- PTAB · Dec 10, 2025 · PGR2025-00054 · APJ Ryan H Flax · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–16 on all four grounds, finding at least one claim more likely than not unpatentable based on obviousness, indefiniteness, or lack of written description.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in a post-grant review. We institute a post-grant review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 321, if unrebutted, shows that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the petition is unpatentable. 35 U.S.C. § 324. On the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’781 patent is unpatentable under a presented ground. See generally Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of post-grant review. Our reasoning is discussed below.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityDecided for petitioner
“STANDING Petitioner states that it certifies that: (1) the ’781 patent is available for post grant review because its earliest claimed effective filing date is October 9, 2018, and the patent issued less than nine months ago, on December 3, 2024; and (2) Petitioner is not barred or estopped from requesting a post grant review on the grounds in this petition. Pet. 5. This is sufficient. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(note)(A)–(B), § 321; 37 C.F.R. § 42.204(a). Patent Owner does not contest standing. See generally Prelim. Resp. B. REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST Petitioner states that “[t]he real parties-in-interest are Petitioner Straumann USA, LLC and its affiliates Institut Straumann AG and JJGC Indústria e Comércio de Materiais Dentários S.A.” Pet. 3. Patent Owner raises no objection and itself identifies “Smart Denture Conversions, LLC is the real party-in-interest.” Paper 4, 2; see generally Prelim. Resp. C.” slip op. at 3
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 42. And, as set forth above, Patent Owner asserts that, for the sake of its present arguments, it matters not which of the two proposed definitions we use for this proceeding. Prelim. Resp. 21. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’781 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This issue may be further developed at trial by the parties, if desired. C.” slip op. at 19
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court thus, by default, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(b); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Petitioner indicates that None of the claim terms of claims 1–16 need to be construed to determine the patentability issues presented in this petition. The petition applies the ordinary meaning of the claim language as it would be understood by a POSA after reading the ’781 patent. Ex. 1002, ¶130. Petitioner will propose a construction if Patent Owner argues or the Board determines that one is required for any term. Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1002). And, Patent Owner presents no express position on claim construction at this point. See generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding, we do not expressly construe any claim terms; however, this position is preliminary and we may change it based on the fully developed record at trial.8 D.” slip op. at 19
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites GrahamPatents in suitUS 12,156,781 - PTAB · Nov 21, 2025 · IPR2025-00956 · APJ Ryan H Flax · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–12 under all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that at least one claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“institute trial in an inter partes review. We institute an inter partes review only if the information presented in the petition filed under 35 U.S.C. § 311, and any preliminary response filed under § 313, shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314. After reviewing the parties’ submissions in view of the existing record, we conclude that Petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood it would prevail in showing that at least one challenged claim of the ’992 patent is unpatentable under the presented grounds. See Pet. Therefore, we grant institution of inter partes review. Our reasoning is discussed below. A.” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“These two proposed definitions of the ordinarily skilled artisan share many consistencies, for example, the types of degrees and experience such a person would have had, but differ in the number of years of experience. Petitioner proposes the ordinarily skilled artisan would have had at least five years of experience and Patent Owner proposes at least three years (which would necessarily include five years, too). Patent Owner also proposes that the ordinarily skilled artisan would have consulted a dentist, oral surgeon, prosthodontist, or periodontist with experience in dental implants and prosthetics. At this point, we find little meaningful difference between the two proposed definitions. In fact, neither does Patent Owner’s witness, Mr. Leinsing, who states that his “opinions would not change under either definition.” Ex. 2011 ¶ 40. Thus, at this stage, we accept and use Petitioner’s proposed definition of the ordinarily skilled artisan, which, unlike Patent Owner’s, does not implicate reliance on the knowledge of people other than the individual ordinarily skilled artisan. Petitioner’s definition appears to comport with the level of skill in the art reflected in the prior art of record and the ’992 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the prior art itself [may] reflect[] an appropriate level” of the ordinary level of skill in the art) (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). This parties may further developed this issue at trial, if desired. C.” slip op. at 13
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“The Board interprets claim terms in an inter partes review using the same claim construction standard that is used to construe patent claims in a civil action in federal district court. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). In construing claims, district courts and the Board here, by default, give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning, which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).” slip op. at 14
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description inadequateNot entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“Here, the first claim limitation at issue is broad, i.e., different thread pattern/profile between a definite and a temporary screw, and the Specification’s and priority applications’ disclosure is narrow and specific, asymmetric buttress style threads in a temporary screw and symmetrical threads in a definite screw (are different). Any apparent predictability in or maturity of the relevant field here must be contrasted with the fact that the Specification, considering the ’992 patent itself or any of the identified priority applications, never once even discusses the (claimed) concept of specifically differing the thread style between a temporary and a definitive screw. Any differences in thread style are not called out by the disclosure, but are described and can be discerned only in relation to the respective threads’ functionality, i.e., Fig. 75’s temporary screw 190 has buttress-style threading so it can be pulled out rather than unscrewed from the abutment; Fig. 9’s definitive screw 75 has male threads that fill the female threads of the abutment 8 for a secure permanent engagement. Ex. 1001, 15:23–30, 21:25–44, 23:3–36; Ex. 1012, 97–98, Figs. 9, 75. And, although it is possible for a single disclosed species to provide written description support for a claimed genus, “a sufficient description of a genus . . . requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350; see also Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013). That does not appear to be the case here—the present record does not support that the described asymmetrical buttress, serrated style of different temporary screw threading (relative to that of the definitive screw and regardless of the direction of the threads for rotation) is sufficiently representative of the genus’s “different” thread patterns/profiles. See, e.g., Ex. 1006 (a buttress style thread does not function the same as a buttress reverse or 75º joint profile or rounded, or trapezoidal thread).” slip op. at 30
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites Phillips · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,937,992 - Aroma360, LLC v. Air Esscentials, Inc.InstitutedPTAB · Oct 8, 2025 · IPR2025-00707 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · IPR · Institution
Instituted inter partes review of claims 1 and 3–8 on all asserted grounds after finding a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at least one challenged claim.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2024) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314. Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the record, for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 As Paper 7 in this proceeding, Patent Owner mistakenly filed the Preliminary Response in a related proceeding. one of the challenged claims. We thus institute inter partes review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. 357, 362–63, 369–70 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (“When instituting inter partes review, the Board will authorize the review to proceed on all of the challenged claims and on all grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.”).” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art, which appears generally consistent with the record at this stage of the proceeding, including the prior art. See GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. We remove the phrase “at least” in both listed options, however, as that phrase adds ambiguity. Patent Owner does not argue at this stage of the proceedings that Petitioner’s proposal for the level of ordinary skill leads to an improper understanding of how a skilled artisan would understand either the challenged patent or the prior art. For purposes of this Decision, we adopt the definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art proposed by Petitioner, as revised above.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“Neither Petitioner nor Patent Owner propose constructions for any claim terms. Pet. 16–17; see generally Prelim. Resp. At this stage of the proceeding and based on the current record, we need not construe explicitly any claim terms because doing so would not change the outcome of the analysis below. See Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms . . . that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).” slip op. at 9
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artNot reached
“At this stage of the proceeding, the record on the analogous art issue is incomplete. Petitioner seems to take the position that Kaiser is in the same “field” (Pet. 47), but Petitioner does not fully address the issue of analogous art. Although Petitioner was not required to anticipate this argument with its initial filing (see Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Mylan Pharma., Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023)), Petitioner may wish to address this issue as appropriate in future briefing. We will consider the full record on this issue, if necessary, as part of our analysis in any final written decision. On the current record and in view of our decision to institute based on other grounds, we reach no conclusion as to whether Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would have combined Goubet and Kaiser as proposed.” slip op. at 23
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,092,918 - Uatp IP LLC v. Slick Slide LLCInstitutedPTAB · Apr 8, 2025 · PGR2024-00054 · APJ Julia Heaney · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on claims 1–17 and 22–28 and all asserted grounds, finding a sufficient likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Institution of a post-grant review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2018). Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one claim challenged in the Petition is unpatentable. Further, Patent Owner has not persuaded us that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion not to institute review. Accordingly, we institute a post-grant review of all claims and all grounds asserted in the Petition.1” slip op. at 2
- Skill levelSkill level patent owner adoptedOther
“On this record, we do not find Patent Owner’s proposed experience level of at least five years in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction to be supported. As to the necessity of experience in textile engineering and fiber science, Patent Owner’s position, although not supported by declarant analysis of the factors listed above, is consistent with the disclosure of the ’854 patent, which describes features of a mesh layer in textile and fiber terms. See e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:17–11:14, 12:65–13:8, 14:20–24. On the whole, however, we do not discern on this record how specific experience in textile engineering and fiber science of a person of ordinary skill would materially alter the outcome at this stage of the proceeding. For purposes of this decision only, we apply Patent Owner’s proposed definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art, except for the requirement of five years of experience in measurement and analysis of coefficient of friction. The level of skill in the art remains an open issue in this proceeding. Further submissions by the parties may include argument and evidence that would assist in the resolution of this issue at the close of trial.” slip op. at 8
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededNot reached
“Petitioner contends “no formal claim construction is necessary in this proceeding.” Pet. 10; Reply 1, 4. Patent Owner contends the terms “mesh layer” and “coefficient of friction” require construction. Prelim. Resp. 14–16; Sur-reply 2–5. We have considered the parties’ arguments and discuss them below with regard to each of the terms Patent Owner contends should be construed. Because our determination that Petitioner demonstrates at least one challenged claim meets the threshold for institution (see SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1359–60) is not based on construing the term “mesh layer” or “coefficient of friction,” we determine we need not construe either claim term at this stage of the proceeding. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”)). As further discussed below, we invite the parties to address claim construction at trial.” slip op. at 9
- Claim Construction › Intrinsic evidence (Phillips canons) › Specification disavowal / 'present invention' languageDisclaimer not foundDecided for petitioner
“We agree with Petitioner that the ’854 patent specification does not include clear and explicit lexicography or a disclaimer that would support requiring “coefficient of friction” to be determined by a specific ASTM test method. The portion of the specification Patent Owner asserts as a definition of “coefficient of friction” (see Ex. 1001, 11:31–42) is a description of an embodiment; we find it does not express patentee intent to redefine the term. Further, the statement that “the coefficient of friction … may be determined using the … ASTM D1894 standard test method” (id. at 11:32–35) indicates that use of that specific test method is optional. Accordingly, in the absence of patentee lexicography or disavowal, we do not limit the scope of the term “coefficient of friction” to require that it be measured by a specific ASTM standard. Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Absent lexicography or disavowal, we do not depart from the plain meaning of the claims.”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). We note that the ’854 patent specification sets forth a definition for the coefficient of friction between the surfaces of the mesh material and the slide surface. Ex. 1001, 4:38–46. As stated above, however, we do not expressly construe any claim term at this stage of the proceeding. Should the parties address the construction of “coefficient of friction” at trial, we will make a determination after the close of evidence and any hearing.” slip op. at 13
Claim construction§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,998,854 - MPL Brands NV, Inc. v. Buzzballz, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Jan 27, 2025 · IPR2024-01098 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR on all challenged claims 1–6 based on all asserted grounds, finding a reasonable likelihood that Kick anticipates or renders them obvious.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314, which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted “unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” After considering the briefing and cited evidence of record in view of this standard, we institute an inter partes review. The following preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law are made solely to determine whether to institute review. Any final decision will be based on the full trial record.” slip op. at 2
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“challenged claims 1, 2, and 6 lack adequate written description support in the ’934 application as filed. See Pet. 10–11. The specification, figures, and claims as originally filed do not disclose any volume limitations. See Ex. 1004 (’934 prosecution history), 1–17. Instead, the volume limitations recited in the challenged claims find their first support in Figure 7, which was filed over one month after the ’934 application was originally filed. Compare id. at 1–17, with id. at 34–56. The addition of new matter during prosecution of a patent application is prohibited. See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (“No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention.”); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.121(f); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 608.04. Therefore, we agree with Petitioner that “the new matter improperly added during the prosecution of the ’934 application cannot be considered part of the disclosure of the original, April 19, 2010 application and/or relied upon for claiming priority in subsequent applications.” Pet. 9.” slip op. at 21
- Novelty / Anticipation (§102) › Priority / effective filing date / continuation supportPriority date, deniedDecided for petitioner
“prosecution history), 34. We agree with Petitioner that “any claims in the subsequent applications that recite the new matter [are] entitled to, at the earliest, a priority date of February 25, 2020—the filing date of the ’195 application.” Pet. 10. As discussed above, challenged claims 1, 2, and 6 recite volume limitations that first find adequate support in Figure 7 of the ’195 application. Accordingly, on this record (and after consideration of Patent Owner’s arguments, discussed below), we determine that the priority date of the challenged claims is no earlier than the February 25, 2020, filing date of the ’195 application. Id. at 10–11. We agree with Petitioner that “Kick is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) with respect to the claims of the ’904 patent because it was published more than one year before the February 25, 2020, priority date of the challenged claims.” Pet. 16.” slip op. at 22
- Obviousness (§103) › Motivation to combine / reasonable expectation of successNot reached
“On this record, we find that the issues the parties raise regarding limitation [1z] are highly fact-intensive and implicate genuine issues of material fact that are more appropriately resolved on a fully-developed record. Accordingly, on this record we reserve judgment on these arguments, to allow the record to develop during trial.” slip op. at 30
§ 102 anticipation§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosurecites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,738,904 - MPL Brands NV, Inc. v. Buzzballz, LLCInstitutedPTAB · Dec 18, 2024 · PGR2024-00035 · APJ Cynthia M Hardman · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted PGR on all asserted grounds after finding the patent eligible for PGR and each challenged claim more likely than not unpatentable under at least one obviousness ground.
RulingsInstitution decision- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the art appears to be consistent with the cited prior art and is undisputed on this record. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that the prior art itself may reflect an appropriate skill level). However, we find some ambiguity in the last sentence of Petitioner’s proposal (“A POSITA could substitute additional education for industry experience and vice versa.”) because the reference to “additional education” is not tethered to relevant education. Accordingly, we modify the last sentence of Petitioner’s proposal to clarify that the additional education must be relevant. Thus, we restate that for purposes of this Decision, a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’441 patent would have had: (i) an associate’s or bachelor’s degree in mechanical, industrial or manufacturing engineering and (ii) at least two to three years of practical experience with designing or manufacturing mechanical products such as food or beverage packaging. A POSITA could substitute additional relevant education for practical experience and vice versa. B. Post-Grant Review Eligibility As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Petitioner has” slip op. at 11
- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Written description adequateDecided for patent owner
“In view of the evidence discussed above, we agree with Patent Owner that there is adequate written description support for a transparent container body such that a depression in the container base is “visible through at least a portion of the container body,” as recited in claims 9, 10, 15, and 16. Prelim. Resp. 9. Regarding Petitioner’s assertion that the ’441 patent does not disclose “a transparent/translucent liquid” (Pet. 7), we again disagree. As Patent Owner points out, “the ’441 Patent mentions beverages, such as ‘beer and soda,’ as liquids for which the claimed container would be suitable.” Prelim. Resp. 10 (quoting Ex. 1001, 1:25–27). Patent Owner demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have recognized that beer is typically see-through, or translucent.” Id. (citing Ex. 2012 (Till) ¶ 24 (discussing an inspection apparatus for bottles that “are filled with a transparent liquid (e.g. beer, table water, mineral water, wine etc.)”); Ex. 2013 (Schnuckle) ¶ 8 (noting “translucent to transparent liquids such as water, soda, juice, or the like”)). We agree with Patent Owner that the ’441 patent’s identification of “beer and soda as beverages the described and claimed container was intended to hold” provides adequate written description support “for having transparent or translucent liquids within the container.”12 Prelim. Resp. 10. For the reasons discussed above, on this record Petitioner has not demonstrated that claims 9, 10, 15, and 16 include subject matter having a November 10, 2023, priority date. Thus, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the ’441 patent is eligible for post-grant review under AIA § 3(n)(1)(A).” slip op. at 15
- Expert testimonyPatent owner expert discountedDecided for petitioner
“Patent Owner’s arguments are unavailing. As an initial matter, Mr. Kirkpatrick is opining about a design patent application, and Patent Owner has not established that Mr. Kirkpatrick possesses the education and experience of a designer of ordinary skill in the art of ornamental aspects of containers for storing liquids or solids. See Ex. 2001 ¶ 5 (implying that Mr. Kirkpatrick is a generalist whose experience with design patents is in preparing formal drawings of designs invented by others).17 For this reason alone, on this record we accord Mr. Kirkpatrick’s declaration little weight on the question of whether the ’195 parent application provides adequate written description support for originally-filed Figure 2 of the ’813 design application. See, e.g., Kyocera Senco Indus. Tools Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 22 F.4th 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“To offer expert testimony from the perspective of a skilled artisan in a patent case . . . a witness must at least have ordinary skill in the art. Without that skill, the witness’ opinions are neither relevant nor reliable.”). Even if Mr. Kirkpatrick’s opinions were relevant, they would not change our conclusion regarding lack of adequate written description. Mr. Kirkpatrick attributes the differences between the drawings to “choices in drafting strategy of the respective illustrators,” such as how to use “contour lines to illustrate sloped surfaces” and how much detail to include for well-known features like pop-tops. See Ex. 2001 (Kirkpatrick Decl.) ¶¶ 19, 23–24, 28–32.18 These arguments are unavailing. First, there is no evidence of record indicating that the figures in the ’195 parent application and ’813 design application were created by different illustrators. Second, 17 Patent Owner also has not established that Mr. Kirkpatrick possesses the education and experience of a person of ordinary skill in the art of the ’441 patent, as we have defined it here. Supra Section II.A. 18 Mr. Kirkpatrick’s analysis of a photograph of a can submitted by the applicant during prosecution (see Ex. 2001 (Kirkpatrick Decl.) ¶¶ 25–32) is additionally unavailing because there is no evidence of record indicating that the patent illustrator(s) used this particular photograph or the depicted can to create the patent illustrations. we agree with Petitioner that even if different illustrators employ different drafting strategies, this “does not absolve Patent Owner’s responsibility not to add new matter.” Prelim. Reply 6.” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“Because the ’441 patent is eligible for post-grant review, we turn to an analysis of whether the Petition demonstrates “that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). C. Petitioner’s Grounds of Alleged Unpatentability As noted above in Section I.E, Petitioner asserts four different obviousness grounds. At this stage of the proceeding, Patent Owner does not address the merits of Petitioner’s obviousness grounds. See generally Prelim. Resp. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the challenged claims are unpatentable based on the asserted grounds.” slip op. at 34
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,932,441 - PTAB · Jun 20, 2023 · PGR2023-00008 · APJ Kristina M Kalan · PGR · Institution
The Board instituted post-grant review of claims 1–13 on all petitioned grounds, finding it more likely than not that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“To institute post-grant review, we must determine that the information presented in the Petition, “if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). For the reasons discussed below, after considering the parties’ submissions and the evidence of record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that at least one of the challenged claims of the ’624 patent is unpatentable. Thus, we institute post-grant review.” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsInstitution denied 325dDenied
“evaluated the subject matter of Riis during examination of the ’624 patent, we agree that Riis was before the Office, as discussed in connection with our analysis of the first part of the Advanced Bionics framework, above. Examiner T presumably was aware of Riis by virtue of having initialed an IDS containing Riis in the ’624 patent’s application and also by virtue of having initialed an IDS containing Riis in the ’067 Application, but Examiner T did not apply Riis in connection with the examination of the ’624 patent. On this record, Patent Owner also fails to show that the claims of the child application leading to the ’624 patent are substantially similar to those of the parent ’814 patent in which Examiner S considered Riis, and, thus, consideration of Riis during the prosecution of the ’814 patent does not equate to consideration of Riis during the prosecution of the ’624 patent. Regarding Patent Owner’s argument (2) that Petitioner fails to sufficiently show how the Examiner erred in evaluating the prior art, we find Petitioner’s arguments demonstrate that Examiner T, the examiner of the ’624 patent, did not apply Riis (or Wypych or Tatarka) during the examination of the’624 patent. As Petitioner argues, the error lies in that “the Examiner failed to consider the relevance of Riis as it applied to the pending method claims,” because although “Riis was considered during examination of the parent ’999 application, Riis was not similarly considered during examination of the ’018 application which led to the ’624 patent.” Pet. 76–77. We determine that the circumstances here demonstrate that the Examiner erred in evaluating the prior art.” slip op. at 12
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Real party in interest / privityNot reached
“35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(2) to deny institution, arguing that the Petition fails to identify every RPI. Prelim. Resp. 10–11, 56–60. Patent Owner argues that the Petition “should also have identified its parent corporation, Huhtamäki Oyj . . . as well as the related corporation Huhtamaki, Inc. . . . as RPIs to comply with the statutory requirements for a PGR.” Id. at 10. On this record, we determine that we need not address whether Huhtamäki Oyj and Huhtamaki, Inc. are unnamed RPIs because, even if they were, it would not create a time bar or estoppel under 35 U.S.C. § 325. See SharkNinja Operating LLC v. iRobot Corp., IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 (PTAB Oct. 6, 2020) (precedential); Lumentum Holdings, Inc. v. Capella Photonics, Inc., IPR2015-00739, Paper 38 at 6 (PTAB Mar. 4, 2016) (precedential) (Board’s jurisdiction to consider a petition does not require a “correct” identification of all RPIs in a petition); see also Blue Coat Sys., Inc. v. Finjan, Inc., IPR2016-01444, Paper 11 at 10 (PTAB July 18, 2017) (“evidence [of failure to identify all RPIs] is, at best, suggestive regarding an issue that is not jurisdictional”); Mayne Pharma Int’l Pty. Ltd. v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 927 F.3d 1232, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[I]f a petition fails to identify all real parties in interest . . . the Director can, and does, allow the petitioner to add a real party in interest.” (quoting Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc))). Here, notwithstanding the arguments devoted to the RPI issue in the Preliminary Response, Preliminary Reply, and Preliminary Sur-Reply, we are not persuaded that Petitioner is barred or estopped from this proceeding, or that Petitioner purposefully omitted Huhtamäki Oyj or Huhtamaki, Inc. to gain some advantage. As Petitioner argues, the “RPI analysis is not necessary at institution, because Patent Owner has not alleged Petitioner would be time barred or otherwise estopped based on unnamed RPIs.” Prelim. Reply 5 (quoting SharkNinja, IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 at 18). As SharkNinja states, certain Board decisions go through extensive analysis to determine whether parties should have been named as RPIs, whereas other Board decisions determine that “such a lengthy exercise is unnecessary for the purposes of rendering a decision on institution of trial.” SharkNinja, IPR2020-00734, Paper 11 at 19. Here, as in SharkNinja, we find the latter approach better serves the interest of cost and efficiency. Thus, at this time and on this record, we will not consider whether Huhtamäki Oyj or Huhtamaki, Inc. must be named as RPIs.” slip op. at 15
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“of the invention “would have had a relevant technical degree in Chemical Engineering, Polymer Science, Materials Science, or the like, and 2–3 years of experience in laminate or film manufacture or similar packaging manufacture and that less experience may be necessary with additional education and vice versa.” Pet. 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 66–72). In its 4 Neither Patent Owner nor Petitioner appear to present any evidence directed to secondary considerations. See generally Pet.; Prelim. Resp.; Prelim. Reply; Prelim. Sur-Reply. Preliminary Response, Patent Owner does not contest Petitioner’s asserted level of ordinary skill in the art. See generally Prelim. Resp. We adopt Petitioner’s definition, which is consistent with the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention as reflected by the prior art and the ’624 patent. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).” slip op. at 17
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · Graham · NautilusPatents in suitUS 11,260,624 - Nespresso USA, Inc. v. K-Fee System GMHBInstitutedPTAB · Apr 14, 2023 · IPR2022-01574 · APJ James J Mayberry · IPR · Institution
The Board instituted IPR of claims 1–13, finding a reasonable likelihood that claim 1 is obvious over Yoakim, Jarisch ’929, and Rossi.
RulingsInstitution decision- Disclosure Requirements (§112) › Written description (Ariad)Not entitled to earlier dateDecided for petitioner
“earlier filed application only if the disclosure of the earlier application provides [written description] support for the claims of the later application, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A] patent’s claims are not entitled to an earlier priority date merely because the patentee claims priority. Rather, for a patent’s claims to be entitled to an earlier priority date, the patentee must demonstrate that the claims meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 120.” (citations omitted)). The written-description inquiry is a question of fact, is context-specific, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Ariad banc). The test for sufficiency of support is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon “reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter.” Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “One shows that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention by describing the invention, with all its claimed limitations . . . .” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We determine that Patent Owner has not demonstrated, at this stage of the proceeding, that the Challenged Claims are entitled to claim priority to the second German application, and, as such, Jarisch ’929 is prior art on the current record. We determine that Patent Owner has not sufficiently demonstrated that the second German application provides written description support for at least the identifier as recited in independent claims 1, 7, and 10. We determine, at this stage of the proceeding and on the current record, that the embodiment of Figures 16, 17, and 18 does not show an identifier with a repeat pattern on the bottom side of the flange as required by the claims. The disclosure of the second German application explains that the means 2.4.2 is a toothed ring, with the teeth formed in the outer circumference of the flange, not on the bottom of the flange. See, e.g., Ex. 1047, 41:17–27 (explaining that the annular peripheral region 2.4 has “in its outer region” means 2.4.2 (emphasis added)); id., Fig. 18 (showing that the outer edge of the flange interacts with pinion 24).” slip op. at 23
- Skill levelSkill level petitioner adoptedDecided for petitioner
“B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art The level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens” through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “This reference point prevents . . . factfinders from using their own insight or, worse yet, hindsight, to gauge obviousness.” Id. Factors pertinent to a determination of the level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) educational level of the inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the technology; and (6) educational level of workers active in the field. Env’t Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–97 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Not all such factors may be present in every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a particular case. Id. Moreover, these factors are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In determining a level of ordinary skill, we also may look to the prior art, which may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.” slip op. at 14
- Claim Construction › Threshold & procedure › Whether a term needs construction (O2 Micro)No construction neededOther
“C. Claim Construction We construe each claim “using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. [§] 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as would have been understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention and in the context of the entire patent disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“We have frequently stated that the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)).” slip op. at 16
- Obviousness (§103) › Analogous artAnalogous artDecided for petitioner
“Yoakim, Jarisch ’929, and Rossi to arrive at the subject matter of the claims challenged in Ground 1. As an initial matter, Petitioner contends that Yoakim, Jarisch ’929, and Rossi are “analogous art in the field of portion 10 The U.S. patent statute precludes the type of multiple dependent claims appearing in the second German application. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(e) (2011) (“A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference, in the alternative only, to more than one claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a basis for any other multiple dependent claim.”). applied in automatic coffee/expresso machines.” Pet. 44 (referencing Ex. 1004 ¶¶ 2–3; Ex. 1006 ¶¶ 1–2; Ex. 1041, 1; Ex. 1003 ¶ 188); cf. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“References within the statutory terms of 35 U.S.C. § 102 qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination only when analogous to the claimed invention.”). Patent Owner does not dispute this contention.” slip op. at 27
Claim construction§ 103 obviousness§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites Phillips · KSR · GrahamPatents in suitUS 11,254,491 - PTAB · Jan 6, 2022 · PGR2021-00097 · APJ Eric C Jeschke · PGR · Institution
Instituted PGR on claims 1, 2, and 8–10 on all asserted grounds because at least one claim was more likely than not unpatentable.
RulingsInstitution decision- PTAB / AIA Trials › Institution threshold (reasonable likelihood / more likely than not)InstitutedInstituted
“review. See 35 U.S.C. § 324 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2021) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf of the Director.”). Section 324(a) of Title 35 of the United States Code provides that a post-grant review may not be instituted “unless . . . the information presented in the petition . . . , if such information is not rebutted, would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Upon consideration of the evidence and arguments in the Petition (including its supporting testimonial evidence) as well as the evidence and arguments in the Preliminary Response (including its supporting testimonial evidence), for the reasons below, we determine that the information presented shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. We thus institute a post-grant review on all challenged claims on all asserted grounds. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354, 1359–60 (2018); 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(a) (“When instituting post-grant review, the Board will” slip op. at 2
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › Fintiv (parallel litigation)Denied
“aware of the claims being asserted, this fact has weighed against exercising the authority to deny institution under NHK.”). For these reasons, we determine that the third Fintiv factor weighs against exercising discretion to deny institution.” slip op. at 19
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › §325(d) same art / argumentsDenied
“4. Conclusion For the reasons above, we find that the same or substantially the same art or arguments were presented to the Office, but we find that Petitioner has shown that the examiner materially erred by overlooking specific teachings in the SafeJet System, as currently presented, that impact the patentability of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny institution under § 325(d).” slip op. at 28
- PTAB / AIA Trials › Discretionary denial › General Plastic (serial petitions)Denied
“Prelim. Reply 1 (“Patent Owner does not point to a single PTAB case suggesting that such ties suffice under General Plastic Factor 1 to transform unrelated petitioners into related ones.”). In fact, at least one recent nonprecedential decision highlighted by Petitioner expressly rejected that proposition. See NetNet Ltd. v. Bright Data Ltd., IPR2021-00465, Paper 11 at 10–11 (PTAB Aug. 12, 2021) (“In any event, a party is free to choose their own legal representation and expert, and, accordingly, we decline to consider a party’s choice of a law firm and expert as a factor that favors discretionary denial.”).” slip op. at 32
Claim construction§ 112 disclosureDiscretionary denialcites PhillipsPatents in suitUS 10,844,697
Holdings, summaries, rulings, issues, outcomes, winners and claim constructions shown for a decision were generated by a large language model reading the opinion. They are a guide to the decision, not the decision. Confirm every one against the court's own text before relying on it. Outcomes read from the patent owner’s side. Party names are extracted from the decision and are missing on about 900 short Director denials and scans, which carry the trial number instead.