• Tesla, Inc. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 18, 2026 · IPR2025-00339 · APJ Kristen L Droesch · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 22, 23, 28, and 30 are unpatentable over Choi, Labaziewicz, and Yu; claims 1–3, 10–12, 24, 25, 32, and 33 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)Plain and ordinary meaningOther

    “We decline Patent Owner’s invitation to construe “during a frame” of “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame” by importing the extraneous limitations “at some point between the beginning and the end of the exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” As pointed out by Petitioner, Patent Owner’s proposed construction is unsupported by the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Specification because Specification does not disclose an exposure interval nor suggest “during a frame” is limited to an exposure interval. Patent Owner and its expert Dr. Saber cite only extrinsic evidence (Exs. 2006, 2009) to support its argument that claim 22 should be limited to an “exposure interval during which the image sensors capture a single image.” See PO Resp. 16–17; Ex. 2020 ¶ 64. Similarly, Patent Owner relies only on extrinsic evidence (e.g., Ex. 2011, 1; Ex. 2022, 1; Ex. 2020 ¶ 66) to limit “during” to “at some point between the beginning and the end.” See id. at 18. When considered in the context of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification which do not limit “during a frame” to an exposure interval, we find that we cannot rely on Patent Owner’s citations to extrinsic evidence to yield a reliable construction for “during a frame.” As demonstrated in the analysis below, we need not provide an explicit construction for “during a frame” to resolve the parties’ disputes regarding the merits of the patentability challenges. See Realtime, 912 F.3d at 1375. We apply the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame.” To the extent that an explicit identification of the ordinary and customary meaning may aid the understanding of our analysis, consistent with the language of claim 22 and the ’180 Patent Specification, we find that the ordinary and customary meaning for “during a frame” is “during the period of time that data for an image frame is acquired.” See Ex. 1001, code (57), 20:6–24, 25:23–35.” slip op. at 12

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “had a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, computer science, or a related field and 2-3 years of experience in digital imaging systems,” and that “[l]ess experience may be necessary with additional education, and likewise, less education may be necessary with additional work experience.” Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s definition. See generally PO Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the level of skill reflected by the ’180 Patent Specification and the prior art of record.” slip op. at 20

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “Owner to show that Labaziewicz is not prior art because the ’180 Patent is entitled to the earliest August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1379–1380. For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier application must provide written description support for the claimed subject matter. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010). To satisfy the written description requirement, “a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also VasCath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention . . . now claimed.” (emphasis omitted)), Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). Patent Owner’s arguments fail to meet this burden of production because, aside from addressing deficiencies of written description support the ’854 Provisional Application provides written description support for all of the limitations of the claimed invention. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–28. Specifically, Patent Owner does not address written description support in the ’854 Provisional Application for “independently controlling simultaneous data acquisition with each of the first and second channels during a frame”––limitation [22.3]––the heart of the parties’ claim construction disputes addressed above in Section II.A. See PO Resp. 60–64; PO Sur-reply 25–27. Accordingly, Patent Owner has not met its burden of production in coming forward with evidence or argument to show possession of the claimed invention in the ’854 Provisional Application. As a result, the burden of production does not shift back to Petitioner, and, therefore, the ’180 Patent is not entitled to the benefit of the August 25, 2004, filing date of the ’854 Provisional Application.” slip op. at 23

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “Petitioner does not present arguments that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to modify the teachings of Matsushima to acquire data for images 62A and 62B at the argues that Matsushima renders obvious this limitation. See id. at 21, 23, 30; PO Resp. 33–34 (“[T]he Petition provides no further explanation why Matsushima renders this limitation obvious.”). In the Reply for the first time, Petitioner asserts that “a POSITA would understand that Matsushima’s disclosure, including its multi-channel architecture, synchronous control of channels, and capturing two images that are scaled versions of the same scene, renders obvious simultaneous acquisition during a frame. Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1069 ¶ 49). We do not consider Petitioner’s belated argument because it exceeds the proper scope of a reply. A reply may only respond to arguments raised in the corresponding patent owner response. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23. As explained in the Trial Practice Guide, “respond” “does not mean proceed in a new direction with a new approach as compared to the positions taken in a prior filing.” Trial Practice Guide at II.I. (December 2025)(citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.23).10 A reply that raises a new issue or belatedly presents evidence may not be considered. See id. For example, a “[p]etitioner may not submit new evidence or argument in reply that it could have presented earlier, e.g. to make out a prima facie case of unpatentability.” Id.” slip op. at 32

  Patent outcomesUS 7,916,180 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 7,916,180
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. / Samsung Electronics America, Inc. v. Ouraring, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Nov 25, 2025 · PGR2024-00030 · APJ Linda E Horner · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 17 and 18 are unpatentable under §112(d) for improper dependent form; claims 1–10 and 12–16 were not shown unpatentable on the asserted obviousness grounds.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedPatent owner expert creditedDecided for patent owner

    “We do not credit Dr. Anthony’s testimony, which is based on the arbitrary shading in Figure 7 (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 174), that Schröder teaches or suggests limitation 1[d] because it (1) is inconsistent with Petitioner’s reasoning for limitation 1[c], and (2) it is based on an admitted misreading of the embodiment of Schröder’s Figure 5 (see Ex. 1002 ¶ 175). As to the first item, Dr. Anthony states that “a POSITA would have been motivated to place a battery in a part of the cavity that is far from a PCB holding other electrical components because that configuration allows for better thermal management.” Ex. 1002, para. 175. The problem with this statement is that Petitioner relies on Schröder’s teaching that inlay 12, i.e., the alleged PCB, could include “other electrical components,” such as a battery to support its position that Schröder suggests placing a battery between the ring halves. See, e.g., Pet. Reply 2 (pointing to Dr. Mercier’s depo testimony that inlay 12 with “other components” is inserted between ring halves); id. at 3 (relying on Schröder’s teaching about placing components in depressions on inlay 12). So, Petitioner earlier asserts for the battery limitation 1[c] that Schröder teaches or suggests putting a battery on inlay 12 inside the ring halves, but then for limitation 1[d], Dr. Anthony testifies that a POSITA would place the battery “far” away from the inlay 12 (i.e., the alleged PCB). These positions are inconsistent.” slip op. at 25

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “at least a four-year degree in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering, optical engineering, or related field of study, or equivalent experience, and at least two years’ experience in academia or industry studying or developing physiological monitoring devices such as non-invasive biosensors. Pet. 8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 18–22). Petitioner also contends that a person of ordinary skill would have been “familiar with, for example, sensor system design and signal processing” and that “[a] higher level of education or skill might make up for less experience, and vice versa.” Id. Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Resp. 26. We adopt this uncontested definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. This definition is supported by the record and consistent with the disclosure in the ’178 patent and the references cited in the Petition.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Patent Owner indicates that in the related ITC proceeding involving the ’178 patent, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) adopted three constructions agreed-upon by the parties in that proceeding8 and also construed two disputed terms.9 Resp. 26–27 (citing Ex. 2016, 5, 6, 14). Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner, however, that no terms need to be construed to decide the issues raised in the Petition. Id. at 27. We reviewed the constructions adopted by the ITC. Ex. 2016, 5, 6, 14. 8 In the ITC proceeding, the ALJ adopted the parties’ agreed-upon constructions that: (1) the preamble of claim 1 [a finger-worn wearable ring device] is limiting; (2) [positioned/configured to fit] within a “cavity” is [positioned/configured to fit] within a “hollow space”; and (3) [the internal housing component] “coupled with” [the external housing component] is [the internal housing component] “connected with” [the external housing component]. Ex. 2016, 5. 9 In the ITC proceeding, the ALJ construed the claims such that: (1) the internal and external housing components of claims 1, 12, and 17 enclose space and do not necessarily exclude potting material; and (2) “circumferential,” as recited in claims 1, 17, and 18, does not require a closed shape. Ex. 2016, 14, 17. These constructions are not germane to the issues we need to decide to resolve this proceeding. Thus, we agree that no explicit claim construction is necessary for this decision. To the extent the parties’ arguments raise any implicit issues of claim construction, we address those issues within the context in which they are raised in our analysis below.” slip op. at 11

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot shown unpatentableMotivation not foundNot shown unpatentable

    “The record supports Patent Owner’s argument that Mestas’s batteries are much too large to fit within a ring form factor, and “Mestas’s batteries, layout, and other components . . . would have to be scaled down 5 to 10 times to be appropriately sized for a finger worn ring.” Resp. 64 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dr. Anthony’s cross-examination testimony at Ex. 2021, 313:12). Moreover, we do not credit Dr. Anthony’s testimony that miniaturization of the battery would have been “trivial to implement.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 242. Dr. Anthony admitted on cross-examination that it would not have been within the level of skill of a person having ordinary skill in the art to design a smaller version of Mestas’s battery, and that such a person would need to procure a battery of the appropriate size and specifications for implementation in a finger-ring from a battery manufacturer. Ex. 2021, 315:9–318:9. Yet Dr. Anthony had not ascertained, for purposes of his testimony, whether there was a battery available in 2013 that was appropriate to fit within the inlay space of the modified version of Schröder’s finger-ring that he and Petitioner allege would have been obvious to one of skill in the art at that time. Id. at 321:5–10. Further, we credit Dr. Mercier’s testimony that Dr. Anthony’s testimony fails to consider the differences in power requirements between Mestas and Schröder or to account for the constraints of such a substantially smaller form factor in Schröder’s finger-ring as compared to Mestas’s wrist device. Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 159–160. Although large curved batteries suitable for use in a wrist band or other larger wearable device, such as shown in Mestas, were known at the time of the ’178 patent, we also have evidence that prior art “finger ring wearables up to the ’178 patent had used ‘coin’ type batteries.” Id. at 66 (citing Ex. 2018 ¶ 161). We credit Dr. Mercier’s testimony that a person having ordinary skill in the art would look to a coin type battery for the necessary power requirements of Schröder’s device. Ex. 2018 ¶ 161. Indeed, this testimony is consistent with the other art of record that consistently shows the use of flat batteries in finger-ring devices, often stacked above and protruding from the general ring shape of the device. See, e.g., Ex. 1005 (Niwa), Figs. 22, 28; Ex. 2025 (Asada ’701 patent), Fig. 4; Ex. 1035 (Rhee), Figs. 7-1, 8-1, 8-2; Ex. 1037 (Asada article), Fig. 9; Ex. 1034 (Asada ’199 patent), Fig. 2; Ex. 1028 (Kimura), Fig. 24; Ex. 2018 ¶¶ 61–70. In fact, Oura’s first-generation ring design, released in 2015, used a Superbowl ring-type design, with the battery and other components mounted on top of the ring. Ex. 2034; Ex. 2018 ¶ 71. Based on these findings, Petitioner has not met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify Schröder’s finger-ring to place a curved battery between the internal and external housing components in light of the teachings in Mestas. Thus, Petitioner has not met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that dependent claim 3 of the ’178 patent is unpatentable over Schröder and Mestas.” slip op. at 38

  Patent outcomesUS 11,868,178 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,868,178
• Billerud Aktiebolag (Publ) v. Westrock MWV, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 12, 2025 · IPR2023-01206 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, and 4–22 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 23 was not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 25–26 are allowed, while 24 and 27 are denied for lack of written-description support.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther

    “Exhibits 1013 and 1014 are also not admissible as expert testimony because Mr. Wirén is not “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. “To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art. Without that skill, the witness’ opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Mr. Wirén does not meet our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Section II.B, supra. That definition is based on the undisputed testimony of Messrs. Zotterman and Klass. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2003 ¶ 26. Although Mr. Wirén has a Master’s of Science in chemical engineering, he lacks any experience or specialization in paperboard manufacturing. Ex. 2011, 12:1–10, 19:6–25, 20:2–7. We therefore agree with Patent Owner that Exhibits 1013 and 1014 are the testimony of Mr. Wirén and should be excluded from evidence because Mr. Wirén is not a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. PO MTE 5–6, 9; Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Unless a patent lawyer is also a qualified technical” slip op. at 61

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Based on the testimony of the parties’ witnesses, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in paper science and engineering, chemical engineering, process engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related degree, with three to five years of experience in paperboard manufacturing, or a master’s degree in paper science and engineering, chemical engineering, process engineering, or mechanical engineering, or a similar field with a specialization in paperboard manufacturing. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2003 ¶ 26. We find that the level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’142 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner

    “A claim construction that excludes a particular element is viewed as a “negative limitation.” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 Fed. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2021). “[S]uch exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Id. (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,’ and ‘clearly express an intent to define the term.’” Id. (citing Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365). Similarly, disclaimer or disavowal requires that the specification or prosecution history demonstrate that the invention does not include a particular feature. Id. Here, we find no claim language, lexicography, or disclaimer in the ’142 Patent or its file history that would support defining a “hot-hard calender” as requiring that only one of the two rollers be heated to an elevated temperature.” slip op. at 12

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “a contact surface of said thermo-roller is heated to an elevated temperature of at least 250°F.” Petitioner shows persuasively that the temperature limitation is taught by the combination of Fugitt and Papermaking. Pet. 32–34. Fugitt discloses that “[t]he rolls of the calender may be steam heated.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 26. In a section titled “Heated Rolls,” Papermaking discloses that “Steam can be used up to 170°C [338°F] surface temperature.” Ex. 1010, 95, 98. Petitioner is thus correct that, “[w]hile Fugitt teaches that a hot calender may be steam heated, Papermaking clarifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that steam heated thermo-rollers may reach up to 338°F.” Pet. 36. Based on these disclosures, we are persuaded by Mr. Zotterman’s testimony that it would have been “obvious to heat the thermo-roller of Fugitt to at least 250°F.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 159. combine Fugitt and Papermaking because of Papermaking’s status as a “trusted handbook[],” because both references disclose a method of manufacturing a paperboard structure with hot calendering,” and “because of the known advantages of heated rollers.” Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157, 159, 162. Petitioner’s contention is supported by Papermaking’s disclosures that, for cartonboard, “[p]recalendering is used before the coater to reduce roughness and porosity” and “[h]igh thermo roll temperatures (in some cases over 200°C) result in bulk savings because of the temperature gradient.” Ex. 1005, 80–82; see also Pet. 38; Ex. 1003 ¶ 164 (citing these disclosures). Papermaking’s disclosed range of “up to 170°C [338°F]” for steam- heated rolls (Ex. 1010, 98), overlaps the claimed range of “at least 250°F.” Patent Owner agrees. Tr. 27:11–13. “If the relevant comparison between a disputed claim limitation and the prior art pertains to a range of overlapping values, ‘. . . even a slight overlap in range establishes a prima facie case of obviousness.’” Genentech, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 946 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “[S]uch an overlap creates a presumption of obviousness, and . . . the burden of production falls upon the patentee to come forward with pertinent evidence that the overlapping range would not have been obvious in light of the prior art.” Id. (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). slip op. at 21

  Patent outcomesUS 11,293,142 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 11,293,142
• Pelican Biothermal, LLC v. Va-Q-Tec AGSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 16, 2023 · PGR2021-00085 · APJ Barry L Grossman · PGR · Final written decision

  The Board granted the motion to amend but held amended claim 64 unpatentable as anticipated by NanoCool 98596-type products and obvious over the cited combinations; all other amended claims were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • PTAB / AIA Trials › Motions to amend / substitute claimsMotion to amend granted in partGranted in part

    “VI. ORDER In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby: ORDERED that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that amended claim 64 is unpatentable; FURTHER ORDERED that Patent Owner’s Non-Contingent Motion to Amend is granted for claims 64 and denied for all other amended claims; and” slip op. at 77

  • ExcludeMotion to exclude, deniedDenied

    “A. Status as Prior Art Is a Substantive Issue, Not an Evidentiary Issue. A motion to exclude is not an appropriate mechanism for challenging the sufficiency of evidence, such as whether a reference qualifies as prior art, or the proper weight that should be afforded an argument. See Flir Systems, Inc. v. Leak Surveys, Inc., IPR2014-00411, Paper 113, 4, 8–9 (PTAB September 3, 2015); PTAB Consol. Trial Practice Guide 79 (Nov. 30 Mr. Zumwalt testifies that other NanoCool products, designated by product number 85430 and 98630, also have the same configuration as the 98830 product and are made by the same process. Thus, “the 98830, 85430, and 98630 products can be collectively referred to as ‘98830-type’ products all having the same relevant design.” Ex. 1030 ¶ 17. 2019) (“A motion to exclude . . . may not be used to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular fact. A motion to exclude is not a vehicle for addressing the weight to be given evidence—arguments regarding weight should appear only in the merits documents.”); Caterpillar Inc. v. Wirtgen Am., Inc., IPR2017-02187, Paper 42,17 (PTAB May 21, 2019) (status as prior art “is a substantive issue, not an evidentiary issue.”) Thus, whether the NanoCool 98830 product is prior art is not the proper basis for Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude evidence concerning the NanoCool 98830 product.” slip op. at 29

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Harber provide any analysis of the factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill, identified above, to support their conclusory statements. We give Mr. Harber’s conclusory testimony minimal probative weight. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(a) (“Expert testimony that does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based is entitled to little or no weight.”). Moreover, there is no persuasive evidence to which we have been directed of the need for specific education or experience in biological or chemical technologies related to the claimed containers and inserts.” slip op. at 26

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “With regard to the level of ordinary skill in the art, Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill would have had “a bachelor’s degree or higher degree in biological, chemical or mechanical engineering, or related sciences, and at least two to five years of experience in designing and testing ISCs [insulated shipping containers] depending on education level.” Pet. 9 (emphasis added) (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 23–24). Exhibit 1002 is the Declaration testimony of Mr. Paul Haber. Mr. Harber actually states a slightly different level of ordinary skill. Mr. Harber testifies: The hypothetical POSITA would have: (i) at least a bachelor’s degree in biological, chemical or mechanical engineering, or related sciences, and have at least three to five years of experience in designing and testing ISCs [Insulated Shipping Containers][29]. Such a person may also have (ii) a higher level degree, such as a PhD and/or Master’s degree in engineering, or related sciences, and have at least two to three years of experience in designing and testing ISCs. 29 See Ex. 1002 ¶ 23. Ex. 1002 ¶ 24 (emphasis added). Mr. Harber also testifies that “[t]hese descriptions are approximate, and a higher level of education or specific skill might make up for less experience, and vice-versa.” Id.” slip op. at 25

  Patent outcomesUS 10,766,685 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,766,685
• Apple Inc. v. Memoryweb, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Jun 7, 2023 · PGR2022-00006 · APJ Jason M Repko · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12, 17–44, and 49–59 are unpatentable over A3UM or for lack of written description; claims 13–16 and 45–48 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner

    “2. Analysis A person is not entitled to a patent if their invention was “described in” slip op. at 9

  • Skill levelOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art According to Petitioner, A person of ordinary skill in the art in 2011 would have had (1) at least a bachelor’s degree in computer science, computer engineering, or electrical engineering, and (2) at least applications such as photo management systems. Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 44–46). In the Institution Decision, we applied Petitioner’s proposed definition. Inst. Dec. 12. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7. We continue to find that the skill level identified by Petitioner (Pet. 12) is consistent with the record. Thus, we use the same definition here that we used in the Institution Decision.” slip op. at 30

  • Obviousness (§103) › Graham factors (scope of art, differences, level of skill)UnpatentableNot shown unpatentableMixed

    “e. Conclusion Petitioner provides articulated reasoning, supported by rational” slip op. at 68

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateUnpatentable

    “11. Written Description: Claims 6, 7, 38, and 39 Petitioner asserts that claims 6, 7, 38, and 39 are unpatentable as lacking adequate written-description support. Pet. 91–93. Claim 6 recites, in part, “The method of claim 4, wherein, in the people view, the first name is displayed adjacent to the first digital file associated with the first thumbnail image and the second name is displayed recites similar limitations. See id. at 38:47–50. Claim 7 depends from claim 6, and claim 39 depends from claim 38. Id. at 35:63–65 (claim 7), 38:51–53 (claim 39). Petitioner asserts that claims 6 and 38 require that the “people view” includes at least the following: (i) “a first thumbnail image associated with a first person,” (ii) “a first name associated with the first person,” (iii) “a second thumbnail image associated with a second person,” (iv) “a second name associated with the second person,” and (v) a “first digital file associated with the first person.” Pet. 91. Petitioner argues that the ’020 patent lacks written-description support for a people view with these features. Id. at 92 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 315). Under Petitioner’s interpretation, digital files are “plainly distinct”” slip op. at 96

  Patent outcomesUS 11,017,020 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 11,017,020
• Simpson Strong-Tie Company Inc. v. Columbia Insurance CompanySome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Mar 15, 2023 · PGR2021-00109 · APJ Stephen E Belisle · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–12, 15–17, and 21–23 are unpatentable; the revised contingent motion to amend is granted for claim 32 and denied for claims 24–31, 33–35, 38–40, and 44–46.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level board ownOther

    “B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Petitioner contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time” slip op. at 22

  • BurdenNot shown unpatentable

    “Accordingly, based on the foregoing and the complete record before” slip op. at 38

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownOther

    “C. Claim Construction We apply the claim construction standard articulated in Phillips v.” slip op. at 23

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Definiteness (Nautilus)IndefiniteMixed

    “persuaded by Petitioner that the limitations “a channel-shaped portion configured to receive the structural component” and “a base configured to receive an end portion of the structural component thereon to support the structural component” would not have informed the skilled artisan, with reasonable certainty, about the scope of the claimed invention. See Energizer Holdings, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 435 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“When the meaning of the claim would reasonably be understood by persons of ordinary skill when read in light of the specification, the claim is not subject to invalidity upon departure from the protocol of ‘antecedent basis.’”). Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioner” slip op. at 40

  Patent outcomesUS 11,021,867 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 11,021,867
• Yantai Jereh Petroleum Equipment & Technologies Co., Ltd v. BJ Energy Solutions, LLCSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Feb 6, 2023 · PGR2021-00102 · APJ Patrick R Scanlon · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 5 and 9 are unpatentable as indefinite under §112(b); the Board did not find claims 1–4, 6–8, and 10–28 unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on our review of the record before us, particularly the ’459 patent’s description and Dr. Adnan’s testimony, we agree with Petitioner that the ordinary level of skill in the art does not require the high level of specialized knowledge of control systems suggested by Patent Owner. Moreover, we find that Petitioner’s stated level of ordinary skill in the art is reasonable because it is consistent with the evidence of record, including the asserted prior art. Accordingly, for the purposes of this Decision, we apply Petitioner’s definition, although our conclusions with respect to obviousness would be the same if we were to apply Patent Owner’s definition.” slip op. at 9

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedDecided for petitioner

    “Based on the full record, we are not persuaded that Mr. Marscher is unqualified to serve as an expert in this proceeding. As noted above, a person of ordinary skill in the art is not required to have been a fracturing operator. Patent Owner’s proposed definition does not even require experience as a fracturing operator. See PO Resp. 22. Furthermore, Mr. Marscher testifies that he has extensive experience developing pumps for fracturing applications. Ex. 2027, 6:24–8:7. Mr. Marscher also testifies that he has experience with control systems relating to pumps and pumps units. Id. at 212:19–23. This testimony, as well as his declaration and curriculum vitae, show that Mr. Marscher has extensive education and experience in relevant fields. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 8–17; Ex. 1004. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Mr. Marscher’s qualifications or experience provide reason to discount the weight associated with Mr. Marscher’s testimony.” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner

    “is the pump unit’s highest HHP output and one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood this value is the pump unit’s output power in intermittent duty. Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 71–72, 123–124; Pet. 9– 10; Ex. 1036, 64:17–67:13, 119:17–120:11, 124:7–24, 198:9–200:9, 221:8– 222:15). However, even if Petitioner is correct that the “maximum power output value” is near or equivalent to a pump unit’s output power in intermittent duty, we are still not persuaded that the term “maximum intermittent power” should be tied to the “maximum power output value,” in conflict with the definition provided in the Specification. Petitioner also argues that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is indefinite. Pet. Reply 3. For the reasons discussed below (see supra § II.I.1), we determine that Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the term “maximum intermittent power,” as defined in the Specification, is indefinite. Thus, based on the complete record before us, we maintain our prior construction of “maximum intermittent power” for this Final Written Decision.” slip op. at 13

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “5. Additional Terms We determine that we need not expressly construe any other claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes because doing so would have no effect on the analysis below. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017; see also Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms that . . . are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’”) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 15

  Patent outcomesUS 10,907,459 mixed
  Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,907,459
• Kiosoft Technologies, LLC / Techtrex, Inc. v. Payrange Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Dec 14, 2022 · PGR2021-00093 · APJ Ken B Barrett · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–6, 8–10, 14, 15, and 18–25 are unpatentable under § 101; claims 7, 11–13, 16, and 17 were not shown unpatentable.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “B. The Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner contends: A [person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA” or “POSA”)] at the time of the earliest claimed filing date of the ’614 Patent would have had an education background of, or practical experience providing an equivalent to, a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, Information Technology, or a related/equivalent field and at least 3 years of academic or industry experience in electronic payment systems. Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 5–6). Patent Owner affirmatively states that it does not dispute Petitioner’s asserted educational background of a person of ordinary skill in the art. PO Resp. 7. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed number of years of experience, instead contending that “the claims are patentable regardless of the number of years of work experience a POSA would have had.” Id. (citing Ex. 2019 ¶¶ 49–58). Petitioner’s definition is consistent with the level of ordinary skill reflected in the prior art references of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art). We adopt Petitioner’s definition of the person of ordinary skill in the art.” slip op. at 8

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “construction disputes to find that Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof.” PO Resp. 8. Patent Owner goes on to state its agreement with Petitioner’s proposed construction for the “identifying” limitation (id. at 9) and indicate its disagreement with certain of Petitioner’s proposals (id. at 9–14). Patent Owner confirmed at the oral argument that no claim term needs to be construed to reach a dispositive issue. Tr. 33:23–34:5. We determine that we need not expressly construe any claim terms to resolve the parties’ disputes.” slip op. at 11

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step one — 'directed to'Step1 directed to exceptionDecided for petitioner

    “All of the claimed method steps of claim 1 occur “at the mobile device” (element 1.1), and the method includes a step of enabling user interaction with the user interface to complete the vending transaction (element 1.9). Id. at 46:61–65, 47:24–28. Claim 1 does not recite completing the purchase. The ’614 patent describes a commercial transaction completed at the payment accepting unit (i.e. the vending machine), not at the mobile device. Ex. 1001, 7:15–19; see also id. at 16:46–50; 17:57–59; 19:17–20; 19:35–38. We, thus, agree with Patent Owner that the claimed method does not require completing or conducting the transaction, but only enabling the completion of the transaction. On this complete record, we are persuaded that the elements block quoted above recite the concept of identifying a merchant and enabling completion of a purchase from the merchant. See Pet. 20 (arguing that the claimed method “is no less abstract than a customer noticing a store, making a purchase, and receiving a receipt.”); Pet. Reply 5 (arguing that the claim describes “nothing more than a customer noticing and identifying a store amongst multiple stores based on the unique visual image of that store, entering the store and communicating with the merchant, making a purchase, and receiving a receipt—all while using conventional tools.”). In particular, claim 1 recites a step for identifying a merchant based on its advertised presence—identifying a nearby vending machine that is available to accept payment from a mobile payment application, with that identifying involving the broadcasting of predefined radio messages.8 Claim 1 also recites steps for enabling completion of a purchase from the merchant— establishing a communication connection between the user’s device and the vending machine; displaying an interface that allows a user to select a vending machine, to trigger payment for the vending transaction, and to enable the completion of the transaction; and updating the user interface after receiving information from the vending machine regarding the transaction (which, as indicated by dependent claim 3, may be information indicating that the vending transaction was completed). Our slight revision of the abstract idea from what we previously stated in our Institution Decision does not impact the patentability analysis. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016).” slip op. at 17

  • Patent Eligibility (§101) › Alice/Mayo step two — inventive conceptStep2 no inventive conceptMixed

    “As discussed above, the Specification indicates that the short-range communication between the vending machine and mobile device can be not only conventional technologies such as Bluetooth, near-field communication (NFC), and radio frequency identification (RFID), but also could be “any wired or wireless technology that could be used to communicate a small distance (approximately a hundred feet or closer) that is known.” Ex. 1001, 9:57–67. The Specification ties that technology to the “broadcast” in claim 1 (id. at 47:2–5). For example, the Specification explains that “[e]ach adapter module 100 [of the vending machine] advertises its presence by broadcasting signals (advertising broadcast signals) to mobile devices in the zones 102, 104, 106.” Id. at 10:43–45. “The outermost range is the Bluetooth range 106 . . . [and] is the area in which the adapter module 100 is able to broadcast its presence.” Id. at 18:29–33. Further, Dr. Shamos testified that the Bluetooth protocol requires that two devices wishing to interact with each other identify themselves to each other. Ex. 1030, 102:3– 24. Dr. Shamos also testified that the Low prior art reference discloses that a vending machine identifies itself to the user. Id. at 100:9–20; see Ex. 1007, 2:25–28 (Low stating that, “in some embodiments, multiple machines may send their unique identifiers, such that the user is able to select one or more machines to purchase from.”). Thus, the abstract idea of identifying a merchant is implemented by nothing more than well-known, routine, and conventional wireless communications.” slip op. at 39

  Patent outcomesUS 10,891,614 mixed
  Claim construction§ 101 eligibility§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Mayo · Bilski · Phillips · KSR · Graham · Nautilus
  Patents in suitUS 10,891,614
• Asetek Danmark A/S v. Coolit Systems, Inc.Some claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Oct 12, 2021 · IPR2020-00825 · APJ Scott C Moore · IPR · Final written decision

  Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9 are unpatentable over Bezama or Bezama and Chiang; claims 13–15 were not shown unpatentable over Kang or Anderson.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner

    “the 2007 Provisional describes the material of which plate 240 is made, much less indicates that the inventor had possession of an invention including a manifold body (i.e., plate 240) defining a pair of compliant surfaces. See generally Ex. 1005.” slip op. at 24

  • Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Anticipation standard (single reference, every element)UnpatentableUnpatentable

    “Bezama discloses all limitations of claims 1 and 9. See Pet. 23–39; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 65–86. Patent Owner’s attempt to disqualify Bezama as prior art fails because claims 1 and 9 are not entitled to a priority date earlier than July 27, 2011. See supra § II.E. On this record, and considering all of the evidence and arguments put forth by the parties, we find that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 9 are unpatentable as anticipated by Bezama. G.” slip op. at 31

  • Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable

    “teach or suggest each limitation recited in claims 2, 4, and 5, and these contentions are supported by testimony from Dr. Tilton. See Pet. 54–66; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 114–137. Petitioner additionally identifies rationales for why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had reason to combine the teachings of Bezama and Chiang to arrive at the inventions recited in those claims. See id.” slip op. at 31

  • Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner

    “bifurcated flow limitation of claim 13. Resp. 46–52. In particular, Patent Owner asserts, with support from Dr. Pokharna, that the fluid entering any of Kang’s inlet channels 44 would mix with fluid from adjacent inlet channels, and that the bulk of the fluid from any inlet channel would exit through adjacent outlet channels, rather than traveling to the outer-most outlet channels as Petitioner suggests. Id. at 47–48; Ex. 2038 ¶¶ 105–114. Patent Owner’s argument is persuasive and supported by well-reasoned testimony from Dr. Pokharna. For example, Dr. Pokharna correctly points out that Dr. Tilton has admitted that microchannels have high flow resistance. Ex. 2038 ¶ 112 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 158). We agree with Dr. Pokharna that because of this high flow resistance, fluid entering a microchannel through any inlet channel 44 would tend to exit through the path of least resistance (i.e., the nearest outlet channel 47) rather than traveling to each end of the microchannel and exiting through the most distant outlets. See id. ¶ 112. contention that in Kang that the bulk of any fluid entering a microchannel would exit through the closest outlet channel 47. See Reply 17–18. Instead, Petitioner contends that at least some portion of the fluid will reach each end of the microchannel. See id. This argument is not persuasive because claim 13 recites that the flow that enters each channel through the one aperture “bifurcates into two sub flows,” and requires that each of the recited outlet regions receives “one of the two sub flows” or “the other of the two sub flows.” This claim language is not satisfied by an outlet region that receives only a portion of one of the two recited sub flows. Claim 13 requires that each outlet region receive one of the same two sub flows that originally entered the microchannel. See also Ex. 2038 ¶ 108. Petitioner neither proposes a claim construction that would encompass such an embodiment, nor offers any persuasive evidence that a POSITA would read claim 13 to encompass such an embodiment. Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that Kang teaches or suggests a flow of heat exchange fluid that is bifurcated into two sub flows within each of the microchannels, wherein each of these two sub flows is received by one of the two outlet regions adjacent to the opposing ends of the microchannels, in the manner required by claim 13.” slip op. at 36

  Patent outcomesUS 10,274,266 mixed
  § 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · Graham
  Patents in suitUS 10,274,266
• Syngenta Crop Protection AG v. FMC CorporationSome claims unpatentable
  PTAB · Aug 31, 2021 · PGR2020-00028 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · PGR · Final written decision

  Claims 1–3, 9–13, and 21–30 are unpatentable for lack of enablement; claims 9–13 also lack written description. Petitioner did not prove anticipation or obviousness of claims 1–7 and 22–31.

  RulingsFinal written decision

  • Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner

    “In determining the level of skill in the art, we consider factors including the type of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems, and the sophistication of the technology. Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Because Petitioner’s proposed definition is consistent with the prior art of record and the sophistication of the technology demonstrated by the record, we apply it here.5” slip op. at 10

  • Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther

    “Based on the complete record developed at trial, we determine that to resolve the disputes herein, we do not need to expressly construe any claim term. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that construction is needed only for disputed terms, and only as necessary to resolve the controversy).” slip op. at 11

  • Expert testimonyPetitioner expert creditedPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner

    “We find that Dr. Dayan’s testimony on these points lacks sufficient supporting analysis. In opining that the tested substituents are representative of the steric and electrostatic properties across the claimed substituents, Dr. Dayan merely compares the properties of the tested substituents to each other. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 52–56. He does not expressly compare them to the properties of the many remaining, untested substituents within the scope of the claims. See id.; see also Reply 14 (“At best, [Dr.] Dayan testified that the positive activity . . . at each substituent” suggests that the position is involved in herbicidal activity, “not that the tested compounds were sufficient to provide any reasonable expectation of success as to the billions of structurally diverse compounds covered” by the claims.). And although Dr. Dayan acknowledges that several tested compounds showed no herbicidal activity, he does not expressly explain how he took these compounds into account in nevertheless concluding that an ordinarily skilled artisan would expect at least some activity across all claimed substituents. See, e.g., Ex. 2011 ¶¶ 54–56 (noting exceptions to herbicidal activity). As one example, Dr. Dayan acknowledges the lack of activity shown in the data for substituents larger than hydrogen at the R6 position, but does not explain the impact of that data on the remaining claimed substituents. See id. ¶ 54 (Dr. Dayan noting that activity is “not as favored by larger alkyl groups” at R6, but nevertheless concluding that “one would expect at least some herbicidal activity” across all claimed R6 substituents). In contrast, Dr. Hunt compares the size and properties of the R6 substituents that showed no activity with the size and properties of other claimed but untested R6 substituents. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 163, 166–68; Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 37, 38. This comparison indicates that the majority of R6 substituents are larger than the tested substituents, such that the vast majority of the claimed compounds (i.e., those with compounds having R6 substituents larger than those tested), could have no herbicidal activity. Ex. 1003 ¶ 167; Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 12, 37, 38. Thus, we find that the data in the Specification regarding at least position R6 gives a person of ordinary skill in the art reason to doubt that substantially all compounds within the full scope of claim 1 of the ’202 patent would exhibit herbicidal activity. Ex. 1003 ¶ 163; Ex. 1029 ¶¶ 11, 12, 38; In re Surrey, 370 F.2d 349, 355 (CCPA 1966) (“[W]here the applicant seeks to obtain a monopoly in exchange for his disclosure of a group of compounds there should be a disclosure which gives a reasonable assurance that all, or substantially all of them are useful.”).” slip op. at 29

  • Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Enablement (Wands, Amgen full scope)Not enabledUnpatentable

    “We find that the need for iterative QSAR modeling, together with the sheer number of candidate compositions that must be synthesized (each of which would take at least a week to make) for both the modeling and herbicide testing, weighs against enablement, especially in light of the limited guidance in the Specification and the general unpredictability in the art. 3. Conclusion In sum, it is undisputed that claim 1 covers at least a billion compounds. The art is unpredictable, and the Specification indicates that not all of the compounds falling within claim 1 are effective herbicides. See, e.g., Pet. 22 (listing compounds that showed no herbicidal activity). Although the level of ordinary skill in the art is relatively high and the field is mature, Petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the ’202 patent does not provide sufficient meaningful guidance or working examples across the full scope of claim 1 to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to determine which other compounds across the full scope of the claim have herbicidal activity without undue experimentation.” slip op. at 45

  Patent outcomesUS 10,294,202 mixed
  Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR
  Patents in suitUS 10,294,202

Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.