• DISH Network Corporation / DISH Network L.L.C. v. Customedia Technologies, L.L.C.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 25, 2018 · CBM2017-00032 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–4, 6–7, 16–19, 23–24, 26–28, 32–36, and 41 are unpatentable under § 101; the petitioner did not show claims 17, 18, 23, 24, and 28 unpatentable under § 112.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenOther

    “Considering each claim limitation, as well as each explicit citation to the specification expressly set forth in the Petition, we are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden of showing, via analysis and evidence explicitly set forth on pages 6–7 of the Petition, that independent claim 1, as a whole, does not recite a technological feature that is novel or unobvious.” slip op. at 22

  • Adverse judgmentOther

    “Response (Paper 24, “PO Resp.”) and disclaimed claims 5, 25, 39, and 43 (Ex. 2006). Petitioner filed a Reply to the Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 38, “Pet. Reply”). Patent Owner filed a Sur-Reply (Paper 40, “PO Sur”), and Petitioner filed a Response to the Sur-Reply (Paper 41, “Pet. Sur”).” slip op. at 2

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Other

    “II. ANALYSIS A. Claim Construction Petitioner and Patent Owner dispute the construction of certain claim terms. Pet. 23–28; PO Resp. 34–46. We apply the constructions of those terms set forth in Paper 49 in this decision.” slip op. at 7

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “We agree. The preambles of independent claims 1, 19, and 33 expressly state as much. In particular, the preamble of claims 1 and 33 provide: “A system for providing targeted advertising to a multimedia content end user” (claim 1) or “a plurality of multimedia content end users” (claim 33). Ex. 1003, 46:13–14, 49:59–60. Likewise, claim 19’s preamble refers to “[a] device for providing targeted advertising to an end user.” Id. at 48:20–21. Taking claim 1 as a representative example, the remainder of the claim recites certain tangible components, namely a “storage device” and specifically, an “addressable and reserved storage space”; a “processor”; and “software implemented by” the processor. Id. at 46:13–28. The claim further requires the following functionalities: the processor “reserv[ing]” the storage space; the processor “select[ing] particular advertising data suitable for targeting to at least one end user based upon predefined criteria data”; the storage space “storing digital advertising data” and specifically, the “particular advertising data”; and the “particular advertising data” being “accessible to” the user. Id. Thus, we are persuaded that claim 1, taken as a whole, is focused on the concept of providing targeted advertising to a user. Further, the claims merely invoke computers as a tool to implement the concept of targeted advertising, and are not directed to any improvement in computer functionality. See Pet. 34; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 944–945. The claims recite generic components and functionality. For example, in claim 1, the required components, outlined above—a storage device and specifically, a storage space, a processor, and software— are conventional. The recited functionalities—reserving the storage space for advertising data, selecting advertising data targeted to a user, storing that data, and making that data accessible to the user—are likewise basic and routine. As Petitioner points out, the specification expressly acknowledges that some of the tangible components of the recited system were known. See Pet. 7–8, 33–34, 40–75; Ex. 1008 ¶ 949. For instance, the specification refers to storage device 14 as “any medium known in the art for storing electronic data” and similarly, “any storage device for audio/video information known in the art.” Ex. 1003, 13:22–28, 15:1–5, 24:66–25:7; see id. at [57], 5:3–6, 21:42–22:2. The testimony of Petitioner’s declarant, Dr. Negus, also persuade us that each recited component and functionality was generic, conventional, and known. Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 945, 949–954; see id. ¶¶ 955–987.” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 9,053,494 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosurecites Mayo · Enfish
  Patents in suitUS 9,053,494
• Ibg LLC / Interactive Brokers LLC et al. v. Trading Technologies International, Inc.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 17, 2017 · CBM2016-00087 · APJ Sally C Medley · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 are unpatentable under § 101, and claims 2 and 15 are also unpatentable under § 112 ¶ 4.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted

    “Tradestation Securities, Inc., (“Petitioner”)1 filed a Petition requesting a review of claims 1–24 of U.S. Patent No. 7,412,416 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’416 patent”) under the transitional program for covered business method patents.2 Paper 3 (“Pet.”). Trading Technologies International, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) did not file a Patent Owner Preliminary Response. Upon consideration of the Petition, we instituted a covered business method patent review of claims 1– 24 of the ’416 patent (Paper 11 (“Dec.”)).” slip op. at 2

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Notwithstanding the parties’ submissions of the level of ordinary skill in the art, we find that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).” slip op. at 16

  • ExcludeDenied

    “Kawashima’s deposition (Ex. 1018), and portions of Exhibit 1060 (the cross examination testimony of Mr. Thomas). PO Mot. to Exclude 1. Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibits 1015 and 1016 as not relevant under Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) and because the exhibits have not been authenticated under FRE 901. Id. at 1–4. Patent Owner also seeks to exclude Exhibit 1018 as hearsay, and pages 248, and 263–269 of Exhibit 1060 (the cross examination testimony of Mr. Thomas) as prejudicial and confusing. Id. at 4–13. In rendering our Final Decision, we did not and need not consider Exhibits 1015, 1016, 1018 or pages 248, and 263–269 of Exhibit 1060. We have determined that Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged claims are unpatentable, without considering Exhibits 1015, 1016, 1018 or pages 248, and 263–269 of Exhibit 1060. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed.” slip op. at 32

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, which we address below, we determine that Petitioner has shown3 that claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of displaying a chart with a vertical price axis and a horizontal time axis, displaying indicators representing historical trading data along those axes, placing an order icon at a particular location of a plurality of locations, and generating and sending the order to an electronic trading system to assist a trader to place an order, which is a fundamental economic practice. The preamble of claim 1 recites a method for facilitating trading and displaying information regarding the buying and selling of a good. The method steps of claim 1 include displaying a chart on a graphical user interface having a vertical axis of price values and a horizontal axis of time, placing an order icon for a quantity of a good at a location along the vertical axis of price levels, and generating and sending the order to an electronic trading system. We agree with Petitioner that claim 1 encompasses the abstract idea of the fundamental economic practice of graphing (or displaying) trading data to assist a trader to place an order, steps that can be performed using pen and paper, or even in a trader’s mind. Pet. 22–25” slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 7,412,416 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Mayo · Enfish · Electric Power
  Patents in suitUS 7,412,416
• Interactive Brokers LLC / CQG, Inc. et al. v. Chart Trading Development, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2017 · CBM2016-00039 · APJ Brian J Mcnamara · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–22 are unpatentable under § 101 and § 103 over Friesen, Jones, and Kirwin; Patent Owner’s motion to amend with substitute claims 23–44 is denied.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART Petitioner contends that one of ordinary skill in the art includes someone who, through education or practical experience, possesses the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in computer science, information science, or a related field and has at least two years of work experience developing or implementing user interfaces for electronic trading systems. Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1002, Declaration of Bernard S. Donefer (“Donefer Decl.”) ¶ 45). Patent Owner contends that a person of ordinary skill would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science or equivalent experience, and at least three years of experience in designing and/or developing user interfaces, including experience designing and/or developing graphical user interfaces for electronic trading. PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 2027, Declaration of Nazaar Molokhia in Support of Patent Owner Response (“Molokhia Resp. Decl.”) ¶¶ 14–15). Notwithstanding their one year difference in experience level, we find the parties’ assessments of the level of ordinary skill not to be materially different.” slip op. at 7

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “At his level of professional responsibility Mr. Donefer works on system architecture to accommodate trader needs—he acknowledges that he does not code programs and in the college courses he teaches Mr. Donefer does not teach programming. Donefer Tr., 30:10–33:18, 36:19–22. Nevertheless, Mr. Donefer takes courses in programming languages, such as C++, R and Python, to keep up with languages that his students are using. Id. at 54:4–56:5. The college level courses Mr. Donefer teaches in IT in financial markets and financial information systems address order management systems, and Mr. Donefer occasionally invites order management vendors to demonstrate such systems to students. Id. at 35:10– 36:13. Mr. Donefer teaches prospective business analysts about business processes and business problems in order to design solutions, focusing on turning requirements into documentation a coder can use to implement a business process, rather than on coding itself. See id. at 38:10–41:8 There is no requirement imposed by the Federal Rules of Evidence that an expert’s qualifications perfectly match the field of the patent at issue. See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The patent claims before us concern a method and an apparatus for providing an interactive graphical representation of a market. Independent method claim 1 recites displaying a graph and a trading dialog box on a display of a workstation. Dependent claims recite the elements of the displayed trading dialog box and user selection options. Independent apparatus claim 9 recites a processor programmed to cause a computer to display a graph and trading dialog box. In the independent and dependent apparatus claims, the programmed processor carries out steps similar to those recited in the method claims. None of the claims in this proceeding recites technical details that require an extensive knowledge of programming or computer design. Mr. Donefer’s background in electronic trading system architectures and supervising the development of graphical user interfaces, along with his many years of experience, are sufficient for him to render opinions as to the subject matter of the claims before us. In addition, the Board can has accord proper weight to the testimony of each party’s expert witness. Therefore, in the context of this covered business method patent review, we are persuaded that we can properly weigh Mr. Donefer’s testimony.” slip op. at 9

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Trading Dialog Box We construed “trading dialog box” to mean “a display on a display terminal through which the user can view values for trading and selected information.” Id. at 13. Patent Owner proposes that we construe this term to mean “an interface that appears as an overlay and enables exchange of input and output between a user and a computer.” PO Resp. 24–29. Petitioner contends that Patent Owner’s construction does present a material dispute, noting that Patent Owner’s testifying expert, Mr. Molokhia states that a popup window, such as that Friesen is an example of an overlay. Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1024, Transcript of Deposition of Nazaar Molokhia (“Molokhia Tr.”) 54:19–24). Upon review, we agree with Patent Owner that the specification of the ’611 Patent refers to the trading dialog box as an overlay and that the dialog box is used for exchanging information with the computer. PO Resp. 27–28. For purposes of this Decision, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed construction and construe “trading dialog box” to mean “an interface that appears as overlay and enables exchange of input and output between a user and a computer.”” slip op. at 5

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Workstation Neither party previously sought a construction of “workstation” and in our Decision to Institute, we accorded this term its ordinary meaning. Patent Owner now proposes that we construe “workstation” to mean “a display terminal.” PO Resp. 29–37. Our analysis of the construction of “trading dialog box” in our Decision to Institute we noted that claims 1 and 12 recite that the display is displayed on “the workstation,” a term for which there is no antecedent basis. Dec. to Inst. 13. Method claim 1 recites “displaying a trading dialog box on the display of the workstation.” Patent Owner’s proposed construction effectively amend the claim by substituting “display terminal,” which has an antecedent basis for the term “workstation,” which has no antecedent basis. However, the antecedent in the claim recites “a display terminal of an electronic trading system,” not a display terminal of a workstation. Nevertheless, according to Patent Owner the meaning of the claim would be understood by persons of ordinary skill and Petitioner did not argue that the claim was indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. PO Resp. 31. Patent Owner correctly points out that indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112 was not presented as an issue in this proceeding and is not an issue we considered. Neither our Decision to Institute nor this Final Decision is based on indefiniteness. In view of Patent Owner’s positon that meaning of the claim would be understood by persons of ordinary skill, that Petitioner has not argued indefiniteness, and that none of our decisions in this covered business method patent review are based on indefiniteness, we need not further construe the term “workstation.”” slip op. at 6

  Patent outcomesUS 8,380,611 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Mayo · Enfish · Electric Power · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,380,611
• Google Inc. v. Better Food Choices LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2016 · CBM2015-00071 · APJ Minn Chung · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–20 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 1–10 are also indefinite under § 112, ¶ 2 because the specification lacks an algorithm for the claimed correlating function.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenOther

    “As an initial matter, Patent Owner asserts that Petitioner has not met its burden of proof because Petitioner relies only on the ’115 patent and its prosecution history to argue unpatentability and does not present any other evidence, such as a witness. PO Resp. 6–7, 13–20. Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has presented no evidence of unpatentability because the ’115 patent and its file history “shows the Patent Owner has a valid, issued patent and nothing more.” Id. at 7. We are not persuaded because, as discussed below, in this case we need to look only to the ’115 patent and its prosecution history to support a finding of unpatentability under §§ 101 and 112. See In re TLI Comm. LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613–14 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the patent alone is sufficient to sustain a finding of unpatentability under § 101).” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Functional claiming / §112(f) means-plus-function › Whether §112(f) applies (Williamson, nonce words)§112(f) appliesDecided for petitioner

    “rebuttable presumption that the limitation is written in a means-plus-function format under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 514 F.3d 1256, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). If, in addition to the word “means” and the functional language, the claim recites sufficient structure for performing the described functions in their entirety, the presumption is overcome, and § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply. Id. “Sufficient structure exists when the claim language specifies the exact structure that performs the functions in question without need to resort to other portions of the specification or extrinsic evidence for an adequate understanding of the structure.” Id. at 1259–60.” slip op. at 28

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionUnpatentable

    “with the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedents on step one analysis under the Alice framework. In step one of the Alice analysis, to determine whether the challenged claims are directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry is to ask, considered in light of the Specification, whether “their character as a whole” is directed to an abstract idea, not, as Patent Owner contends, identifying the “core invention” of the patent. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Relying on the distinction made in Alice between, on one hand, computer-functionality improvements and, on the other, uses of existing computers as tools in aid of processes focused on “abstract ideas,” the court in Enfish clarified that a relevant inquiry in step one of the Alice framework is to ask whether the “focus” of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–59). In this inquiry, claims “directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer” are contrasted with claims “simply adding conventional computer components to well-known business practices” or “generalized steps to be performed on a computer using conventional computer activity.” See TLI, 823 F.3d at 612 (quoting Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1338). The Federal Circuit further clarified recently and described the first-stage inquiry as “looking at the ‘focus’ of the claims, their ‘character as a whole.’” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., No. 2015-” slip op. at 17

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptUnpatentable

    “claims fail to recite any elements that individually or as an ordered combination transform the abstract idea of collecting and correlating information to provide personalized nutritional information of food products to shoppers into a patent-eligible application of that idea. It is well-settled that mere recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea. TLI, 823 F.3d at 613. Rather, the recited components must involve more than performance of “‘well- understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).” slip op. at 22

  Patent outcomesUS 5,841,115 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Mayo · Bilski · Enfish · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 5,841,115
• Square, Inc. v. Protegrity CorporationAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 2, 2016 · CBM2014-00182 · APJ Meredith C Petravick · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 33–60 are unpatentable under § 101; the motion to add substitute claims 61–68 is denied because it broadens claims and lacks written-description support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “claim, and “it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The written description of the ’281 patent does not contain a definition of “database.” The claimed database for storing a plurality of data portions corresponds to the O-DB database disclosed in the ’281 patent. The O-DB database is part of a larger “database management system” that includes multiple databases. Id. at 5:53–6:22; Fig. 3. Similar to the other databases, the O-DB database is described as containing data and, in particular, data to be protected. Id. at 6:62–67. Contrary to Patent Owner’s argument (PO Resp. 17–18), the ’281 patent does not describe the O-DB database, or any other database, as performing any other data processing or managing functions. In particular, the ’281 patent does not describe that the O-DB database produces the compelling calling to the data protection catalogue. See Ex. 1001, 10:48–60 (“is first collected by the system”); see id. at Abstract, 2:65–3:5, 3:59–4:2, 4:26–31, 7:63–67, 8:53–61 (describing a compelling calling to a data protection catalogue, but failing to describe the compelling calling being produced by the O-DB database).” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We are persuaded by Petitioner that the broadest reasonable construction, in light of the specification of the ’281 patent, of “data portion” is “a part or share of the database.” The ’281 patent contains no lexicographic definition of “data portion” and, therefore, “data portion” is given its plain and ordinary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. Petitioner’s construction is consistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of “portion,” which is an individual’s part or share of something. See Ex. 3001 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 908 (10TH ED. 1998)). Petitioner’s proposed construction is also consistent with the words of independent claims 33 and 47, which require that the data portions are part of a database. E.g., see Ex. 1001, 11:18–19 (claim 1 recites “maintaining a database comprising a plurality of data portions”). Petitioner’s proposed construction is further consistent with dependent claims 37, 38, 51, and 52, which further define the claimed data portions to be “a column of data in the database” or “a field of data in the database.” Patent Owner’s proposed construction is overly narrow and improperly attempts to import the limitations from the specification of the ’281 patent into the claim. Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim are not read into the claim. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted “in view of the specification” without importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Although the ’281 patent describes the invention as working on the cell or data element level (see Ex. 1001, 3:52–59), we see nothing in the claims, themselves, that require the data portions to be data element values. Dependent claims 37 and 51 are inconsistent with Patent Owner’s proposed construction, because they define the data portion as a column of data, which is a larger portion of data than a data element value.” slip op. at 15

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “Mr. Mattsson’s and Dr. Direen’s testimony is unpersuasive because it is inconsistent with the ’281 patent. As discussed above, the ’281 patent describes the O-DB as one database in a larger database management system. Ex. 1001, 5:52–6:22. The ’281 patent describes the O-DB database as containing data and describes the modules of the larger database management system as performing data processing. Id. at 5:62–67, 6:23–56. The ’281 patent does not describe the O-DB database as producing the compelling calling. See Ex. 1001, 10:48–60 (“is first collected by the system”); see id. at Abstract, 2:65–3:5, 3:59–4:2, 4:26–31; 7:63–67; 8:53–61 (disclosing a compelling calling to a data protection catalogue, but failing to describe the compelling calling being produced by the O-DB database). The assertion that the compelling calling is produced by the O-DB database is only found in Patent Owner’s arguments, Mr. Mattsson’s testimony, and Dr. Direen’s testimony, and not the ’281 patent. E.g., see Ex. 2045 ¶¶ 12–16, 22, 29; Ex. 2046 ¶ 19; Ex. 2078 ¶¶ 11–12; Ex. 2079 ¶¶ 7–8. Extraneous features should not be read into the claim. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In that regard, “extrinsic evidence may be used only to assist in the proper understanding of the disputed limitation; it may not be used to vary, contradict, expand, or limit the claim language from how it is defined, even by implication, in the specification or file history.” Bell Atl. Network Servs. v. Covad Commc'ns Grp., 262 F.3d 1258, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“expert testimony, which was inconsistent with the specification and file history, should have been accorded no weight”). Further, we give little weight to Mr. Mattsson’s testimony because Mr. Mattsson is not a disinterested witness. Mr. Mattsson is Patent Owner’s Chief Technology Officer and Co-founder (Ex. 2019, 2) and has an interest in the outcome of this proceeding. Contrary to Mr. Mattsson’s and Dr. Direen’s testimony, Petitioner’s declarant Dr. Shamos testifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would know, based upon the ’281 patent, that the compelling calling is produced not by the O-DB, but by control module 20, Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 15–21. Dr. Shamos’ testimony is persuasive because it is consistent with the written description of the ’281 patent, discussed above. Patent Owner argues that we should give no weight to Dr. Shamos’ testimony. PO Resp. 61–64. According to Patent Owner, Dr. Shamos is not a person of ordinary skill in the art because Dr. Shamos lacks knowledge and expertise in database administration and security. Id. at 63. Patent Owner’s argument is unpersuasive because Dr. Shamos is testifying as an expert whose knowledge and experience qualify him to opine on what a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood at the time of the invention. See Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 1–2 (testimony concerning his knowledge of encryption and database technology); Ex. 1003 (Resume of Dr. Shamos). We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that Dr. Shamos is not qualified to opine as to the knowledge of person of ordinary skill at the time of the filing. We, thus, are not persuaded by Patent Owner that we should give no weight to Dr. Shamos’ testimony.” slip op. at 12

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

    “Independent claim 33 recites a data processing method that grants access to a requested data portion if the rules associated with a data category that is associated with the requested data portion is satisfied. Ex. 1001, 13:38–54. Claim 33 requires a database that comprises the data portions and requires a separate data protection table comprising data processing rules that must be satisfied before the data portion can be accessed. Id. The data processing rules are associated with the data category. Id. Independent claim 47 recites a corresponding computer system. Id. at 14:47–63. Independent claims 33 and 47, thus, recite a method or system that grants access to a requested data portion if the rules associated with a data category that is associated with the requested data portion are satisfied. Ex. 1001, 13:38–54. Given the above, we are persuaded by Petitioner that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of determining whether access to data should be granted based on whether one or more rules are satisfied. We are not persuaded by Patent Owner that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, because Patent Owner’s argument is based upon elements not required by the claims. See PO Resp. 21–28, 35–38. Given our construction of “data portion” and “database” in section II (A) above, the claims do not require protection on the data element level based on rules stored in a separate database, where the first database calls out to the second database. Patent Owner’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claims.” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,402,281 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Mayo
  Patents in suitUS 8,402,281
• Boku, Inc. / Boku Account Services, Inc. v. Xilidev, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 2, 2015 · CBM2014-00148 · APJ Justin T Arbes · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–18 and 20–23 are unpatentable; claim 19 was not shown unpatentable because Gerson does not disclose its product identification code and quantity limitations.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteUnpatentable

    “the particular function of the limitation and then identifying the corresponding structure for that function in the specification. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A structure is corresponding “only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Additionally, the corresponding structure of a means-plus-function limitation must be “more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor” to avoid pure functional claiming. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352 (citing Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). If a special purpose computer is required to carry out the recited function, the specification must disclose an “algorithm for performing the claimed function,” id., which may be expressed “in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, or as a flow chart, or in any other manner that provides sufficient structure,” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “[I]f a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the claim, a means-plus-function clause is indefinite” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.” slip op. at 8

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “discloses every limitation of claims 12–16 and 18. For example, with respect to claim 12, Petitioner asserts, with supporting testimony from Dr. Shamos, that Gerson discloses (1) a “payment authorization source” (i.e., bank or other financial institution) configured to authorize payment for a transaction; (2) a “payment resolution module” (i.e., central processing computer) in communication with the bank or other financial institution; (3) a “hand-held device” (i.e., user’s mobile phone) in communication with the central processing computer that transmits an authorization request (i.e., payment transaction) to the central processing computer; and (4) a “confirmation device” (i.e., POST) that receives an “authorization code” (i.e., transaction-specific authorization code) from the user and authorizes the transaction in response to validating the authorization code. -140 Pet. 69–73; see Ex. 1003, 83–90. Petitioner further argues that Gerson necessarily includes an “I/O interface” because the central processing computer transmits (i.e., outputs) the transaction-specific authorization code to the mobile phone via a “wireless telecommunications link,” and such transmission requires an I/O interface between the mobile phone and central processing computer. -140 Pet. 71–72 (citing Ex. 1005, 6 (ll. 8–14)). We also have reviewed Petitioner’s arguments and evidence for the other challenged claims, and are persuaded that Petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating anticipation by a preponderance of the evidence. Based on all of the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claims 12–16 and 18 are anticipated by Gerson under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” slip op. at 13

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “It would have been obvious to combine Gerson’s system storing the authorization code in a processor with Wronski’s database additionally storing an indication of the transaction request because in both cases the information relates to the transaction being authorized and therefore Wronski merely stores additional information about the same transaction that Gerson does. Furthermore, a user in Gerson would be motivated to combine the processor database with Wronski’s database including an indication of the transaction request because such a combination would facilitate the later retrieval of transaction specific information (such as when Gerson’s processor database is accessed by the point-of-sale system).” slip op. at 20

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 405 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)). Dr. Shamos testifies that he believes a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had “an undergraduate degree in computer science, or equivalent work experience, and, in addition, at least two years of experience with electronic payment systems, including familiarity with databases and integration with interactive voice response software.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 14; see -140 Pet. 11. Based on the record presented, including our review of the ’168 patent and the types of problems and solutions described in the ’168 patent and cited prior art, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had an undergraduate degree in computer science (or equivalent work experience) and at least two years of experience with electronic payment systems, including familiarity with databases. We apply this level of ordinary skill in the art for purposes of this Decision. Although a person of ordinary skill in the art may have had experience with interactive voice response software, we do not see why such experience should be required, as the ’168 patent discloses that “various communication mediums and protocols [for interacting with users were] known in the art,” of which interactive voice response is merely one example. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, col. 5, ll. 4–52.” slip op. at 18

  Patent outcomesUS 7,273,168 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,273,168
• PNC Bank, N.A. / U.S. Bank, N. A. et al. v. Secure Axcess, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 8, 2015 · CBM2015-00009 · APJ Barbara A Benoit · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–32 are unpatentable as obvious over the SHTTP document and Arent.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • BurdenFwd all claims unpatentableUnpatentable

    “For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the subject matter recited in claims 1–32 of the ’191 patent as a whole would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the teachings of the SHTTP document and Arent. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” slip op. at 71

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedNot reached

    “Information Prepared by Paul C. Clark” (Ex. 1018). Petitioner opposes, arguing that Exhibit 1018 is Dr. Clark’s notes used during his deposition. We did not refer to or rely on Exhibit 1018 in this Final Written Decision. As such, we need not reach the merits as to Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude certain evidence (Ex. 1018) is dismissed as moot.” slip op. at 71

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Petitioner’s expert adopted the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention used by Patent Owner’s expert. See Ex. 2006 ¶ 8 (testimony by Patent Owner’s declarant identifying the level of ordinary skill); Ex. 1002 ¶ 29 (testimony by Petitioner’s declarant). We do not 31 disagree with the parties. Therefore, one of ordinary skill in the art would have a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or an equivalent field and least two years of work experience in the area of information technology.” slip op. at 31

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner and its declarant that the provisional application does not disclose the claimed authenticity key or preferences file or the claimed use thereof, as recited in each of independent claims 1, 17, 29, 31, and 32. The provisional application describes the invention in a few sentences. The scarcity of detail fails to provide sufficient disclosure of the claimed steps. For example, we see no disclosure of inserting any data in the provisional application, much less inserting something that could be identified as an authenticity key. Although a shared secret is disclosed, the shared secret is not described as being inserted into the web page or any other data. See id. at 5–6 (“The invention proposes to utilize the shared secret data created as part of being” a credit card holder of a particular credit 33 card company.). Moreover, the record evidence indicates that the provisional application does not disclose the recited “authenticity key.” Pet. 20 (citing Ex. 1002 at 18, ¶ 37). Thus, we agree with Petitioner that the provisional application lacks written description support for “authenticity key,” which is recited by all claims in the ’191 patent. Accordingly, we determine Arent is prior art under 102(a) to the ’191 patent and is available for consideration in this covered business method patent review.” slip op. at 33

  Patent outcomesUS 7,631,191 unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,631,191
• Google Inc. v. Unwired Planet, LLCAll claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 6, 2015 · CBM2014-00006 · APJ Jennifer S Bisk · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 25–29 are unpatentable under § 101; claim 25 is also unpatentable as obvious over Havinis ’931 and Leonhardt, and Landgren and Leonhardt.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther
  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “reasoning with rational underpinning to combine Havinis ’931 and Leonhardt. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). For instance, Petitioner states: [a] person of ordinary skill would have found it obvious to modify the system of Havinis ’931 to include Leonhardt’s location access policies, in order to further Havinis ’931’s goals of managing positioning requests sent by Location Applications such that location services can be tailored individually to meet the needs of the mobile device user. Pet. 59 (citing Ex. 1004, 3:33–40). Relying on Dr. Cox, Petitioner adds that this modification “would have been nothing more than the application of a known method of privacy management to achieve a predictable result.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 76. As explained in our Decision to Institute, we are persuaded the rationale set forth by Petitioner and Dr. Cox is reasonable. See Dec. 24–25. Subsequent to our preliminary finding, Patent Owner has provided no evidence or argument to the contrary. Thus, after once again evaluating Petitioner’s arguments and supporting evidence, we conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have been obvious to combine the relied upon teachings of Havinis ’931 and Leonhardt. We conclude that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 25 of the ’752 Patent would have been obvious over Havinis ’931 and Leonhardt.” slip op. at 13

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “We are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the ’752 patent fails to provide sufficient written description support for the notifying limitation. Petitioner’s only evidence that the notifying limitation is not sufficiently supported is its argument that the ’752 patent fails to explicitly describe notifying the wireless device that access to the location information was denied. Pet. 44–45. Petitioner proffers testimony from Dr. Cox parroting, almost word for word, the argument in Petitioner’s brief. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 24–36. This argument and testimony, however, does not speak to the correct standard—whether the ’752 specification “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Moreover, “the disclosure as originally filed does not . . . have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at issue,” nor must it describe “every conceivable and possible future embodiment of [the] invention.” Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with Patent Owner, that the ’752 patent broadly describes notifying the wireless device at any time during the described process. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 9:26–29 (“the system described herein is for a subscriber to receive a notification on their wireless communications device whenever a location request is made by any client application”). Moreover, as pointed out by Petitioner, the ’752 patent describes sending “denied access” messages to client applications. See Pet. 44 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:40–42). Based on these disclosures, we are persuaded that the ’752 patent provides broad support for providing notifications of various messages to different elements of the system at multiple points in the described process. Petitioner has not pointed to anything in the ’752 patent specification that clearly limits what messages can be sent to the various elements or when they can be sent. In fact, as Patent Owner points out, the Provisional Application explicitly contemplates “initiat[ing] a dialogue with the subscriber regarding permission for a location request.” Ex. 1020, 22. Although Petitioner complains that this disclosure does not describe how a dialogue would occur or how messages are relayed (Reply 5), we are not persuaded that a person of ordinary skill in the art would disbelieve, based on the entirety of the ’752 patent disclosure, that the inventor had possession of sending an access denied message to the wireless device at the appropriate time during the process. Thus, we are persuaded that the ’752 patent “provides ample support for the breadth” of the notifying limitation and does not “unambiguously limit” its meaning to a narrower embodiment (e.g., notifying the wireless device only when a request has been made). Cordis, 339 F.3d at 1365. Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the ’752 patent fails to support the notifying limitation.” slip op. at 20

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

    “We agree with Petitioner that the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea, specifically, the abstract idea of controlling access to location information using a subscriber profile. The preambles and all claim limitations of both claims support this abstract idea, and the ’752 patent repeatedly discloses that the invention is directed to controlling access to location information. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:14–19, 1:60–2:7. Patent Owner has not identified any portion of the ’752 patent inconsistent with this abstract idea, and we are persuaded that the identified abstract idea is similar to the kind of “organizing human activity” at issue in Bilski and Alice. See, e.g., Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing “methods and systems for managing a game of Bingo” to the kind of “organizing human activity” at issue in Bilski and Alice).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 7,203,752 unpatentable
  § 101 eligibility§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · KSR
  Patents in suitUS 7,203,752
• Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 17, 2014 · CBM2013-00035 · APJ Michael W Kim · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–25 and 29 are unpatentable: claims 2–15, 20–23, and 29 over Paul; claims 1–19, 23–25, and 29 for lack of written description. Claims 26–27 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownPreamble limitingDecided for patent owner

    “Accordingly, we look to the ordinary meaning of the term “subsidy”— financial assistance given by one to another.5 The ’516 patent’s use of “subsidy” is consistent with its ordinary meaning. Specifically, the ’516 patent describes an advertiser setting up a subsidy program to subsidize communication fees, offer product discounts, generate and accumulate “reward points” for subscribers, or mitigate or defer other expenses of the subscriber. Ex. 1001, 3:21–27 (referring to Fig. 2). These examples are financial in nature. Product discounts reduce the monetary cost of a financial transaction, reward points are a form of currency, and mitigating or deferring expenses reduces the monetary cost of a financial transaction or postpones the monetary cost of a financial transaction, respectively. Also, the ’516 patent describes, as part of a subscriber setup process, an intermediary presenting, to a subscriber for selection, “subsidy programs 5 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 896 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “subsidy” as “1. Monetary assistance granted by a government to a person or group in support of an enterprise regarded as being in the public interest. 2. Financial assistance given by one person or government to another.”). available, including the criteria for continued subsidy and levels of subsidy.” Ex. 1001, 4:41–43 (referring to Fig. 3). For these reasons, in the Decision to Institute, the Board construed “subsidy” as “financial assistance given by one to another.” Dec. 7–9. Neither party challenges this construction. Having considered whether the construction set forth in the Decision to Institute should be changed in light of evidence introduced during trial, we are not persuaded any modification is necessary. Therefore, we maintain the construction of “subsidy” as “financial assistance given by one to another.”” slip op. at 7

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “The determination of whether a particular reference qualifies as a prior art printed publication “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The key inquiry is whether the reference was made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” before the critical date. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it . . . .” Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indexing is not “a necessary condition for a reference to be publicly accessible,” but is among many factors that may bear on public accessibility. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 1. Whether the Ratsimor Paper Was Publicly Accessible in November 2003 Although Petitioner does provide some evidence to support its position, after considering all of the evidence regarding the facts and the circumstances surrounding the public accessibility of the Ratsimor paper, in view of the relevant case law, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing that the Ratsimor paper was publicly accessible in November 2003.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication not establishedReference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “The determination of whether a particular reference qualifies as a prior art printed publication “involves a case-by-case inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members of the public.” In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The key inquiry is whether the reference was made “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” before the critical date. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it . . . .” Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Indexing is not “a necessary condition for a reference to be publicly accessible,” but is among many factors that may bear on public accessibility. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 1. Whether the Ratsimor Paper Was Publicly Accessible in November 2003 Although Petitioner does provide some evidence to support its position, after considering all of the evidence regarding the facts and the circumstances surrounding the public accessibility of the Ratsimor paper, in view of the relevant case law, we determine that Petitioner has not met its burden of showing that the Ratsimor paper was publicly accessible in November 2003.” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “1. Principles of Law To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To anticipate, a prior art reference must disclose more than “multiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.” Net MoneyIN, 545 F.3d at 1371. Although the elements must be arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim, “the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test,” i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Moreover, the prior art reference is read from the perspective of one with ordinary skill in the art. In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A reference anticipates a claim if it discloses the claimed invention such that a skilled artisan could take its teachings in combination with his own knowledge of the particular art and be in possession of the invention.”); In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”).” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 7,664,516 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 7,664,516
• Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.All claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 13, 2014 · CBM2013-00004 · APJ Joni Y Chang · CBM · Final written decision

  Claims 1–78 are unpatentable: anticipated by Burge and Nakagawa, and claims 16, 17, 47, 63, and 64 are also obvious over the stated combinations with Herrod.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Under 35 U.S.C. § 120, a patent claim is entitled to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed application only if the disclosure of the earlier-filed application provides written description support for the patent claim as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112. In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The test for determining compliance with the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, is whether the original disclosure of the earlier-filed application reasonably would have conveyed to one with ordinary skill in the art that the inventor had possession the claimed subject matter at the time of the earlier-filed application. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The specification must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that the inventor was in possession of the claimed subject matter, as of the filing date of the earlier-filed application. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563- 64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).” slip op. at 18

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportDecided for petitioner

    “Upon reviewing the parties’ arguments and supporting evidence, we have reevaluated our determination in the Decision on Institution (Dec. 19- 30) that certain claim features lack written description support in the ’650 application. For example, we agree with Progressive that the claim term “a level of risk” does not require a level of risk to be “assigned based at least in part on the indicated level of willingness of the driver to allow at least one aspect to be recorded.” PO Resp. 10. Nevertheless, based on the record before us, we determine that the original disclosure of the ’650 application does not support the claimed subject matter set forth in claims 1-78 of the ’598 patent. For the reasons stated below, we determine that claims 1-78 of” slip op. at 17

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “C. Principles of Law To establish anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, each and every element in a claim, arranged as is recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242 F.3d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).” slip op. at 30

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “We disagree with Liberty that Mr. Zatkovich must be qualified both in the field of insurance and in the field of vehicle telematics to give reliable testimony in this proceeding. It is only the “hypothetical” person of ordinary skill in the art who possesses ordinary skill in each of the fields involved in a claimed invention. In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior art.”). The qualifications of Mr. Zatkovich, as summarized in his curriculum vitae (Ex. 2014), qualify him to give expert testimony on the subject of vehicle telematics, computer systems, and network communications. With regard to Mr. Zatkovich’s alleged lack of 5 With some enumerated exceptions, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to covered business method patent review. 37 C.F.R. § 42.62. The Federal Rule of Evidence 702 entitled “Testimony by Experts” states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 59 ordinary skill on the specific subject of insurance, the Board weighs his testimony accordingly, taking into account the limited extent of his expertise. We also disagree that Mr. Zatkovich’s technical experience must have been acquired prior to January 1996. Under the Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify in the form of an opinion. Liberty has not shown that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires the witness to have particular experience with the specific subject matter of the ’598 patent, or requires the relevant experience of the witness to have been acquired during the January 1996 time-frame.” slip op. at 59

  Patent outcomesUS 8,090,598 unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,090,598

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.