- Pacificorp v. Birchtech Corp.InstitutedPTAB · Nov 4, 2025 · IPR2025-00718 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims, claims 1–4 and 6–26, on all asserted grounds because Petitioner showed a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). For the reasons provided below, we determine Petitioner has satisfied the threshold requirement set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). We institute inter” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“On the current record, it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the alleged “scientific basis for the invention” describes adding bromine to coal. Written description requires more than that the disclosure renders the claimed subject matter obvious. Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The question is not whether a claimed invention is an obvious variant of that which is disclosed in the specification. Rather, a prior application itself must describe an invention.”); PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed.”).” slip op. at 18
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Prior-art status of a reference › Printed publication / public accessibilityPrinted publication establishedDecided for petitioner
“The standard for public accessibility is one of “reasonable diligence,” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016), to locate the information by “interested members of the relevant public.” Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. it was ‘disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.’” Blue Calypso, 815 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Patent Owner argues that “Petitioners rely on their paid technical expert’s largely uncorroborated fact testimony regarding a conference that took place twenty years ago.” Prelim. Resp. 27. Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioners have not corroborated the number of people in attendance at this track during the relevant time, nor whether those people were skilled in the art.” Id. Thus, Patent Owner concludes that “Petitioners have not provided sufficient evidence that Sjostrom was disseminated or otherwise made available to . . . persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Dr. Niksa, who attended and delivered a presentation at the 2005 EUEC. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 125, 242–251; Ex. 1030, 3, 7, 23, 32, 106–118; Ex. 1031. Dr. Niksa testifies that there were over 800 attendees. Ex. 1002 ¶ 250. Other evidence corroborates Dr. Niksa’s testimony. Ex. 1030, 103–118 (list of attendees); Ex. 1031. Petitioner’s evidence does not indicate that attendance of the 2005 EUEC was restricted, and the evidence indicates that the CD appears to have been disseminated without any apparent restriction or expectation of confidentiality. Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 243, 244, 248; Ex. 1010; Ex. 1030, 103–118; Ex. 1031; GoPro, 908 F.3d at 694–95. reasonable likelihood that Sjostrom was publicly available, and thus, qualifies as printed publications. See Hulu, LLC v. Sound View Innovations, LLC, IPR2018-01039, Paper 28 (PTAB Dec. 20, 2019) (Paper 29) (precedential).” slip op. at 28
§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,926,218 - PTAB · Oct 14, 2025 · IPR2025-00688 · APJ Avelyn M Ross · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“The mere existence of some relationship between a petitioner and another entity, however, is not sufficient to place that petitioner in privity with that entity. Google LLC v. DDC Technology, LLC, IPR2023-00707, Paper 27 at 37 (PTAB Oct. 25, 2023). Instead, that relationship must be related to an earlier lawsuit and be “sufficiently close that it can be fairly said that the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent in that lawsuit” or the evidence must show “the petitioner is simply serving as a proxy to allow another party to litigate the patent validity question that the other party raised in an earlier-filed litigation.” WesternGeco, 889 F.3d at 1319.” slip op. at 10
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner asserts that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art [“POSITA”] would have at least a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related field of study with at least two years of experience implementing pollution control in power generation plants for natural gas, coal, and/or industrial waste incineration.” Pet. 11 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 48–51). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’370 patent and prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner “do[es] not, at this time, contend that any term requires construction,” and instead, states that “[a]ll terms have been accorded their plain and ordinary meaning.” Pet. 10 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 212–215). Patent Owner does not propose any constructions at this time. See generally Prelim. Resp. Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any claim term expressly.” slip op. at 13
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateDecided for petitioner
“We are not persuaded by this argument. The Federal Circuit has instructed that [e]ntitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed. It extends only to that which is disclosed. While the meaning of terms, phrases, or diagrams in a disclosure is to be explained or interpreted from the vantage point of one skilled in the art, all the limitations must appear in the specification. The question is not whether a claimed invention is an obvious variant of that which is disclosed in the specification. Rather, a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought. Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571–72. Here, what “a POSITA would understand,” without disclosure in the specification, is insufficient to show written-description support. Prelim. Resp. 24. Thus, on this record, and for purposes of institution, Patent Owner has not shown that the Provisional Application provides sufficient support for adding the claimed genus to the coal. 3. Summary In sum, on this record, Patent Owner has not shown that either the Provisional Application or the Pre-2018 Applications provide sufficient written-description support for the challenged claims. As a result, we determine that the ’370 patent cannot claim priority to the Provisional Application. Thus, all asserted prior art qualifies as prior art.” slip op. at 25
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,933,370 - PTAB · Oct 9, 2025 · IPR2025-00425 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims and all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail on at least one claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“After reviewing the evidence of record, we are persuaded the instant Petition is not time-barred as to the Chem-Mod Purchasers. Generic indemnity agreements are insufficient, without more, to establish privity. 9 Petitioner asserts that the supply agreements between the Chem-Mod Purchasers and Chem-Mod expired in 2021. For the reasons discussed herein, we determine that the language of these agreements does not establish privity. In the event Patent Owner maintains its argument that the Chem-Mod Purchasers are in privity with Chem-Mod, the parties should address the legal impact, if any, of the expiration of these agreements on Patent Owner’s arguments. WesternGeco LLC, 889 F.3d at 1321 (a “contractual and fairly standard customer-manufacturer relationship regarding the accused product” does not suggest, “without more, that the parties were litigating . . . [an] IPR[] as proxies for the other.”). The only relationship alleged to exist between Chem-Mod, its affiliates, and the Chem-Mod Purchasers is that of a supplier-customer relationship. As part of that relationship, the parties entered into supply agreements that included an indemnification provision for the purchased products. Exs. 2037–2042 (discussed at Sur-reply 7–8). We acknowledge, but disagree with, Patent Owner’s argument that the terms of the indemnity “specifically targeted” the activities at the “heart of the alleged infringement.” Sur-reply 7–8. Rather, the indemnification language in these agreements appears to be standard and typical of supply agreements. See Ex. 2037, 26;10 Ex. 2038, 10–12; Ex, 2039, 10–12; Ex. 2040, 10–12; Ex. 2041, 10–12; Ex. 2042, 24–27. Such language, without more, “does not amount to a sufficiently-close relationship to warrant finding . . . privity.” WesternGeco LLC, 889 F.3d at 1321–22.” slip op. at 11
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not point to any record evidence that suggests the parties to the Delaware Action adequately represented the Chem-Mod Purchasers’ interests or that the Chem-Mod Purchasers controlled, directed, or funded the Delaware Action. See generally Prelim. Resp.; Sur-reply. Nor does Patent Owner suggest that the indemnified Petitioners are acting as a proxy for Chem-Mod and its affiliates in this case. Thus, the relationship with Chem-Mod, its affiliates, and the indemnified Petitioners was not “sufficiently close that it can be fairly said petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent in that lawsuit.” Google, IPR2023-00707, Paper 27 at 37. In sum, Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) and § 315(b), but the current record does not provide sufficient reason to doubt Petitioner’s assertion that Chem-Mod was not “funding this petition, advising on strategy for this petition, or exercising any control over Petitioner’s decision to file the petition (or the arguments included therein).” Pet. 2; see also Reply 1–2. Indeed, the current record supports that the relationship between Chem-Mod and the Chem-Mod Purchasers was a standard supplier/customer relationship. Exs. 2037–2042. The evidence does not support that Chem- Mod negotiated a license on behalf of the Chem-Mod Purchasers or that the Chem-Mod Purchasers owned power plants that were at issue in the Delaware Litigation. Ex. 2009, 91; Ex. 2010, 107. Therefore, on this record, we determine that the relationship between Chem-Mod and the Chem-Mod Purchasers does not support that the Petition is time-barred.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) “would have at least a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related field of study with at least two years of experience implementing pollution control in power generation plants for natural gas, coal, and/or industrial waste incineration.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 48–51). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s proposed definition of a POSITA because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’225 patent and prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Petitioner discusses the term “pyrolysis char” and states that, for the purposes of the Petition, it adopts and applies the Delaware court’s construction that “allow[s] for the pyrolysis char to be created within the combustor, so long as it is then present (and combusted) with the coal and the bromine compound.” Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1071). Patent Owner does not appear to propose any express claim constructions. See generally Prelim. Resp. 7. Claim terms need only be construed to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011). On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we see no need to construe any claim term expressly.” slip op. at 20
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,589,225 - PTAB · Oct 6, 2025 · IPR2025-00423 · APJ Zhenyu Yang · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–4 and 6–29 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability based on the asserted obviousness and anticipation challenges.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › §315(b) time barNot time barredDecided for petitioner
“After reviewing the evidence of record, we are persuaded the instant Petition is not time-barred as to the Chem-Mod Purchasers. Generic indemnity agreements are insufficient, without more, to establish privity. WesternGeco LLC, 889 F.3d at 1321 (“a contractual and fairly standard customer-manufacturer relationship regarding the accused product” does not suggest, “without more, that the parties were litigating . . . [an] IPR[] as proxies for the other.”). The only relationship alleged to exist between Chem-Mod, its affiliates, and the Chem-Mod Purchasers is that of a supplier-customer relationship. As part of that relationship, the parties entered into supply agreements that included an indemnification provision for the purchased products. Exs. 2037–2042 (discussed at Sur-reply 7–8).” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityRpi dispute resolved for petitionerDecided for petitioner
“In sum, Petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) and § 315(b), but the current record does not provide sufficient reason to doubt Petitioners’ assertion that Chem-Mod was not “funding this petition, advising on strategy for this petition, or exercising any control over Petitioners’ decision to file the petition (or the arguments included therein).” Pet. 2; see also Reply 2. Indeed, the current record supports that the relationship between Chem-Mod and the Chem-Mod Purchasers was a standard supplier/customer relationship. Exs. 2037–2042. The evidence does not support that Chem-Mod negotiated a license on behalf of the Chem-Mod Purchasers or that the Chem-Mod purchasers owned power plants that were at issue in the Delaware Litigation. Ex. 2009, 91; Ex. 2010, 107. Therefore, on this record, we determine that the relationship between Chem-Mod and the Chem-Mod Purchasers does not support that the Petition is time-barred.” slip op. at 16
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related field of study with at least two years of experience implementing pollution control in power generation plants for natural gas, coal, and/or industrial waste incineration.” Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 48–51). Patent Owner does not dispute the level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim Resp. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt Petitioners’ proposed definition of a POSITA because it is consistent with the skill level reflected in the disclosures of the ’430 patent and prior art. See Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355 (the prior art may reflect an appropriate level of skill in the art).” slip op. at 21
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,668,430 - Billerud Aktiebolag (Publ) v. Westrock MWV, LLCSome claims unpatentablePTAB · Mar 12, 2025 · IPR2023-01206 · APJ Elizabeth M Roesel · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 1, 2, and 4–22 are unpatentable as obvious; claim 23 was not shown unpatentable. Substitute claims 25–26 are allowed, while 24 and 27 are denied for lack of written-description support.
RulingsFinal written decision- Expert testimonyPetitioner expert discountedOther
“Exhibits 1013 and 1014 are also not admissible as expert testimony because Mr. Wirén is not “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. “To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case—like for claim construction, validity, or infringement—a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art. Without that skill, the witness’ opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.” Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Mr. Wirén does not meet our definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. See Section II.B, supra. That definition is based on the undisputed testimony of Messrs. Zotterman and Klass. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2003 ¶ 26. Although Mr. Wirén has a Master’s of Science in chemical engineering, he lacks any experience or specialization in paperboard manufacturing. Ex. 2011, 12:1–10, 19:6–25, 20:2–7. We therefore agree with Patent Owner that Exhibits 1013 and 1014 are the testimony of Mr. Wirén and should be excluded from evidence because Mr. Wirén is not a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art. PO MTE 5–6, 9; Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Unless a patent lawyer is also a qualified technical” slip op. at 61
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art Based on the testimony of the parties’ witnesses, we determine that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a bachelor’s degree in paper science and engineering, chemical engineering, process engineering, mechanical engineering, or a related degree, with three to five years of experience in paperboard manufacturing, or a master’s degree in paper science and engineering, chemical engineering, process engineering, or mechanical engineering, or a similar field with a specialization in paperboard manufacturing. Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 2003 ¶ 26. We find that the level of ordinary skill in the art, as articulated above, is consistent with the level of technical understanding and competence reflected in the ’142 Patent Specification and the asserted prior art references.” slip op. at 10
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageTerm construed petitioner constructionDecided for petitioner
“A claim construction that excludes a particular element is viewed as a “negative limitation.” Ethicon LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 847 Fed. App’x 901, 907 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2021). “[S]uch exclusions must find support either in ‘the words of the claim’ or through an ‘express disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description that would justify adding that negative limitation.’” Id. (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are exacting.” GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “To act as its own lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term,’ and ‘clearly express an intent to define the term.’” Id. (citing Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365). Similarly, disclaimer or disavowal requires that the specification or prosecution history demonstrate that the invention does not include a particular feature. Id. Here, we find no claim language, lexicography, or disclaimer in the ’142 Patent or its file history that would support defining a “hot-hard calender” as requiring that only one of the two rollers be heated to an elevated temperature.” slip op. at 12
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundUnpatentable
“a contact surface of said thermo-roller is heated to an elevated temperature of at least 250°F.” Petitioner shows persuasively that the temperature limitation is taught by the combination of Fugitt and Papermaking. Pet. 32–34. Fugitt discloses that “[t]he rolls of the calender may be steam heated.” Ex. 1004 ¶ 26. In a section titled “Heated Rolls,” Papermaking discloses that “Steam can be used up to 170°C [338°F] surface temperature.” Ex. 1010, 95, 98. Petitioner is thus correct that, “[w]hile Fugitt teaches that a hot calender may be steam heated, Papermaking clarifies that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that steam heated thermo-rollers may reach up to 338°F.” Pet. 36. Based on these disclosures, we are persuaded by Mr. Zotterman’s testimony that it would have been “obvious to heat the thermo-roller of Fugitt to at least 250°F.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 159. combine Fugitt and Papermaking because of Papermaking’s status as a “trusted handbook[],” because both references disclose a method of manufacturing a paperboard structure with hot calendering,” and “because of the known advantages of heated rollers.” Pet. 36–37; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 157, 159, 162. Petitioner’s contention is supported by Papermaking’s disclosures that, for cartonboard, “[p]recalendering is used before the coater to reduce roughness and porosity” and “[h]igh thermo roll temperatures (in some cases over 200°C) result in bulk savings because of the temperature gradient.” Ex. 1005, 80–82; see also Pet. 38; Ex. 1003 ¶ 164 (citing these disclosures). Papermaking’s disclosed range of “up to 170°C [338°F]” for steam- heated rolls (Ex. 1010, 98), overlaps the claimed range of “at least 250°F.” Patent Owner agrees. Tr. 27:11–13. “If the relevant comparison between a disputed claim limitation and the prior art pertains to a range of overlapping values, ‘. . . even a slight overlap in range establishes a prima facie case of obviousness.’” Genentech, Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 946 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). “[S]uch an overlap creates a presumption of obviousness, and . . . the burden of production falls upon the patentee to come forward with pertinent evidence that the overlapping range would not have been obvious in light of the prior art.” Id. (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). slip op. at 21
Patent outcomesUS 11,293,142 mixedClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,293,142 - Voltage, LLC v. Shoals Technologies Group, LLCInstitution deniedPTAB · Sep 30, 2024 · PGR2024-00022 · APJ Michael G Mcmanus · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution on claims 1–24 because Voltage did not show that any challenged claim was more likely than not unpatentable under the asserted grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“We have authority to determine whether to institute a post-grant review. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). A post-grant review may not be instituted “unless. . . the information presented in the petition . . . if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) and the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response (including its supporting testimonial evidence), we determine that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the ’153 patent is eligible for post-grant review. Accordingly, we decline to institute a post-grant review of claims 1–24 based on the grounds articulated in the Petition.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelOther
“In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “These factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art.” Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We determine that no express finding is necessary, on the present record, and that the level of ordinary skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). Further, for purposes of this institution decision, and on the present record, we determine that the adoption of either party’s proposal regarding requisite work experience would not change our analysis or conclusions. C. Claim Construction” slip op. at 12
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“The parties put forward several terms for construction. Pet. 14–17; Prelim. Resp. 9–12. With respect to Grounds I through VII, we have determined that no claim constructions are required in order to address the points at issue. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that “we need only construe terms that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy” (internal citation omitted)). Claim construction is required to resolve certain issues arising in connection with Ground VIII. Accordingly, we construe certain terms in our discussion of that ground, infra.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Plain and ordinary meaning to a POSITATerm construed board ownDecided for patent owner
“through the undermold.” The term “aperture only partially extending through said undermold” was added to the claims of the ’254 parent application by amendment. Ex. 1021, 103–105; Ex. 1020, 6:60–8:47. With this amendment, the claims of the ’254 patent align with Figure 7, reproduced below. Figure 7 of the ’254 Patent (Figure 7 of the ’153 patent is identical to Figure 7 of the ’254 patent except for minor stylistic changes). As can be seen, the aperture occupied by drop line 12 extends partially through the undermold to compression lug 20 while the aperture occupied by feeder cable 14 extends completely through the undermold. This suggests a construction of “aperture extending partially through the undermold” where such aperture does not extend completely through the undermold. Such a construction of “aperture extending partially through the undermold” is consistent with the plain meaning of “extending partially.”” slip op. at 62
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,689,153 - 3M Company v. Bay Materials, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jan 18, 2023 · IPR2022-01215 · APJ Grace Karaffa Obermann · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted inter partes review of claims 1–4, 7, 11–14, 18, and 31 on all asserted grounds, finding at least one claim sufficiently shown anticipated by Yu.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“The Petition includes detailed arguments that map the limitations of the challenged claims to specific disclosures in Yu (Sample 1). Id. at 50–62. The Petition also maps adequately the limitations of the challenged claims to specific disclosures in Stewart (Example 2). Id. at 62–66. For example, Petitioner shows sufficiently that Yu (Example 1) coextrudes “a multilayered polymeric film,” that is, a “sheet,” arranged in the hard-soft-hard-soft-hard, five-layer configuration required by claim 11. Pet. 50–51; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 124, 126–128; Ex. 1012 ¶¶ 63, 78, 92. Petitioner also shows sufficiently that the hard layers in that configuration of Yu (Example 1) are “hard” and the hard layers are “hard” within the meaning of claim 11. Pet. 53; Ex. 1002 ¶ 131; Ex. 1012 ¶ 78. In other words, Petitioner shows sufficiently, on this record, that Yu (Example 1) anticipates claim 11. Based on the information presented, we find that Petitioner shows sufficiently, for purposes of trial institution, that at least one challenged claim of the ’263 patent is anticipated by Yu (Sample 1).” slip op. at 12
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“That prior art disclosure of elastomeric materials for use as the outer layers in an unclaimed and disfavored soft-hard-soft layer configuration does not convey, with reasonable clarity, that the inventors had possession of the claimed subject matter, in which the elastomeric material forms the inner layer of a polymeric sheet in a hard-soft-hard layer configuration. See id. ¶¶ 7, 33–35, 109–110. Even if the hardness limitation of the challenged claims would have been obvious from the relied-upon disclosure of the ’176 application (Ex. 2001 ¶ 109), that circumstance is insufficient to establish written description support. “Entitlement to a filing date does not extend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is expressly disclosed.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted); see Pet. 21 (quoting that precedent). Accordingly, we agree with Petitioner that the invention that Patent Owner seeks to protect in the ’263 patent does not appear to be “part of the invention” described in the ’176 application. Pet. 40; see Ex. 2001 ¶ 109 (describing elastomeric materials, having the specified hardness, only in the context of an unclaimed prior art soft-hard-soft embodiment). On this record, we preliminarily agree with Petitioner that the earliest effective filing date to which the ’263 patent appears to be entitled is December 18, 2019, namely, the filing date of the ’256 application, from which the ’263 patent issued. Ex. 1001, codes (21), (22). Patent Owner may contest this issue in a timely response to the Petition.” slip op. at 9
- Skill levelNot reached
“The parties disagree about whether the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had specific “experience with dental appliances or access to individuals with such experience.” Prelim. Resp. 17; see Pet. 14–15 n.1 (disagreeing with that proposition). Neither party explains why a resolution of that Stat. 284 (September 16, 2011), includes revisions to Section 102(a) that became effective on March 16, 2013. For reasons explained in this Decision, on this record it appears Petitioner is correct that the challenged claims are entitled to an effective filing date no earlier than December 18, 2019 and, therefore, the AIA provisions apply in this proceeding. See Pet. 22, 39–40; Ex. 1001, code (60). 2 WO 20010/043419 A1, published Apr. 22, 2010, with English Translation (Ex. 1015). 3 We take notice that the first and second grounds identified in the Petition assert anticipation based on the same prior art disclosure. 4 US Pub. 2004/0224283 A1, published Nov. 11, 2004 (Ex. 1008). dispute is necessary to this Decision to institute review. See, e.g., Prelim. Resp. 17 n.2 (“even under Petitioner’s proposed definition, the Petition fails to show a reasonable likelihood that any claim is unpatentable”); Pet. 14–15 & n.1 (arguing about the issue without explaining how a resolution of the dispute would change the outcome of the decision on institution). If either party believes that the difference in level of skill would have a material effect on the analysis of the patentability of the challenged claims, that issue should be specifically addressed in briefing during the trial. We will resolve that dispute only to the extent necessary in any final written decision. Based on the information presented, we find that the asserted prior art itself is sufficient to demonstrate the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (prior art itself can reflect the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art).” slip op. at 6
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction needed
“We construe terms in controversy only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “Petitioner discusses the terms “layer A,” “layer B,” “layer C,” “layer C,” “layer B',” inner layer B,” “inner layer B',” and “inner layer D.” Pet. 15–20. Patent Owner discusses the terms “layer” and “inner.” Prelim. Resp. 19–22. Taking account of the information presented, we determine that no claim term requires express construction for purposes of deciding whether to institute review. Compare Pet. 15–20 (addressing issues of claim construction, without demonstrating that an express construction is necessary to resolve whether to institute review), with Prelim. Resp. 19–22 (same).” slip op. at 7
Claim construction§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 10,870,263 - PTAB · Aug 15, 2022 · IPR2022-00381 · APJ Julia Heaney · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–10 and 12–18 on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that the claims are unpatentable as obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one claim challenged in the Petition. Accordingly, we institute an inter partes review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateOther
“Having reviewed the disclosures of the ’626 provisional application relied upon by Patent Owner, we do not agree that they would convey to a person of ordinary skill in the art that Mr. Niester had possession of using 222 or 282 nm wavelengths to disinfect human or animal skin. While they refer to human activity such as travel, surgery, and food preparation, the disclosures do not refer to disinfecting skin. Rather, they refer to sterilizing things in the presence of humans, such as surfaces and air, but not human or animal skin itself. Therefore, we determine that Petitioner has satisfied its initial burden of production on the effective-filing-date issue by identifying the absence of specific supporting disclosure for claim 1 from the ’626 provisional application. See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1379–1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing burden framework in inter partes review). Based on this record, we find that Petitioner has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that it will prevail in establishing that challenged claims 1–10 are not entitled to an effective filing date earlier than the filing date of the PCT application. The parties will have an opportunity to develop their positions on the issue of the effective filing date of claims 1–10 during trial.” slip op. at 10
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundInstituted
“Having considered the evidence and arguments presented by both parties on the present record, we are persuaded Petitioner sufficiently shows that Eckhardt and Sosnin teach or suggest all of the limitations in claim 1, and sufficiently explains how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have used Eckhardt’s teaching of narrow spectrum light in the range of 220 to 310 nm to disinfect skin, with Sosnin’s implementation of excimer lasers including 222 and 282 nm to kill bacteria, to arrive at the method of claim 1 with a reasonable expectation of success. We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Eckhardt teaches away from the use of UV light on skin because it is based on a mischaracterization of Eckhardt, which does not teach bandages as a way to provide cover from direct UV light, but rather, compensates for application of UV light through a bandage by controlling the UV light intensity. Indeed, Eckhardt’s embodiment that Petitioner relies upon is titled “UV- Transmissive Bandage” and explains how to choose bandage materials that transmit UV-C light. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 69–72. We also disagree, on this record, with Patent Owner’s argument that Sosnin would dissuade a person of ordinary skill from using 222 or 282 nm wavelengths to disinfect skin . Although Patent Owner is correct that Sosnin refers to the need for additional testing before using its technology outside of a laboratory (Prelim. Resp. 31), Mr. Lawal directs us to evidence supporting his testimony that it was general knowledge in the art at the time of the invention that even though UV light poses safety risks to human skin, UV-C light of 222 nm on bare skin for disinfection was relatively safe. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88–91 (citing Exs. 1013, 1015, 1016, 1017). Patent Owner presents only attorney argument in response to Mr. Lawal’s testimony and supporting evidence. We invite the parties to continue to develop this issue during trial.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of success › Teaching awayTeaching away not foundDecided for petitioner
“We disagree with Patent Owner’s argument that Eckhardt teaches away from the use of UV light on skin because it is based on a mischaracterization of Eckhardt, which does not teach bandages as a way to provide cover from direct UV light, but rather, compensates for application of UV light through a bandage by controlling the UV light intensity. Indeed, Eckhardt’s embodiment that Petitioner relies upon is titled “UV- Transmissive Bandage” and explains how to choose bandage materials that transmit UV-C light. See Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 69–72. We also disagree, on this record, with Patent Owner’s argument that Sosnin would dissuade a person of ordinary skill from using 222 or 282 nm wavelengths to disinfect skin . Although Patent Owner is correct that Sosnin refers to the need for additional testing before using its technology outside of a laboratory (Prelim. Resp. 31), Mr. Lawal directs us to evidence supporting his testimony that it was general knowledge in the art at the time of the invention that even though UV light poses safety risks to human skin, UV-C light of 222 nm on bare skin for disinfection was relatively safe. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 88–91 (citing Exs. 1013, 1015, 1016, 1017). Patent Owner presents only attorney argument in response to Mr. Lawal’s testimony and supporting evidence. We invite the parties to continue to develop this issue during trial.” slip op. at 17
§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 9,700,642 - China Lithium Battery Technology Co., Ltd. v. Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., LimitedInstitution deniedPTAB · Jun 6, 2022 · PGR2022-00008 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · PGR · Institution
The Board denied institution because Petitioner did not show that claims 1–19 were more likely than not unpatentable on the asserted anticipation, obviousness, written-description, enablement, or further-limitation grounds.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)Institution denied meritsInstitution denied
“that at one point contained at least one claim with an effective filing date on or after March 16, 2013. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), §§ 3(n)(1), 6(f)(2)(A). Under 35 U.S.C. § 324(a), a post-grant review may be instituted only if “the information presented in the petition . . . demonstrate[s] that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” After considering the Petition, the Preliminary Response, and the evidence of record, for the reasons set forth below, we deny the Petition and do not institute a post-grant review.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level board ownOther
“We agree with the parties that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had a post-graduate or equivalent degree in material science and engineering, mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, or a related field, and three to five years of work experience lithium ion battery technology, battery electrode materials, and experience with XRD analysis, which is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Although we do not fully adopt either party’s definition of the person having ordinary skill in the art, our determination regarding Petitioner’s challenge does not turn on the differences between Petitioner’s and Patent Owner’s definitions, and we note that our conclusions would be the same under either definition.” slip op. at 8
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert creditedPetitioner expert discountedDecided for patent owner
“results of the tests relied on by Petitioner are representative of the properties of Batteries #1–6, L, M, and S prior to the June 29, 2018 effective filing date of the ’932 patent.17 In that regard, we credit Dr. White’s testimony, which is supported by objective evidence of record, that the condition of lithium-ion batteries can change over time upon storage or usage, and that such changes could lead to changes in the OI values of the positive film. Ex. 2003 ¶ 73 (citing Ex. 2017, 617–618, Fig. 4; Ex. 2018, 418, Figs. 7, 8; Ex. 2019, 2737, 2739–40, Figs. 2, 3; Ex. 2020, 33, Fig. 6). We further credit Dr. White’s testimony, also supported by objective evidence of record, that “overcharging, deep discharging, or exposure to heat, among other things” can cause swelling and deterioration of the batteries, which “in turn could lead to altered structure and OI values of the cathode.” Id. ¶ 74 (citing Ex. 2021; Ex. 2022; Ex. 2023).” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The parties propose constructions for the terms “layered lithium- containing compound” recited in claim 1 and “monocrystal particles” recited in claim 17. Pet. 11–14; Prelim. Resp. 13–14. For purposes of this Decision, based on the record before us, we determine that no claim term requires an explicit construction.” slip op. at 9
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,930,932 - Beckman Coulter, Inc. v. Sysmex Corporation And Sysmex America, Inc.All claims unpatentablePTAB · Feb 18, 2022 · IPR2020-01503 · APJ Jo-Anne M Kokoski · IPR · Final written decision
Claims 7–15 are unpatentable as obvious over Nagai and Jagtiani; the priority applications lack written-description support for the claimed electrical detection and cell-counting combination.
RulingsFinal written decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“In the Institution Decision, we determined that Petitioner’s definition was consistent with the disclosure of the ’351 patent and the scope and content of the asserted prior art to the extent that Petitioner’s definition requires familiarity with the design and operation of automated hematology analyzers available in the market. Dec. 8 (citing Ex. 1001, 1:45–61, 15:52– 58). We also determined that Petitioner’s proposal was more reasonable than Patent Owner’s with respect to the duration of a POSA’s practical experience, whether such practical experience is in addition to or possibly as experience could be merely using hardware and/or software for an analyzer, as opposed to developing such hardware and/or software. Id. at 8–9. Neither party contends that the differences in proposals affect the outcome of this proceeding, and we find that they do not. Nonetheless, on the full record now before us, we find that our identification of the level of ordinary skill in the art in the Institution Decision, modified to state that a higher level of experience can compensate for less technical education, is supported by the ’351 patent, the prior art of record, and the opinions of Mr. Roche and Dr. Robinson (which, as discussed above, recognize that additional work experience can compensate for technical education). Thus, we find that a POSA would have had at least a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree in biologic science, biomedical engineering, and/or electrical engineering or a related field and at least five years of experience in developing hardware and/or software for hematology analyzers, and would have been familiar with the design and operation of hematology analyzers available in the market. We also find that less technical education may be compensated by a higher level of experience, or vice versa.” slip op. at 10
- Prior constructionPrior construction adoptedDecided for petitioner
“a controller programmed to,” “optical detector,” “electrical detector,” and “mono-nucleated cells and poly-nucleated cells” as recited in claim 7, and “total count of nucleated cells” as recited in claims 8 and 13. Pet. 22–29. Patent Owner responds that “[t]he District Court issued an opinion regarding claim construction on April 6, 2021,” and, “[f]or purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner applies the District Court’s constructions.” PO Resp. 13. Patent Owner also specifically addresses the terms “controller programmed to” and “electrical detector.” Id. at 13–14. Petitioner replies that its proposed claim constructions are consistent with the District Court’s constructions. Pet. Reply 4–5. At the oral hearing, the parties confirmed that they do not dispute the District Court’s claim constructions. See Tr. 16 (Petitioner’s counsel stating that “Petitioner would request that this Board adopt these same [District Court] constructions in this IPR”), 34 (Patent Owner’s counsel agreeing that “neither side has objected to the court’s claim construction”). Based on the parties’ apparent agreement, and considering the record before us and the Report and Recommendation from the District Court (Ex. 2065), we agree with and adopt the District Court’s claim constructions. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“Any prior claim construction determination concerning the claim in a civil action . . . that is timely made of record in the inter partes review proceeding will be considered.”). Accordingly, we construe the terms “controller programmed to,” “electrical detector,” and “optical detector” as set forth below. slip op. at 12
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateNot shown unpatentable
“that Petitioner has established that the priority applications do not provide adequate written description support for the challenged claims. More specifically, we find that the priority applications do not reasonably convey to a POSA that the inventors were in possession of a sample analyzer that both (1) uses an electrical detector to electrically sense cells in a body fluid measurement sample, and (2) from the analysis of the cells sensed by the electrical detector, counts the number of mono-nucleated cells and poly-nucleated cells in the body fluid measurement sample as required by claim 7.” slip op. at 17
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successMotivation foundReasonable expectation foundUnpatentable
“Based on our review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has established that a POSA would have had reason to combine the teachings of Nagai and Jagtiani to achieve the claimed subject matter. Nagai describes an electrical detector (RBC/PLT detection unit 42) that “is capable of measuring the number of red blood cells and platelets by a sheath flow-DC detection method.” Ex. 1044, 6:58–63, Fig. 5. Nagai also describes WBC detection unit 41 that produces a DIFF scattergram that, in the body fluid measuring mode, is analyzed in order to classify the white blood cells into two subclasses, namely, mono-nucleated cells and poly-nucleated cells. Id. at 5:56–58, 12:27–36. Nagai teaches that WBC detection unit 41 is “configured as an optical detection unit” that performs white blood cell classification in the body fluid measurement mode using a combination of electrical resistance and absorbed light. Id. at 5:56–58, 15:52–16:6. Jagtiani teaches a channel sensor that can detect impedance to differentiate between different types of cells in a biological sample, including differentiating between red blood cells, white blood cells, and platelets. Ex. 1045 ¶¶ 21, 25; see also id. ¶ 187 (“The channel sensor is based on impedance sensing using the Coulter principle.”). Jagtiani teaches the sensor can be configured to differentiate between and count the number of eosinophils, basophils, neutrophils, monocytes, and lymphocytes in the biological sample. Id. ¶ 25; see also id. ¶ 121 (“In some embodiments, the cell count can include a white blood differential, and can include a count of basophils, a count of eosinophils, a count of lymphocytes, a count of neutrophils, and/or a count of monocytes.”). Jagtiani further teaches that “[s]uch biological samples can include, for example, blood, serum, saliva, sweat, tears, urine, or any other biological sample or derivative suspended in a fluid.” Id. ¶ 119. In light of these teachings in Nagai and Jagtiani, we credit Mr. Roche’s testimony that Jagtiani demonstrates a known technique of detecting poly-nucleated and mono-nucleated white blood cells using an electrical detector. A POSA at the time of the invention would have been led to modify Nagai with the teaching of Jagtiani in the manner claimed to allow the body fluid measurement of Nagai to differentiate poly-nucleated and mono-nucleated blood cells (instead of measuring red blood cells alone). Such a motivation is found, for example, in Petitioner’s DxH system, which discloses use of an electrical detector in both a blood measuring mode and a fluid measuring mode. Ex. 1042 ¶¶ 30, 31. In the DxH system, use of an electrical detector in both the blood measuring mode and body fluid measuring mode allows identification of total number of cells in measured body fluid.” slip op. at 29
Patent outcomesUS 10,401,351 unpatentableClaim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · KSRPatents in suitUS 10,401,351
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.