• Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Abtis Co., Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 3, 2026 · IPR2025-00283 · APJ Lilan Ren · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board cancelled claim 11 and granted substitute claims 14–16, finding Petitioner had not shown those claims unpatentable on any asserted ground.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “must determine whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121. Lectrosonics, Paper 15 at 4. In that regard, Patent Owner bears the burden of persuasion to show that: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new subject matter;” slip op. at 9

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “In this case, Patent Owner’s expert “Dr. Zhou signed the second declaration, stood behind its contents, and was available for cross-examination.” Paper 35, 4. Petitioner does not dispute this statement. Paper 39, 1. Petitioner does not identify any specific undue prejudice caused by Exhibit 2008. For example, Petitioner argues that “the failure to impress upon a witness that a statement is under oath goes to the heart of its reliability as evidence” and that “as the Board has recognized, hearsay is inherently unreliable” without specifying what statement in Exhibit 2008 lacks reliability. Paper 39, 4. Because Petitioner does not provide specific evidence of undue prejudice, we find Petitioner has suffered no such undue prejudice in this case. See Liquidia, 2021 WL 4860773 at *25. We therefore deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of lack of authenticity. With regard to the assertion that Exhibit 2008 is hearsay, Petitioner objects to the exhibit because the testimony is based “on other informal and unpublished documents that are hearsay under FRE 802.” Paper 29, 1. Petitioner does not specify what such “informal and unpublished documents” are. See id. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 expressly states, “[a]n expert may base an opinion on fact or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” The facts or data “need not be deny Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude on the basis of hearsay.” slip op. at 50

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner’s argument is unpersuasive. Paragraph 59 of the ’503 application describes formula 8-1 but does not support Petitioner’s argument that other unknown formulas may be included in the recited modified heavy chains. Ex. 2003 ¶ 59. Petitioner’s hypothesis that the recited heavy chains may (or may not) encompass unknown formulas is also inapposite to the written description inquiry before us — that is, whether the inventor was in possession of the subject matter recited in claims 14–16 based on the disclosure including formulas 8-1, 8-2, and 8-3. See PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1306.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)EnabledNot shown unpatentable

    “These arguments in the Sur-Reply are unpersuasive to show a lack of enablement first and foremost because the arguments do not specifically provide evidence showing that any purported experimentation is undue. See Sur-Reply 2–8 (asserting, but without providing evidence under any specific Wands factors, that the examples and guidance in the specification do not extend to the broad scope of all antibodies); see Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. We again emphasize that the analysis of undue experimentation does not necessarily require every Wands factor to be explicitly addressed but the analysis must be based on “weighing many factual considerations” depending on the nature of the invention and underlying art. Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The assertion that the claim scope is broad alone does not suffice to show a lack of enablement based on the record before us. Moreover, as we note supra, Petitioner’s claim scope argument is based on the false premise that the scope of claims 14–16 is as broad as the claim term “antibody” without taking into account all other claim elements. For example, Petitioner does not disagree with Patent Owner’s statement that “[t]he ’675 Patent’s specification discloses the structural modification site, the chemistry used to modify that residue, and working examples demonstrating the modification” (Reply 2), but asserts only that “[t]he disclosure of SSFI that only binds to IgG1 Fc domains (SEQ ID NO:1) is . . . . inconsistent with the expansive scope of the claims.” Sur-Reply 5. Petitioner’s argument that the claims encompass proteins that lack a lysine reside at a 248 position improperly excludes from the claim language the “lysine residue at 248 position . . . [as] determined by the EU numbering system” that claims 14–16 require. As Dr. Zhou testifies, “each proposed lysine residue at position 248 (EU numbering) is covalently modified with a specific attachment with a terminal bio-orthogonal click-chemistry functional group. The specification describes targeted transfer of a chemical functional group to lysine 248” and when claims 14–16 are considered in their entirety, which includes all claim elements, “[a] POSA would understand the claim itself to limit the modified antibodies to those with lysine at position 248.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 48; Ex. 2008 ¶ 47. We also note that Patent Owner states “a POSA would understand that the phrase ‘one or more modified heavy chain’ encompasses antibodies within typical DAR distributions (i.e., fractional numbers) rather than requiring a distinct process for producing antibodies bearing modified heavy chains in exact integers.” Reply 2–3. Moreover, Patent Owner states that PepTalk Presentation demonstrates that “a POSA would understand antibody conjugation products to exist as mixtures rather than discrete whole number species” because PepTalk Presentation “presents DAR values as non-integer measurements, i.e. DARs of 1.8 and 1.9 reflecting such distributions.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 1007, 28). According to Patent Owner, “preparations having an average DAR of approximately 1.8 (commonly referred to in practice as ‘DAR2’) may reflect typical reaction distributions in which some antibodies contain two modified heavy chains while others contain fewer.” Id. at 3 (citing Ex. 2008 ¶ 46). Petitioner does not rebut these statements. See Sur-Reply 2–8. Based on the foregoing, the evidence before us does not show any” slip op. at 27

  Patent outcomesUS 11,896,675 not shown unpatentable
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,896,675
• Inari Agriculture, Inc. v. Corteva Agriscience LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 18, 2025 · IPR2024-01014 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Final written decision

  Petitioner did not show claims 1–8 unpatentable because they are entitled to the 2004 priority date, making Barbour unavailable as prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Entitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “For a claim to a biological material, the enablement requirement of § 112, first paragraph, does not require such assured access to a microorganism deposit as of the filing date; what is required is assurance of access (to the microorganism culture by the public upon issuance of a patent on the application) prior to or during the pendency of the application, so that, upon issuance of a U. S. patent on the application, the public will, in fact, receive something in return for the patent grant. Feldman, 517 F.2d at 1355. Patent Owner has persuaded us that such exception not only applies to a deposit, but also extends to a biological material known and readily available. See 52 Fed. Reg. 34080, 34081. In this case, it is undisputed that TC1507 germplasm was known and readily available to the public by Barbour’s publication date in 2006 (Pet. 49–53), years before the 2014 issuance date of the ’378 patent (Ex. 1001, code 45). Thus, based on the record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the 2004 application satisfies the enablement requirement as of its application date in 2004. PO Resp. 16–18 (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 34080, 34081). As a result, the challenged claims are entitled to the 2004 priority date and, thus, Barbour does not qualify as prior art.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date awardedDecided for patent owner

    “In this case, it is undisputed that TC1507 germplasm was known and readily available to the public by Barbour’s publication date in 2006 (Pet. 49–53), years before the 2014 issuance date of the ’378 patent (Ex. 1001, code 45). Thus, based on the record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the 2004 application satisfies the enablement requirement as of its application date in 2004. PO Resp. 16–18 (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 34080, 34081). As a result, the challenged claims are entitled to the 2004 priority date and, thus, Barbour does not qualify as prior art. Because all of Petitioner’s challenges rely on Barbour (Pet. 6), all those challenges fail.” slip op. at 15

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Patents / published applications (effective date, provisional support)Reference not prior artNot shown unpatentable

    “In this case, it is undisputed that TC1507 germplasm was known and readily available to the public by Barbour’s publication date in 2006 (Pet. 49–53), years before the 2014 issuance date of the ’378 patent (Ex. 1001, code 45). Thus, based on the record developed through trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the 2004 application satisfies the enablement requirement as of its application date in 2004. PO Resp. 16–18 (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 34080, 34081). As a result, the challenged claims are entitled to the 2004 priority date and, thus, Barbour does not qualify as prior art. Because all of Petitioner’s challenges rely on Barbour (Pet. 6), all those challenges fail.” slip op. at 15

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “would understand that the term “‘flanked by’ permits overlap between the expression cassette and the DNA sequence it is flanked by.” Pet. 24–26. Patent Owner does not propose any claim construction. PO Resp. 6–7. On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to expressly construe any claim term.” slip op. at 9

  Patent outcomesUS 8,901,378 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips
  Patents in suitUS 8,901,378
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Maxell LtdNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 31, 2025 · IPR2024-00777 · APJ Jameson Lee · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 16–27 were not shown unpatentable because Petitioner failed to account for limitations 16[b] and 16[i] and their counterparts across the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Patent Owner proposes that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Human Computer Interaction, or a related technical field, with at least one year of experience working in the field of user interfaces and/or content management.” PO Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2040 ¶ 53). The Decision on Institution adopted Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. Inst. Dec. 10. We find Patent Owner’s stated level to be less precise than that proposed by Petitioner in that the modifier “at least” used by Patent owner imposes no upper bound on the amount of experience possessed by one of ordinary skill in the art. Also, Patent Owner states: “The difference between the Board’s definition and Patent Owner’s (EX2040. ¶53) does not change the arguments set forth herein.” PO Resp. 11. Thus, we continue to adopt Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art.4 4 All of our findings and conclusions would still be the same, however, had we applied Patent Owner’s articulation of the level of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “In its Reply, Petitioner does not assert that the district court’s construction is incorrect. We agree with Patent Owner that the district court’s construction is better than Petitioner’s proposed construction, because for reasons indicated by Patent Owner, which are not disputed by Petitioner, settings in the computer, e.g., dedicated folders for each user are the user profiles, rather than simply data alone of any kind. Further, when asked about the appropriateness of the district court’s construction, counsel for Petitioner expressed that Petitioner has no objection to the Board’s adopting the district court’s construction for “user profile”: JUDGE LEE: So, you’d be fine with just going with the District Court’s construction? MR. HEINTZ: Yes, Your Honor. Tr. 15:22–24. For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the district court’s construction for “user profile,” i.e., “a collection of settings and information associated with a user.”” slip op. at 13

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “PO Resp. 30–31 (Figure 26 omitted). In its Reply, Petitioner still does not provide an articulated reason for placing user profile selection buttons, labeled with user names, within Horn’s panes 2601 or 2602. Reply 12–14. Although Horn does describe personalized profile, Petitioner points to no disclosure of Horn as to how a user would have selected his or her own profile from among a plurality of user profiles. Petitioner presents no reason for placing these user profile selection buttons, labeled with user names, gleaned from or suggested by Baumgartner, within either pane 2601 or pane 2602 in Horn’s workspace view. Further, pane 2602 contains “a list of all collections defined by MFS and the user,” and pane 2601 lists the source examined by the user to create his or her collections. Ex. 1005, 19:41–46. That disclosure suggests the contents of panes 2601 and 2602 are tied to one particular user. No rational basis is articulated by Petitioner to place user profile selection buttons within these panes which appear to be in the profile space of one user. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner has not adequately accounted for limitation 16[b].” slip op. at 22

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “The test for sufficiency of a written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 is whether the earlier application’s disclosure “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The specification must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.” Id. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained: One shows that one is “in possession” of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious. Id. (“[T]he applicant must also convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.”) (emphasis in original). One does that by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention. Although the exact terms need not be used in haec verba, see Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1038, 34 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 (Fed.Cir.1995) (“[T]he prior application need not describe the claimed subject matter in exactly the same terms as used in the claims. . . .”), the specification must contain an equivalent description of the claimed subject matter. A description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient. Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).” slip op. at 31

  Patent outcomesUS 11,017,815 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,017,815
• AT&T Mobility LLC / AT&T Services Inc. et al. v. Daingean Technologies Ltd.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jul 14, 2025 · IPR2024-00402 · APJ Mary C Hoffman · IPR · Final written decision

  The Board granted Patent Owner’s revised non-contingent motion to amend, canceling claims 1–4 and substituting claims 7 and 8, which Petitioner did not prove unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend, grantedGranted

    “whether the motion to amend meets the statutory and regulatory requirements set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121.” See Lectrosonics, Inc. v. Zaxcom, Inc., IPR2018-01129, Paper 15 at 4 (PTAB Feb. 25, 2019) (precedential). A “patent owner bears the burden of persuasion to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the motion to amend complies” with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(d)(1). Specifically, a patent owner must demonstrate the following: (1) the amendment proposes a reasonable number of substitute claims; (2) the amendment responds to a ground of unpatentability involved in the trial; (3) the amendment does not seek to enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent; and (4) the amendment does not introduce new matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)–(b). For the reasons explained below, Patent Owner satisfies its burden of persuasion to show that the amendments comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.” slip op. at 8

  • Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedDecided for patent owner

    “Both parties rely on expert testimony for their respective positions relating to the number of years of experience needed to attain ordinary skill, but neither expert cites supporting evidence for their testimony. See Ex. 1002 ¶ 33; Ex. 2002 ¶ 15. Our decision is the same regardless of whether the length of experience is two years or three. We find Patent Owner’s proposed “wireless communications” is more consistent with the ’958 patent than Petitioner’s proposed “telecommunication,” which encompasses a variety of technologies including, e.g., landline and wireless telephones, cable, and satellite. See Ex. 1001, 1:11–62 (describing the invention in terms of wireless communications). Accordingly, we adopt a modified version of Petitioner’s proffered level of ordinary skill in the art, substituting “wireless communications” for “telecommunication.” Neither party, moreover, indicates the overall result would change based on a different definition.” slip op. at 18

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “We agree with Patent Owner that the recited second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. The plain meaning of “first type” and “second type” indicates that the first type and second type are different in kind. RMTA 22 (App. A). Our interpretation is consistent with the Specification, which explains that second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. As Patent Owner points out, the ’958 patent discloses “first type of system information (1TYP SIB) is . . . essential . . . for initial system access” and “second type of system information (2TYP SIB) is nonessential system information . . . defined as all other types of information, and thus excludes the [] information required for initial access.” Id. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 1001, 8:34– 46); see also Ex. 1001, Abstract (interchangeably using the terms second type and non-essential). Despite Petitioner’s argument that this disclosure is non-limiting and directed to a disclaimed example embodiment (Opp. 8–9), Petitioner could not identify any embodiment, among the approximately forty disclosed embodiments, describing something other than the first type SIB being essential information and the second type SIB being non-essential information. Tr. 22:18–26. Even the Petition acknowledges that “the ’958 Patent further classifies a second type of system information, the ‘non-essential’ SI, which is defined as all other types of information excluding that first type of information required for initial access.” Pet. 5. Furthermore, the prior art of record suggests that a person of ordinary skill would have understood second type SIBs exclude first type SIBs. See Ex. 1008 ¶ 48 (describing two categories of system information, “essential SI” and “Other SI”). Patent Owner’s expert also understood the recited first and second type SIBs as being mutually exclusive. See Ex. 1011, 49:10–13. For the above reasons, we do not agree with Petitioner that the recited second type SIB lacks any requirements, nor do we interpret claims 7 and 8 such that the first type SIB could be a second type SIB.” slip op. at 19

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “(d) Limitation 7h: Analysis We agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner’s arguments with respect to limitation 7h are insufficient because they fail to address the limitation as written and improperly incorporate previous arguments by reference. For example, Petitioner did not map the recited “group identifier” when opposing Patent Owner’s Revised Motion to Amend. See Opp. 16–17. In its Sur-reply, Petitioner contends that limitation 7h’s requirement of transmitting the group identifier was previously “set out in Patent Owner’s prior papers,” but does not refer to any specific papers or exhibits. Pet. Surreply 11–12. We decline to search for and piece together Petitioner’s arguments and evidence to develop a persuasive theory of unpatentability. See 37 C.F.R. section 42.6(a)(3). Petitioner similarly failed to address adequately where Lee discloses or suggests the recited “compressed format” and “plural parameters.” See Opp. 16–17. Aside from the above concerns, we also do not see sufficient explanation with respect to limitation 7h’s requirement that the transmitting by broadcast be based on a comparison of the value tag. Petitioner argues that, because Patent Owner does not dispute limitation 7g, “it would have been obvious to a POSITA to use the same value tag[] to determine the system information broadcast in Lee’s compressed format embodiment.” Pet. Sur-reply 12. This conclusory statement is not supported by any citations to evidence and was improperly introduced in the Sur-reply. Moreover, whether it was obvious to determine what system information is broadcast is not commensurate with the claim scope because limitation 7h requires that the broadcasting (not the broadcast content) be based on a comparison of the value tag. See supra III.B.4 and IV.B. Further, we are not persuaded that Lee’s transmitting by broadcast is” slip op. at 26

  Patent outcomesUS 10,841,958 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,841,958
• Lti Flexible Products, Inc. D/B/A Boyd Corporation v. The Regents Of The University Of CaliforniaNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jan 9, 2023 · IPR2021-01189 · APJ Hyun J Jung · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–13 were not shown unpatentable because MacDonald was not prior art and the petition failed to establish anticipation or obviousness; the contingent motion to amend was dismissed as moot.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedOther

    “The full record makes clear that the parties do not dispute the portion of Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill regarding education and years of experience. Compare Pet. 14–15, with PO Resp. 3. Patent Owner acknowledges that the analysis does not depend on whether Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill or Patent Owner’s proposal is adopted. See PO Resp. 3–4; Ex. 2003 ¶ 34 (testifying that Patent Owner’s declarant has an understanding of the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art irrespective of which proposed skill level is adopted), ¶ 35. The parties’ proposals are consistent with the factors of GPAC, the disclosure of the ’728 patent, and the prior art of record. Ex. 1012 ¶ 71 (testifying that Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill is based on considering the factors of GPAC); Ex. 2003 ¶ 32 (testifying that Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill is based on the ’728 patent); GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1579. In view of the above, we see no reason to disturb our preliminary determination regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we maintain and reaffirm that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had “(1) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering or a similar field that includes thermal sciences; and (2) at least two years of industrial experience on the design and evaluation of thermal management of electronic systems and heat pipes/TGPs.” Pet. 14–15; Ex. 1012 ¶ 71; Ex. 2003 ¶ 35. We agree with Patent Owner that the analysis would not be affected by adopting Patent Owner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 3–4; Ex. 2003 ¶ 35.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “Petitioner contends that “the ordinary and customary meaning of the term ‘pitch’ in [c]laim 9 encompasses the definition of ‘pitch’ given in [c]laim 1—‘a distance from a center of one microfabricated structure to a center of a next neighboring microfabricated structure.’” Pet. 15. No claim term was interpreted expressly for our Institution Decision. Inst. Dec. 10. Patent Owner does not propose expressly any interpretation for any claim term. See generally PO Resp. Patent Owner, however, states that “claim 1 of the ’728 Patent expressly defines the claimed ‘pitch’ of the microfabricated structures as being ‘a distance from a center of one microfabricated structure to a center of a next neighboring microstructure.’” Id. at 12 (citing Ex. 1001, 14:45–48). Patent Owner notes that “[c]laim 9 does not include this particular definition, but the Board apparently applied the definition of the ‘pitch’ limitation in claim 1 to claim 9, as did Petitioner.” Id. “Patent Owner does not dispute or disagree with this.” Id. Based on the full record and because the parties do not dispute it, we apply the definition of pitch in claim 1 to the recited pitch of claim 9. Also, based on the full record, we determine that no other claim term requires express interpretation. Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner appears to be seeking verbatim support, when, as argued by Patent Owner, the Specification does not need to provide exact or verbatim support to meet the written description requirement. See Pet. 20; PO Resp. 32. One of ordinary skill in the art would have immediately discerned that 5–500 microns is well within 2–1500 microns calculated by Petitioner using the parent applications’ claim 2. See Pet. 21–22; PO Resp. 16–17; Ex. 2003 ¶ 47. The numerical differences between the derived and claimed ranges do not address sufficiently why one of ordinary skill in the art would not discern the claimed range. See Pet. 20. As determined above, the disclosure would allow one of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the claimed “distance from a center of one microfabricated structure to a center of a next neighboring microfabricated structure” has a range of values, such as the 2– 1500 microns calculated by Petitioner. See id. at 22. The numerical differences between the calculated ranges and the claimed ranges alone fail to show that the ordinarily skilled artisan would not have discerned the claimed range of 5–500 microns from the range of 2–1500 microns.” slip op. at 42

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “Patent Owner responds that “[b]ecause MacDonald does not qualify as prior art against the claims of the ‘728 Patent, Petitioner has failed to show that the challenged claims of the ‘728 Patent . . . would have been obvious over MacDonald in view of Ding.” PO Resp. 40. No reply arguments are presented specifically for the obviousness challenge. See generally Pet. Reply; PO Sur-reply. For the reasons given above, we agree with Patent Owner that MacDonald is not prior art to the ’728 patent. PO Resp. 39. Accordingly, based on the full record, Petitioner fails to show by a preponderance of the evidence that MacDonald and Ding would have rendered obvious claims 2, 3, and 7.” slip op. at 51

  Patent outcomesUS 10,309,728 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,309,728
• Shure Incorporated v. Clearone, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 14, 2022 · PGR2020-00079 · APJ David C Mckone · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–24 were not shown unpatentable because the petitioner failed to prove the asserted §112 grounds and obviousness grounds by a preponderance of the evidence.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “As we stated in the Institution Decision (at 30), Petitioner’s proposal is reasonable in light of the descriptions in the ’653 patent and prior art, and is supported by expert testimony. We further find that Patent Owner’s proposed addition, that a skilled artisan would have had experience with digital signal processing, is consistent with the descriptions in the ’653 patent and prior art. Because the parties do not contend that their disagreement over “at least” has any bearing on this proceeding, we need not evaluate whether a skilled artisan might have had more than three years of work experience or whether that would lead to vagueness. Instead, we adopt Petitioner’s proposal, with Patent Owner’s addition, and omit “at least”: A skilled artisan would have possessed: (i) a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, physics, or acoustical engineering that included coursework on the design of acoustic and/or antenna arrays, phased arrays, and/or beamforming; or (ii) three years of work experience in the field of directional microphone arrays; and the skilled artisan would have had experience with digital signal processing.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “We disagree with Patent Owner that the claim limitation at issue here specifies a single device that has multiple properties. Rather, claim 1 broadly recites “a ceiling tile combined with the beamforming microphone array.” We agree with Petitioner that the plain language of claim 1 does not require that the entire beamforming microphone array is physically integrated into a single ceiling tile, as combining a ceiling tile and a microphone array is broader than physically installing the microphone array in the ceiling tile. Nor can the language of claim 1 reasonably be read to exclude combining more than one ceiling tile with the microphone array. Where claim 1 assigns specific properties to a ceiling tile, it does so expressly, reciting “the ceiling tile being sized and shaped to be mountable in a drop ceiling in place of at least one of a plurality of ceiling tiles included in the drop ceiling.” Thus, the plain language of claim 1 requires at least one ceiling tile combined in some way with a beamforming microphone array, and each ceiling tile (if there is more than one) is a particular size and shape.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached

    “Second, Patent Owner argues that our construction “should reflect the fact the microphones of a [beamforming microphone array] are located in positions relative to each other, by design, to establish constructive interference in one or more preferred beam directions.” PO Resp. 18–19 (citing Ex. 2013 ¶¶ 31–37, 48). Petitioner responds that claim 1 recites “beamforming” broadly and that Patent Owner attempts to limit “beamforming” to one technique out of several, including techniques that determine time delay between microphones rather than knowing the distances between the microphones. Reply 3 (citing Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 11–21). The parties’ competing proposals here are directed to Petitioner’s allegations that CTG System and Levit render the challenged claims obvious. However, as explained below, Petitioner has not established whether CTG System performs beamforming under either proposed construction. Thus, we need not resolve the parties’ claim construction dispute. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017; Vivid Techs., 200 F.3d at 803.” slip op. at 19

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable

    “Despite an obligation to identify in the Petition the evidence that supports its indefiniteness allegations,5 Petitioner largely failed to discuss the Specification. Pet. 30; see also Dec. 41 (“Despite enumerating five techniques that it contends exemplify ‘adaptive acoustic processing,’ Petitioner does little to address the description of those techniques in the Specification.”). In one passage cited by Petitioner, the Specification states that an “embodiment of Array 116 may include adaptive acoustic processing that automatically adjusts to the room configuration for the best possible audio pickup.” Ex. 1001, 6:13–16. Petitioner argues that this description “lacks any disclosure providing objective boundaries of the claim’s scope, either through definitions or working examples.” Pet. 30. Petitioner also acknowledges that the Specification “discusses acoustic echo cancellation (in general) as an additional feature from adaptive acoustic processing,” and admits that a skilled artisan “would have recognized that echo cancellation processing occurring automatically in response to a room configuration would be a meaning of adaptive acoustic processing.” Id. at 35 (citing Ex. 1001, 6:5–22). However, Petitioner does not discuss the rest of the Specification in the Petition. Petitioner should have addressed in the Petition the express descriptions of Dr. Vipperman’s enumerated examples of adaptive acoustic processing in the Specification in order to support its 5 Our rules require Petitioner to make its case in the Petition, including identifying “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed,” “the specific part of the claim that fails to comply with the statutory grounds raised and . . . how the identified subject matter fails to comply with the statute,” and “specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(b). Indeed, “[t]he Board may exclude or give no weight to the evidence where a party has failed to state its relevance or to identify specific portions of the evidence that support the challenge.” Id. at § 42.204(b)(5). otherwise conclusory statement that “[n]one of these techniques are described in the specification,” Pet. 32. If it was Petitioner’s position that these express descriptions were nevertheless not examples of adaptive acoustic processing, Petitioner should have made those arguments in the Petition.” slip op. at 24

  Patent outcomesUS 10,728,653 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,728,653
• LKQ Corporation / Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc. v. GM Global Technology Operations LLCNo claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 8, 2021 · PGR2020-00054 · APJ Robert L Kinder · PGR · Final written decision

  The sole claim was not shown unpatentable: it is definite, and neither asserted obviousness combination renders the design unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. The Designer of Ordinary Skill in the Art (“DOSA”) LKQ contends that: a designer of ordinary skill would be an individual who has at least an undergraduate degree in transportation or automotive design experience in the field of transportation design, or someone who has several years’ work experience in transportation or automotive design. Pet. 51 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 42; Ex. 1004 ¶ 41). Based on the final record, which includes testimony by LKQ’s witnesses, we adopt LKQ’s proposed definition of the ordinary designer.” slip op. at 19

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “Based on the final record, the purported issues related to a double line on the convex crease and the length of the single line do not create internally inconsistent drawings that would preclude the overall understanding of the drawing as a whole. We have considered the testimony of each witness and we find Mr. Peters’ explanation most convincing that “the claimed design describes the convex band consistently because each of the figures presents at least one of the ways that a convex band can be represented. . . . Figure 1 illustrates the two intersecting lines of the convex band, while Figures 2-4 illustrate the single max height line of the convex band.” Ex. 2004 ¶ 58. Thus, we agree with GM that these figures are not inconsistent, but rather complementary because both connecting lines (as shown in Figure 1) and the max height line (as shown in Figure 2) are accurate depictions of the convex band of the claimed design. Further, GM has presented persuasive evidence that the varied length of the line between figures is also understandable depending on the point of reference of a particular figure. Ex. 2004 ¶¶ 55, 56; Ex. 2006, 143:11–16, 144:4–7.” slip op. at 27

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable

    “7. Overall Indefiniteness Analysis The figures of the ’065 patent are not perfect and the issues discussed above demonstrate that attention to detail matters when conveying the scope of a three-dimensional object in two dimensions. The proper standard for indefiniteness does not, however, require perfection, but instead requires that an invention is shown with “reasonable certainty.” Nautilus, Inc., 572 U.S. at 910. The purpose of the definiteness standard is “to ensure that the disclosure is clear enough to give potential competitors (who are skilled in the art) notice of what design is claimed – and therefore what would be infringed.” Maatita, 900 F.3d at 1376. Based on the totality of the evidence before us, we determine that the claimed design of the ’065 patent is reasonably understandable and gives potential competitors, and the public, notice of the scope of the claim. As analyzed above, LKQ has not shown that most of the alleged inconsistencies are, in fact, inconsistent features within the claim. Further, we determine that the inconsistencies argued by LKQ do not in the aggregate “preclude the overall understanding of the drawing as a whole.” Id. at 1375–76.” slip op. at 45

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)Not shown unpatentableNot shown unpatentable

    “The Petition fails to adequately address the differences between the claimed ornamental fender design and the Fiat Toro in several important areas, including: the distinct upper portions of each design, the claimed design’s inwardly folded (L-shaped) top edge, and the rear lateral edge. Based on the final record, these differences combined with the other differences noted by LKQ (Pet. 81) are substantial and prevent the Fiat Toro from having design characteristics that are basically the same as that claimed in the ’065 patent – as required for a Rosen reference.” slip op. at 67

  Patent outcomesUS D864,065 not shown unpatentable
  § 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Nautilus
• Illumina, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 11, 2020 · IPR2019-01201 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–27 were not shown unpatentable: the single-cell Dhallan theories lacked a reasonable expectation of success, and Rabinowitz was not established as prior art.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableReasonable expectation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “In sum, Petitioner’s evidence in the Petition establishes that single cells were used for genetic analysis, amplification techniques were known, and SNP arrays could be used to analyze chromosome imbalances. Petitioner’s evidence, however, does not persuasively address the interplay between the amount of DNA in a single cell and the amount of DNA or amplified DNA needed to carry out the claimed method using a SNP 22 genotyping array and Dhallan’s aneuploidy analysis. This is important because Patent Owner cites evidence demonstrating that at the relevant time, “various researchers had determined that very low amounts of DNA could not be reliably used for SNP genotyping arrays (even with intervening amplification).” PO Resp. 47.” slip op. at 22

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateEntitled to earlier dateDecided for patent owner

    “On this record, we agree with Patent Owner and Dr. Quackenbush that the ’406 application and ’741 provisional together demonstrate to persons of 23 The ’741 provisional is incorporated by reference into the ’406 application. Ex. 1026, 1:5–13. 48 ordinary skill that the inventors understood pyrosequencing could be used for high-throughput sequencing, if expensive machines were purchased. In other words, the ’741 provisional gives context to the statement in the ’406 application, and we agree with Dr. Quackenbush that “‘[s]uitability’, as the provisional makes clear to a person of ordinary skill in the art, is a cost issue, rather than a technical one.” Ex. 2012 (Quackenbush Decl.) ¶ 277; see also id. ¶¶ 276–80 (opining on disclosures in the ’741 provisional).” slip op. at 48

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “As to Dr. Quackenbush’s qualifications, although Petitioner characterizes his expertise as relating to statistics, the record reflects that he also has adequate experience in the fields of genetics and biotechnology. For example, he is Professor of Computational Biology and Bioinformatics, the Chair of the Department of Biostatistics, and the Director of the Health Data Science Center at the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health. Ex. 2013, 1. He has almost three decades of experience in research and teaching in the fields of genetics and biotechnology (id. at 1–8, 12), has published hundreds of articles in these fields (id. at 13–52), was the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Genomics for over a decade (id. at 8), and has served as a peer reviewer, or on the editorial board, of a dozen other publications relating to genetics and biotechnology (id. at 7–8). Paper 49, 2. Given that experience in genetics and biotechnology, we find that Dr. Quackenbush has sufficient 54 specialized knowledge, experience, and education in the techniques of the ’592 Patent and prior art, such as DNA amplification, genotyping, and analysis of genetic data, for his testimony to be helpful to us. Moreover, even if Dr. Quackenbush did not personally work in fetal diagnostics at the relevant time, there is no requirement that a declarant must actually be a person of ordinary skill in the art to present testimony as to what such a person would have understood at the time of the invention. See, e.g., SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1373 (stating there is no requirement of a perfect match between an expert’s experience and the field of the art in question, provided the expert has “sufficient relevant technical experience” to testify). The remaining arguments raised in Petitioner’s motion relate to the sufficiency, rather than admissibility, of evidence. Such arguments are improperly advanced in a motion to exclude. See TPG 79 (stating that a motion to exclude may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular fact); see also Corning Inc. v. DSM IP Assets B.V., IPR2013-00053, Paper 66 at 19 (PTAB May 1, 2014) (“[T]he Board, sitting as a non-jury tribunal, is well-positioned to determine and assign appropriate weight to the evidence presented in this trial.”). Moreover, “there is a strong public policy for making all information filed in an administrative proceeding available to the public.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., CBM2012-00010, Paper 59 at 40 (PTAB February 24, 2014). Rather than excluding evidence that is allegedly 55 confusing, misleading, or incorrect, we simply give it the appropriate weight in our analysis.” slip op. at 54

  • Strike new argumentNew argument disregardedDecided for patent owner

    “success arguments focus solely on Dhallan’s single cell disclosure, while “ignor[ing] Dhallan’s disclosure that its methodology can be performed using 2–32 cells, which also falls within the claims.” Reply 18 (citing, e.g., Pet. 13–14). Patent Owner responds that this is an improper attempt to change the thrust of the obviousness theory presented in the Petition. Sur-reply 16–17. We agree with Patent Owner. Although the Petition references portions of Dhallan that address using sources of DNA other than a single cell (see, e.g., Pet. 13–14, citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 44, 74), this is by way of background only, falling within a section titled “Introduction to Dhallan.” See Pet. 11. Petitioner’s detailed obviousness arguments for claim 1 are limited to use of DNA from a single cell, and do not extend to DNA from multiple cells.15 See, e.g., id. at 19–20 (arguing that, because Dhallan’s preferred embodiment is one embryo cell, Dhallan teaches the claimed limitation reciting “wherein the small amount of genetic material from the individual is from fifty or fewer of the individual’s 15 As noted above, claim 1 recites several possible sources for the claimed “small amount of genetic data.” See supra n.9. Here we focus on Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments based on option [i], but note that Petitioner’s unpatentability arguments under options [ii] and [iii] also did not extend to use of DNA from multiple cells. See, e.g., Pet. 20 (cross-referencing arguments for claims 4, 5, and 17); id. at 34 (for claim 4, arguing option [ii] based on “a single human cell”); id. at 35 (for claim 5, arguing option [iii] based on “extracellular fetal DNA from maternal blood”); id. at 42 (for claim 17, arguing option [iii] based on a “single fetal cell”). 30 cells”); id. at 29 (“A POSA would have been motivated to use a single cell as the source of genetic material . . . .”); id. at 31 (“A POSA would have reasonably expected success in using Dhallan’s methodology, for example as described in Example 14, on one embryonic cell.”). Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that Petitioner is impermissibly attempting to change the thrust of its obviousness theory on reply. Sur-reply 16–17. We will not consider Petitioner’s belated attempt to argue a reasonable expectation of success in using more than a single cell in the claimed method. 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b) (“A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the . . . patent owner response.”).” slip op. at 30

  Patent outcomesUS 8,682,592 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 8,682,592
• Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Finjan, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Apr 7, 2020 · IPR2019-00026 · APJ Charles J Boudreau · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 15, and 41 were not shown unpatentable: Abadi did not identify suspicious code in its annotations, and the Abadi and Gryaznov combination did not cure that deficiency.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelOther

    “differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are “such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; 2 Abadi et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,253,370 B1, issued June 26, 2001 (filed Dec. 1, 1997) (Ex. 1008, “Abadi”). 3 Dmitry O. Gryaznov, Scanners of the Year 2000: Heuristics, Virus Bull. Conf. 225 (Sept. 1995) (Ex. 1009, 2–11, “Gryaznov”). (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). “To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We analyze the asserted grounds with the principles stated above in mind.” slip op. at 7

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Having considered the parties’ arguments, we see no reason to disturb their agreed construction of “Downloadable” as “an executable application program, which is downloaded from a source computer and run on the destination computer,” with which the parties state their express agreement. We clarify in Section II.D.2. below that we agree with Patent Owner that the executable application program that is to be run on the destination computer must be the same executable application program that is downloaded from the source computer within the agreed construction. Sur-reply 1–2. This interpretation is not a question of the construction of the term “Downloadable” itself, but rather flows from the express language of the challenged claims, in which “the Downloadable” that is “ma[de] . . . available to web clients” in the final step of each of independent claims 1 and 41 has its antecedent basis in the first claim step, “receiving . . . a Downloadable.” Likewise, the antecedent in claim 15 for “the Downloadable” that is made available to web clients is the Downloadable in which suspicious code is identified by the content inspection engine. We also agree with Patent Owner that the claimed “linking” of a DSP “to the Downloadable” does not compel a different understanding because we are not persuaded that the linking contemplated in the ’844 patent requires modification of the code of the Downloadable itself. Sur-reply 2–3.” slip op. at 12

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Term construed patent owner constructionDecided for patent owner

    “Having considered the full record developed during trial, we agree with Patent Owner that the replacement of the word “profile” with “information” does not add any clarity to the meaning of this phrase and that the proper construction of “Downloadable security profile that identifies suspicious code in [the received / a] Downloadable” in the context of the ’844 patent is “profile that must at least include, but is not necessarily limited only to, an identification of hostile, potentially hostile, undesirable, or potentially undesirable code in the corresponding Downloadable.” PO Resp. 7–8. Regardless, we do not discern that the difference between the parties’ positions with respect to these phrases is dispositive of any issues in this proceeding.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “generate an ID for the Downloadable.” PO Resp. 21 (emphasis added) (quoting Ex. 2015, 15), 23 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 2015, 20). Based on Patent Owner’s arguments, we are not persuaded that the ’639 provisional demonstrates possession by the inventors of linking a DSP to the Downloadable “before a web server makes the Downloadable available to web clients.” Rather, by the time that the DSP has been linked to the Downloadable (e.g., by code scanner 325, in Patent Owner’s mapping), we understand that the Downloadable has already been received—and hence “made available”—by the web server. Notably, this conclusion does not depend on where the “linking” occurs—particularly, whether it may occur at a network gateway, a focus of the parties’ claim construction arguments (see, e.g., Pet. 25–27; PO Resp. 10–12; Section II.B.5, supra)—but instead on when it occurs relative to the Downloadable being made available to clients. Further, having considered the alleged Appendix to the ’639 provisional (Ex. 2015, 37–45), including portions cited by Dr. Butler in related litigation (see Ex. 2047), we are not persuaded that anything in the Appendix demonstrates possession of linking “before a web server makes the Downloadable available to web clients.” In conclusion, therefore, we are not persuaded that the inventors were in possession of the subject matter of the challenged claims at any time prior to the December 22, 1997, filing date of the ’648 application.” slip op. at 35

  Patent outcomesUS 6,154,844 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 6,154,844
• Supercell OY v. Gree, Inc.No claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Sep 26, 2019 · PGR2018-00050 · APJ Carl M Defranco · PGR · Final written decision

  The Board held claims 1–10 not unpatentable under § 101, § 112(a), or § 112(b), finding the claims patent eligible and rejecting the written-description and indefiniteness challenges.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningDecided for patent owner

    “Neither Supercell nor GREE proposes a construction for any particular claim term. See Pet. 20–26; PO Resp. 6. We determine that no express construction of the claim terms is necessary for purposes of this decision, with one exception. We note that the Specification of the ’886 patent describes the claimed “terminal attribute” as follows: “Examples of the attribute information may include the OS version, the browser type, the terminal type, the communication circumstance, and the like.” Ex. 1001, 11:33–35. In that regard, the Specification also explains a communication circumstance as follows: “For example, in a case where an information processing speed or a communication speed in the user terminal . . . is high, the number of rounds is set to be large.” Id. at 11:20–23. As such, we determine that the plain and ordinary meaning of “terminal attribute” encompasses at least the examples listed in the Specification and should be read accordingly.3” slip op. at 5

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 not directed to exceptionNot shown unpatentable

    “We agree with GREE that the claims are drawn to a specific technological improvement in the transmission of online game content by using a terminal attribute to improve the efficiency and functionality of transmitting multiple rounds of an online game to a user terminal, and that this improvement is not an abstract idea.7 Although, as Supercell argues, the recited function of “transmitting game view data” may be result-oriented (see Pet. 33–37; Reply 4–6), the claims nonetheless recite a specific technique for achieving that result-oriented function—identifying a terminal attribute of the user terminal and determining the predetermined number based on the terminal attribute. That particular technique, as made clear by the ’886 patent, solves a specific technological problem with conventional online game systems—long wait times and interruptions in the transmission of multiple rounds of the game. See Ex. 1001, 1:46–54 (describing the problem with conventional online game systems). So, rather than reciting just result-oriented functions, the clear focus” slip op. at 9

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateNot shown unpatentable

    “As explained by GREE’s expert, a skilled artisan would have known from that description how to determine the predetermined number of rounds using a terminal attribute table. See Ex. 1007, 57:20–62:10, 82:14–23, 87:7– 90:22. That expert testimony, which we find persuasive, is unrebutted and stands in direct contrast to unsupported attorney argument from Supercell. See Pet. 58–61; Reply 19–21. Thus, we determine that Supercell has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–10 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking written description support.” slip op. at 14

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)DefiniteNot shown unpatentable

    “Pet. 64–65; Reply 22–23. But aside from that conclusory assertion, Supercell’s Petition simply poses a series of rhetorical questions without further analysis or evidentiary support. See Pet. 65–66. GREE, on the other hand, offers expert testimony as to why the meaning of the claimed “determining” limitation is clear not only from the claim language itself but also in light of the Specification. Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 40– 42 (citing Ex. 1001, 11:20–41). We find that testimony persuasive. We also find persuasive GREE’s reasoning in response to each of the rhetorical questions raised by Supercell, even though it was under no obligation to do so. PO Resp. 47–49; Sur-Reply 17–19. And given the lack of argument, not to mention evidentiary support, in the Petition as to the purported indefiniteness of the challenged claims, we are not persuaded that Supercell has carried its burden of showing that the claims are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 9,675,886 not shown unpatentable
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 112 disclosurecites Alice · Mayo · Electric Power
  Patents in suitUS 9,675,886

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.