- PTAB · Nov 13, 2023 · IPR2023-00796 · APJ Nathan A Engels · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 7–10, and 18–22 on all petitioned grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability based on the asserted combinations.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s Preliminary Response asks the Board to exercise its discretion to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314 in view of parallel litigation. Prelim. Resp. 1–10. However, “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution of an IPR or PGR in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner stipulates not to pursue in a parallel district court proceeding the same grounds as in the petition or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised in the petition.” Katherine K. Vidal, Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ interim_proc_discretionary_denials_aia_parallel_district_court_litigation_m emo_20220621_.pdf. Petitioner made such a stipulation. Pet. 71. Hence, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314 to deny institution in view of parallel litigation.” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“At this stage, we determine it is unnecessary to construe any terms, but we encourage the parties to directly address issues of claim construction in future briefing. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“f) Preliminary Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 On the current record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown for the purposes of institution that portions of Williams and Fulton teach or reasonably suggest each limitation of claim 1. Patent Owner will have an opportunity to address Petitioner’s showings during the trial stage, but on the current record, we preliminarily determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in its challenge to claim 1 as unpatentable in view of the combined teachings of Williams and Fulton.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Petitioner argues a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to incorporate the functionality of Fulton’s rotator in Williams’s digital array processor for several reasons. Pet. 40–44; see Pet. 36–38. Among other things, Petitioner contends Williams and Fulton describe similar devices and “a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the proposed combination due to the similarities in their function and architecture.” Pet. 41. f) Preliminary Conclusion Regarding Claim 1 On the current record, Petitioner has sufficiently shown for the purposes of institution that portions of Williams and Fulton teach or reasonably suggest each limitation of claim 1. Patent Owner will have an opportunity to address Petitioner’s showings during the trial stage, but on the current record, we preliminarily determine that Petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in its challenge to claim 1 as unpatentable in view of the combined teachings of Williams and Fulton.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 7,260,141 - BTC Corporation v. TG Biotech Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentablePTAB · Nov 13, 2023 · IPR2022-00998 · APJ Ulrike W Jenks · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable under the asserted obviousness grounds; Patent Owner’s motion to strike Exhibit 1038 was granted.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contention that we should disregard Dr. Naumovski’s testimony because she may have taken a leave of absence from work for a couple of years. The record supports that Dr. Naumovski not only meets the requirements of the person of ordinary skill in the art, but also appears to have relevant knowledge with respect to Gynostemma pentaphylum (“GP”) saponins. See Ex. 2015 (Appendix A). related field, and at least two years of experience using techniques for extraction and characterization of plant-based materials.” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2015 ¶ 74). Because there are more than 400 species of plants that contain saponins, Patent Owner disagrees that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be familiar with the structure and utility of saponins. Id. The level of skill in the art is a reference point for gauging what would have been obvious based on the reference disclosures. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355. In other words, the lens of the level of ordinary skill in the art does not change a prior art’s disclosure, though it may change one’s understanding of what is disclosed. Patent Owner, however, does not explain how its definition provides a reference point that would meaningfully alter the Petition’s assertions of obviousness. For purposes of this decision, we analyze the asserted prior art with respect to the level of skill set forth by Petitioner, but there would be no difference in the outcome of this Decision if we were to apply the level of skill in the art set forth by Patent Owner. C.” slip op. at 13
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner
“during the full trial, we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that applying the methods of Kim 460 to the G. pentaphyllum starting material of Razmovski necessarily results in the damulin levels as claimed. We agree with Dr. Naumovski’s explanation that the use of an impure damulin B standard containing a double peak renders the results as shown in Exhibit 1013 unreliable. Ex. 2015 ¶¶ 141–143, 162–173; see Ex. 2007. Dr. Naumovski further explains that the use of an impure standard would require the application of a correction factor, but this correction factor would need to be reassessed as the purity of the standard decreases over time. See Ex. 2015 ¶ 166. As Dr. Naumovski explains that applying a correction factor to the linear regression would result in a shallower slope. Ex. 2015 ¶ 165 (citing 2006, 71:12–73:5; 99:2–9). “Reducing the calibration curve slope increases the amount of damulin B calculated from the experimental extracts.” Ex. 2015 ¶ 165. However, in the Experimental Report-1 the same correction factor for the damulin B standard was used to” slip op. at 41
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner requests construction of the terms “an effective amount for improving or treating the metabolic syndrome,” which is found in claims 11–13, as meaning “an amount that produces any measurable amount of improvement in the metabolic syndrome” (Pet. 13–15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 91)) and “[a] pharmaceutical composition for improving and treating a metabolic syndrome, comprising at least one of at least 0.7% damulin A and at least 0.5% damulin B . . . and a pharmacologically acceptable carrier or excipient,” which is found in claim 8, as meaning “a pharmaceutical composition that includes an extract with 0.7% and 0.5% of damulin A and damulin B[, respectively,] along with a carrier or excipient” (id. at 15–16 (citing Ex. 1002, 64–65, 251–52, 280; Ex. 1001, 12:15–67, Table 2)). Patent Owner argues that “constructions are not necessary.” PO Resp. 11–12. We agree with Patent Owner and determine that it is not necessary for purposes of this Decision to construe any claim terms. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (only terms” slip op. at 15
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundDecided for petitioner
“Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success . . . all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.” In re Droge, 695 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903–04 (Fed.Cir.1988)); Intelligent Bio-Systems, Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the expectation of success issue involves a showing of “a reasonable expectation of achieving what is claimed”) (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner relies on Kim 460 to show that heating ginseng, which contains the ginsenosides Rb1, Rb2, Rc, Rd, Rg3, and Rg5, results in a teaches that ginseng with the higher Rg3 and Rg5 content is 50-fold more potent in their vasodilation studies than the non-treated samples. Razmovski teaches that G. pentaphyllum contains over 100 saponins and eight of those saponins are the same as protoparaxadiol-type ginsenosides Rb1, Rc, Rb3, Rd, F2, Rg3, malonyl-Rb1, and malonyl-Rd that are found in P. ginseng. Ex. 1007, 4. Knowing that G. pentaphyllum also contains ginsenosides Rb1, Rb2, Rc, Rd, Rg3, and Rg5, we find Petitioner’s conclusion that heating a G. pentaphyllum extract that contains these ginsenosides would similarly increase the ginsenoside levels of Rg3 and Rg5 is a reasonable inference from the cited references. Based on the teachings in Kim 460, we agree with Petitioner that it would have been reasonable to expect that the same source material, although derived from a different plant, would behave similarly to heat treatment. See Pet. 24. Because G. pentaphyllum is a less expensive starting material, we also agree with Petitioner that there is sufficient motivation to substitute G. pentaphyllum for ginseng in the methods of Kim 460. slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,357,786 not shown unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,357,786 - PTAB · Oct 23, 2023 · IPR2023-00670 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 10–14 under § 103(a) over Gladstone and Salazar, finding a reasonable likelihood that the combination teaches the claims.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)); see id. at 7, 9. The Interim Procedure also explains that such a stipulation (a Sotera stipulation) “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB.” Id. at 7. Petitioner provides a Sotera stipulation. Paper 9, Attach. A.” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Decided for petitioner
“General Plastic does not apply here because Petitioner did not file multiple, staggered petitions “challenging the same patent and same claims” and different petitioners did not challenge the same patent at different times. See Gen. Plastic, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 9–10, 16–17; see also Valve Corp. v. Elec. Scripting Prods., Inc., IPR2019-00062, Paper 11 at 9 (PTAB Apr. 2, 2019) (precedential). Instead, Petitioner initiated IPR2023-00669 and this proceeding on the same day by filing parallel petitions. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 1, 9, 13–14. Thus, these circumstances do not implicate the roadmapping concerns that General Plastic seeks to alleviate. See Gen. Plastic, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 16–17.” slip op. at 18
- Parallel petitionsDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the circumstances here justify two petitions. See Notice 2–5. As Petitioner asserts, Petitioner “devote[d] a substantial portion” of the 14,000 word-count limit to the potential constructions of claims 10, 11, 13, and 14 under § 112, sixth paragraph, in the Petition. See id. at 3; Pet. 13–28. As Petitioner also asserts, the “presentation of separate petitions” challenging claims 1–6 and 9 in IPR2023-00669 and claims 10–14 in this proceeding “facilitates the Board’s consideration of each challenge.” See Notice 5. Under the circumstances here, conducting two related inter partes reviews will not stress the Board’s finite resources or unduly burden the Board or Patent Owner. In IPR2023-00669 and this proceeding, the prior art and the unpatentability arguments largely overlap. Specifically, Petitioner cites Gladstone and Salazar when arguing the obviousness of each challenged claim in each proceeding and additionally cites Hada in IPR2023-00669 when arguing the obviousness of claim 6. Pet. 39–86; Prelim. Resp. 13–15; IPR2023-00669, Paper 2 (Pet.) at 26–75. Also, as Patent Owner admits, the challenges in each proceeding involve similar unpatentability arguments based on Gladstone and Salazar, e.g., “essentially the same” arguments in “remarkably similar” petitions according to Patent Owner. See Pet. 49–86; Prelim. Resp. 13–15; IPR2023-00669, Paper 2 (Pet.) at 36–69. 6. CONCLUSION CONCERNING DISCRETIONARY DENIAL DUE TO MULTIPLE PETITIONS For the reasons discussed above, we decline to exercise our discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution due to multiple petitions.” slip op. at 21
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“disclosures in Gladstone and Salazar teach claim 10’s subject matter. See supra §§ IV.D.3(a)–(g). Additionally, Petitioner provides a reason with a rational underpinning as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine Salazar’s teachings with Gladstone’s teachings in the way Petitioner proposes and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. See supra § IV.D.3(h). Hence, Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of proving that claim 10 is unpatentable under § 103(a) as obvious over Gladstone and Salazar.” slip op. at 56
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,302,708 - PTAB · Oct 23, 2023 · IPR2023-00669 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–6 and 9 for all petition grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Cisco would prevail on the asserted obviousness challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–6 and 9 in the ’708 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)); see id. at 7, 9. The Interim Procedure also” slip op. at 15
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“factors to consider when deciding whether to exercise discretion under § 314(a) to deny institution based on a follow-on petition: (1) whether the same petitioner previously filed a petition directed to the same claims of the same patent; (2) whether at the time of filing of the first petition the petitioner knew of the prior art asserted in the second petition or should have known of it; (3) whether at the time of filing of the second petition the petitioner already received the patent owner’s preliminary response to the first petition or received the Board’s decision on whether to institute review in the first petition; (4) the length of time that elapsed between the time the petitioner learned of the prior art asserted in the second petition and the filing of the second petition; (5) whether the petitioner provides adequate explanation for the time elapsed between the filings of multiple petitions directed to the same claims of the same patent; (6) the finite resources of the Board; and (7) the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) to issue a final determination not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director notices institution of review. Gen. Plastic, IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 at 9–10, 16.” slip op. at 17
- Parallel petitionsDenied
“Parallel Petitions Challenging the Same Patent. Based on the Board’s experience, one petition should be sufficient to challenge the claims of a patent in most situations. Two or more petitions filed against the same patent at or about the same time (e.g., before the first preliminary response by the patent owner) may place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the Board and the patent owner and could raise fairness, timing, and efficiency concerns. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). In addition, multiple petitions by a petitioner are not necessary in the vast majority of cases. To date, a substantial majority of patents have been challenged with a single petition. Nonetheless, the Board recognizes that there may be circumstances in which more than one petition may be necessary, including, for example, when the patent owner has asserted a large number of claims in litigation or when there is a dispute about priority date requiring arguments under multiple prior art references. . . .” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,302,708 - PTAB · Oct 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00703 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted review of claims 1–4, 7–14, 16, 17, 21, and 22 on all grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 was obvious over Pham and Wu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Institution denied fintivDecided for petitioner
“on the related district court matters identified above. Prelim. Resp. 1–12; see Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 11–12 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (holding that PTAB has discretion to deny institution in certain circumstances where there are parallel district court proceedings). Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”). Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like in Sotera, i.e., to “not pursue in the co-pending district court litigation the specific ground asserted in the petition, or any other ground that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in an IPR (i.e., grounds that could have been raised under §§ 102 or 103 on the basis of prior art patent or printed publications)” (Paper 7, Appendix A at 2), we do not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Reviewing Petitioner’s analysis of claim 1, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of Pham and Wu. The three remaining grounds are also based on the same or similar combination of Pham and Wu, and add one or more references to address features in dependent claims. As” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundInstituted
“Lastly, Petitioner notes that Wu discloses the claimed signature database and intrusion detection system. Pet. 45–48. In particular, Petitioner notes that Wu discloses a “signature engine 34 [that] compares packets from the network traffic with such attack signatures such that policy violations can be discovered.” Id. at 47 (quoting Ex. 1005, 5:23–29). Petitioner asserts that it would have been obvious to add the intrusion detection system discussed in Wu to Pham’s network security system between the cryptographic core and the packet engine in order to gain the benefits of that intrusion detection system. Id. at 25–31. Petitioner explains that devices such as that disclosed in Wu should be placed where it can inspect unencrypted traffic in the first possible moment, which in the case of Pham would be adjacent the encryption/decryption engine 120 (i.e., between the cryptographic core and the packet engine, as claimed). Id. at 29–31. Reviewing Petitioner’s analysis of claim 1, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of Pham and Wu. The three remaining grounds are also based on the same or similar combination of Pham and Wu, and add one or more references to address features in dependent claims. As” slip op. at 11
§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,566,612 - PTAB · Oct 18, 2023 · IPR2023-00673 · APJ William V Saindon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–4, 7–14, 16, 17, 21, and 22 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Pham and Wu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“based on the related district court matters identified above. Prelim. Resp. 1– 12; see Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 11–12 (PTAB Mar. 20, 2020) (precedential) (holding that PTAB has discretion to deny institution in certain circumstances where there are parallel district court proceedings). Our analysis under Fintiv is guided by the USPTO Director’s Memorandum issued on June 21, 2022, titled “Interim Procedure for Discretionary Denials in AIA Post Grant Proceedings with Parallel District Court Litigation” (“Director’s Memo”). Pursuant to the Director’s Memo, we “will not discretionarily deny institution . . . where a petitioner presents a [Sotera] stipulation.” Director’s Memo at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)). Because Petitioner has offered a stipulation like in Sotera, i.e., to “not pursue in the co-pending district court litigation the specific ground asserted in the petition, or any other ground that was raised or could have been reasonably raised in an IPR (i.e., grounds that could have been raised under §§ 102 or 103 on the basis of prior art patent or printed publications)” (Paper 8, Appendix A at 2), we do not discretionarily deny institution under Fintiv.” slip op. at 6
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Reviewing Petitioner’s analysis of claim 1, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of Pham and Wu. The three remaining grounds are also based on a similar combination of Pham and Wu, and add one or more references to address features in dependent claims. As mentioned above, Patent Owner has not argued the merits of the case at this time. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons given above, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood of success in showing that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of Pham and Wu. Accordingly, we institute inter partes review on all challenged claims and grounds. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting . . . review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art: would have a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or a related discipline, and 3–4 years of experience in computer networking with an emphasis on packet processing systems including traffic monitoring, inspection, and encryption/decryption systems. More experience could compensate for less formal education and vice versa. Pet. 14–15. Patent Owner did not offer a level of ordinary skill in the art in its preliminary response. We adopt Petitioner’s definition for purposes of this Decision, which appears consistent with the level of disclosure provided in the ’436 patent and the prior art cited.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction Neither party offers any claim constructions, nor do we see a need to construe any terms in order to make this Decision. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms. . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,685,436 - PTAB · Oct 2, 2023 · IPR2023-00568 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4, 8–15, 19, and 20, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable over the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“determine that the information presented sufficiently supports, for purposes of institution, Petitioner’s assertions that the combination of IMU and Okabe teaches each of the limitations of claim 1. We further determine that Petitioner provides an adequate reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of IMU and Okabe in the manner asserted by Petitioner, with a reasonable expectation of success. We therefore determine Petitioner has met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable over the combination of IMU and Okabe.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“determine that the information presented sufficiently supports, for purposes of institution, Petitioner’s assertions that the combination of IMU and Okabe teaches each of the limitations of claim 1. We further determine that Petitioner provides an adequate reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of IMU and Okabe in the manner asserted by Petitioner, with a reasonable expectation of success. We therefore determine Petitioner has met its burden to show a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in demonstrating that claim 1 is unpatentable over the combination of IMU and Okabe.” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least one 1–2 years of experience in image processing and animation,” and “[l]ess education could have been compensated with more experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 23–24). Petitioner adds that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have also been familiar with existing systems for image processing and animation and understood how to implement such systems.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 23–24). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior slip op. at 8
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,182,641 - DGL Group, Ltd. v. Hangzhou Chic Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Oct 2, 2023 · IPR2022-00844 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1 and 4–25 are unpatentable as obvious over the Chen/Guangjing-based combinations; the Board did not reach the alternative Kickstarter-based grounds.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“In its petition, DGL adopts the definition of the level of skill in the art as proposed by Hangzhou in the parallel district court litigation. Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1016, 8). There, Hangzhou asserted that one skilled in the art— would have at least (1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, computer science, or a related field, or equivalent experience, and (2) at least two years of experience in the area of: (i) robotics or feedback control for electromechanical systems; (ii) mechanical design, dynamic analysis, and/or control design for mechatronic systems, or (iii) equivalent experience in (i) or (ii). Ex. 1016, at 8. Hangzhou agrees that the above definition from the parallel litigation should control. See PO Resp. 4–5. Because the parties’ definition of the level of skill in the art appears consistent with the level reflected by the prior art, we adopt it for purposes of our analysis.” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Here, the parties summarize their claim construction positions from the parallel district court litigation for three claim terms: “electric balance vehicle,” “controller,” and the various iterations of the “control” limitation of the claims, i.e., “control the hub motors,” “controls the motors,” and “controlling the first and second hub motors.” Compare Pet. 22–23, with PO Resp. 8–9. At the same time, however, the parties state that an express claim construction is not needed for purposes of this inter partes review. See PO Resp. 8–9 (submitting “no construction was necessary.”); Pet. Reply 1 (submitting that “[c]laim construction is not required in this inter partes review.”). Nonetheless, the parties note their agreement that “electric balance vehicle” means “electric self-balancing vehicle.” PO Resp. 8; Pet. Reply 1. We find the parties’ construction of that term is reasonable and adopt it for purposes of our analysis. As for the other two claim terms, we agree with the parties that no further construction is needed to decide this case. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (approving Board decision not to construe claim language where the construction is not material to the dispute).” slip op. at 7
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Resp. 25–29. In doing so, Hangzhou makes the mistake of arguing the references individually without ever acknowledging the combination of their teachings as a whole. For instance, Hangzhou argues that the asserted combination is improper “because Chen at least does not disclose the inner cover.” PO Resp. 24. But DGL never argued that Chen discloses an inner cover. Instead, DGL observed that one skilled in the art “would have been inclined to employ the inner cover of Guangjing with the electric balance vehicle of Chen because of the benefits expressly taught by Guangjing: improved structural strength, lighter weight, lower battery load, faster response speed, and longer batter[y] run-time,” which “would have merely been the predictable result of using the elements of Guangjing according to their known function.” Pet. 29 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 83) (emphases added). Similarly, Hangzhou argues that the asserted combination is improper because “Guangjing discloses controlling the device through the use of a steering rod” (PO Resp. 25–26) and “[i]ncluding the steering mechanism of Guangjing would be necessary for the user to control turning of the device” (id. at 24). But, again, DGL never proposed using Guangjing’s steering mechanism in the asserted combination. Instead, DGL argued that one skilled in the art would have modified each of the foot platforms in Chen to include an inner cover, thereby preserving the rotatable relationship of the two foot platforms and their ability to independently turn and otherwise operate the wheels as originally intended by Chen. See Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 85). We also disagree with Hangzhou’s contention that the asserted combination “would lead to an inoperative result.” PO Resp. 24. Apparently, Hangzhou believes that “combining the single piece, non- rotatable-frame of Guangjing, with that of Chen would result in a device capable of only moving directly forward or directly backward.” Id. (emphasis added). But that argument relies on the false premise that Guangjing’s single-piece framework would extend the length of both of Chen’s foot platforms, while ignoring DGL’s express position that one skilled in the art would necessarily account for the rotatable relationship of Chen’s foot platforms when incorporating Guangjing’s teaching of an inner cover. See Pet. 30 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 85–86); Pet. Reply 3–4 (same). Indeed, in undertaking the combination, it would have been unthinkable for one skilled in the art to destroy the very essence of Chen’s invention— independently rotatable foot platforms for steering the vehicle. More reasonably, one skilled in the art, seeing Guangjing’s teaching of an inner cover for improving the structural strength of a self-balancing vehicle, would have immediately envisaged installing an inner cover into each of Chen’s foot platforms in a manner that preserved the ability of the user to steer the vehicle via the rotatable foot platforms. In that regard, we find the testimony of DGL’s expert more persuasive and credible than Hangzhou’s expert. Compare Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 83–86, with Ex. 2006 ¶¶ 31–33, 36.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“away” from structures like Guangjing’s inner framework. PO Resp. 30. According to Hangzhou, Guangjing’s inner framework equates to the “prior art” device that Chen disparages, which includes “a multi-component parallelogram structure” that “adds to the weight, bulk, complexity, and potential for mechanical failure.” Id. at 29 (quoting Ex. 1004 ¶ 5). We disagree. In quoting Chen, Hangzhou omits that the “multi-component” structure disparaged by Chen is used “to coordinate/link movement of the two platform sections and the wheels,” which reasonably refers to a mechanical linkage for steering the vehicle. Ex. 1004 ¶ 5. Chen’s disparagement of a multi-part steering linkage does not, in our view, teach away from using a static cover or frame to strengthen the underside of the foot platform itself, as taught by Guangjing. Nor can Hangzhou reasonably argue that Guangjing’s inner cover would add to the vehicle’s weight or bulk, given Guangjing’s express disclosure that the inner framework “reduc[es] the overall weight of the vehicle body.” Ex. 1006, 2:15–16; see also id. at 2:27–29 (“the weight is slightly lighter”). Similarly, Hangzhou argues that Chen’s disclosure of the platform sections being formed of “metal, sturdy plastic, or other suitable material” that is “reinforced” means that Chen “specifically teaches away from including additional structures, which would include an inner cover.” PO Resp. 29–30 (citing Ex. 1004 ¶ 18). Again, we disagree. Chen simply states that “[t]he housing may be molded and incorporate strengthening reinforcements” and “[t]he housing may be formed of metal, sturdy plastic or other suitable material.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 18 (emphasis added). Thus, these are not requirements in Chen. At most, Chen is describing a preferred embodiment. However, “[a] reference does not teach away ‘if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.’” Huawei Techs. Co. v. Iancu, 813 F. App’x 588, 591–92 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Here, while Chen may indicate a “general preference” for the use of strengthening reinforcements or certain materials, nothing in Chen criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the use of Guangjing’s inner cover. Indeed, in our view, one skilled in the art would have recognized that replacing Chen’s molded strengthening reinforcements in each of the foot platforms with an inner cover, as taught by Guangjing, is nothing more than substituting one strength-enhancing structure for another equivalent structure. Accordingly, Chen does not teach away from employing the inner cover of Guangjing in the electric balance vehicle of Chen.” slip op. at 13
Patent outcomesUS 10,597,107 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,597,107 - Lightricks Ltd. v. Plotagraph, Inc. And Sascha ConnellyInstitution deniedPTAB · Oct 2, 2023 · IPR2023-00569 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution on all challenged claims because Petitioner did not show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any asserted AEM, IMU-Okabe, or IMU-Okabe-Li ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute an inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2022). To institute an inter partes review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition shows “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons set forth below, we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we do not institute an inter partes review of any challenged claim on any asserted ground.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner contends that a person having ordinary skill in the art “would have had at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, and at least one 1–2 years of experience in image processing and animation,” and “[l]ess education could have been compensated with more experience, and vice versa.” Pet. 5–6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–29). Petitioner adds that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have also been familiar with existing systems for image processing and animation and understood how to implement such systems.” Id. at 6 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 27–29). Patent Owner does not address the level of ordinary skill in the art in its Preliminary Response. Based on our review of the record before us, we determine that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it appears consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends that all claim terms should be given their plain and ordinary meaning at this stage of the proceeding. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 46). Patent Owner indicates that it proposes “construction for certain claim language below,” but it does not actually identify any claim language for construction, let alone provide any constructions. Prelim. Resp. 16–17. On the present record, we do not discern a need to construe explicitly any claim language because doing so would have no effect on our analyses below of Petitioner’s asserted grounds and will not assist in resolving the present controversy between the parties. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable
“First, the disclosure of AEM that Petitioner relies on for teaching selecting certain pixels to be transparent or nontransparent pertains to “compositing,” i.e., creating a composite image from multiple images. Ex. 1003, 315–16. AEM states specifically: “To create a composite from multiple images, you can make parts of one or more of the images transparent so that other images can show through.” Id. at 315. Thus, each pixel in the composite image is either transparent or nontransparent such that every pixel is “selected” under Petitioner’s usage of the term “selecting.” The possibility that some of these pixels, in theory, could extend along a non-linear motion path of a Deform pin is mere happenstance—we are not directed to any disclosure in AEM of actually selecting a set of pixels (either transparent or nontransparent) that extend along a non-linear motion path. See In re Facebook, Inc., 743 F. App’x. 998, 1001–02 (Fed Cir. 2018) (deciding that an example in a prior art reference showing that it is possible for image elements to be contiguous is not sufficient to teach a claim limitation that requires contiguity). We are not persuaded on the record before us that AEM’s disclosure of designating pixels as transparent or nontransparent satisfies selecting a first set of pixels extending along a non-linear pathway.” slip op. at 12
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,301,119 - PTAB · Sep 26, 2023 · IPR2023-00537 · APJ Steven M Amundson · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–12, 14, and 15 on all petitioned challenges, finding a reasonable likelihood that Silva renders them obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Decided for petitioner
“C. Analysis The Interim Procedure explains that “the PTAB will not discretionarily deny institution in view of parallel district court litigation where a petitioner presents a stipulation not to pursue in a parallel proceeding the same grounds or any grounds that could have reasonably been raised before the PTAB.” Interim Procedure at 3 (citing Sotera Wireless, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., IPR2020-01019, Paper 12 (PTAB Dec. 1, 2020) (precedential as to § II.A)); see id. at 7, 9. The Interim Procedure also explains that such a stipulation (a Sotera stipulation) “mitigates concerns of potentially conflicting decisions and duplicative efforts between the district court and the PTAB.” Id. at 7. Petitioner provides a Sotera stipulation. Paper 7, Attach. A.” slip op. at 14
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“to institute an inter partes review. We may institute an inter partes review only if “the information presented in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). The “reasonable likelihood” standard is “a higher standard than mere notice pleading” but “lower than the ‘preponderance’ standard to prevail in a final written decision.” Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018- 01039, Paper 29 at 13 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (precedential). Based on the current record and for the reasons explained below, Petitioner has shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Thus, we institute an inter partes review of claims 1–12, 14, and 15 in the ’630 patent on all challenges included in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Based on the current record and for purposes of this Decision, we accept Petitioner’s description of an ordinarily skilled artisan because it comports with the technology and claims of the ’630 patent as well as the asserted prior art.” slip op. at 16
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Based on the current record, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction to decide whether Petitioner satisfies the “reasonable likelihood” standard for instituting trial. “[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,916,630
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.