- PTAB · Sep 27, 2024 · IPR2024-00672 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds and granted Texas Instruments’ motion to join IPR2023-01243 in an understudy role.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“At this stage of the proceeding, we determine that the arguments and evidence of record favor Petitioner. Both parties agree that a downward-sloping gradient, as disclosed in Kawagoe, will create an electrical field with a force in a direction toward the substrate. See generally Prelim. Resp.; Ex. 1007, 16:7–9. Patent Owner does not meaningfully dispute that Kawagoe has a graded dopant concentration in an active region. See generally Prelim. Resp. Further, Patent Owner contradictorily stated during prosecution of the ’195 patent that a graded dopant concentration itself creates “a built-in electrical field that forces the movement of carriers in a particular direction” (Ex. 1016, 289–290) and is “the additional parameter for ensuring that all minority carriers are being moved in one direction” (id. at 290). In light of this evidentiary record, which at most presents a material issue of fact for resolution at trial, we determine Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge of claim 1. We decline to further discuss the parties’ arguments or resolve any disputed issues as to challenges based on Kawagoe on this preliminary record, because the trial in the 1243 IPR is the better proceeding in which to do so. Specifically, as compared to the preliminary phase of this case, the instituted trial in the 1243 IPR affords the parties better opportunity to brief, argue, and develop evidence in support of their positions. Thus, for the same reasons stated in our Decision on Institution in the 1243 IPR, we determine the Petition here warrants institution.” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successInstituted
“deficient because Kawagoe’s disclosure of graded dopant concentration teaches impeding carrier movement rather than aiding it, as required by claim element 1.5. Prelim. Resp. 13–14. Patent Owner relies on Kawagoe’s disclosure that the concentration gradient prevents electrons from entering the p-well. Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1007, 16:7–11). Patent Owner further argues Kawagoe’s carriers are not in the active regions, as required by claim element 1.5. Id. at 14–16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 91, n.5). At this stage of the proceeding, we determine that the arguments and evidence of record favor Petitioner. Both parties agree that a downward-sloping gradient, as disclosed in Kawagoe, will create an electrical field with a force in a direction toward the substrate. See generally Prelim. Resp.; Ex. 1007, 16:7–9. Patent Owner does not meaningfully dispute that Kawagoe has a graded dopant concentration in an active region. See generally Prelim. Resp. Further, Patent Owner contradictorily stated during prosecution of the ’195 patent that a graded dopant concentration itself creates “a built-in electrical field that forces the movement of carriers in a particular direction” (Ex. 1016, 289–290) and is “the additional parameter for ensuring that all minority carriers are being moved in one direction” (id. at 290). In light of this evidentiary record, which at most presents a material issue of fact for resolution at trial, we determine Petitioner establishes a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge of claim 1.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“II. TIMELINESS OF PETITION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 315(B) Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), “[a]n inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent.” 1 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 287–88 (2011), included revisions to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 that became effective in 2013, after the effective filing date of the challenged claims. See Ex. 1001, codes (22), (60). Therefore, we apply the pre-AIA versions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103(a). 2 US 6,043,114, issued March 28, 2000 (Ex. 1007, “Kawagoe”). Petitioner asserts that Kawagoe is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 4. 3 US 6,163,877, issued December 19, 2000 (Ex. 1014, “Gupta”). Petitioner asserts that Gupta is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 5. 4 US 2003/0183856 A1, published October 2, 2003 (Ex. 1006, “Wieczorek”). Petitioner asserts that Wieczorek is prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a),(e). Pet. 4. 5 Stanley Wolf and Richard N. Tauber, Silicon Processing for the VLSI Era, Vols. 1–4, Lattice Press (2000) (Ex. 1008, “Wolf”). Petitioner asserts that Wolf was published and publicly available no later than 2002, and is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Pet. 5 (citing Exs. 1012, 1013, 1036). Exhibit 1008 was submitted in four parts (A–D) and includes selected portions of Wolf. We cite to Wolf using its original page numbers and omit the exhibit part designations. Patent Owner argues that the Petition is untimely under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities. Prelim. Resp. 18– 39. However, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) also provides that the one-year time bar “shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).” See also 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). Because the Petition is accompanied by a timely request for joinder (Paper 2) to the instituted proceeding (IPR2023-01243), which we grant as further discussed below, Patent Owner’s argument that the Petition is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) is moot, irrespective of whether Petitioner is in privity with time-barred entities.” slip op. at 8
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Joinder §315(c) / SAS all-or-nothingJoinder, grantedGranted
“Patent Owner’s first argument is not persuasive because it is based on speculation that Petitioner “is trying to block settlement with any of these defendants unless [Patent Owner] also settles with” Petitioner. Opp. Mot. Join. 5. As discussed below, we determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder. Moreover, we note that even in a situation where the petitioner and patent owner in the proceeding to be joined had settled (Code200 v. Bright Data Ltd., IPR2022-00861, Paper 17 at 5 (PTAB July 25, 2022) (vacated)), the Director nevertheless vacated a decision to deny a motion for joinder. Code200 v. Bright Data Ltd., IPR2022-00861, Paper 18 at 7 (Office of the Director of the USPTO Aug. 23, 2022) (precedential); see also eBay, Inc. v. Lexos Media IP, LLC, IPR2024-00336, Paper 11 at 13–15 (PTAB Feb. 23, 2024). Patent Owner’s second argument is moot because Patent Owner’s Request for Director Review has been denied. 1243 IPR, Paper 43 (PTAB Apr. 24, 2024). Based on the facts and circumstances discussed above, we determine Petitioner has established good cause for joining the 1243 IPR. Specifically, we find that joining Petitioner to the 1243 IPR is unlikely to require any delay or modification to the scheduling order already in place for the 1243 IPR. We also determine that Patent Owner will not be prejudiced unduly by the joinder of this proceeding. Thus, we determine that granting the Motion for Joinder would help “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution” of these proceedings. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b). For the above reasons, we grant Petitioner’s Motion for Joinder and join Petitioner as a party to the 1243 IPR.” slip op. at 19
§ 103 obviousnessPatents in suitUS 10,510,842 - SAP America, Inc. v. Isix IP LLCInstitutedPTAB · Sep 26, 2024 · IPR2024-00615 · APJ Elizabeth J Reagan · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–5, 7–10, 19, and 23–25 on all asserted grounds; the Board found a reasonable likelihood of success on at least claims 1 and 8 over Brann.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine whether to institute an inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314 and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Institution of an inter partes review requires that “the information presented in the petition and . . . any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). “When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2023). For the reasons set forth below, upon considering the briefing and the evidence of record, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner will prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review on all of the challenged claims of the ’178 patent based on all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability identified in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“stipulation (Prelim. Sur-Reply 2–3), which we need not address in view of the conditional nature of the stipulation offered by Petitioner. As noted above, in accordance with the Guidance Memo, we will not discretionarily deny if there is an effective Sotera stipulation. However, here, Petitioner’s stipulation states, “if the Board . . . determines that discretionary denial is warranted, then Petitioner stipulates . . . .” Prelim. Reply 7 (emphasis added). Petitioner therefore conditions its stipulation on the Board first determining, based on a consideration of the Fintiv factors, to exercise its discretion to deny institution. Due to the conditional nature of this stipulation, Petitioner is not “stipulat[ing] not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition,” as required by the Guidance Memo. As discussed in NXP, the policy of favoring institution when a Sotera stipulation is provided by Petitioner “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the Board.” IPR2021-01556, Paper 13 at 4. Although in NXP, the petitioner offered a stipulation after the decision denying institution issued, it is a distinction without a difference because here the stipulation is only being offered after the Board first reviews the Fintiv factors and determines that it would be appropriate to exercise its discretion to deny the Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner’s conditional stipulation would “[p]ermit[] a petitioner to wait and see if the Board denies institution under Fintiv, and then offer such a stipulation . . . [which] frustrates [the] goals [of a Sotera stipulation] and would open the door to gamesmanship.” Id. at Paper 13 at 4. Accordingly, we do not consider Petitioner’s representation to be an effective stipulation under the Guidance Memo. We therefore must consider the Fintiv factors.” slip op. at 18
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“art “in the field of the ’178 patent, as of its earliest possible priority date of October 21, 1999, would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the computer science or engineering field, or with integration systems,” but that a “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa.” Pet. 13–14 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 17– 20). At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not challenge Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we find that Petitioner’s proposal is consistent with the ’178 patent and the asserted prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. This proposal is also supported by the Houh Declaration. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 19. Accordingly, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision.7” slip op. at 11
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“For purposes of this Decision, we adopt these constructions applied by Petitioner and Patent Owner. See Ex. 1007. 8 ISIX IP LLC v. International Business Machines Corp., Case No. 6:22-cv- 201-ADA-DTG, “Claim Construction Order,” Doc. 37, filed 01/04/23. 9 Petitioner states that it “accepts Patent Owner’s constructions for purposes of this proceeding only to simplify issues” and that Petitioner “reserves the right to propose alternative constructions in the corresponding District Court case.” Pet. 14, fn. 2.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,308,178 - Aylo Freesites Ltd v. Wellcomemat, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Sep 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00710 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 13–15 and 18–20 on all five asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, Reply, Sur-Reply, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim in the ’286 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 13–15 and 18–20 of the ’286 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“demonstrated so-called “compelling merits” in its Grounds of challenge. Pet. 5; Prelim. Resp. 47; Reply 5; Sur-Reply 4–5. The Director has clarified her Guidance Memo, such that “in circumstances where the Board determines that the other Fintiv factors 1–5 do not favor discretionary denial, the Board shall decline to discretionarily deny under Fintiv without reaching the compelling merits analysis.” CommScope Techns. LLC v. Dali Wireless, Inc., IPR2022-01242, Paper 23, 4–5 (PTAB Feb. 27, 2023) (precedential) (“CommScope”). Because we determine that Fintiv factors 1–5 collectively weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution, we do not reach the question of whether Petitioner has demonstrated “compelling merits” in support of its unpatentability challenges. Conclusion Regarding Discretionary Denial On balance, we determine that Fintiv factors 1–5 collectively weigh against exercising our discretion to deny institution. Therefore, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution of inter partes review under Section 314(a).” slip op. at 19
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Instituted
“On the present record, we determine Petitioner’s argument and evidence show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of independent claim 13 as anticipated by Gupta.” slip op. at 29
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“On the present record, Patent Owner’s arguments do not address Dr. Houh’s detailed testimony or Petitioner’s proposed substitution of the Internet as taught by Logan, in place of the HAN in Vasilevsky’s system. For example, the substitution of the Internet for the HAN in Vasilevsky would appear to provide the centralized media server as a server-side “video editing environment” recited in claim Limitation 13.1. See Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 318 (“processor and memory [] at the server-side such that the centralized media server executes software for serving clients”), 319 (“computer-readable media of Vasilevsky comprises a video editing environment in the form of software for both editing bookmarks and streaming video, executed by the centralized media server and storages”), 321 (“Logan . . . teaches implementing a television program bookmarking system using a public network, i.e., the Internet”), 322 (“Logan discloses the desirability of implementing its bookmarking system over a public network such as the Internet”), 323 (proposed “modification would have beneficially allowed more users access via a wider public network to participate in the system to add, modify and playback video bookmarks”). On the present record, Dr. Houh’s declaration testimony stands unrebutted and provides a motivation for a POSITA to combine references with a reasonable likelihood of success.” slip op. at 38
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 8,307,286 - PTAB · Aug 14, 2024 · IPR2024-00207 · APJ Kevin C Trock · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–25, 38, and 39 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Motorola would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), we may not authorize an inter partes review unless the information in the petition and the preliminary response “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated below, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one claim. We therefore institute inter partes review as to all of the challenged claims of the ’249 patent and all of the asserted grounds of unpatentability in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“The mixing operation described in Botha appears materially different than that described in Löppönen. The Office acknowledged in allowing the ’249 patent that in Löppönen’s mixed stream, “the user still hears only one group at a time.” Ex. 1003 at 32, 76–77. That does not appear to be the case in Botha. In Botha, the combination of a variety of audio streams [occurs] in such a way that each participant will hear all other participants’ voices except their own. This is known as an ‘N minus l’ mix- where ‘N’ represents the sum of all audio streams entering a[t] the core logic of the invention, and the ‘minus l’ portion refers to the subtraction of the current participant’s stream from the stream returned to them. Ex. 1004, 10:35–43. 3. Conclusion Based on the current record before us, we determine that Petitioner is not asserting the same or substantially the same art or arguments previously presented to the Office with respect to Botha (Ground 1). Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).3 E. Prior Art References” slip op. at 21
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“According to Petitioner, a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art: would have had at least a B.S. degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus approximately three years of industry in networking or communication systems, in particular address interoperability between different types of networks and satellite communications. Pet. 7–8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 68). Patent Owner “does not dispute the proposal provided by Petitioner as to who would qualify as a POSITA.” Prelim. Resp. 6. pre-AIA law applies. See Prelim. Resp. Accordingly, we cite to pre-AIA § 103(a). We regard Petitioner’s definition as consistent with the ’249 patent and the asserted prior art, and the definition is supported by the testimonial evidence. Therefore, for the purpose of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s description. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“We agree with Petitioner that we can determine whether to institute trial without having to resolve Petitioner’s assertion of indefiniteness. See Samsung, 948 F.3d 1355 (question of indefiniteness “is simply another ground on which the claims might be challenged in an appropriate forum,” and “does not necessarily preclude the Board from addressing the patentability of the claims on section 102 and 103 grounds”). Independent claim 25 is directed to a system for providing a push-to- talk proxy media service, reciting a “means for receiving,” a “means for mixing,” and a “means for transmitting,” among other things. Ex. 1001, 25:51–64. Petitioner identifies the recited functions and provides corresponding structures for these “means for” limitations recited by claim 25 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. Pet. 10–11. Patent Owner “maintains that the proposed constructions for these three claim terms are overly limiting since the specification provides support for a broader range of structures, at the least, and does not concede to the constructions provided by Petitioner.” Prelim. Resp. 6. It is not necessary for us to resolve the claim construction issues identified by the parties in order for us to determine whether to institute inter partes review of the ’249 patent. Accordingly, for purposes of this Decision and based upon the preliminary record, we decline to expressly construe any of the claim terms at this point in the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). This preliminary Decision, however, does not prevent the parties from proposing, presenting evidence, or arguing a same or different construction of the claims during trial. The parties are encouraged to present their claim construction arguments and evidence as permitted by our rules.2 A final claim construction will be determined after the close of all the evidence and after any oral hearing in this matter. D. Discretionary Denial – 325(d)” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,145,249 - PTAB · Aug 13, 2024 · IPR2024-00511 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of all challenged claims on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of success on the Shaffer-Keller obviousness challenge.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted unless it is determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. After considering the parties’ arguments and evidence, and for the reasons set forth below, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one of the challenged claims of the ’949 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review with respect to all challenged claims and grounds asserted in the Petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Other
“below, we agree with Petitioner on this record that the ’852 patent claims lack priority to the parent application, Shaffer. For example, paragraph 34 of the ’299 application11 resulting in the ’852 patent explains that “IS 102 (FIG. 1) can determine if the endpoint 104 adheres to the rules of transmission.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 34. This paragraph does not state that any other device (such as the endpoint itself) receives a determination from the IS that the endpoint does not adhere to the rules of transmission. Figure 7, reproduced below, is similarly devoid of any such description: 11 U.S. App. No. 14/523,299 (Ex. 1004). The specification describes Figure 7 as “an example methodology that can facilitate dynamic communication between non-compatible communication devices.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 55. The specification further explains that “if the device demonstrates that it cannot comply with the behavioral characteristics of the interoperability system, the device can be attached to a VTG [virtual talk group] via a proxy,” in blocks 710 and 714 of Figure 7. Id. ¶ 56. But the ’299 application does not explain that this lack of compliance is communicated to any device, such as an endpoint.” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Petitioner also sets forth a rationale to combine Shaffer and Keller. Id. at 33–34. For example, Petitioner argues that Shaffer’s goal was to provide a way for incompatible endpoints to work using “standards-based IP technologies,” and Keller’s SIP protocol is an established “standards-based IP technolog[y]” for signaling in PTT. Id. at 33 (citing Ex. 1016 ¶ 2; Ex. 1002 ¶ 155). Petitioner asserts that a POSITA would have looked for an example of such a system, such as Keller’s SIP-based system, for a PTT system as in Shaffer. Id. at 33–34. Combining these systems therefore 15 This appears to be a typographical error, as Petitioner appears to be quoting Ex. 1024 ¶ 122. “would have been seen by a POSITA as nothing more than a combination of known elements according to their established functions to achieve an expected result, and would been considered to constitute nothing more than a routine engineering task that was well within the skill level of a POSITA,” Petitioner argues. Id. at 34 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 155). On this record, we agree with Petitioner that the combination of Shaffer and Keller discloses limitation [1c] and determine that Petitioner articulates a sufficient rationale to combine these references.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther
“Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have had “at least a bachelors’ degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field, plus approximately three years of industry in networking or communication systems, in particular address interoperability between different types of networks and satellite communications,” and that “[a]dditional education in the fields of electrical engineering or computer science, such as a masters or doctorate degree, could substitute for professional experience in the field.” Pet. 14–15. Petitioner adds that “[a] person with less or different education but more relevant practical experience, or vice versa, may also meet this standard.” Id. at 15. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposal. Prelim. Resp. 7. Based on the current record, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan as consistent with the ’852 patent and the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 6
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,319,852 - Motorola Solutions, Inc. v. Sta Group LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Aug 6, 2024 · IPR2024-00479 · APJ Scott Raevsky · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that claims 1–5 and 8–11 were obvious over Choksi.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring inter partes review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). slip op. at 5
- BurdenDecided for patent owner
“Patent Owner contends, and we agree, that “the Petition ignores that the proxy is ‘dynamically inserted to connect . . . the endpoint to a virtual talk group.” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner’s argument fails because the 5 Elsewhere, Petitioner mentions “virtual talk group” in the context of the recited “rules of transmission” (Pet. 27) and trusted endpoint identity (Pet. 30), but neither of these passages provides an explanation of how Choksi discloses “receive a first determination from the IS . . . that a proxy is to be dynamically inserted to connect the endpoint to a virtual talk group.” Petition provides no explanation as to what constitutes claim 1’s “virtual talk group” in Choksi, let alone that Choksi teaches “that a proxy is to be dynamically inserted to connect the endpoint to a virtual talk group” as claimed. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that Choksi’s signaling bridge is a dynamically inserted proxy, Petitioner does not explain how the signaling bridge “connect[s] the endpoint to a virtual talk group.”” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Patent Owner contends, and we agree, that “the Petition ignores that the proxy is ‘dynamically inserted to connect . . . the endpoint to a virtual talk group.” Prelim. Resp. 17. Petitioner’s argument fails because the 5 Elsewhere, Petitioner mentions “virtual talk group” in the context of the recited “rules of transmission” (Pet. 27) and trusted endpoint identity (Pet. 30), but neither of these passages provides an explanation of how Choksi discloses “receive a first determination from the IS . . . that a proxy is to be dynamically inserted to connect the endpoint to a virtual talk group.” Petition provides no explanation as to what constitutes claim 1’s “virtual talk group” in Choksi, let alone that Choksi teaches “that a proxy is to be dynamically inserted to connect the endpoint to a virtual talk group” as claimed. Even if we were to agree with Petitioner that Choksi’s signaling bridge is a dynamically inserted proxy, Petitioner does not explain how the signaling bridge “connect[s] the endpoint to a virtual talk group.”” slip op. at 10
§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,319,852 - PTAB · Aug 5, 2024 · IPR2024-00595 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR of claims 1–18 on all grounds; Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim, including obviousness over Pierre and Gershman.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“Advanced Bionics Part 2 We also consider whether Petitioner has demonstrated the Office erred “in a manner material to the patentability of challenged claims.” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 8. “An example of a material error may include misapprehending or overlooking specific teachings of the relevant prior art where those teachings impact patentability of the challenged claims.” Id. at 8 n.9; see also NPRM at 28700 (“material error may include misapprehending or overlooking clear, specific evidence in the prior record, including teachings of the relevant prior art that impact the patentability of the challenged claim”). We evaluate Becton, Dickinson factors (c), (e), and (f) to determine whether Petitioner has demonstrated material error. Id. at 10. Those factors are: (c) the extent to which the asserted art was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art was the basis for rejection; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in the Petition warrant reconsideration of the prior art or arguments. Becton, Dickinson, Paper 8 at 17–18. According to our precedent, “if the record of the Office’s previous consideration of the art is not well developed or silent, then a petitioner may show the Office erred by overlooking something persuasive under [Becton, Dickinson] factors (e) and (f).” Advanced Bionics, Paper 6 at 10; see also Keysight Techs., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., IPR2022-01421, Paper 14 (PTAB Aug. 24, 2023) (Director Review vacating Board decision denying institution, finding examiner misapprehended or overlooked prior Board determinations regarding same references in related IPR). In evaluating Becton, Dickinson factors (c) and (e), we determine Petitioner has shown the Examiner erred by overlooking Gershman’s teaching of a “moving plate” and digital image capture of an unrestrained chick as a disclosure of the “unrestrained chick” limitation. More particularly, the record evidence at this stage of the proceeding indicates the Examiner did not meaningfully consider Gershman’s disclosure: (i) of Figure 3, showing a chick on a “moving plate,” (ii) of Figures 5 and 6, digital images of a chick “reflexively” opening its wings without restraint for image capture, or (iii) that it would have been “obvious” to “adapt[]” and “add” the “moving plate” system to the “end” of industrial chick processing lines. Pet. 10, 22, 36–37 (compare Ex. 1002, 220–221, 226–228 with Ex. 1003, 1, 2, 5, 6, 10). Regarding Becton, Dickinson factor (f), the Petition presents additional evidence and facts, including material teachings of the new Pierre reference regarding the “unrestrained chick” limitation as detailed in Part 1 above, that warrant inter partes review.” slip op. at 13
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing with respect to at least one challenged claim in the ’124 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–18 of the ’124 patent on all grounds set forth in the Petition. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“unrestrained chick” limitation in independent claims 1 and 6. Pet. 36–37, 39–40. Petitioner emphasizes Pierre’s teaching of placing a chick in a position where it is falling so that it will open its wings “naturally” for image capture by a digital camera. Id. at 36, 39 (citing Ex. 1004, 4). Petitioner argues it would have been obvious to use Gershman’s moving plate to cause a chick to fall and “reflexively” open it wings for image capture as in Pierre, “because both Pierre and Gershman are in the same field and directed to solving the same problem, namely, automating assessment of chicks by imaging their wings.” Id. at 37, 39–40. Patent Owner does not address the argument. See Prelim. Resp. 12–15. On the present record, we agree with Petitioner’s reliance on Pierre-Gershman and also refer to our analysis of Ground 1 and the teaching of Gershman’s “moving plate” as a disclosure of the “unrestrained chick” limitation. On the present record, Petitioner’s argument and evidence support the position that Pierre and Gershman are analogous art and the proposed combination of Pierre-Gershman teaches the “unrestrained chick” limitation. slip op. at 24
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,806,124 - Databricks, Inc. v. R2 Solutions LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00659 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood that Pike, Pike with Chowdhuri, or Pike with Chowdhuri and MacLeod rendered claims 1–46 obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsDenied
“We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’610 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner relies on conclusory reasoning grounded in hindsight to assert a POSITA would have found it obvious to include file names to identify the data in each of Pike’s input files “because it would have allowed for locating that data group in Pike’s system and understanding the data in that file.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 93).13 Petitioner then makes the leap that, by understanding the data in an input file, a MapReduce programmer would have had reason “to identify input files and write ‘application-specific’ map and reduce functions on those files.” Id. at 18–19 (citing Ex. 1002, 10:1–7, 11:28–47, 14:12–27; Ex. 1005 ¶ 93). The difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that neither Pike nor other cited references disclose, teach, suggest, or otherwise provide motivation to write application-specific map and reduce functions that process each input file by identifiable schema or data type, i.e., by “data group” as recited in claim 1. Pike teaches application-specific programming “to process the input data one record at a time” or “to generate its output data in the form of key/value pairs,” nothing more. Ex. 1002, 7:31–36; see Pet. 29 (citing same); Prelim. Resp. 40–41, 50–51, 56 (citing same). Petitioner’s posited file names for Pike’s input files, moreover, could not serve as the claimed “data group” mechanism to identify the data in each input file by schema (or data type) for separate map and reduce processing. Each of Pike’s 13 Linn Declaration paragraph 93 is substantially identical to Petitioner’s argument and does not add any further insight or analysis on this point. data blocks can include data from more than one input file, a portion of one input file, or an entire input file. Ex. 1002, 6:55–7:6; see also Prelim. Resp. 47 (“Pike’s ‘data blocks’ (purported ‘partitions’) can be entire ‘input files,’ parts of ‘input files,’ or parts of multiple ‘input files’”). Therefore, a file name for one input file could not uniquely identify all of the data within a given data block, which could include data from different input files. Id. We agree with Patent Owner’s reasoning and argument on this point as well. In sum, Petitioner fails to show sufficiently that a POSITA would have had reason or motivation to use input file names in Pike as “data group” identifiers, as recited in claim 1 of the ’610 patent. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (obviousness requires “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”).” slip op. at 31
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › HindsightNot shown unpatentable
“We further agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s asserted motivation for tracking processed data “derived from a particular [input] file” to improve efficiency “by enabling a data set to be selectively reduced after it is mapped” (Pet. 35–36 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 119)), is speculative hindsight-based reasoning. Petitioner’s posited motivation is grounded in benefits residing in the ’610 patent, not in the prior art or knowledge of a POSITA. Prelim. Resp. 48. Petitioner’s evidence—Dr. Linn’s naked opinion that a POSITA “could” have used the identification of processed output file data as “derived from a particular file” to selectively reduce intermediate data (Ex. 1005 ¶ 119)—is unpersuasive for the reasons given above and legally insufficient. See Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[O]bviousness concerns whether a skilled artisan not only could have made but would have been motivated to make the combinations or modifications of prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.”).” slip op. at 35
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsNot reached
“reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its challenge to the patentability of any of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent. Therefore, we deny institution of inter partes review of the challenged claims. We need not address Patent Owner’s argument for discretionary denial under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) in view of our decision denying institution on the merits.” slip op. at 50
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,190,610 - Cloudera, Inc. v. R2 Solutions LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 11, 2024 · IPR2024-00303 · APJ Brian P Murphy · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on the merits, finding that Pike and Pike with Chowdhuri, alone or with MacLeod, did not show a reasonable likelihood of rendering claims 1–46 unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” Under § 314, the Board may not institute review on fewer than all claims challenged in the petition. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1359– 60 (2018). If the Board institutes a review, it will institute “on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude Petitioner does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim of the ’610 patent. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of claims 1–46 of the ’610 patent.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“someone having “at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science or similar field, and approximately two years of industry or academic experience in a field related [to] performing data analytics and/or related data processing tasks.” Pet. 9 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶¶ 67–69; In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Petitioner further asserts that work experience can substitute for formal education and additional formal education can substitute for work experience. Id. Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s definition for purposes of its Preliminary Response. Prelim. Resp. 14.” slip op. at 14
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“13–31; Ex. 1008, 10–19); Prelim. Resp. 10 n.1, 17 (citing Pet. 10; Ex. 1007, 24– 25); see also Paper 7, 2 (Updated Mandatory Notices).10 The parties each provided proposed constructions of “data group” and related arguments to the court. Id. The district court construed “data group” as “a group of data and a mechanism for identifying data from that group (e.g., a group identifier).” Ex. 1007, 23–25. Having reviewed the district court’s construction of “data group,” and given the parties’ application of that construction here, we apply the district court’s construction of “data group” for purposes of this Decision. See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (claim terms “need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“Petitioner’s argument explicitly and implicitly relies on the teachings of the ’610 patent, not Pike or some other MapReduce reference or teaching, for the proffered motivation that a “POSITA would have understood,” “recognized,” or “found it obvious to implement” Pike’s MapReduce system to include input file names as the “data group” identifiers in claim 1 of the ’610 patent. See Pet. 17–18. Petitioner relies on conclusory reasoning grounded in hindsight to assert a POSITA would have found it obvious to include file names to identify the data in each of Pike’s input files “because it would have allowed for locating that data group in Pike’s system and understanding the data in that file.” Id. at 18 (citing Ex. 1005 ¶ 93).14 Petitioner then makes the leap that, by understanding the data in an input file, a MapReduce programmer would have had reason “to identify input files and write ‘application-specific’ map and reduce functions on those files.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, 10:1–7, 11:28–47, 14:12–27; Ex. 1005 ¶ 93). The difficulty with Petitioner’s position is that neither Pike nor other cited references disclose, teach, suggest, or otherwise provide motivation to write application-specific map and reduce functions that process each input file by identifiable schema or data type, i.e., by “data group” as recited in claim 1. Pike teaches application-specific programming “to process the input data one record at a time” or “to generate its output data in the form of key/value pairs,” nothing more. Ex. 1002, 7:31–36; see Pet. 27 (citing same); Prelim. Resp. 39–40, 49–50, 55 (citing same).” slip op. at 31
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 8,190,610 - Sierra Wireless, Inc. / Thales Dis Ais Deutschland GmbH v. Sisvel International S.A.Some claims unpatentablePTAB · May 28, 2024 · IPR2020-01099 · APJ Monica S Ullagaddi · IPR · Remand
On remand, claims 5–7 and 10 are unpatentable as obvious over Chen; claim 8 was not shown unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“with the Federal Circuit. Paper 53. Petitioner subsequently filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal. Paper 54. The Federal Circuit rendered its Decision on October 6, 2023 (Paper 58) and entered its mandate on November 29, 2023 (Paper 57). In its Decision, the Federal Circuit vacated our conclusion regarding the “means for detecting” limitation recited in claims 5 and 10. Sisvel, 82 F.4th at 1364, 1370. The Court ordered that, on remand, we “must conduct the analysis appropriate for Noah group two, including whether any of the protocols are clearly linked or associated with ‘the function recited in the claim,’[ ] and whether they are ‘adequate structure for performing this function.’” Id. at 1370 (citing Noah Systems, Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The Court further held that “the Board should have considered the knowledge of a skilled artisan,” and specifically, Dr. Kakaes’s expert testimony, “to assess whether the protocol name sufficiently discloses an understood algorithm corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation.” Id. at 1369. The Court also held that we “must either (1) determine whether the claim[s] [are] indefinite and then whether such indefiniteness renders it impossible to adjudicate a prior-art challenge on the merits, or (2) resolve the prior art challenge to the patentability of the claims despite the potential indefiniteness of the means-plus-function term.” Id. at 1370. After the Federal Circuit issued its mandate, we ordered the parties to brief these issues including “the supported construction of the ‘means for detecting’ claim term, as well as the attendant patentability issues of indefiniteness and impossibility as relevant to this claim term.” Paper 59, 3. Petitioner filed an Opening Brief on Remand (Paper 63, “Rem. Pet. Br.”). Patent Owner thereafter filed a Response to Petition (Paper 64, “Rem. PO” slip op. at 4
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner
“In its Patent Owner’s Response, Patent Owner states: [A] person having ordinary skill at the time of invention— September 10, 1999—in the relevant art would be one with a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering or computer sciences and telecommunications networks, along with at least three or more years of practical experience in the field. A combination of more experience in the field and less education or more education and less experience in the field would also suffice. PO Resp. 7 (citing Inst. Dec. 9; Ex. 2001 ¶ 27). In our original Final Written Decision, we determined that: Although there are differences between the contentions of the parties as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, the parties have not informed us of a dispute that needs to be resolved. We do not find it necessary to resolve the differences between the contentions of the parties as to the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art because the findings and conclusions rendered in this Decision do not turn on either proposed definition. We determine, on this record, that the level of ordinary skill proposed by Patent Owner is consistent with the ’561 patent and the asserted prior art. As such, we adopt Patent Owner’s proposed definition for a person of ordinary skill in the art. Final Dec. 10. Based on our review of the entire record, we are not apprised of nor can we ascertain any reason to deviate from this determination. As such, in this Final Written Decision on remand, we maintain the definition of level of ordinary skill in the art from the original Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“Claim limitations that include the terms “means” or “means for” are presumed to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Claims subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 are construed in a “two-step process,” whereby we “first identify the claimed function,” and then “determine what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed function.” Id. at 1351. Accordingly, the rules governing this inter partes review require that Petitioner “identify the specific portions of the specification that describe the structure, material, or acts corresponding to each claimed function.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3). It is well established that “the corresponding structure for a § 112 ¶ 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in the specification.” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. vs. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also EON Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient structure only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other computer-implemented functions require disclosure of an algorithm.”). The Federal Circuit has held that “[t]he specification can express the algorithm ‘in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.’” Noah, 675 F.3d at 1312 (citing Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted)).” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner
“For example, with respect to the CRC protocol, Dr. Kakaes testifies that “CRCs are often referred to as ‘error detecting codes’ as they are typically used[] to detect whether a received data message is or is not erroneous.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 88. Dr. Kakaes further testifies that [t]o use a CRC, the transmitter runs a polynomial division of the data block (before forward error correcting code has been applied, if any) to calculate a “remainder” consisting of a predetermined number of bits, for example 16, which are also called “parity bits,” or “check bits,” or “checksum bits,” or “CRC bits” that are attached to the block to be encoded and then transmitted, in whichever way it may or may not be encoded, punctured, etc. After reception and channel decoding (recall that means determining the “maximum likelihood” message), the receiver then runs the same polynomial division of the received decoded data block (which includes the parity bits) and, if the result does not match the “remainder,” i.e., the “parity bits” are not consistent with the determined message, the decoded data block “fails” the “check,” i.e., is declared as being erroneous. As it turns out such a determination is never wrong. In other words, the “false negative” rate is 0. Id. (emphasis added). With regard to the ARQ protocol, Dr. Kakaes testifies that “[i]n an ARQ scheme, the receiver automatically requests retransmission of a data packet if it is detected to be erroneous, such as through the use of CRC, as discussed above.” Id. ¶ 91.” slip op. at 20
Patent outcomesUS 6,529,561 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 6,529,561
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.