either decreasing, increasing, or similar deltas between their values. Doing so would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success. In that regard, the deltas between values of the corresponding digital outputs can either increase, decrease, or stay the same. Accordingly, there are only three possible relationships between deltas of successive digital outputs. With so few possibilities, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try each of them. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 196). The analysis for 13.8 is incorporated by reference in 13.9. See Pet. 53–54. Although there are three possible relationships between two, consecutive deltas, there are many possible sequences of deltas––Petitioner does not sufficiently show a finite number of solutions in its challenge. Petitioner’s obvious-to-try rationale is insufficient to show that a person of ordinary skill would have used a digital-to-digital-mapping in which there are regions in which the deltas are both decreasing and increasing. Moreover, Petitioner’s Reply includes positions not supported by a Reply Declaration from Dr. Blumenthal and thus, constitute attorney argument that is not sufficiently supported by evidence. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 14–15 (Petitioner arguing “Roberts’ design obviates the need for a separate,” slip op. at 32

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “Inst. Dec. 35 (citing Ex. 1006, 8:2, 8:8). Based on our review of the complete record developed during trial, we are persuaded to modify our preliminary determinations. For the reasons discussed below, we are persuaded that the scope of claim 1 does not encompass linear compensation methods effected by analog pre-distortion because the ’998 patent specification distinguishes analog pre-distortion (see Ex. 1001, 1:64–2:36) and the prosecution history specifically distinguishes analog pre-distortion from the claimed approach (see Ex. 3001, 172).6 We find persuasive Dr. Dallesasse’s testimony that “a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the [’998] patent would understand that th[e] [claimed] approach of mapping, based on the converter output pattern differs 6 Ex. 3001 is a portion of the prosecution history of U.S. Patent No. 11, 133, 872, a parent of the ’998 patent. Ex. 2022 ¶ 34 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–9 (’998 patent disclosing common, prior art solutions such as “an analog pre-distortion circuit to feed the modulator”); Ex. 1005, 2:53; Ex. 1006, 7:67–8:5, Fig. 6); Ex. 1001, 2:35– 37(the ’998 patent describing the need for a “digital to analog converter” that would “improve[] linearity of response without sacrificing efficiency or dynamic range” as in the common, prior art solutions). Dr. Dallesasse explains how “the prosecution history of the parent ’872 patent [illustrates] that when [Patent Owner] changed ‘correct for non-linearities’ to the more specific language ‘determined based on a pattern for actuating drive voltages that alters the linearity of an optical response of the modulator,’” “the Examiner then allowed the claims over a rejection based on Roberts,” which “suggests that there are ways to ‘correct for non-linearities’ that do not meet the amended claims, as the ’998 Patent itself admits.” Id. ¶ 79 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:5–9; Ex. 2009, 2; Ex. 1010, 16–48). During prosecution, Patent Owner argued: Roberts does not disclose a “digital-to-digital mapping,” where, “for a given plurality of N digital input data bits, the mapping to the corresponding M digital output data bits is determined based on a pattern for actuating drive voltages that alters the linearity of an optical response of the modulator,” as recited in amended claim 1. Instead, the linear compensation in Roberts is performed pursuant to a compensation function c(t) when the Vx(n) multi-bit sample streams are generated. Importantly, this linear compensation in Roberts occurs before the mapping of Vx(n) to Sx(n). As a result, the mapping between Vx(n) to Sx(n) in Roberts, such as the mapping shown in Table 1 of Roberts, is not a part of the linear compensation operation performed in Roberts. Ex. 3001, 172 (emphasis added). We interpret the quoted passage to exclude analog pre-distortion because we interpret the argument distinguishing distortion techniques––in particular, those accomplished by analog compensation function, c(t). Id. Both the ’998 patent and Patent Owner’s arguments during prosecution support Dr. Dallesasse’s testimony and Patent Owner’s position that the scope of claim 1 does not encompass linear compensation methods effected by analog pre-distortion.” slip op. at 34

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “limitation 1.9. This is because the idealized sinusoidal curves that form the basis of Dr. Blumenthal’s analysis lack a sufficient showing of relevance to the teachings of Taraschuk cited by Petitioner. Patent Owner persuades us that Petitioner does not point to any basis for a LUT having the recited deltas except for Dr. Blumenthal’s analysis. Although Wright generally teaches compensating for mismatches, Dr. Blumenthal’s analysis fills in limitations 1.8 and 1.9––Petitioner does not set forth a sufficiently supported reason for using the specific values recited in limitations 1.8 and 1.9. Even assuming, arguendo, we were to credit Petitioner’s arguments that “it is sufficient for the prior art to render obvious a mapping exhibiting the deltas features; the prior art need not calculate the deltas themselves” (Pet. Reply 11) and that “Dr. Dallesasse agrees that modeling a Mach- Zehnder modulator as exhibiting a sinusoidal response—as Dr. Blumenthal did—was ‘reasonable’ ‘to a first order’” and “[a]ny other sources of non-linearity would merely be less significant, ‘second order effects,’” (id. at 12– 13), Petitioner does not sufficiently show that the sinusoidal response curve would look like the one Dr. Blumenthal proposes. Dr. Blumenthal asserts, without specifically or credibly explaining why, that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have selected a region of the sinusoidal response curve that includes an inflection point such that deltas both decrease and increase over some portion of the curve being linearized. See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 173–174 (scaling and shifting a sinusoidal response curve so that the curve contains an inflection point within the linearized region, but without adequately explaining the evidentiary basis for these selections); id. ¶ 52 (opining that “in the close vicinity of the center of the positive or negative inflection regions, otherwise known as the Quadrature point, the modulator is almost would have included regions on both sides of an inflection point). If a person of ordinary skill would have selected a region of the sinusoidal response curve on only one side of an inflection point, the evidence does not suggest that such a mapping would satisfy both limitations 1.8 and 1.9. At best, Petitioner presents an “obvious to try rationale”: In addition to the reasons mentioned above, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try a mapping scheme in which entries in the look-up table as taught by Taraschuk are selected such that successively decreasing inputs correspond to digital output entries with either decreasing, increasing, or similar deltas between their values. Doing so would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success. In that regard, the deltas between values of the corresponding digital outputs can either increase, decrease, or stay the same. Accordingly, there are only three possible relationships between deltas of successive digital outputs. With so few possibilities, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try each of them. Pet. 52 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 196). The analysis for 13.8 is incorporated by reference in 13.9. See Pet. 53–54. Although there are three possible relationships between two,” slip op. at 32

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “IV. MOTION TO EXCLUDE Patent Owner requests that we exclude Petitioner’s Exhibits 1031 through 1038 submitted with Petitioner’s Reply. Paper 25, 1. Petitioner opposes. Paper 27. As we do not rely on any of these exhibits in rendering the findings and conclusions in this Decision, Patent Owner’s motion is moot.” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 11,342,998 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,342,998
• Unified Patents, LLC v. Ideahub Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 5, 2024 · PGR2022-00044 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 are unpatentable for lack of written description under § 112(a); the Board did not reach the anticipation and obviousness grounds based on HEVC265.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that: A person of ordinary skill in the art at the priority date for the ’274 Patent (“POSITA”) would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical or computer engineering, or a closely related scientific field such as physics or computer science, and two years of work experience with video processing. A lack of experience can be remedied with additional education (e.g., a Master’s degree), and likewise, a lack of education can be remedied with additional work experience (e.g., 4–5 years). This definition would apply at the earliest claimed priority date of the ’274 Patent as well as any later date. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 50–52). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition as it appears to be consistent with the Specification of the ’274 patent and the cited reference.” slip op. at 14

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(e) estoppelEstoppel appliesDecided for petitioner

    “A party is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue if: (1) a prior action presents an identical issue; (2) the prior action actually litigated and adjudged that issue; (3) the judgment in that prior action necessarily required determination of the identical issue; and (4) the prior action featured full representation of the estopped party. VirnetX Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 909 F.3d 1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Disney Enterprises, Inc., 702 F.3d 640, 644 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).” slip op. at 21

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable
  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “For the reasons that follow, we determine that the ’928 application does not provide sufficient written description support, for at least independent claim 1 of the ’274 patent, so as to “reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date” of the ’928 application. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Accordingly, we are persuaded that the ’928 application lacks sufficient written description support for the invention recited in claim 1 of the ’274 patent, and thus, claim 1 does not receive an effective filing date as early as that of the ’928 application (i.e., December 23, 2010). We further determine that Petitioner filed the Petition within the 9-month statutory period for requesting post-grant review in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). The ’274 patent issued on September 14, 2021 (see Ex. 1001, code (45)), and the present Petition was accorded a filing date of June 9, 2022 (see Paper 5). Accordingly, the Petition was filed less than 9 months after the date of issuance of the ’274 patent. In view of the above, we are persuaded that the ’274 patent is eligible for post-grant review.” slip op. at 16

  Patent outcomesUS 11,122,274 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,122,274
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Ramot At Tel Aviv University, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 3, 2023 · IPR2022-00576 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 13, 14, and 23–29 were not shown unpatentable as obvious over Roberts and Taraschuk, with or without Wright, because the asserted combinations did not teach or suggest the claimed delta features.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “We do not discern a substantial difference between the parties’ definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Instead, we determine that the parties’ definitions are substantially similar. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the disclosure of the ’872 patent and asserted prior art of record. The findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change had we adopted Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “We need not construe any claim term in our Decision in order to resolve the issues before us. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 9

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “for a LUT having the recited deltas except for Dr. Blumenthal’s analysis. Although Wright generally teaches compensating for mismatches, Dr. Blumenthal’s analysis fills in limitations 13.8 and 13.9––Petitioner does not set forth a sufficiently supported reason for using the specific values recited in limitations 13.8 and 13.9. At best, Petitioner presents an “obvious to try rationale”: In addition to the reasons mentioned above, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try a mapping scheme in which entries in the look-up table as taught by Taraschuk are selected such that successively decreasing inputs correspond to digital output entries with either decreasing, increasing, or similar deltas between their values. . . . Doing so would have involved choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success. In that regard, the deltas between values of the corresponding digital outputs can either increase, decrease, or stay the same. Accordingly, there are only three possible relationships between deltas of successive digital outputs. With so few possibilities, a POSITA would have found it obvious to try each of them. Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 265). The analysis for 13.8 is incorporated by reference in 13.9. See Pet. 60. Although there are three possible relationships between two, consecutive deltas, there are many possible sequences of deltas––Petitioner does not sufficiently show a finite number of solutions in its challenge.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with Patent Owner’s argument that the portions of Taraschuk in column 7, lines 61–67 and column 8, lines 13–15 cited by Petitioner in its challenge to claim 13 teach “an end-to-end approach” “because that calculation involves predistortion of the input M-bit word by subtracting a digitized analog sample of the ultimate output,” and as such, teach “[a]n approach that necessarily does one combined correction for all of the nonlinearities that occur in-between those ends—whether bit mismatches in the digital logic or non-linearities in the Mach-Zehnder modulator.” PO Sur-reply 18 (citing PO Resp. 30–36; Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 48, 49, 85–87, 89, 103; Ex. 1006, 7:34–39, 7:61–67). We further agree with Patent Owner’s assertion that [Patent Owner] and Prof. Dallesasse are not suggesting that Dr. Blumenthal should model the logic-level mismatches. But rather pointing out that calculating an idealized sinusoidal response in isolation is not obvious (or flowing naturally) from a reference that can only deal with compensating the combined response of the modulator and digital logic mismatches together—via real-time pre-distortion fed back from the ultimate output and subtracted from the input. Dallesasse testifies that Dr. Blumenthal starts with the premise that all that is required is deriving a complementary function to the sinusoidal response. . . . But this ignores that the disclosure of Taraschuk describes compensating “the sinusoidal response of the modulator” and “logic level mismatches through the D/A converter” together. . . . Dr. Blumenthal’s complementary sinusoidal correction curve won’t do that. The combined non-linearity from the multiple sources likely won’t simply be evenly sinusoidal. Taraschuk does not disclose, or in my opinion render obvious, any pre-calculation solution. (Taraschuk mentions a real-time analog feedback loop to pre-distort, which would not involve pre-calculation.) And it certainly does not suggest one that could deal with the combined and likely complex non-linearities described.” slip op. at 28

  Patent outcomesUS 11,133,872 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,133,872
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Ramot At Tel Aviv University, Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 29, 2023 · IPR2022-00575 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12, 15–22, and 30 were not shown unpatentable under § 103 over Roberts and Taraschuk because the combination did not teach or suggest the claimed mapping.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Inst. Dec. 25–26 (citing Ex. 1006, 8:2, 8:8, 6:61–65; Ex. 1003 ¶ 147; Prelim. Resp. 46). Based on our review of the complete record developed during trial, we are persuaded to modify our preliminary determinations. For the reasons discussed below, we are persuaded that the scope of claim 1 does not encompass linear compensation methods effected by analog pre-distortion because the ’872 patent specification distinguishes analog pre-distortion (see Ex. 1001, 1:55–2:34) and the prosecution history specifically distinguishes analog pre-distortion from the claimed approach (see Ex. 1002, 172). We find persuasive Dr. Dallesasse’s testimony that “a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the [’872] patent would understand that th[e] [claimed] approach differs from pre-distortion based on real-time measured analog modulator output.” Ex. 2018 ¶ 33 (citing-in-part Ex. 1001, 2:3–7 (’872 patent disclosing common, prior art solutions such as “an analog predistortion circuit to feed the modulator”)); see also Ex. 1001, (the ’872 patent describing the need for a “digital to analog converter” that would “improve[] linearity of response without sacrificing efficiency or dynamic range” as in the common, prior art solutions). Dr. Dallesasse explains how “the prosecution history of the ’872 patent [illustrates] that when [Patent Owner] changed ‘correct for non-linearities’ to the more specific language ‘determined based on a pattern for actuating drive voltages that alters the linearity of an optical response of the modulator,’” “the Examiner then allowed the claims over a rejection based on Roberts, which “suggests that there are ways to ‘correct for non-linearities’ that do not meet the amended Ex. 2009, 2; Ex. 2003). During prosecution, Patent Owner argued: Roberts does not disclose a “digital-to-digital mapping,” where, “for a given plurality of N digital input data bits, the mapping to the corresponding M digital output data bits is determined based on a pattern for actuating drive voltages that alters the linearity of an optical response of the modulator,” as recited in amended claim 1. Instead, the linear compensation in Roberts is performed pursuant to a compensation function c(t) when the Vx(n) multi-bit sample streams are generated. Importantly, this linear compensation in Roberts occurs before the mapping of Vx(n) to Sx(n). As a result, the mapping between Vx(n) to Sx(n) in Roberts, such as the mapping shown in Table 1 of Roberts, is not a part of the linear compensation operation performed in Roberts. Ex. 1002, 172 (emphasis added). We interpret the quoted passage to exclude analog pre-distortion because we interpret the argument distinguishing Robert’s compensation as happening “before the mapping” to refer to pre-distortion techniques––in particular, those accomplished by analog compensation function, c(t). Id. Both the ’872 patent and Patent Owner’s arguments during prosecution support Dr. Dallesasse’s testimony and Patent Owner’s position that the scope of claim 1 does not encompass linear compensation methods effected by analog pre-distortion.” slip op. at 21

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “mapping is based on an analog feedback loop, by . . . quoting from the reference and leaving out the very next sentence” has merit. Sur-Reply 8 (citing Pet. Reply 23). Petitioner does not sufficiently address the cited teachings and in particular, Taraschuk’s teachings of calculating a difference between a “sampled analog output signal (S) and corresponding M-bit word” to a calculate a mapping “required to obtain the desired output analog signal level.” Ex. 1006, 7:34–39. We are persuaded Petitioner does not sufficiently rebut Patent Owner’s contention that Roberts’ and Taraschuk’s teachings of linear compensation are implemented by analog pre-distortion. Petitioner cannot ignore these teachings of Taraschuk and consider only the portions that support its challenge. See Pet. Reply 17 (citing Pet. 43–45; Ex.1006, 7:56–60) (“Patent Owner’s emphasis on Taraschuk’s digital feedback loop is also misplaced because the Petition simply relied on Taraschuk’s linearizer 44 as a discrete, known device for performing non-linear compensation of a Mach-Zehnder modulator.” (emphasis added)). Petitioner cannot set forth the teachings of Taraschuk in such a piecemeal sufficiently explain why the converter of Taraschuk relies on analog pre-distortion, or explain why analog pre-distortion is encompassed by the invention recited in independent claim 1, Petitioner does not sufficiently carry its burden.” slip op. at 25

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Second, Petitioner concludes that “a POSITA would have found it obvious to map input bits to output bits within the look-up table such that the output bits correspond to voltage values to be transmitted to electrodes of an optical modulator,” but offers no support other than Robert’s teaching that the DSP’s output is a multi-bit parallel binary signal. See id. at 51 (citing Ex. 1005, 6:40–42). That is, the sole basis for Petitioner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to perform the claimed method is that the output is the same. Id. This is impermissible hindsight. Third, Petitioner essentially argues that a person would have found it obvious to perform the mapping because Taraschuk teaches a look-up table and non-linear compensation. Id. at 51–52. Yet the claim recites how the mapping is performed, which is left unaddressed by Petitioner. Id. That is, Petitioner has not shown where Taraschuck teaches mapping a given number look-up table, so that the output bits compensate for the non-linear effects of the optical modulator. Id. at 52. Rather, Petitioner provides a piecemeal analysis that uses the ’872 patent’s specification as a blueprint to pull together a look-up table, non-linear compensation, and a modulator to arrive at the claimed invention. See id. Thus, all three rationales for limitation 1.9 are deficient. See PO Resp. 27.” slip op. at 30

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “We do not discern a substantial difference between the parties’ definitions for the level of ordinary skill in the art. Instead, we determine that the parties’ definitions are substantially similar. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the level of skill in the art, which is consistent with the disclosure of the ’872 patent and asserted prior art of record. The findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision would not change had we adopted Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 8

  Patent outcomesUS 11,133,872 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,133,872
• Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · May 22, 2023 · PGR2022-00009 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–5, 7–12, and 14–19 are unpatentable based on lack of written description, anticipation by Bruning, or obviousness over Bruning and Kabel.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “lighting device.” Accordingly, we determine that the level of ordinary skill in the art is “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, or similar technical field, with two years of relevant experience in the field of design and/or development of LEDs and circuits,” as Petitioner proposes and that “the field of design and/or development” would be “in the context of lighting devices” as Patent Owner proposes, in which “[a]n increase in experience could compensate for less education.” Id.; Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 46).” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Prosecution history disclaimer / disavowalDisclaimer foundDecided for patent owner

    “theoretically fall under the “or greater” portion of the amended claim limitation “forward voltage of 6V or greater,” Applicant distinguished Colby on the basis that the 120V AC voltage from a wall outlet is not “the minimum voltage difference required between the anode and cathode of the LEDs in the claimed circuit to allow current to flow through the LEDs.” See Ex. 1023, 9 (emphasis added). Applicant’s argument specifically identifies the claim language at issue––“forward voltage of 6V or greater”––and specifically states that it is not disclosed because Colby does not disclose the minimum voltage and instead, discloses something else, something larger–– 120V AC voltage. Accordingly, we conclude that Applicant disclaimed any voltage that is more than “the minimum voltage difference required between the anode and cathode of the LEDs in the claimed circuit to allow current to flow through the LEDs” from the scope of “forward voltage.”” slip op. at 25

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable

    “4. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) With respect to the written description requirement, we are persuaded” slip op. at 32

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable

    “Basis § Unpatentable Unpatentable Lack of written description, 3, 10, 17 112(a) 3, 10, 17 Lack of enablement 3, 10, 17 112(b) Indefiniteness 3, 10, 17 Lack of written description, 4, 11, 18 112(a) 4, 11, 18 Lack of enablement 4, 11, 18 112(b) indefiniteness 4, 11, 18” slip op. at 77

  Patent outcomesUS 10,932,341 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,932,341
• Ironsource Ltd. v. Digital Turbine Inc.Instituted
  PTAB · Mar 17, 2023 · PGR2022-00053 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · PGR · Institution

  The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–22 under § 101, § 102(a) over Pasha, and § 103 over Pasha, Pasha and Yamada, and Pasha and Molinet.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may not be instituted unless it is determined that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Based on the information presented in the Petition and the supporting evidence, we are persuaded that the Petition demonstrates it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of the challenged claims on the grounds set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “[t]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Id. (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Neither of those exceptions apply here, and for the reasons below, we find the plain and ordinary meaning of “invoke” or “invoking” to be to call or activate, as proposed by Petitioner. slip op. at 11

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Lexicography (patentee as own lexicographer)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “to mean “to shift user interaction on the device,” and we disagree with Patent Owner that the claim term requires the shifting to take place without requiring a user interaction. We begin with the language of the independent claims. Claim 1 recites “redirect said device to an app store for downloading said first software application on said device.” Ex. 1001, 21:38–40. The claim language, therefore, does not recite any requirement relating to user interaction during the redirect.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed

    “3. Other Claim Terms We determine that we do not need to expressly construe any other terms in order to determine whether to institute. The parties are reminded claim terms will be based on the complete record developed during trial.” slip op. at 17

  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Alice · Enfish · Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 11,157,256
• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Ramot At Tel Aviv University, Ltd.Instituted
  PTAB · Feb 22, 2023 · IPR2022-01283 · APJ Christopher L Crumbley · IPR · Institution

  The Board instituted review of claims 1–63 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on obviousness over Roberts, Taraschuk, and Wright.

  RulingsInstitution decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “The standard for institution is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted unless the information presented in the Petition and the Preliminary Response shows that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; see also 37 C.F.R § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Having considered the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, we determine that, for the reasons discussed herein, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Patent Owner does not persuade us that we should exercise our discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) to deny institution. We thus institute an inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); see also Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial Practice Guide 64 (Nov. 2019) (“TPG”) (“The Board will not institute on fewer than all claims or all challenges in a petition.”).” slip op. at 2

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied

    “We need not proceed to the second prong of the Advanced Bionics framework because Petitioner presents a challenge applying Roberts and Taraschuk in combination with Wright, a reference not considered during prosecution of the ’998 patent. Petitioner’s challenge applying Roberts, Taraschuk, and Wright is also supported by Dr. Blumenthal’s Declaration, evidence which was not before the Examiner during prosecution of the ’998 patent. Patent Owner does not address this additional evidence, or provide us with any reason why they are “substantially the same” as the disclosures of Roberts and Taraschuk that were previously presented to the Office. Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner presents at least one challenge–– the challenge applying Roberts, Taraschuk, and Wright––that is not based on substantially the same art or substantially the same arguments as previously presented during prosecution. Patent Owner’s arguments that “Wright is in a different field and uses a different approach to compensation as what is discussed (briefly) in Taraschuk” lend support to this finding. Prelim. Resp. 60. Even if we were to continue to the second prong of the Advanced Bionics framework, as Patent Owner urges, we would find that the Office erred in a manner material to the patentability of the challenged claims. Patent Owner’s argument relies heavily on the fact that both Roberts and Taraschuk were cited during prosecution, and while Roberts was the basis of a rejection, Taraschuk is “presumed to have [been] considered” because it was listed by the applicant on an IDS. Prelim. Resp. 2. But when a reference was not the basis of rejection, the Board has found that this weighs “strongly against exercising our discretion to deny institution.” CODE200, UAB et al. Patent Owner’s arguments in this case are nearly identical to those raised in a related case involving both Roberts and Taraschuk, where we found there was insufficient basis to justify discretionary denial. Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Ramot at Tel-Aviv University Ltd., IPR2022-00575, Paper 10 at 32–38 (PTAB Oct. 5, 2022). Patent Owner’s arguments fare no better here, and we incorporate our discussion in the related case herein. Indeed, the record before us in this case is even more persuasive of material error. As Petitioner notes, during prosecution of a related application that is a continuation of the ’998 patent, the Examiner rejected the pending claims over Roberts and Taraschuk after being provided with materials from this inter partes review, including the analysis in the Petition. Reply 1–3. At the very least, this rejection suggests that the Office erred by not rejecting the claims of the ’998 patent over Roberts and Taraschuk. For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded to exercise our” slip op. at 13

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). According to Petitioner, [a] Person of Ordinary Skill in The Art (“POSITA”) in June of 2007 would have had a working knowledge of optical modulators and modulation schemes. A POSITA would have had a master’s degree in electrical engineering, or an equivalent, and two years of professional experience relating to optical communications, and in particular, optical signal modulation. 5 Patent Owner does not present objective evidence of nonobviousness at this stage of the proceeding. education, and vice versa. Pet. 9–10 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 21–23). According to Patent Owner: [a] person of ordinary skill in the art with respect to the ’998 Patent would have at least a Master of Science degree in Electrical Engineering or Electrical and Computer Engineering, with at least two years of academic or professional engineering experience in the analysis and design of optoelectronic systems for optical communications. Prelim. Resp. 43 (citing Ex. 2005 ¶ 22). We do not discern a substantial difference between the parties’” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner contends construction of the aforementioned terms is “not necessary to the resolution of any issues presented in the Petition.” Prelim. Resp. 44. As contended by Patent Owner, “[t]he Board did not need to and did not address claim construction in dismissing Cisco’s three prior IPRs challenging related patents with shared specifications.” Id. at 43–44 (citing Ex. 2004). We need not construe any claim term to resolve the institution question, and therefore, do not expressly define any claim term in our Decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for terms that are in dispute, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 10

  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,342,998
• Home Depot USA, Inc. v. Lynk Labs, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 14, 2023 · IPR2021-01369 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 11, and 13 are unpatentable as obvious over the respective combinations of Deese, Kuo, and Obeck; Deese and Kuo; and Okuno and Teshima.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, we consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers in the field. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986).” slip op. at 6

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for petitioner

    “C. Claim Construction In this proceeding, the claims of the ’251 patent are construed “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2001). Under that standard, the words of a claim are generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning,” which is the meaning the term would have had to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent including the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 7

  • Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner

    “a) Analogous Art To resolve whether art is analogous we must determine “(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).” slip op. at 16

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner

    “c) Reason to Combine As noted above, Petitioner contends one of ordinary skill in the art would have sought to add data signal preemption capabilities in Deese and Kuo because (1) Deese, Kuo, and Obeck are analogous art to the ’251 patent (i.e., are all in the field of lighting systems), (2) “[t]he need for signal preemption was well-known in the art,” and (3) Obeck expressly teaches that its use of a data receiver solves the need for signal preemption in traffic lights. Pet. 15–16. Petitioner contends one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reasonable expectation of success in implementing Obeck’s data receiver and signal preemption method in Deese because Deese’s signal controller 70 is a “conventional” controller for selectively energizing the red, yellow, and green traffic lights and this is “precisely the same type of ‘regular signal control 71’ that Obeck teaches should be supplemented with 5:45–63; 1006, 6:36–48; Ex. 1002 ¶ 51).” slip op. at 23

  Patent outcomesUS 10,492,251 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,492,251

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.