- Masimo Corporation v. Apple Inc.Institution deniedPTAB · Apr 25, 2024 · IPR2024-00071 · APJ Robert L Kinder · IPR · Institution
The Board denied institution under § 314(a), finding substantial road-mapping concerns from Masimo’s staggered petition challenging claims 6 and 7.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Institution denied general plasticInstitution denied
“has modified its prior positions to account for both arguments made in preliminary responses, as well as concerns identified by the panel in the 745 IPR decision to institute. See Prelim. Resp. 11. Claims 6 and 7 depend from claims 1 and 4. Masimo has bolstered its analysis of Markel and Mills with respect to certain elements of claim 1 and its reasons for combining the references in this second Petition. For example, Petitioner added new mappings of the Markel-Mills combination to address claim 1 in direct response to concerns identified by Patent Owner and by the panel in the 745 IPR. See id. at 11–13. Addressing limitation 1[b(i)], Petitioner added a new mapping of Markel based on pushbuttons having electrodes as shown in Figure 2 of Markel. See Pet. 51–52. Petitioner even identified this discussion of Figure 2 as “a second mapping of the claims.” Id. This second mapping of claim 1 based on Figure 2, and the corresponding analysis, appear nowhere in the analysis of claim 1 (or claim 4) in Masimo’s 745 IPR petition. The new embodiments relied on and modified arguments addressing claim 1 of the ’257 patent suggest that Petitioner is using the prior proceedings as a roadmap to address issues to its first petition in the 745 IPR. Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor of invoking our discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 20
Discretionary denialPatents in suitUS 10,076,257 - Netflix Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 17, 2024 · IPR2020-00646 · APJ Iftikhar Ahmed · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1, 5, 8, 9, 13–15, 18, and 21–23 unpatentable as obvious over Zetts and Kaku, with claims 5, 18, and 21 also obvious over Zetts, Kaku, and Seo.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandDecided for petitioner
“the Federal Circuit. Paper 49. On September 11, 2023, the Federal Circuit issued a decision in the appeal vacating our Final Written Decision and remanding for further proceedings consistent with its decision. Netflix, 80 F.4th at 1362. The Federal Circuit determined that we abused our discretion in finding that Petitioner had failed to articulate a field of endeavor. Id. at 1359. The Federal Circuit remanded to allow us to decide the “factual question of whether Kaku is directed to the same field of endeavor as the patent-in-suit.” Id. at 1361. The Federal Circuit, however, did not address the other three issues raised by Patent Owner since we did not decide those issues in the Final Written Decision and they were not presented for appeal. See generally Netflix.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In the Final Written Decision, we stated the following:” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner
“Petitioner has not shown that one of the prior art references is analogous to the claimed invention.” Final Dec. 9. On remand, the construction of this claim is an issue that must be decided to reach a conclusion on the patentability of the Challenged Claims of the ’792 patent.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“1. Analogous Art – Field of Endeavor Before turning to Petitioner’s analysis of the claims, we address” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 8,472,792 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 8,472,792 - Intel Corporation / Dell Technologies Inc. et al. v. 3d Surfaces, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00004 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 9–11, 17, and 18 are unpatentable: claims 1–4, 9, 11, and 17 as obvious over Sfarti and Foley; claims 10 and 18 as obvious over Sfarti, Foley, and Möller.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’299 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years[’] work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these scientific fields.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–97. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 10–11; Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Based on the record presented, we now find as we did in the Institution Decision that Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’299 patent and the prior art of record, and is not disputed by Patent Owner. See Inst. Dec. 20–21. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s formulation in this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesTerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6, we conclude that they are. Because the Unit Terms do not use the word “means,” we apply a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Nonetheless, as Petitioner argues, the claim term “unit” does not connote any particular structure, and the terms “transform unit”, “lighting unit”, “renderer unit”, and “tessellate unit” recite function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. The “unit” term at issue here is closely akin to the “module” term at issue in Williamson, and similarly generic terms such as “element” and “device,” and is, therefore, in the context of the ’299 patent claims and specification, a “nonce” word used “in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51; see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1298–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the claim term “cheque standby unit” was subject to § 112, ¶ 6, because it failed to “recite any structure, much less ‘sufficiently definite structure,’” and the claim recited a function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function, despite an expert witness’s contrary testimony); WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2022-1066, 2023 WL 6210607, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) (stating “the term ‘unit,’ in a vacuum, is defined only by the function it performs, much like terms such as ‘element’ or ‘means’” and “[a] ‘unit’ could be almost anything”).4 We therefore agree with Petitioner’s position that the rebuttable presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome in this case, because the Unit Terms are not understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“transforming is performed by a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the disclosed microcode. See Ex. 1001, 5:20–29, 5:51–67, 7:1–8, 7:12–13, 12:24–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105. We construe “transform unit” as a means-plus-function limitation with the function of transforming graphic objects into transformed objects (claims 1 and 11) including control points (claims 2 and 11), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the microcode disclosed in the specification. The foregoing construction of “transform unit” is identical to the preliminary construction in the Institution Decision, with two exceptions. First, it adds that the corresponding structure is a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor. See Inst. Dec. 22–23. We agree with Patent Owner’s contention that the ’299 patent describes such pipeline hardware as being part of “[t]he present invention,” so we include it in our construction. Ex. 1001, 5:20–29. Second, our construction does not require a dedicated processor, which is part of Petitioner’s claim construction. See Inst. Dec. 22–23; Pet. 11–12. As Patent Owner points out, the ’299 patent specification does not include the term “dedicated.” To the extent Petitioner’s “dedicated” term is meant to require that the processor is programmed solely to perform the claimed transforming function, to the exclusion of any other processing, we conclude the claim is open to both a dedicated processor and a non-dedicated processor.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“7. Remaining Claim Terms Upon review of the arguments and evidence, we determine no further construction of any claim term is needed. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 7,245,299 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,245,299 - Intel Corporation / Dell Technologies Inc. et al. v. 3d Surfaces, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2022-01589 · APJ George R Hoskins · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–4, 9–11, 17, and 18 are unpatentable as obvious over Sfarti and Foley, with claims 10 and 18 also unpatentable over Sfarti, Foley, and Möller.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’299 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years[’] work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these scientific fields.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–97. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 10–11; Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Based on the record presented, we now find as we did in the Institution Decision that Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’299 patent and the prior art of record, and is not disputed by Patent Owner. See Inst. Dec. 20–21. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s formulation in this Decision.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6, we conclude that they are. Because the Unit Terms do not use the word “means,” we apply a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Nonetheless, as Petitioner argues, the claim term “unit” does not connote any particular structure, and the terms “transform unit”, “lighting unit”, “renderer unit”, and “tessellate unit” recite function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. The “unit” term at issue here is closely akin to the “module” term at issue in Williamson, and similarly generic terms such as “element” and “device,” and is, therefore, in the context of the ’299 patent claims and specification, a “nonce” word used “in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51; see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1298–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the claim term “cheque standby unit” was subject to § 112, ¶ 6, because it failed to “recite any structure, much less ‘sufficiently definite structure,’” and the claim recited a function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function, despite an expert witness’s contrary testimony); WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2022-1066, 2023 WL 6210607, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) (stating “the term ‘unit,’ in a vacuum, is defined only by the function it performs, much like terms such as ‘element’ or ‘means’” and “[a] ‘unit’ could be almost anything”).4 We therefore agree with Petitioner’s position that the rebuttable presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome in this case, because the Unit Terms are not understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”).” slip op. at 15
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“transforming is performed by a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the disclosed microcode. See Ex. 1001, 5:20–29, 5:51–67, 7:1–8, 7:12–13, 12:24–28; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 104–105. We construe “transform unit” as a means-plus-function limitation with the function of transforming graphic objects into transformed objects (claims 1 and 11) including control points (claims 2 and 11), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the microcode disclosed in the specification. The foregoing construction of “transform unit” is identical to the preliminary construction in the Institution Decision, with two exceptions. First, it adds that the corresponding structure is a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor. See Inst. Dec. 22–23. We agree with Patent Owner’s contention that the ’299 patent describes such pipeline hardware as being part of “[t]he present invention,” so we include it in our construction. Ex. 1001, 5:20–29. Second, our construction does not require a dedicated processor, which is part of Petitioner’s claim construction. See Inst. Dec. 22–23; Pet. 11–12. As Patent Owner points out, the ’299 patent specification does not include the term “dedicated.” To the extent Petitioner’s “dedicated” term is meant to require that the processor is programmed solely to perform the claimed transforming function, to the exclusion of any other processing, we conclude the claim is open to both a dedicated processor and a non-dedicated processor.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“7. Remaining Claim Terms Upon review of the arguments and evidence, we determine no further construction of any claim term is needed. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 25
Patent outcomesUS 7,245,299 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites GrahamPatents in suitUS 7,245,299 - Intel Corporation / Dell Technologies Inc. et al. v. 3d Surfaces, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2023-00006 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Sfarti and Foley because the combination teaches the claimed graphics pipeline, including a tessellation unit between transformation and lighting.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’534 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years[’] work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these scientific fields.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–97. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 11; Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Based on the record presented, we now find as we did in the Institution Decision that Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’534 patent and the prior art of record, and is not disputed by Patent Owner. See Inst. Dec. 7–8. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s formulation in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6, we conclude that they are. Because the Unit Terms do not use the word “means,” we apply a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Nonetheless, as Petitioner argues, the claim term “unit” does not connote any particular structure, and the terms “transform unit”, “lighting unit”, “rendering unit”, and “tessellating unit” recite function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. The “unit” term at issue here is closely akin to the “module” term at issue in Williamson, and similarly generic terms such as “element” and “device,” and is, therefore, in the context of the ’534 patent claims and specification, a “nonce” word used “in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51; see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1298–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the claim term “cheque standby unit” was subject to § 112, ¶ 6, because it failed to “recite any structure, much less ‘sufficiently definite structure,’” and the claim recited a function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function, despite an expert witness’s contrary testimony); WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2022-1066, 2023 WL 6210607, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) (stating “the term ‘unit,’ in a vacuum, is defined only by the function it performs, much like terms such as ‘element’ or ‘means’” and “[a] ‘unit’ could be almost anything”).4 We therefore agree with Petitioner’s position that the rebuttable presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome in this case, because the Unit Terms are not understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”). Patent Owner’s and Mr. Van Dyke’s apparent disagreement with this” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“Second, our construction does not require a dedicated processor, which is part of Petitioner’s claim construction. See Inst. Dec. 10; Pet. 14– 15. As Patent Owner points out, the ’534 patent specification does not include the term “dedicated.” To the extent Petitioner’s “dedicated” term is meant to require that the processor is programmed solely to perform the claimed transforming function, to the exclusion of any other processing, we conclude that the claim is open to both a dedicated processor and a non-dedicated processor. Nonetheless, we agree with Petitioner’s position that the transform unit encompasses, at least in some embodiments, a different unit from the other three claimed units. This is suggested by the language of claim 10, which refers to each of the units separately. Claim 10 additionally refers to the tessellation unit being “coupled between the transform unit and the lighting unit,” demonstrating that at least those three units can be different units. Further, Figure 3 of the ’534 patent correspondingly illustrates four separate units 2, 9, 3, and 4 within GPU 7. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 3, 7:4–15. Thus, although the transform unit may perform functions other than the transforming function, the transform unit in at least some embodiments does not perform the lighting, rendering, or tessellating functions of the other claimed units. In summary, we construe “transform unit” as a means plus function limitation with the function of transforming graphic objects into transformed objects (claims 10 and 15), or the function of transforming the spatial coordinates of said graphic objects (claim 12), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the microcode disclosed in the ’534 patent specification. Further, the transform unit does not perform the lighting, rendering, or tessellating functions of the other claimed units.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededDecided for patent owner
“7. Remaining Claim Terms Upon review of the arguments and evidence, we determine no further construction of any claim term is needed. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS RE42,534 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham - Intel Corporation / Dell Technologies Inc. et al. v. 3d Surfaces, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 16, 2024 · IPR2022-01591 · APJ Jeffrey S Smith · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 10–20 are unpatentable as obvious over Sfarti and Foley because their combination teaches the claimed graphics pipeline, including a tessellation unit between transformation and lighting.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“to the ’534 patent “would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, electrical engineering, or a related scientific field, and approximately two years of work experience in computer graphics or, alternatively, two years[’] work towards a masters or doctorate degree in these scientific fields.” Pet. 10; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 96–97. Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s formulation of ordinary skill in the Patent Owner Response. See PO Resp. 11; Ex. 2005 ¶ 31. Based on the record presented, we now find as we did in the Institution Decision that Petitioner’s formulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art is consistent with the level of skill reflected in the ’534 patent and the prior art of record, and is not disputed by Patent Owner. See Inst. Dec. 7–8. We, therefore, apply Petitioner’s formulation in this Decision.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner
“function limitations subject to § 112, ¶ 6, we conclude that they are. Because the Unit Terms do not use the word “means,” we apply a rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Nonetheless, as Petitioner argues, the claim term “unit” does not connote any particular structure, and the terms “transform unit”, “lighting unit”, “rendering unit”, and “tessellating unit” recite function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. The “unit” term at issue here is closely akin to the “module” term at issue in Williamson, and similarly generic terms such as “element” and “device,” and is, therefore, in the context of the ’534 patent claims and specification, a “nonce” word used “in a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350–51; see also Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291, 1298–1301 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the claim term “cheque standby unit” was subject to § 112, ¶ 6, because it failed to “recite any structure, much less ‘sufficiently definite structure,’” and the claim recited a function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function, despite an expert witness’s contrary testimony); WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 2022-1066, 2023 WL 6210607, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2023) (stating “the term ‘unit,’ in a vacuum, is defined only by the function it performs, much like terms such as ‘element’ or ‘means’” and “[a] ‘unit’ could be almost anything”).4 We therefore agree with Petitioner’s position that the rebuttable presumption against application of § 112, ¶ 6 is overcome in this case, because the Unit Terms are not understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (“The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.”).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Corresponding structure / algorithm (indefinite if none)Term construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“preliminary construction in the Institution Decision, with two exceptions. First, it adds that the corresponding structure is a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor. See Inst. Dec. 10. We agree with Patent Owner’s contention that the ’534 patent describes such pipeline hardware as being part of “[t]he present invention,” so we include it in our construction. Ex. 1001, 5:25–34. Second, our construction does not require a dedicated processor, which is part of Petitioner’s claim construction. See Inst. Dec. 10; Pet. 14– 15. As Patent Owner points out, the ’534 patent specification does not include the term “dedicated.” To the extent Petitioner’s “dedicated” term is meant to require that the processor is programmed solely to perform the claimed transforming function, to the exclusion of any other processing, we conclude that the claim is open to both a dedicated processor and a non-dedicated processor. Nonetheless, we agree with Petitioner’s position that the transform unit encompasses, at least in some embodiments, a different unit from the other three claimed units. This is suggested by the language of claim 10, which refers to each of the units separately. Claim 10 additionally refers to the tessellation unit being “coupled between the transform unit and the lighting unit,” demonstrating that at least those three units can be different units. Further, Figure 3 of the ’534 patent correspondingly illustrates four separate units 2, 9, 3, and 4 within GPU 7. See Ex. 1001, Fig. 3, 7:4–15. Thus, although the transform unit may perform functions other than the transforming function, the transform unit in at least some embodiments does not perform the lighting, rendering, or tessellating functions of the other claimed units. In summary, we construe “transform unit” as a means plus function limitation with the function of transforming graphic objects into transformed objects (claims 10 and 15), or the function of transforming the spatial coordinates of said graphic objects (claim 12), and with the corresponding structure of a GPU with computer graphics pipeline hardware including a processor programmed to execute the transforming step of the microcode disclosed in the ’534 patent specification. Further, the transform unit does not perform the lighting, rendering, or tessellating functions of the other claimed units.” slip op. at 18
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“7. Remaining Claim Terms Upon review of the arguments and evidence, we determine no further construction of any claim term is needed. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (claim terms need to be construed “only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 23
Patent outcomesUS RE42,534 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Graham - Platinum Optics Technology, Inc. v. Viavi Solutions Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Apr 11, 2024 · IPR2022-01489 · APJ Sharon Fenick · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1–19 are unpatentable: Hendrix anticipates them, and the listed combinations also render their respective claims obvious.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“In the Decision on Institution, we adopted a slightly modified version of this definition in which we removed the open-ended term “at least.” Inst. Dec. 10–11. Patent Owner does not address the definition of a POSA. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner’s declarant Dr. Clemens applies Petitioner’s definition, but does not opine on whether it is correct. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 22–23. As in the Decision on Institution (Inst. Dec. 10), we apply the same slightly modified version of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art that removes the open-ended term “at least.” We determine this level of skill comports with the qualifications a person would have needed to understand and implement the teachings of the ʼ794 patent and the” slip op. at 11
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“filter comprises “a third set of layers on the second side, whether the third set of layers includes oxygen.” Ex. 1001, 10:41–49. Petitioner argues that the proper construction of this limitation “means that there is a third set of layers on the opposite side of the substrate, whether or not [the layers] include oxygen” – i.e., that the third set of layers do not need to include oxygen. Pet. 7–8. Patent Owner agrees that this is the “literal” reading of the language, but contends that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have appreciated that this language was intended to read ‘wherein’ rather than ‘whether’” and that the claim requires that this set of layers must include oxygen. PO Resp. 24–26 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 53–55). We agree with Petitioner’s representation that each of the challenges presented either anticipates or renders obvious a third set of layers with oxygen on a second side of a substrate (Pet. 8) and therefore, no claim construction is necessary for this term. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for petitioner
“415 F.3d at 1314): “a first set of layers on the first side, wherein the first set of layers includes silicon and hydrogen” (claim 1) and “a first set of layers including silicon and hydrogen” (claims 9 and 15). Ex. 1001, 10:41–49, 10:65–11:4, 11:17–12:5. As the parties agree, these recitations are broadly worded. See Pet. 14 (describing the recitations of the claims as “broad” and directed to “layers of any material that has both ‘silicon and hydrogen’”); PO Resp. 42 (describing the claims as “simply specifying physical layers including silicon and hydrogen in them”), 44 (describing the disputed terms as “open-ended claiming of layers including hydrogen and silicon”). Despite this broad language, Patent Owner contends that we must read “layers including silicon and hydrogen” in conjunction with other limitations in the claims reciting a “near infrared bandpass filter.” PO Resp. 35–37 (citing Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 65–66). For purposes of our analysis, we limit “layers including silicon and hydrogen” to only materials suitable for NIR bandpass filters, as suggested by Patent Owner. We next examine the rest of the intrinsic evidence. The specification of the ’794 patent does not contain language that generally describes “layers including silicon and hydrogen.” Instead, the specification describes only layers of hydrogenated silicon: its abstract is directed to an “optical filter” that “includes a filter stack formed of hydrogenated silicon layers” (Ex. 1001, code (57)); the technical field of the invention is described as “relat[ing] to optical filters including hydrogenated silicon layers and to sensor systems comprising such optical filters” (id. at 1:20–23); the summary of the invention describes “the present invention” as an optical filter or sensor system “comprising” “a plurality of hydrogenated silicon layers” (id. at 2:57–3:19); and the detailed description begins with a hydrogenated silicon (Si:H) layers” (id. at 4:19–20). The specification only mentions silicon and hydrogen separately with respect to the disclosed sputter-deposition system “used to produce the hydrogenated silicon material.” Id. at 4:35–5:61, 7:10–19. In particular, the specification describes how “cathode 430 includes a silicon target 431, which is sputtered in the presence of hydrogen (H2), as well as an inert gas such as argon, to deposit the hydrogenated silicon material as a layer on the substrate 420.” Id. at 4:44–47. The specification also describes how altering the hydrogen flow rate in the deposition process affects the optical properties of hydrogenated silicon produced by the deposition system. See id. at 5:1–61. But the only end product described from the sputter-deposition process using silicon and hydrogen is hydrogenated silicon. See id. at 4:35–5:61, 7:10–19. As such, the specification does not provide any indication of materials beyond hydrogenated silicon that are within the scope of “layers including silicon and hydrogen.”” slip op. at 15
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“hydrogen” defines a genus. The test for providing a written description that supports a genus claim is whether the description provides “either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). “Regarding whether common structural features must exist between a claim and a putative priority disclosure, those features must constitute the near-entirety of the structures being compared.” Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 61 F.4th 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Yet the patentees only disclosed hydrogenated silicon as a possible species. Indeed, the specification focuses on a singular example of a sputterdeposition system that is used to produce an improved hydrogenated silicon material. See Ex. 1017 ¶¶ 36–38. Patent Owner cites this deposition process as written description support for “the claimed layers containing silicon and hydrogen.” See PO Resp. 44. But this example supports only how to make hydrogenated silicon and does not include any indication about what other materials would be within the scope of the claimed genus. Under these circumstances, the specification’s disclosure of a single species is not an adequate number to show possession of the entire genus of “layers including silicon and hydrogen.” Beyond the disclosure of the sputter-deposition process for producing hydrogenated silicon, Patent Owner does not identify—and we cannot discern—any other examples of a “structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350. This is particularly noteworthy given that undisputed record evidence shows numerous other potential filter materials “including silicon and hydrogen.” See supra § II.D.1.a. In the absence of structural description supporting “layers including silicon and hydrogen,” we determine that an” slip op. at 19
Patent outcomesUS 11,131,794 unpatentableClaim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,131,794 - Netflix, Inc. v. Divx, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 21, 2024 · IPR2020-00511 · APJ Bart A Gerstenblith · IPR · Remand
On remand, the Board held claims 1–3, 5, 6, 10–12, 14, and 15 unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Chen and Grab-333 with Candelore or Kocher.
RulingsRemand decision- RemandOther
“I. INTRODUCTION This case is on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to address the patentability of claims 1–3, 5, 6, 10–12, 14, and 15 (“the Challenged Claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 9,184,920 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’920 patent). Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, No. 2022-1043, 2023 WL 3115576 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 2023) (nonprecedential). For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Challenged Claims are unpatentable.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownDecided for petitioner
“F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978)). As neither party challenges our preliminary finding regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art, we see no reason to disturb that finding. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with at least two years of experience in video encryption and cryptography or . . . a master’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or a similar field with a specialization in video encryption and cryptography.” See Inst. Dec. 9–10 (finding the same).” slip op. at 17
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“In the Response, Patent Owner does not propose a construction for any claim term or contest our preliminary findings regarding limitations 1[a] and 1[b]. See generally PO Resp. Accordingly, we maintain and reaffirm our preliminary determinations regarding the meaning of the recited “user encryption key” and “content encryption key.” [Inst.] Dec. 12– 15. Additionally, we need not construe other claim terms to resolve the present controversy before us.” slip op. at 19
- Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableUnpatentable
“obviousness] involves the weighing of the fact findings to conclude whether the claimed combination would have been obvious to an ordinary artisan.” Arctic Cat, 876 F.3d at 1361. On balance, considering the complete record before us, Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, and 15 of the ’920 patent would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” slip op. at 103
Patent outcomesUS 9,184,920 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,184,920 - Amphenol Corp. v. PPC Broadband, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Mar 20, 2024 · IPR2023-01363 · APJ Jon B Tornquist · IPR · Institution
Instituted IPR on claims 1, 2, and 10–13 because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim, including obviousness over Holmberg and Battey.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“An inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Having considered the arguments and evidence presented by Petitioner and Patent Owner, we determine that the information presented in the Petition demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one of the Challenged Claims of the ’483 patent. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review as to all the Challenged Claims of the ’483 patent on all the grounds of unpatentability set forth in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner contends claim 1 should be construed to require that “the drop cable retain its external jacket as it is routed internally.” Pet. 10. Petitioner contends this construction differs from Patent Owner’s apparent construction in the district court, “which allows the external jacket to be removed as the drop cable enters the DIB and the fibers routed inside the box without the external jacket.” Id. at 10–11. Patent Owner contends Petitioner’s narrower construction requiring the “drop cable” retain its external jacket is incorrect, but contends “the Board need not resolve this claim construction dispute to deny institution because Petitioner’s proposed Grounds 1–5 are all insufficient under” either party’s construction. Prelim. Resp. 9. Upon review of the parties’ arguments and the prior art of record, we determine that no claim terms require express construction for purposes of this decision. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). We address below, however, whether the recited cable types themselves constitute claim limitations.” slip op. at 11
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“slack fiber. Prelim. Resp. 33–37. These arguments are not persuasive. First, Petitioner does not propose a bodily incorporation of Battey’s shelf into the device of Holmberg. Rather, Petitioner’s proposed combination retains splice tray 230 of Holmberg and relies on Battey for its disclosure of using a hinge connection for the splice tray. Pet. 40 (asserting that one of ordinary skill in the art “would have found it obvious to modify Holmberg pursuant to Battey, resulting in splice tray 230 moveable relative to main body 216”), 43 (“Such a modification would have been a simple substitution of a hinged connection instead of a fastener.”). Second, although Battey utilizes a fixedly mounted slack basket to store excess cable, we are directed to no disclosure or teaching in Battey that teaches away from using other means of storing slack fiber.” slip op. at 23
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDecided for petitioner
“For the reasons set forth below, we determine that part two of the Advanced Bionics framework has not been satisfied. Thus, we need not address whether part one of the framework is satisfied in view of the alleged cumulative nature of Laporte and Battey.” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 103 obviousnessDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,008,483 - Maplebear Inc. D/B/A Instacart v. Consumeron, LLCAll claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 29, 2024 · IPR2022-01357 · APJ Carl M Defranco · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 14–17, 21, 22, and 24–26 are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted combinations of Park, Kim, Hileman, Pugliese, and Mault.
RulingsFinal written decision- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“does not equate an “acquisition request” exclusively with a shopping or purchase request. See Ex. 3006, 10–11. Rather, the specification repeatedly uses the phrase “purchase or otherwise acquire” to indicate that a delivery agent may acquire goods by means other than purchasing or shopping. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:25–27 (“[T]he user specifies the exact location from which the selected delivery agent is to purchase or otherwise acquire the product, such as a retail store location.”); id. at 7:56–58 (“If the product is approved at 120, the delivery agent will purchase or otherwise acquire the product on behalf of the customer at 121.”); id. at 2:24–28 (“[T]he user provides the service provider with information regarding the type of product desired and the shopping or acquisition location from which the user desires to purchase or otherwise obtain the product.”) (emphases added). Consumeron’s argument that the specification “uses the word ‘or’ to refer to things that are synonymous to each other” is not persuasive. See PO Resp. 10; see also PO Sur-Reply 3–4 (essentially same). As noted above, the specification uses the phrase “purchase or otherwise acquire.” Ex. 1001, 5:25–27, 7:56–58 (emphasis added); see also id at 2:24–28 (similar). By including the adverb “otherwise,” the specification makes clear that purchase and acquire are not used synonymously, but rather that acquiring is broader and encompasses other ways of obtaining a product. See Ex. 1039, 1 (“otherwise” means “in a different way or manner”). Indeed, the specification unequivocally describes instances where the delivery agent acquires a product without purchasing or shopping for it. For instance, the specification explains that the customer may “pre-purchase[]” goods such that the customer requests simply that the delivery agent “pick-up” of the goods: [T]he customer has the option of paying the retailer or seller directly, in which case the customer will only be billed for the pick-up and delivery services provided. . . . If pre-purchased by the customer, the delivery agent obtains a receipt showing proof of pre-payment by the customer. Id. at 8:15–23 (emphases added). Even more explicitly, the specification states that, “although discussed in the context of a customer who wishes to purchase a product, it should be understood that system 10 may be utilized to schedule both pick-ups and delivery of any type of goods, including free goods. Id. at 10:40–44 (emphasis added). Those disclosures collectively indicate that a delivery agent can fulfill an acquisition request without necessarily shopping for or purchasing goods. Consumeron attempts to distinguish those descriptions, urging that they refer to an “alternative” embodiment that “does not expand the meaning of the term ‘acquisition request’ beyond its ordinary meaning.” PO Sur- Reply 4. But that argument is premised on an incorrect assumption that the ordinary meaning is limited to purchasing or shopping. Here, nothing in the intrinsic record suggests that the term “acquisition request” excludes the specification’s embodiments where “pre-purchased” or “free” goods are only in need of “pick-up.” To the contrary, as noted above, the specification repeatedly states the delivery agent may “otherwise acquire” goods without purchasing them, thereby, indicating that the agent can fulfill an acquisition request without necessarily shopping for the goods on the customer’s behalf. See Ex. 1001, 5:25–27, 7:56–58.” slip op. at 8
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“We previously construed the term “acquisition request” in the related 865 IPR to encompass “not only a request for an agent to shop for and purchase goods for delivery to a customer, but also to encompass a request for a delivery agent to simply pick up and deliver goods that have been prepurchased by the customer.” See Ex. 3006, 9–11 (granting institution in conjunction with construing “acquisition request”). As noted above in Section I.A (“Related Matters”), the 865 IPR centers on the ’465 patent, whose lineage derives from the same application—the ’867 application—as the ’835 patent challenged here. Compare Ex. 1001, 1:7–15 (referencing Appl. No. 12/711,867), with Ex. 3005, code (63) (also referencing Appl. No. 12/711,867). Indeed, the ’835 and ’465 patents share essentially identical specifications and figures. Thus, based on the final record before us (as discussed below) and consistent with our prior construction in the related 865 IPR, we likewise determine here that Instacart’s construction of “acquisition request” is the more reasonable one. See SightSound Techs., LLC v. Apple Inc., 809 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Where multiple patents ‘derive from the same parent application and share many common terms, we must interpret the claims consistently across all asserted patents.’” (quoting NTP, Inc., v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). More specifically, as we explained in the 865 IPR, the specification does not equate an “acquisition request” exclusively with a shopping or purchase request. See Ex. 3006, 10–11. Rather, the specification repeatedly uses the phrase “purchase or otherwise acquire” to indicate that a delivery agent may acquire goods by means other than purchasing or shopping. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 5:25–27 (“[T]he user specifies the exact location from which the selected delivery agent is to purchase or otherwise acquire the product, such as a retail store location.”); id. at 7:56–58 (“If the product is approved at 120, the delivery agent will purchase or otherwise acquire the product on behalf of the customer at 121.”); id. at 2:24–28 (“[T]he user provides the service provider with information regarding the type of product desired and the shopping or acquisition location from which the user desires to purchase or otherwise obtain the product.”) (emphases added).” slip op. at 7
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“Although the district court considered “intentional delay” in the course of construing the term “real time,” the district court does not appear to have accepted Consumeron’s narrower construction in that regard. More accurately, the district court stated it “sees no reason that a ‘real-time’ transmission of data could not both involve no inherent delay and permit a system that requires multiple ‘clicks’ to operate.” Ex. 1035, 24 (emphasis added). In addition, the district court quoted from a technical dictionary, which provided: The basic definition of real-time data is that it is data that is not kept or stored, but is passed along to the end user as quickly as it is gathered. It is important to note that real-time data does not mean that the data gets to the user instantly. There may be any number of bottlenecks related to the data collection infrastructure, the bandwidth between various parties, or even just the slowness of the end user’s computer. Real-time data does not promise data within a certain number of microseconds. It just means that the data is not designed to be kept back from its eventual use as it is collected. Id. at 25 (citing “Technopedia”). In other words, the district court contemplated that real-time data includes data that is transmitted as it is gathered despite some inherent delay in transmitting and accessing the data, such as bottlenecks in the infrastructure, slowness of the user’s computer, or “multiple clicks” by the user. With that in mind, we reject Consumeron’s attempt to alter our construction of “real-time” to exclude so-called “intentional delay.” Thus, consistent with the district court and our institution decision, we maintain that “real-time” transmission means “data that is passed along as it is gathered.”” slip op. at 12
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Instacart submits that one skilled in the art would have had “a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or equivalent training, and approximately two years of experience working in the field of electronic commerce” and that “[l]ack of work experience can be remedied by additional education, and vice versa. Pet. 14 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24). Consumeron responds that one skilled in the art would have been “someone with a background in electrical engineering, computer science, or the like,” but that “industry experience can make up for a lack of technical training, and more education can make up for a lack of industry experience.” PO Resp. 9 (citing Ex. 2016 ¶¶ 17–20). 1 WO 01/11523 A1, published Feb. 15, 2001 (Ex. 1005) (“Park”). 2 Certified translation of KR2003-0085802, published Nov. 7, 2003 (Ex. 1006); corrected certified translation of Figure 2 (Ex. 1038); and original Korean language version (Ex. 1007) (collectively, “Kim”). 3 US 2003/0040944 A1, published Feb. 27, 2003 (Ex. 1009) (“Hileman”). 4 US 2002/0072974 A1, published June 13, 2002 (Ex. 1010) (“Pugliese”). 5 US 2002/0027164 A1, published Mar. 7, 2002 (Ex. 1016) (“Mault”). We discern no material difference between the levels of skill in the art espoused by the parties. Nor does Consumeron’s expert. See Ex. 2016 ¶ 20 (“Petitioner’s definition of a POSITA is not materially different from my definition.”). Accordingly, we adopt the level of skill in the art as defined by Instacart.” slip op. at 6
Patent outcomesUS 10,628,835 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousnesscites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,628,835
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.